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JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


JAPAN'S  PACIFIC  POLICY 

ESPECIALLY  IN  RELATION  TO 
CHINA,  THE  FAR  EAST,  AND 
THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE 


BY 

K.  K.  KAWAKAMI 

if 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE  REAL  JAPANESE  QUESTION," 
"JAPAN  AND  WORLD  PEACE,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
E.    P.    DUTTON   &   COMPANY 

681    FIFTH    AVENUE 


Copyright,  1922, 
By  E.  P.  Button  &  Company 


All  Rights  Reserved 


v 


> 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED 
STATES   OF    AMERICA 


PREFACE 

JAPAN  has  gone  home  from  the  Washington  Con- 
ference on  probation.  Although  she  made  a  fairly 
good  impression  at  the  Conference,  that  impression 
is,  as  I  see  it,  neither  profound  nor  durable.  What 
America  and  Europe  will  really  think  of  her  will 
depend  upon  what  she  does  in  China  and  Siberia  in  the 
coming  few  years. 

If  Japan  withdraws  her  troops  from  Siberia  without 
delay — if  she  conforms  to  the  spirit  of  the  policy 
adopted  by  the  Conference  with  regard  to  China — if 
she  proves  herself  more  far-sighted  and  generous  in 
dealing  with  her  neighbors,  the  good  impression  she 
has  made  at  Washington  will  not  only  endure  but  will 
grow  better.  Let  her,  in  addition,  reduce  her  army 
and  curb  the  power  of  her  militarists  without  awaiting 
an  international  agreement  on  land  armament,  and  the 
world's  estimate  of  her  statesmanship  and  good  sense 
will  become  immeasurably  higher.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  Japan  clings  to  old  ideas  and  practices  in  dealing 
with  Siberia  and  China,  what  success  she  has  achieved 
at  Washington  will  be  immediately  set  at  naught. 

In  saying  this,  I  am  advancing  no  opinion  that  Japan 
is  the  sole,  or  even  chief,  sinner  among  the  Powers. 
So  far  from  it,  I  am  prepared  to  assert  that  her  diplo- 
matic history  is  bright  enough  when  compared  with 
the  dark  leaves  recording  the  international  dealings  of 
some  Western  Powers.  Indeed,  Japan  could  have 
made  herself  an  enfant  terrible  at  the  Washington 


vi  PREFACE 

Conference,  had  the  Occidental  Powers  shown  pro- 
clivities to  make  sport  of  her  foreign  policy  and  at- 
tempted to  pursue  her  relentlessly  in  Siberia  or  China. 
Would  it  not  have  been  somewhat  embarrassing  to  the 
United  States,  had  Japan  proposed,  for  instance,  that 
an  international  conference  be  convened  at  Tokyo  to 
discuss  Near  Western  and  Caribbean  Problems,  the 
agenda  of  which  might  include  such  matters  as  foreign 
troops  in  Haiti  and  Porto  Rico,  the  territorial  and 
administrative  integrity  of  the  West  Indies,  and  the 
open  door  and  equal  opportunity  in  Mexico?  As  for 
the  European  Powers,  their  books  of  diplomacy  are 
replete  with  stories  in  the  face  of  which  Japan's  acts 
on  the  Asian  continent  need  no  apology. 

And  what  of  China?  It  may  be  safely  said  that  the 
Washington  Conference  has  definitely  put  an  end  to 
an  age  of  international  freebooting  in  that  country,  and 
that  she  need  no  longer  be  haunted  with  fear  of  dis- 
memberment. Nevertheless,  she  faces  a  new  danger— 
the  danger  of  an  international  concert  for  the  super- 
vision of  her  administration  and  finances.  Some  of  the 
utterances  made  and  the  resolutions  adopted  at  the 
Conference  furnish  an  unmistakable  warning,  which 
China  must  heed  if  she  is  to  avoid  the  approaching 
danger.  In  the  chapters  on  China,  I  have  tried  to 
describe  some  of  the  grave  internal  problems  which 
she  must,  in  justice  to  herself  as  well  as  to  the  Powers, 
make  honest  efforts  to  solve.  I  have  pointed  out  that 
the  real  menace  to  China  lies  within  rather  than 
without. 

Many  of  the  following  chapters  were  originally 
written  for  the  New  York  Herald  Syndicate,  while 
some  were  published  in  the  Baltimore  Sun.  Acknowl- 
edgment is  due  to  the  publishers  and  editors  of  the 
Herald  and  of  the  Sun  for  permission  to  use  them  in 


PREFACE  vii 

this  book.  Of  course,  those  articles  have  been  thor- 
oughly revised,  and  in  some  cases  almost  rewritten,  so 
as  not  only  to  bring  them  up  to  date,  but  also  to  make 
them  suitable  to  the  scope  and  nature  of  the  present 
volume. 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  acknowledge  my 
indebtedness  to  Mr.  D.  S.  Richardson,  loyal  friend  and 
honest  critic,  who  has  read  the  manuscript  and  criti- 
cised it  from  what  I  believe  to  be  the  real  American 
point  of  view. 

K.  K.  KAWAKAMI. 
New  York,  April,  1922. 


CONTENTS 

PART   I.    NAVAL  ARMAMENT 


I.  A  GREAT  BEGINNING  ......  3 

II.  JAPAN  DELAYS  DECISION  .....  11 

III.  A  GRAIN  OF  COMMON  SENSE  ....  17 

IV.  JAPAN  GIVES  UP  THE  RATIO  FIGHT  .     .  24 
V.  HUGHES  AGREES     .......  28 

VI.  THE  "FORTIFICATIONS  FOR  PEACE"  .     .  35 

PART    II.    THE    PACIFIC   TREATY 

VII.  THE  PARTING  OF  THE  WAYS  ....  43 

VIII.  A  NEW  ALIGNMENT     ......  47 

IX.  BRITAIN  THINKS    .......  51 

X.  JAPAN  DECIDES       .......  56 

XI.  THE  NEW  TREATY      ......  59 

XII.  THE  AFTERMATH   .......  66 

PART   III.    THE    RIDDLE   OF   CHINA 

XIII.  CHINA'S  "BILL  OF  RIGHTS"    ....  73 

XIV.  CHINA  AT  HOME  AND  AT  WASHINGTON  81 
XV.  CHINA'S  CHAOTIC  FINANCES  ....  85 

XVI.  THE  TARIFF  AND  Llkin     .....  91 

XVII.  THE  STIGMA  OF  EXTRATERRITORIALITY  .  97 
*     ix 


x  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  'AGE 

XVIII.  CHINA  DIVIDED 103 

XIX.  JAPAN'S  ATTITUDE 107 

XX.  Quo  VADIS 114 

XXI.  SOLVING  THE  RIDDLE 119 

PART   IV.    THE    NEW   OPEN    DOOR 

XXII.  THE  SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE     .     .     .  131 

XXIII.  THE  HAY  DOCTRINE 138 

XXIV.  THE  HUGHES-ROOT  DOCTRINE     ...  145 
XXV.  JAPAN'S  "SPECIAL  INTERESTS"      .     .     .  156 

XXVI.  JAPAN  IN  MANCHURIA 166 

XXVII.  THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS      .     .     .  174 

PART    V.    THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE 

XXVIII.  SHANTUNG  COMES  TO  WASHINGTON  .  191 

XXIX.  CHINA  MEETS  JAPAN 196 

XXX.  THE  RAILROAD  BLOCKS  THE  WAY  .  .  200 

XXXI.  WHO  MANAGE  RAILWAYS  FOR  CHINA?  .  204 

XXXII.  SETTLED  AT  LAST! .216 

PART  VI.    JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN   VENTURE 

XXXIII.  "LET  HER  BUY  SIBERIA!"      ....  225 

XXXIV.  CHITA  "ARRIVES" 234 

XXXV.  SHIDEHARA  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE  .     .  242 

XXXVI.  JAPAN'S  DISCORD  WITH  AMERICA  .     .     .  249 

XXXVII.  THE  IRONY  OF  FATE 257 

XXXVIII.  AN  INTERNATIONAL  TRUSTEE     .      .  263 


CONTENTS  xi 

APPENDICES 

PACK 

I.    AGENDA  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 273 

II.    SHANTUNG 

A.  Articles  in  the  Versailles  Treaty  Transfer- 
ring to  Japan  German  Rights  in  Shantung    274 

B.  Japanese  Memorandum  to  China  Concerning 
Shantung,  September  7,   1921      ....     275 

C.  Treaty   for   the   Settlement   of   Outstanding 
Questions  Relative  to   Shantung,   Signed   at 
Washington,  February  3,   1922   ....     277 

D.  Understanding  Recorded  in  the  Minutes  of 
Chino-Japanese  Conversations      ....     287 

III.  THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

A.  Baron  Shidehara's  Statement  before  the  Far 
Eastern  Committee,  February  2,  1922     .      .     290 

B.  Mr.  Wang's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  February  3,   1922     ....     293 

C.  Mr.    Hughes'    Statement    before    the    Far 
Eastern  Committee,  February  3,  1922  .      .     296 

IV.  THE  OPEN  DOOR 

A.  Root  Resolution  Adopted  by  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  November  21,  1921  ....     300 

B.  Hughes  Resolution  for  Enforcing  the  Open 
Door,  Adopted  by  the  Far  Eastern  Commit- 
tee, January   18,   1922 300 

C.  Root  Resolution  Preventing  the  Creation  of 
Spheres  of   Influence,   Adopted  by   the   Far 
Eastern  Committee,  January  21,   1922  .      .301 

D.  Geddes  Resolution  Against  Rate  Discrimina- 
tion on  Chinese  Railways,  Adopted  by  the 

Far  Eastern  Committee,  November  10,  1921     302 

E.  The  Open  Door  Treaty  Based  upon  the  Fore- 
going Four  Resolutions,  Signed  February  6, 
1922 302 


xii  CONTENTS 

PACK 

F.  Resolution  Adopted  on  February  4,  1922,  and 
Attached  to  the  Above  Treaty,  Relative  to  a 
Board  of  Reference  in  China 306 

G.  Hughes  Resolution  for  Listing  China's  Com- 
mitments, Adopted  by  the  Conference,  Febru- 
ary 1,  1922 306 

H.  Baron  Shidehara's  Statement  before  the  Far 

Eastern  Committee,  January  14,  1922  .  .  308 

I.  Mr.  Sze's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 

Committee,  February  2,  1922  ....  309 

V.    THE  CUSTOMS  TARIFF  OF  CHINA 

A.  Mr.  Koo's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  November  23,  1921,  as  Summar- 
ized in  the  Official  Communique  .      .      .      .      311 

B.  Nine-Power  Treaty,  Signed  February  6,  1922     313 
VI.    EXTRATERRITORIALITY  IN  CHINA 

A.  Mr.  Wang's  Statement  before  the  Far  East- 
ern Committee,  November  25,  1921  .      .      .     318 

B.  Resolution  Adopted  by  the  Conference,  De- 
cember  10,   1921 321 

VII.    LEASED  TERRITORIES  IN  CHINA 

A.  Mr.  Koo's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  December  3,  1921,  as  Summar- 
ized in  the  Official  Communique       .      .      .     324 

B.  Mr.    Hanihara's    Statement   before   the   Far 
Eastern  Committee,  December  3,  1921  .      .     326 

C.  Mr.  Balfour's  Statement  before  the  Far  East- 
ern Committee,  December  3,  1921,  as  Sum- 
marized in  the  Official  Communique  .      .      .     327 

VIII.    FOREIGN  TROOPS  IN  CHINA 

A.  Mr.  Sze's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  November  28,  1921  ....     330 

B.  Mr.    Hanihara's   Statement  before   the   Far 
Eastern  Committee,  November  29,   1921      .     332 

C.  Resolution  Adopted  by  the  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 1,  1922 336 


CONTENTS  xiii 


IX.     FOREIGN  POST  OFFICES  IN  CHINA 

A.  Mr.  Sze's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  November  25,   1921        .      .  : 

B.  Resolution  Adopted  by  the  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 1,  1922 343 

C.  Japan's  Letter  Accepting  the  Above  Resolu- 
tion         344 


X.    FOREIGN  RADIO  STATIONS  IN  CHINA 

A.  Resolution  Adopted  by  the  Far  Eastern  Com- 
mittee, December  7,  1921,  and  by  the  Con- 
ference, February   1,    1922 345 

B.  Declaration    Concerning   the    Resolution    on 
Radio  Stations  in  China  of  December  7,  1921     346 

C.  Chinese  Declaration  on  the  Above  Resolution     347 


XL    TREATIES  ON   CHINA   CONCLUDED  WITHOUT 
HER  KNOWLEDGE 

A.  Mr.  Koo's  Statement  before  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee,  December  8,   1921,  as  Summar- 
ized in  the  Official  Communique       .      .      .      348 

B.  Mr.    Balfour's    Observations    at    the    Same 
Meeting 349 

C.  Mr.  Hughes'  Statement  at  the  Same  Meeting    350 

D.  Resolution  Adopted 351 

XII.     CHINESE  RAILWAYS 

A.  Hughes  Resolution  for  the  Unification  of  the 
Chinese  Railways,  Adopted  by  the  Confer- 
ence, February  1,  1922 352 

B.  Chinese   Delegation's   Statement  Concerning 
the  Hughes  Resolution  before  the  Far  East- 
ern Committee,  November  19,  1921  .      .      .     352 

C.  Resolutions  on  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  .      .     353 


xiv  CONTENTS 


XIII.  SIBERIA  PAGE 

A.  Baron  Shidehara's  Statement  before  the  Far 
Eastern  Committee,  January  23,  1922  .      .     354 

B.  Mr.  Hughes'  Statement  before  the  Far  East- 
ern Committee,  January  24,   1922   .      .      .     359 

XIV.  BARON    SHIDEHARA'S    STATEMENT,    DEFINING 
JAPAN'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  CHINA,  AT  THE 
FINAL  PLENARY  SESSION,  FEBRUARY  4,  1922  .     365 

XV.    THE  YAP  TREATY,  SIGNED  FEBRUARY  11,  1922    368 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


PART  I 
NAVAL  ARMAMENT 


JAPAN'S  PACIFIC  POLICY 

PART  I 
NAVAL  ARMAMENT 


CHAPTER  I 
A  GREAT  BEGINNING 

Washington,  November  12  1921:  A  great  begin- 
ning has  been  made  for  the  lasting  peace  of  the  world. 
Mr.  Hughes,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  at  the 
very  first  sitting  of  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of 
Armament  this  morning,  laid  down  a  concrete  plan  for 
the  reduction  of  naval  armament.  The  proposal  calls 
for  the  scrapping  of  thirty  ships  by  the  United  States, 
twenty-three  ships  by  Great  Britain,  and  seventeen  ships 
by  Japan. 

The  foreign  delegations,  before  entering  the  confer- 
ence hall,  had  expected  that  today's  session  would  be 
confined  to  the  exchange  of  diplomatic  formalities.  Few 
thought  that  any  business  would  be  transacted.  Cer- 
tainly none  anticipated  such  a  sweeping,  definite,  clear- 
cut  proposal  as  was  put  forth  by  Secretary  Hughes. 

Dramatic  is  too  prosaic  a  word  to  describe  the  scene 
of  the  Conference  this  morning.  As  Mr.  Hughes  un- 
folded his  naval  program,  the  whole  audience  seemed 
electrified.  Delegates  from  foreign  countries  fixed  their 


4  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

eyes  upon  the  Secretary  of  State  as  if  they  were  be- 
wildered by  his  audacity.  Spectators  in  the  galleries 
leaned  forward,  eager  to  catch  every  word  that  fell 
from  the  lips  of  the  speaker.  When  the  American 
spokesman  finished  his  introductory  remarks  and  en- 
tered upon  the  statement  of  a  practical  program,  he 
was  greeted  with  an  outburst  of  applause.  From  that 
time  until  the  close  of  his  address,  peals  of  applause 
alternated  with  a  scene  of  tense  attention  in  which  one 
could  hear  a  pin  drop. 

And  yet  the  speaker  himself  made  no  effort  for 
dramatic  effect.  His  statement  was  logical,  business- 
like, free  from  any  exhibition  of  oratory.  Was  this 
due  to  his  long  experience  as  a  lawyer,  or  because  he  is 
a  really  great  man  who  scorns  the  dramatic  and  refuses 
to  play  to  the  gallery? 

Unexpected  as  was  the  presentation  of  the  American 
naval  plan  at  the  first  session  of  the  Conference,  it  is 
not  after  all  surprising  that  America  should  take  this 
course,  because  unless  the  American  Government  took 
the  initiative  and  proved  its  sincerity  to  the  world,  the 
Conference  would  not  be  a  success. 

This  afternoon  I  interviewed  a  number  of  Japanese 
here,  both  official  and  non-official.  Some  of  the  naval 
men  said  that  they  were  not  astonished  by  the  degree  of 
naval  retrenchment  suggested  by  Mr.  Hughes,  for  they 
were  themselves  prepared  to  make  due  sacrifices.  As  a 
Japanese  well  versed  in  naval  affairs  said  to  me,  "The 
American  suggestion  goes  a  little  further  than  we  had 
expected,  but  the  discrepancy  between  it  and  our  idea, 
though  material,  is  not  very  great." 

Although  it  may  take  Admiral  Kato's  staff  of  experts 
a  week  or  ten  days  to  examine  the  American  proposal 
from  all  angles  and  arrive  at  a  definite  conclusion,  I  feel 
certain  that  the  Japanese  delegation  will  not  disappoint 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  5 

the  American  Government  or  people.  This  conclusion 
must  be  right  if  the  sympathetic  atmosphere  pervading 
the  Japanese  headquarters  here  does  not  deceive  us. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  Japanese  critics  are  in 
entire  accord  with  every  detail  of  the  American  pro- 
posal. If  one  looks  at  it  critically,  he  can  undoubtedly 
find  points  on  which  opinions  may  differ. 

In  the  first  place,  the  basis  of  estimation  for  the  ton- 
nage of  ships  to  be  scrapped  is  not  the  same  for  England 
and  Japan.  In  the  case  of  England  four  new  Hoods, 
which  are  not  yet  laid  down  and  for  which  only  some 
$2,500,000  has  been  appropriated,  are  included  in  the 
total  tonnage  which  the  Hughes  plan  calls  upon  En- 
gland to  scrap. 

In  the  case  of  Japan  two  battleships,  Owarl  and  Kii, 
upon  which  Japan  has  already  expended  $15,000,000, 
are  not  included  in  the  total  tonnage  to  be  scrapped.  If 
we  include  them,  as  in  the  case  of  England,  relative 
sacrifices  for  the  three  countries  will  be  approximately 
as  follows:  America,  845,740  tons;  England,  583,375 
tons;  Japan,  535,928  tons. 

Again,  the  naval  armament  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States  should  not  be  considered  independently  of  the 
fortifications  and  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific.  Suppose 
that  Japan  possessed  a  couple  of  islands  1300  knots 
from  the  Pacific  Coast  of  America,  established  mag- 
nificent naval  bases  there,  and  fortified  them  on  a  great 
scale.  Would  not  American  naval  experts  regard  them 
as  a  grave  menace,  and  build  or  maintain  ships  ac- 
cordingly ? 

No  naval  critic  can  ignore  the  fact  that  the  Philip- 
pines are  1318  knots  and  Guam  1360  knots  from 
Japan,  and  that  on  both  islands  America  has  splendid 
potential  naval  bases,  to  guard  which  magnificent  forti- 
fications are  to  be  erected. 


6  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

In  the  third  place  (and  this  is  most  important) ,  mod- 
ern war  is  a  war  of  resources  rather  than  of  soldiers 
and  guns.  A  nation  with  unlimited  resources,  both  in 
money  and  in  raw  materials,  may  scrap  half  a  million 
tons  of  warships  today,  and  embark  upon  a  gigantic 
building  scheme  tomorrow,  if  a  sudden  change  of  inter- 
national relations  requires  it. 

On  the  other  hand  a  nation,  financially  poor  and  des- 
titute of  raw  materials,  will  find  it  extremely  difficult, 
almost  impossible,  to  replenish  its  fleet  to  meet  unfore- 
seen situations  that  may  develop  after  it  had  scrapped 
many  of  its  ships.  And  Japan  is  exactly  in  that  con- 
dition. 

Let  us  consider  Japan's  iron  supply.  Her  output  of 
ores,  including  that  of  Korea,  amounts  to  only  some 
324,000  tons,  equivalent  to  about  160,000  tons  in  pig 
iron.  As  against  this  small  output  Japan  consumes 
something  like  1,300,000  tons  of  steel  and  pig  iron. 

The  late  War  demonstrated  the  great  danger  to 
Japan's  shipbuilding  industry  in  relying  upon  such  an 
inadequate  iron  supply.  Before  the  war  the  deficiency 
was  partly  supplied  by  steel  imported  from  England  and 
Belgium.  When  the  war  cut  off  this  source  of  supply 
Japan  turned  to  the  United  States  for  relief.  For  three 
years — from  the  fall  of  1914  and  to  the  summer  of 
1917 — Japan's  shipyards  and  iron  works  were  enabled 
to  work  almost  entirely  with  material  furnished  by  steel 
mills  in  America.  But  in  July,  1917,  the  United  States, 
too,  declared  an  embargo  upon  steel,  and  the  activities 
of  Japanese -shipyards  and  iron  works  came  suddenly  to 
a  halt.  At  that  moment  Japan  had  300,000  tons  of 
merchant  ships  in  course  of  construction  at  various 
yards.  The  American  embargo  virtually  stopped  work 
on  all  such  ships. 

That  experience  intensified  Japan's  national  desire, 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  7 

long  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  her  industrial  leaders, 
for  the  independence  of  her  steel  industry  from  foreign 
mills.  That  desire  soon  became  a  national  slogan.  And 
yet  how  is  Japan  to  translate  that  slogan  into  a  reality? 
She  has  but  scant  supply  of  ores  at  home.  What  she 
is  at  present  getting  from  China  and  Manchuria  is  far 
from  commensurate  with  her  needs.  Equally  deplor- 
able is  the  shortage  of  coking  coal,  without  which  the 
steel  industry  is  impossible.  Japan  produces  practically 
no  coal  that  is  suitable  for  coking  purposes.  China  is 
the  country  to  which  Japan  must  logically  turn  for  such 
materials.  Even  after  the  suspension  of  naval  building, 
Japan  must  needs  make  more  satisfactory  arrangements 
by  which  she  may  secure  iron  and  coal  in  increasing 
quantities  from  China,  for  she  will  and  must  devote 
greater  energies  to  the  upbuilding  of  her  merchant  ma- 
rine, her  industries,  and  foreign  trade  such  as  will  at 
least  alleviate  her  predicament  arising  out  of  over- 
population and  the  lack  of  land. 

THE   HUGHES    PROGRAM 

Quoted  from  Mr.  Hughes'  address  at  the  first  plenary  session 
of  the  Conference,  November  12,  1921. 

In  making  the  present  proposal  the  United  States 
is  most  solicitous  to  deal  with  the  question  upon  an 
entirely  reasonable  and  practicable  basis  to  the  end  that 
the  just  interests  of  all  shall  be  adequately  guarded,  and 
the  national  security  and  defense  shall  be  maintained. 
Four  general  principles  have  been  applied. 

1.  That  all  capital  shipbuilding  programs,   either 
actual  or  projected,  should  be  abandoned. 

2.  That  further  reduction  should  be  made  through 
the  scrapping  of  certain  of  the  older  ships. 

3. ^  That,  in  general,  regard  should  be  had  to  the 
existing  naval  strength  of  the  powers  concerned. 


8  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

4.  That  the  capital  ship  tonnage  should  be  used  as 
the  measurement  of  strength  for  navies,  and  a  pro- 
portionate allowance  of  auxiliary  combatant  craft  pre- 
scribed. 

The  principal  features  of  the  proposed  agreement 
are  as  follows: 

UNITED   STATES 

The  United  States  is  now  completing  its  program  of 
1916  calling  for  ten  new  battleships  and  six  battle 
cruisers.  One  battleship  has  been  completed.  The 
others  are  in  various  stages  of  construction;  in  some 
cases  from  60  to  over  80  per  cent  of  the  construction 
has  been  done.  On  these  fifteen  capital  ships  now 
being  built  over  $330,000,000  have  been  spent.  Still 
the  United  States  is  willing,  in  the  interests  of  an  imme- 
diate limitation  of  naval  armament,  to  scrap  all  these 
ships. 

The  United  States  proposes  if  this  plan  is  accepted: 

1.  To  scrap  all  capital  ships  now  under  construction. 
This  includes  six  battle  cruisers  and  seven  battleships 
on  the  ways  and  in  the  course  of  building,  and  two 
battleships  launched. 

The  total  number  of  new  capital  ships  thus  to  be 
scrapped  is  fifteen.  The  total  tonnage  of  the  new 
capital  ships  when  completed  would  be  618,000  tons. 

2.  To  scrap  all  of  the  older  battleships  up  to,  but 
not  including,  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota.     The 
number  of  these  old  battleships  to  be  scrapped  is  fifteen. 
Their  total  tonnage  is  227,740  tons. 

Thus  the  number  of  capital  ships  to  be  scrapped  by 
the  United  States,  if  this  plan  is  accepted,  is  thirty, 
with  an  aggregate  tonnage  (including  that  of  ships  in 
construction,  if  completed)  of  845,740  tons. 

GREAT    BRITAIN 

The  plan  contemplates  that  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
shall  take  action  which  is  fairly  commensurate  with  this 
action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  9 

It  is  proposed  that  Great  Britain: 

1.  Shall  stop  further  construction  of  the  four  new 
Hoods,  the  new  capital  ships  not  laid  down,  but  upon 
which  money  has  been  spent.     The  four  ships,  if  com- 
pleted, would  have  a  tonnage  displacement  of  172,000 
tons. 

2.  Shall,  in  addition,   scrap  her  pre-dreadnoughts, 
second  line  battleships  and  first  line  battleships  up  to 
but  not  including  the  King  George  V  class. 

These,  with  certain  pre-dreadnoughts  which  it  is  un- 
derstood have  already  been  scrapped^  would  amount  to 
nineteen  capital  ships  and  a  tonnage  reduction  of  411,- 
375  tons. 

The  total  tonnage  of  ships  thus  to  be  scrapped  by 
Great  Britain  (including  the  tonnage  of  the  four 
Hoods,  if  completed)  would  be  583,375  tons. 

JAPAN 

It  is  proposed  that  Japan : 

1.  Shall  abandon  her  program  of  ships  not  yet  laid 
down,  viz.,  the  Kit,  Owari,  No.  7  and  No.  8  battle- 
ships, and  Nos.  5,  6,  7  and  8,  battle  cruisers. 

It  should  be  observed  that  this  does  not  involve  the 
stopping  of  construction,  as  the  construction  of  none  of 
these  ships  has  been  begun. 

2.  Shall    scrap    three    capital    ships     (the    Mutsu, 
launched;  the  Tosa;  the  Kaga,  in  course  of  building), 
and  four  battle  cruisers    (the  A  magi  and  Akagi,   in 
course  of  building,  and  the  Atago  and  Takao,  not  yet 
laid  down,  but  for  which  certain  material  has  been 
assembled). 

The  total  number  of  new  capital  ships  to  be  scrapped 
under  this  paragraph  is  seven.  The  total  tonnage  of 
these  new  capital  ships  when  completed  would  be  289,- 
130  tons. 

3.  Shall  scrap  all  pre-dreadnoughts  and  battleships 
of  the  second  line.     This  would  include  the  scrapping 
of  all  ships  up  to,  but  not  including,  the  Setsu;  that  is, 


10  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

the  scrapping  of  ten  older  ships,  with  a  total  tonnage 
of  159,828  tons. 

The  total  reduction  of  tonnage  on  vessels  existing, 
laid  down  or  for  which  materials  have  been  assembled 
(taking  the  tonnage  of  the  new  ships  when  completed) 
would  be  448,928  tons. 

LIMIT    FOR   THREE   NAVIES 

Thus,  under  this  plan,  there  would  be  immediately 
destroyed,  of  the  navies  of  the  three  powers,  sixty-six 
capital  fighting  ships,  built  and  building,  with  a  total 
tonnage  of  1,878,043  tons. 

It  is  proposed  that  it  should  be  agreed  by  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  that  their  navies,  with 
respect  to  capital  ships,  within  three  months  after  the 
making  the  agreement,  shall  consist  of  certain  ships, 
designated  in  the  proposal,  and  numbering  for  the 
United  States  18,  for  Great  Britain  22,  for  Japan  10. 

The  tonnage  of  these  ships  would  be  as  follows:  Of 
the  United  States  500,650,  of  Great  Britain  604,450, 
of  Japan  299,700.  In  reaching  this  result  the  age 
factor  in  the  case  of  the  respective  navies  has  received 
appropriate  consideration. 


CHAPTER   II 
JAPAN   DELAYS   DECISION 

Washington,  November  24,  1921:  Each  succeeding 
day  dawns  with  the  conviction  growing  among  the 
Japanese  delegates  that  the  Conference  is  going  to  ac- 
complish results  in  a  comparatively  short  time.  They 
have  come  prepared  for  a  protracted  session.  Some  of 
them  thought  they  might  have  to  stay  here  through  the 
spring.  Now  they  think  the  main  business  of  the  Confer- 
ence will  be  finished  within  the  year,  and  that  they  may 
be  starting  for  home  in  the  latter  part  of  January.  They 
are  also  confident  that  they  will  leave  Washington  in 
the  friendliest  feeling  towards  the  American  Govern- 
ment and  people. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  the  Conference,  the  Japa- 
nese delegates  have  been  deeply  impressed  with  the 
systematic,  businesslike,  and  withal  straightforward 
manner  in  which  Mr.  Hughes  has  been  conducting  the 
meetings.  They  are  absolutely  convinced  of  the  sin- 
cerity and  earnestness  of  the  American  delegates  and 
are  glad  to  deal  with  them  in  like  spirit. 

And  yet  the  Japanese  delegation  has  allowed  two 
weeks  to  pass  without  arriving  at  any  decision  on  the 
Hughes  proposal.  The  public  is  beginning  to  fret  and 
look  at  Japan  with  a  question  mark.  What  did  Admiral 
Baron  Kato,  the  chief  delegate  of  Japan,  mean  when 
he  said  he  would  accept  the  Hughes  program  in  prin- 
ciple? The  Admiral,  at  the  session  of  November  14, 
made  this  statement  endorsing  the  American  proposal: 

"Japan  deeply  appreciates  the  sincerity  of  purpose 

11 


12  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

evident  in  the  plan  of  the  American  Government  for  the 
limitation  of  armaments.  She  is  satisfied  that  the  pro- 
posed plan  will  materially  relieve  the  nations  of  waste- 
ful expenditures  and  cannot  fail  to  make  for  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

"She  cannot  remain  unmoved  by  the  high  aims  which 
have  actuated  the  American  project.  Gladly  accepting, 
therefore,  the  proposal  in  principle,  Japan  is  ready  to 
proceed  with  determination  to  a  sweeping  reduction  in 
her  naval  armament. 

"It  will  be  universally  admitted  that  a  nation  must 
be  provided  with  such  armaments  as  are  essential  to 
its  security.  This  requirement  must  be  fully  weighed 
in  the  examination  of  the  plan.  With  this  requirement 
in  view,  certain  modifications  will  be  proposed  with  re- 
gard to  the  tonnage  basis  for  replacement  of  the  various 
classes  of  vessels.  This  subject  should  be  referred  to 
special  consideration  by  naval  experts.  When  such 
modifications  are  proposed,  I  know  that  the  American 
and  other  delegations  will  consider  them  with  the  same 
desire  to  meet  our  ideas  as  we  have  to  meet  theirs. 

"Japan  has  never  claimed  or  had  any  intention  of 
claiming  to  have  a  naval  establishment  equal  in 
strength  to  that  of  either  the  United  States  or  the 
British  Empire.  Her  existing  plan  will  show  conclu- 
sively that  she  never  had  in  view  preparations  for  of- 
fensive war.n 

In  saying  that  he  accepted  the  Hughes  plan  in  prin- 
ciple, Baron  Kato  meant  that  he  endorsed  the  four 
fundamental  principles  laid  down  in  the  American  pro- 
gram, namely: 

1.  That   all  capital   shipbuilding  programs,   either 
actual  or  projected,  should  be  abandoned. 

2.  That  further  reduction  should  be  made  through 
the  scrapping  of  certain  of  the  older  ships. 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  13 

3.  That,  in  general,  regard  should  be  had  to  the 
existing  naval  strength  of  the  powers  concerned. 

4.  That  the  capital  ship  tonnage  should  be  used  as 
the  measurement  of  strength  for  navies,  and  a  propor- 
tionate  allowance   of  auxiliary  combatant  craft  pre- 
scribed. 

Now  as  to  the  first,  second,  and  fourth  principles, 
there  can  be  no  argument.  But  the  third  principle  calls 
for  the  definition  of  the  "existing  naval  strength,'1  which 
is  to  be  the  basis  of  calculation  for  the  future  naval 
strength  of  each  of  the  nations  participating  in  the 
Conference. 

Yesterday  afternoon  the  Japanese  experts  had  a 
frank  but  friendly  exchange  of  views  with  the  American 
experts  in  Mr.  Hughes'  office  at  the  State  Department. 
What  transpired  behind  the  closed  doors  is  known  only 
to  those  present  at  the  meeting.  But  it  is  surmised  that 
the  conversation  was  characterized  by  a  spirit  of  accom- 
modation on  both  sides.  The  Japanese  asked  for  more 
information  on  certain  aspects  of  the  American  pro- 
posal, more  particularly  the  basis  of  calculation  as  to 
the  existing  relative  naval  strength  of  England,  Ameri- 
ca, and  Japan.  They  are  of  the  opinion  that  if  the 
allotment  of  ships  for  the  coming  ten  years  is  to  be 
based  upon  the  present  ratio,  the  existing  relative 
strength  of  the  three  navies  should  be  most  carefully 
examined  and  defined. 

Inquiries  have  revealed  that  the  American  estimate 
in  this  respect  is  not  entirely  accurate.  Basing  his 
judgment  upon  that  estimate,  Mr.  Hughes  seems  to 
think  that  Japan's  present  naval  strength  is  between 
50  and  60  as  against  America's  100.  Consequently  his 
conclusion  is  that  an  allotment  of  100  to  America  and 
60  to  Japan  for  the  coming  ten  years,  namely  a  ratio 


14?  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

of  5  to  3,  does  not  disturb  the  status  quo  of  the  relative 
strength  of  the  two  navies. 

The  Japanese  experts  contend  that  the  estimate 
upon  which  Mr.  Hughes'  conclusion  is  founded  is  erro- 
neous. To  support  this  contention,  it  is  understood, 
they  have  submitted  to  Mr.  Hughes  and  the  American 
experts  a  brief  but  clear  statement,  which  they  are 
ready  to  back  up  with  further  information  and  ex- 
planation. 

The  substance  of  this  statement  is  carefully  guarded. 
In  one  of  the  Tokyo  newspapers  just  to  hand,  I  find 
the  following  table  showing  the  existing  strength  of  the 
American  and  Japanese  navies  as  follows : 

Japan        United  States    Percentage 
Tonnage          Tonnage        for  Japan 

Existing  capital  ships 533,000  728,000  73 

Existing  post-dreadnought 

capital  ships 361,000  532,000  68 

Existing  post-super-dread- 
nought capital  ships. . . .  301,000  365,000  83 
Capital  ships  existing  and 

under  construction 612,000  913,000  67 

Post  -  dreadnought  capital 

ships  existing  and  under 

construction 441,000  717,000  61 

Super  -  post  -  dreadnought 

capital  ships  existing  and 

under  construction 381,000         549,000          70 

As  this  table  shows,  there  are  six  methods  of  esti- 
mating the  existing  strengths  of  the  two  navies.  The 
percentage  of  the  Japanese  navy  thus  obtained  ranges 
from  61  to  83.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Japanese  experts 
the  first  classification,  which  allows  73  per  cent  to 
Japan,  gives  the  most  logical  basis  of  estimation.  But 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  15 

taking  the  average  of  the  six  classifications,  70  per  cent 
is  adopted  as  the  reasonable  allotment  for  Japan. 

The  Japanese  experts  agree  that  if  the  Japanese 
navy  is  reduced,  as  proposed  by  Mr.  Hughes,  to  6  as 
against  America's  10,  Japan  will  be  exposed  to  attack 
at  the  hands  of  a  superior  navy.  In  other  words, 
Japan's  self-defense  and  security  requires  a  navy  of  a 
ratio  slightly  more  favorable  than  6  to  10.  Japan  will 
be  satisfied  if  the  existing  ratio  of  7  to  10  is  maintained, 
for  that  is  the  proportion  which  the  Japanese  experts 
think  not  only  fair  but  necessary  to  defend  their  country 
against  an  attack.  Under  that  ratio  the  Japanese  navy 
will  be  far  too  small  to  cross  the  Pacific  for  an  aggres- 
sive purpose.  While  the  American  navy  may,  under  the 
same  ratio,  find  it  possible  to  go  to  Far  Eastern  waters 
for  a  similar  purpose,  Japan  will  be  able  to  cope  with 
the  attack.  Thus,  the  ratio  of  7  to  10  will  insure  peace 
and  security  to  both  countries. 

Japan  is  willing  to  go  much  farther  than  the  Hughes 
plan  in  reducing  the  navy,  if  only  the  existing  ratio  of 
7  to  10  can  be  maintained.  Her  sole  purpose  in  insist- 
ing upon  that  ratio  is  the  defense  and  security  of  her 
country. 

The  Japanese  delegates  rely  upon  Mr.  Hughes'  firm 
stand  of  fairness  and  justice.  They  are  confident  that, 
once  Mr.  Hughes  grasps  the  real  meaning  of  their  argu- 
ment, he  will  not  be  reluctant  to  make  due  concession. 
At  the  same  time  their  minds  are  open  for  any  new 
information  or  argument  which  Mr.  Hughes  or  his 
experts  may  supply.  If  such  information  or  argument 
is  convincing,  the  Japanese  delegates  and  experts  will 
be  willing  to  recede  from  their  present  stand.  In  a 
word,  their  present  attitude  is,  as  I  see  it,  one  of  frank- 
ness, sincerity,  open-mindedness,  and  conciliation,  all 
tending  to  an  early  settlement  of  the  matter. 


16  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  amicable 
and  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  naval  question.  Cer- 
tain it  is  that,  when  the  Conference  comes  to  an  end, 
England,  America  and  Japan  will  have  agreed  upon  a 
program  of  radical  reduction  in  their  respective  navies. 

Already  the  Japanese  naval  officers  here  are  antici- 
pating the  dismissal,  in  the  near  future,  of  a  large 
number  of  officers.  They  think  that  from  next  year  the 
number  of  students  to  be  admitted  to  the  naval  acad- 
emies will  have  to  be  radically  reduced.  An  officer  said 
to  me :  "We  have  no  illusion  as  to  what  is  ahead  of  us. 
A  new  era  has  dawned  upon  the  Pacific  and  the  world. 
We  must  ourselves  be  ready  and  willing  to  scrap  our- 
selves." 

The  naval  retrenchment,  which  is  to  be  carried  out  by 
the  three  Powers  as  the  result  of  this  Conference,  will 
have  a  more  far-reaching  effect  in  Japan  than  is  com- 
monly realized  among  the  Americans.  Once  the  Jap- 
anese navy  is  reduced  to  such  an  extent  as  is  proposed 
by  Mr.  Hughes,  resulting  in  the  dismissal  of  many 
officers  and  the  virtual  closing  of  shipyards,  the  army 
will  not  long  be  able  to  escape  a  similar  fate.  The 
public,  which  has  been  shouldering  heavy  armament  tax- 
ation, will  not  fail  to  utilize  the  naval  retrenchment 
as  an  occasion  to  arouse  popular  sentiment  for  the 
reduction  of  the  army. 


CHAPTER   III 
A  GRAIN   OF   COMMON    SENSE 

Washington,  December  3,  1921:  Although  I  still 
adhere  to  my  repeated  prediction  that  the  question  of 
naval  ratio  will  be  settled  in  a  way  satisfactory  to 
America,  it  seems  too  early  at  this  time  to  say  that  the 
three  great  Powers  have  come  to  an  agreement  at  yes- 
terday's Conference  between  Mr.  Hughes,  Mr.  Balfour, 
and  Admiral  Kato.  It  may  be  safest  for  us  to  expect 
that  the  Conference,  will  take  a  tortuous  course  before 
it  reaches  its  inevitable  decision. 

To  a  layman,  it  appears  that  too  much  importance  is 
attached  to  expert  knowledge  at  the  Armament  Confer- 
ence. Is  it  not  time  that  common  sense  should  take 
the  stage  and  ask  expert  knowledge  to  retire  into  the 
background  for  a  while? 

Common  sense  does  not  care  to  know  whether  Ad- 
miral Baron  Kato's  experts  are  right  in  their  contention 
that  the  existing  ratio  between  the  American  and  Japa- 
nese navies  is  10  to  7.  Nor  does  it  care  for  the  opinion 
of  American  naval  experts  that  5  to  3  is  the  only  right 
and  fair  ratio  to  ensure  the  peace  of  the  Pacific. 

Common  sense  brushes  aside,  or  looks  askance,  at 
naval  statistics  prepared  by  experts.  Instead  of  poring 
over  such  figures  and  statistics,  it  looks  at  the  map  of 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  reads  a  few  authoritative  books  on 
the  economic  conditions  of  Japan  and  America,  and 
arrives  at  its  own  conclusion. 

What,  then,  is  the  conclusion  of  common  sense  ?  It 

17 


18  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

concludes  that,  whether  the  naval  ratio  between  Amer- 
ica and  Japan  be  5  to  3,  as  claimed  by  American  experts, 
or  5  to  3.5  as  claimed  by  Japanese,  it  makes  little  dif- 
ference to  America,  as  far  as  her  security  and  self- 
defense  are  concerned. 

In  discussing  the  naval  question  of  the  Pacific  we 
must  always  remember  that  the  distance  between  Yoko- 
hama and  San  Francisco  is  almost  5,500  miles,  and  that 
Panama  is  8,000  miles  from  Japan.  No  man  with  com- 
mon sense,  whether  American  or  Japanese,  can  possibly 
believe  that  the  Japanese  navy,  with  a  strength  of  3  or 
3.5  as  against  America's  5,  is  capable  of  crossing  this 
vast  expanse  of  water,  to  deliver  an  attack  upon  any 
part  of  the  American  coast.  Keep  in  sight  also  the 
American  naval  bases  on  the  Philippines  and  at  Hawaii, 
which  are  in  themselves  a  safeguard  against  any  aggres- 
sive move  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  navy.  Experts 
may  juggle  with  figures  and  tell  us  that  such  an  aggres- 
sion is  not  impossible,  but  common  sense  refuses  to 
swallow  such  a  theory. 

Let  me  tell  you  what  difficulty  Japan  encountered 
during  the  Russian  War  in  transporting  troops  across 
the  narrow  straits  of  Korea  only  80  miles  wide.  She 
employed  six  transports  for  that  purpose,  and  they 
were  guarded  by  a  large  fleet  of  warships.  Yet  two  of 
these  transports  were  attacked  and  sunk  by  Russian 
cruisers,  of  which  there  were  only  three  operating  in 
the  Japan  Sea. 

Now  what  would  happen  if  Japan  tried  to  send  a 
fleet  of  transports  across  the  Pacific  to  a  point  5,500  to 
8,000  miles  away?  To  transport  an  army,  strong 
enough  to  accomplish  anything,  across  the  ocean,  Japan 
would  have  to  impress  every  steamer  afloat  in  her  home 
waters.  A  steamer  can  carry  only  50  soldiers  per  100 
tons  of  displacement.  Japan  would  make  herself  more 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  19 

picturesque  than  Don  Quixote  if  her  navy,  with  a 
strength  of  only  3.5  as  against  America's  5,  were  to 
attempt  an  aggressive  move  toward  the  Pacific  coast 
of  the  United  States. 

Even  more  serious  is  Japan's  economic  drawback. 
If  ever  she  goes  to  war  against  America,  it  will  be  a 
single-handed  fight  for  her.  No  European  nation  will 
help  Japan  either  with  money  or  with  arms.  Pitted 
against  the  inexhaustible  financial  resources  of  America, 
the  Japanese  Treasury  would  go  bankrupt  in  a  very 
short  time. 

Then  there  is  the  matter  of  steel  and  fuel  supply, 
of  which  Japan  is  deplorably  deficient.  Japan  is  per- 
haps the  poorest  country  in  this  respect.  Her  ship- 
yards are  almost  entirely  dependent  upon  foreign  steel 
mills.  Her  naval  and  merchant  ships  rely  solely  upon 
foreign  countries  for  supply  of  petroleum.  In  the  event 
of  an  American-Japanese  war,  where  is  Japan  going  to 
get  such  supplies?  In  such  a  war,  England  would  be 
friendly,  if  she  would  not  render  actual  military  assis- 
tance, to  America.  This  would  make  it  virtually 
impossible  for  Japan  to  obtain  steel  and  oil  from  any 
country,  without  which  war  is  inconceivable. 

Some  time  ago  a  Japanese  army  officer  wrote  a  book 
trying  to  show  that  Japan  could  successfully  defend  her- 
self in  a  war  with  America.  When  the  book  was 
brought  to  the  notice  of  Count  Shibusawa,  this  fore- 
most financier  and  publicist  of  Japan  said:  "If  war 
breaks  out  between  the  two  countries,  America  will 
not  have  to  send  a  single  fleet  to  the  Orient.  She  may 
stay  at  home  and  just  wait  until  our  resources  are 
exhausted,  which  will  be  a  matter  of  surprisingly  short 


time." 


In  the  judgment  of  common  sense,  a  ratio  of  5  to 
3.5,  or  10  to  7,  as  between  the  American  and  Japanese 


20  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

navies  would  sufficiently  guarantee  the  safety  and  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  an 
American  fleet  under  that  ratio  may  find  it  possible  to 
cross  the  Pacific  and  make  a  successful  attack  upon 
Japan,  especially  when  it  is  supported  by  a  formidable 
naval  base  or  bases  located  in  the  western  Pacific.  If 
America  had  no  such  base  in  that  part  of  the  Pacific, 
that  would  make  a  great  difference  in  the  Japanese  con- 
sideration of  the  situation.  But  as  things  are,  Japan 
entertains  a  genuine  fear  of  the  American  navy. 
Whether  that  fear  is  well  founded  or  not,  we  have  to 
admit  that  that  fear  is  absolutely  sincere. 

General  Tasker  Howard  Bliss,  an  American  military 
representative  at  the  Supreme  War  Council  and  Com- 
missioner Plenipotentiary  at  the  Paris  Peace  Confer- 
ence, in  a  recent  essay  expresses  this  pertinent  opinion : 

"It  will  be  a  long  time  before  the  nations  will  be 
relieved  of  a  certain  fear  of  each  other;  a  fear,  which 
undoubtedly  exists  in  varying  degree,  is  largely  bred 
out  of  the  existence  of  excessive  and  necessarily  unequal 
armaments,  and  which  results  in  continuing  them.  And 
it  is  this  fear,  whether  unreasoning  or  not,  that  must  be 
taken  into  account  in  any  attempt  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment about  these  armaments.  Fear  results  in  arma- 
ments, and  the  armaments  are  simply  a  concrete  expres- 
sion of  national  policies." 

I  have  tried  to  show  that  Japan  entertains  genuine 
fear  of  the  American  navy  supported  by  American  bases 
of  operation  in  the  western  Pacific.  If  America  is  pre- 
pared for  real  leadership,  she  should  be  able  by  some 
generous  means  to  remove  that  fear.  Such  a  move 
would  be  a  great  diplomatic  stroke  and  win  the  heart- 
felt confidence  of  the  Japanese. 

Of  all  times  this  is  the  time  for  mutual  patience  and 
mutual  magnanimity.  The  Conference  must  be  a  sue- 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  21 

cess.  The  nations  assembled  at  Washington  came  here 
with  the  honest  hope  that  this  Conference  will  open  a 
new  age.  It  will  never  do  to  blight  that  hope  by  impa- 
tience and  stubbornness.  The  Japanese  are  just  as 
anxious  to  see  this  Conference  a  success  as  are  the 
Americans.  Their  sincerity  cannot  be  disputed.  If 
evil  prophets  continue  to  impute  ulterior  motives  to  the 
Japanese  attitude  towards  the  naval  ratio  question,  it 
will  simply  aggravate  the  matter  and  contribute  materi- 
ally to  the  difficulty  of  the  Conference. 

The  Americans  must  sympathize  with  the  delicate 
position  in  which  the  Japanese  delegation  finds  itself. 
The  recent  assassination  of  Premier  Hara  has  left  the 
Government  without  dominating  leadership,  and  the 
Government  is  undoubtedly  afraid  of  popular  opinion 
which  is  not  entirely  united  in  favor  of  .scrapping  such 
new  ships  as  the  Mutsu,  into  the  making  of  which  has 
gone  the  very  blood  of  the  nation  groaning  under  the 
heavy  burden  of  taxation.  That  which  is  easily  made 
can  be  easily  destroyed.  But  it  is  human  nature  to 
cling  to  a  thing  resulting. from  a  great  and  heroic  sacri- 
fice. America,  with  its  affluence  and  its  abundant  sup- 
ply of  steel,  may  not  fully  realize  the  Japanese  feeling 
on  this  question.  But  the  far-seeing  statesmen  of  Amer- 
ica surely  will  not  fail  to  sympathize  with  that  feeling. 
Above  all  they  will  appreciate  the  delicate  situation  con- 
fronting the  Japanese  delegation.  American  states- 
manship will  see  to  it  that  the  Conference  will  be 
crowned  with  success,  in  spite  of  the  gloomy  views 
voiced  by  evil  prophets. 

Meanwhile,  nothing  is  resented  more  bitterly  by  the 
Japanese  delegation  than  the  vile  insinuation  that  it  is 
withholding  decision  on  the  naval  ratio  for  the  purpose 
of  barter.  The  Japanese  came  to  the  Conference,  not 
to  acquire,  but  to  give  as  much  as  they  possibly  can 


22  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

without  prejudicing  their  national  safety  and  existence. 
Is  there  anything  they  can  hope  to  get  by  delaying  deci- 
sion on  the  naval  question?  Absolutely  nothing.  In 
Shantung  they  have  already  announced  their  intention 
to  relinquish  the  rights  given  them  by  the  Paris  Peace 
Treaty.  In  Manchuria,  Japan's  rights  are  defined 
in  a  treaty  with  China.  That  right  Japan  has  never 
had  the  idea  of  bartering  for  any  expediency  or  pur- 
pose. 

That  there  should  be  any  delay  in  the  settlement  of 
the  naval  ratio  is  exceedingly  deplorable.  But  when 
we  come  to  consider  the  gravity  of  the  issue,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  immediate  agreement  has  not  been 
reached.  When  Japan  received  the  American  invita- 
tion, she  accepted  it  in  the  friendly  spirit  in  which  that 
invitation  was  addressed  to  her.  In  accepting  it,  she 
was  confident  that  opportunity  would  be  given  her  for 
full,  unreserved,  friendly  exchange  of  opinions  on  all 
problems  which  would  be  considered  at  the  Conference. 

That  undoubtedly  was  and  is  the  real  intention  of 
America.  President  Harding  and  Secretary  Hughes 
certainly  have  no  desire  to  dictate  "terms  of  peace"  to 
any  of  the  nations  which  they  have  so  graciously  invited. 
If  the  Japanese  have  any  reason  to  disagree  with  the 
conclusions  of  the  American  delegation,  it  is  their  obvi- 
ous privilege  and  duty  to  speak  courteously  and  frankly. 
Surely  the  American  delegation  would  not  deny  that 
privilege  to  any  delegation,  even  if  that  meant  a  delay 
of  a  few  days  in  the  final  settlement  of  a  question. 

Mr.  Roosevelt  once  said,  "The  leader  leads,  but  the 
boss  drives."  Today  America  has  a  splendid  oppor- 
tunity for  assuming  leadership  among  the  nations.  If 
she  wants  to  rise  to  the  occasion  and  accomplish  a  great 
task  for  the  lasting  peace  of  the  world,  she  must  lead 
but  not  drive.  Leadership  implies  patience,  magna- 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  23 

nimity,  and  open-mindedness.  Impatience  and  stub- 
bornness are  not  the  qualities  of  real  leadership.  If 
America  becomes  a  law  unto  herself  and  takes  the  stand 
that,  once  a  proposition  is  put  forward,  it  can  never  be 
altered,  she  is  certainly  treading  upon  perilous  ground. 


CHAPTER   IV 
JAPAN    GIVES    UP    THE    RATIO    FIGHT 

Washington,  December  13,  1921:  We  are  on  the 
eve  of  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  naval  ratio  ques- 
tion. It  may  even  be  safe  to  say  that  the  question  has 
already  been  settled  among  the  "big  three."  Unques- 
tionably announcement  to  that  effect  will  be  forthcom- 
ing within  a  very  short  time. 

Does  this  mean  that  Japan  has  accepted  the  Hughes 
plan  with  no  modification?  No.  Has  America  agreed 
to  alter  the  ratio  of  5-5-3  ?  Not  at  all. 

It  is  of  course  impossible  to  read  the  minds  of  the 
silent  statesmen  who  are  formulating  the  naval  policy 
of  the  powers,  but  one  intuitively  feels  that  some  sort 
of  a  concession  has  been  made  by  America  in  order  to 
expedite  a  speedy  agreement.  What  is  the  concession 
that  has  been  made?  Is  it  not  possible  that  Japan  is 
permitted  to  save  the  Mutsu  which  was  completed  in 
October,  and  is  to  be  commissioned  this  month?  Is  it 
not  likely  that  America,  too,  will  save  a  ship  corre- 
sponding to  this  new  Japanese  man-of-war?  Then  may 
not  America  and  Japan  agree  to  destroy  some  of  the 
older  ships  which  are  not  on  the  scrapping  list  origi- 
nally proposed  by  Mr.  Hughes?  To  these  questions 
no  definite  answer  can  be  given  by  an  outsider  until  the 
much  expected  announcement  is  made  by  the  "big 
three."  But  to  one  who  has  closely  followed  the  tortu- 

24 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  25 

ous  course  of  the  Naval  Conference,  the  only  logical 
answer  seems  to  be  "yes." 

Even  when  the  naval  negotiation  was  reported  to 
have  come  to  a  deadlock,  I  held  steadfastly  to  the  view 
that  the  question  would  be  settled  satisfactorily  to  both 
countries.  If  the  settlement  is  to  be  satisfactory  to 
both,  what  conceivable  settlement  is  there  other  than 
the  one  suggested  in  the  above  three  questions?  It 
ought  to  be  satisfactory  to  America  because  it  does  not 
alter  the  ratio  originally  proposed  by  Mr.  Hughes.  It 
ought  to  satisfy  Japan,  because  she  is  allowed  to  keep 
a  ship  for  which  she  seems  to  cherish  something  of  an 
affection. 

Undoubtedly  the  conclusion  of  the  new  four-power 
Treaty,  which  was  announced  on  December  9,  coupled 
with  the  American  pledge  to  suspend  work  on  the  pro- 
jected fortification  of  Guam  and  the  Philippines,  has 
had  great  influence  on  the  happy  solution  of  the  naval 
ratio  question.  The  abrogation  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  has  eased  the  American  mind  to  no  small 
degree,  while  the  new  four-power  Treaty  has  inspired 
a  sense  of  security  in  the  Japanese  mind.  The  mutual 
feeling  of  fear  and  suspicion  has  been  dissipated,  and 
a  new  spirit  of  trust  and  cooperation  has  become  the 
basis  of  action  on  both  sides. 

It  is,  of  course,  regrettable  that  delay  has  been  caused 
in  the  settlement  of  the  naval  ratio.  Many  Ameri- 
cans and  Japanese  believe  that  the  Japanese  delegation 
has  made  a  great  blunder  in  failing  to  come  out  at  once 
for  the  unqualified  acceptance  of  the  Hughes  plan. 
Some  ill-informed  critics  have  said  that  this  Japanese 
failure  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  chief  Japanese  dele- 
gate is  an  admiral.  But  Admiral  Baron  Kato  is  a 
statesman  rather  than  a  naval  officer.  It  is  now  an 
open  secret  among  the  Japanese  that  personally  he  was 


26  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

in  favor  of  accepting  the  Hughes  plan  without  modifi- 
cation. But  he  has  brought  a  staff  of  earnest  and 
faithful  experts  whose  opinion  he  was  obliged  to  ask. 
In  the  meantime,  public  sentiment  at  home  has  not  been 
in  entire  accord  with  the  view  he  had  personally  held. 
The  Government  at  home  has  been  sensitive  to  popular 
sentiment  which  has  not  been  wholly  united  in  favor  of 
scrapping  such  ships  as  the  Mutsu. 

The  American  promise  to  abandon  the  fortification 
project  for  Guam  and  the  Philippines  has  been  doubly 
auspicious.  Not  only  has  it  facilitated  the  settlement 
of  the  naval  ratio,  but  it  has  unquestionably  contributed 
materially  towards  the  speedy  solution  of  the  Yap  con- 
troversy. Whatever  may  have  been  the  diplomatic 
reasons  for  Japan's  reluctance  to  accede  to  the  Ameri- 
can proposal  on  the  Yap  question,  the  real  reason  must 
be  found  in  Japanese  fear  of  the  American  project  of 
establishing  formidable  naval  bases  at  Guam  and  in 
the  Philippines.  How  seriously  the  Japanese  have 
taken  that  project  may  be  judged  from  a  recent  essay 
published  in  the  Dal  Nippon  or  Greater  Japan,  a 
monthly  magazine  devoted  to  the  study  of  naval  and 
military  problems : 

"Should  America  drop  her  naval  harbor  in  Guam, 
this  country  would  willingly  surrender  its  mandatory 
right  over  the  Pacific  Islands  north  of  the  Equator. 
There  appear  to  be  many  in  America  who  suspect  that 
Japan  is  going  to  fortify  Yaloot,  Truck,  Angower,  Yap, 
and  Saipan,  in  fact  all  mandatory  islands.  This  suspi- 
cion is  worth  only  a  big  hearty  laugh  for  its  unfound- 
edness.  Should  America  indefinitely  postpone  her 
Guam  and  Philippine  plans,  it  might  be  stated  unequivo- 
cally that  Japan  would  willingly  withdraw  from  those 
islands,  and  return  them  to  the  League  of  Nations. 

"The  return  of  the  Pacific  islands  to  the  League  will 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  27 

decidedly  accelerate  the  world's  peace.  With  the  Phil- 
lippines  and  Guam  designs  abandoned,  America  will 
have  no  base  nearer  to  these  parts  than  Hawaii,  and 
that  turn  of  affairs  will  necessarily  result  in  checking 
the  fighting  spirit  both  in  America  and  in  Japan." 


CHAPTER  V 
HUGHES   AGREES 

Washington,  December  16,  1921:  Today  the  lead- 
ership of  Charles  Evans  Hughes  looms  bigger  than 
ever.  It  is  the  common  verdict  among  the  Japanese 
here  that  the  happy  conclusion  of  the  naval  negotia- 
tions, so  skillfully  and  so  patiently  engineered  by 
Mr.  Hughes,  is  a  master-stroke  of  American  diplomacy 
even  greater  than  the  announcement  of  his  naval  re- 
trenchment program  at  the  very  first  sitting  of  the 
Conference. 

If  Mr.  Hughes'  naval  program,  given  out  on  Novem- 
ber 12,  elicited  the  world's  admiration  by  reason  of  its 
daring  and  sweeping  nature,  his  conduct  of  the  delicate 
parley  that  followed  the  presentment  of  that  program 
has  called  forth  even  greater  admiration  because  of 
the  good  temper,  magnanimity,  and  the  conciliatory 
spirit  he  has  consistently  maintained. 

To  discriminating  observers,  his  unostentatious,  un- 
pretentious manner  in  announcing  the  consummation 
of  that  all-important  parley  yesterday  was  exceedingly 
pleasing.  He  appeared  wholly  unconscious  of  the 
great  part  he  had  played  in  it.  He  reported  it  to  the 
representatives  of  the  press  in  a  matter-of-course,  bus- 
iness-like fashion,  as  though  he  was  unaware  of  the 
tremendous  influence  which  that  report  was  going  to 
exercise  upon  the  whole  world. 

Especially  are  the  Japanese  pleased  with  the  open- 
mindedness,  frankness,  and  friendliness  which  have 

28 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  29 

characterized  Mr.  Hughes'  attitude  throughout  the 
negotiations  that  lasted  a  month.  He  had  the  vision  to 
see  the  unfortunate  effect  which  might  have  been  pro- 
duced upon  the  mental  attitude  of  the  Japanese  people, 
had  America  and  Britain  compelled  the  Japanese  dele- 
gation to  accept  a  program  to  which  there  was  a 
strong  opposition  on  the  other  side  of  the  water.  As 
the  real  situation  was  revealed  to  him,  Mr.  Hughes 
came  to  understand  that  the  Japanese  people  had  jus- 
tifiable reasons  for  their  reluctance  to  put  the  Mutsu 
upon  the  scrap  heap.  This  dreadnought,  which  has  not 
only  been  completed  but  is  fully  equipped  for  commis- 
sion, is  the  result  of  a  heroic  sacrifice  which  the  masses 
of  Japan  have  offered  upon  the  altar  of  national  de- 
fense. Furthermore,  the  ship  is  more  distinctly  than 
any  other  ship  a  child  of  Japan,  having  been  designed 
by  Japanese  engineers  and  including  some  original  plans 
developed  by  them.  Had  Japan  been  forced  to  de- 
stroy this  new  ship,  her  people  would  have  inevitably 
felt  that  grave  injustice  had  been  done  to  them.  Their 
feeling  would  have  been  doubly  depressed  by  reason 
of  their  consciousness  of  the  lack  of  steel  and  other 
materials  which  make  it  practically  impossible  for  them 
to  embark  on  short  notice  upon  any  program  of  naval 
building  that  might  be  necessitated  by  any  unexpected 
turn  of  international  relations.  Mr.  Hughes  appre- 
ciated all  these  circumstances  and  knew  how  to  sym- 
pathize with  the  popular  sentiment  prevailing  in  Japan 
on  the  question  of  the  Mutsu. 

The  naval  program  as  reported  by  Mr.  Hughes  is 
exactly  as  I  reported  on  December  13.  Japan  has 
given  up  the  10-10-7  ratio  which  her  experts  at  first 
advocated,  but  is  allowed  to  keep  the  Mutsu  without 
making  any  change  in  the  5-5-3  ratio  as  proposed  by 
Mr.  Hughes.  This  is  proof  that  both  the  American 


30  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

and  Japanese  delegations  are  animated  by  a  spirit  of 
conciliation,  and  are  eager  to  accomplish  the  purpose 
for  which  this  epoch-making  Conference  has  been 
called.  If  the  Conference  is  to  attain  that  purpose,  it 
is  not  enough  to  arrive  at  an  agreement  on  the  naval 
ratio,  but  the  agreement  must  be  reached  after  full  and 
frank  exchange  of  views  and  giving  no  occasion  for 
unhappy  feelings  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  participat- 
ing nations.  That  purpose  has  been  accomplished  by 
the  masterly  manner  in  which  Mr.  Hughes  has  con- 
ducted the  negotiations.  He  has  won  the  confidence 
of  the  Japanese  without  receding  from  his  original 
stand.  This  at  least  is  the  prevailing  opinion  among 
the  Japanese. 

The  Japanese  delegation  is  in  receipt  of  a  number 
of  cablegrams,  showing  that  public  opinion  at  home, 
as  expressed  through  the  press,  is  on  the  whole  satisfied 
with  the  naval  decision  reached  by  the  Conference.  It 
also  indicates  that  this  decision,  coupled  with  the  new 
four-power  Treaty,  will  prove  to  be  a  strong  impetus 
to  the  movement  already  started  in  Japan  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  army.  The  Tokyo  Jiji-Shimpo,  for  one, 
deeply  regrets  that  the  Washington  Conference  is  not 
going  to  discuss  the  reduction  of  land  armaments.  It 
believes  that  the  Japanese  army  calls  for  retrenchment 
even  more  urgently  than  the  navy,  and  that  the  quickest 
way  to  reduce  it  is  external  pressure  brought  to  bear 
upon  it  by  an  international  agreement.  Now  that  the 
Conference  has  decided  not  to  take  up  the  question  of 
land  armaments,  the  Jiji-Shimpo  urges  that  the  people 
of  Japan  must  endeavor  to  bring  public  opinion  to  a 
head  so  as  to  force  the  reduction  of  the  army  without 
relying  upon  outside  influence.  The  Osaka  Asahi  and 
the  Tokyo  Asahi,  two  of  the  most  influential  dailies, 
are  also  advocating  a  radical  reduction  of  the  army. 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  31 

As  to  the  Pacific  Treaty,  the  Nichi-Nichi,  the  Asahi, 
the  Yomiuri,  the  Chuo,  and  the  Chugai,  all  of  Tokyo, 
welcome  it  as  a  crystallization  of  a  new  international 
spirit  of  peaceful  cooperation.  They  are  particularly 
pleased  that  the  new  entente  removes  the  suspicion  and 
fear  which,  however  groundless  they  may  have  been, 
have  been  instilled  in  the  American  mind  by  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  They  are  somewhat  disappointed 
that  the  treaty  confines  itself  to  the  Pacific  Islands,  but 
trust  that  the  more  important  question  of  China  will 
be  dealt  with  in  a  separate  treaty. 

Even  the  opposition  party  is  compelled  to  admit  that 
the  treaty  is  unot  bad."  Its  leader,  Count  Kato, 
though  not  very  enthusiastic  about  it,  declares  that  "this 
treaty  is  better  than  no  treaty." 


FINAL  RATIO  AGREEMENT  AS  ANNOUNCED  BY 
MR.  HUGHES,  DECEMBER  15 

An  agreement  has  been  reached  between  the  three 
Powers — the  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,  and  Japan,  on  the  subject  of  naval  ratio.  The 
proposal  of  the  American  Government  that  the  ratio 
should  be  5-5-3  is  accepted.  It  is  agreed  that  with 
respect  to  fortifications  and  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific 
region,  including  Hongkong,  the  status  quo  shall  be 
maintained,  that  is,  that  there  shall  be  no  increase  in 
these  fortifications  and  naval  bases,  except  that  this 
restriction  shall  not  apply  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  islands  composing 
Japan  proper,  or,  of  course,  to  the  coasts  of  the  United 
States  and  Canada,  as  to  which  the  respective  Powers 
retain  their  entire  freedom. 

The  Japanese  Government  has  found  special  diffi- 
culty with  respect  to  the  Mutsu,  as  that  is  their  newest 


32  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

ship.  In  order  to  retain  the  Mutsu,  Japan  has  pro- 
posed to  scrap  the  Setsu,  one  of  her  older  ships,  which, 
under  the  American  proposal,  was  to  have  been  re- 
tained. This  would  leave  the  number  of  Japan's  capital 
ships  the  same,  that  is,  ten,  as  under  the  American  pro- 
posal. The  retention  of  the  Mutsu  by  Japan  in  place 
of  the  Setsu  makes  a  difference  in  net  tonnage  of  13,600 
tons,  making  the  total  tonnage  of  Japan's  capital  ships 
3 13,300  tons,  as  against  299,700  tons  under  the  original 
American  proposal. 

While  the  difference  in  tonnage  is  small,  there  would 
be  considerable  difference  in  efficiency,  as  the  retention 
of  the  Mutsu  would  give  to  Japan  two  post-Jutland 
ships  of  the  latest  design. 

In  order  to  meet  this  situation  and  to  preserve  the 
relative  strength  on  the  basis  of  the  agreed  ratio,  it 
is  agreed  that  the  United  States  shall  complete  two  of 
the  ships  in  course  of  construction,  that  is,  the  Colorado 
and  the  Washington,  which  are  now  about  90  per  cent 
completed,  and  scrap  two  of  the  older  ships,  that  is,  the 
North  Dakota  and  the  Delaware,  which  under  the 
original  proposal  were  to  be  retained.  This  would 
leave  the  United  States  with  the  same  number  of  capital 
ships,  that  is,  eighteen;  as  under  the  original  proposal, 
with  a  tonnage  of  525,850  tons,  as  against  500,650  tons 
as  originally  proposed.  Three  of  the  ships  would  be 
post-Jutland  ships  of  the  Maryland  type. 

As  the  British  have  no  post- Jutland  ships,  except  one 
Hood,  the  construction  of  which  is  only  partly  post- 
Jutland,  it  is  agreed  that  in  order  to  maintain  proper 
relative  strength  the  British  Government  may  construct 
two  new  ships  not  to  exceed  35,000  legend  tons  each, 
that  is,  calculating  the  tonnage  according  to  British 
standards  of  measurement,  or,  according  to  American 
calculations,  the  equivalent  of  37,000  tons  each.  It  is 
agreed  that  the  British  Government  shall  on  the  com- 
pletion of  these  two  new  ships,  scrap  four  of  their 
ships  of  the  King  George  V  type,  that  is,  the  Erin, 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  33 

King  George  F,  Centurion,  and  Ajax,  which  were  to 
have  been  retained  under  the  original  American  pro- 
posal. This  would  leave  the  British  capital  ships  in 
number  twenty,  as  against  twenty-two  under  the  Ameri- 
can proposal.  Taking  the  tonnage  of  the  two  new  ships 
according  to  American  calculation,  it  would  amount  to 
74,000,  and  the  four  ships  scrapped  having  a  tonnage 
of  96,000  tons,  there  would  be  a  reduction  in  net  ton- 
nage of  22,400  tons,  leaving  the  British  tonnage  of 
capital  ships  592,050,  instead  of  604,450.  This  would 
give  the  British  as  against  the  United  States  an  excess 
tonnage  of  56,200  tons,  which  is  deemed  to  be  fair,  in 
view  of  the  age  of  the  ships  of  the  Royal  Sovereign 
and  the  Queen  Elizabeth  type. 

The  maximum  limitation  for  the  tonnage  of  ships  to 
be  constructed  in  replacement  is  to  be  fixed  at  35,000 
legend  tons,  that  is,  according  to  British  standards  of 
measurement,  or  according  to  American  calculations, 
the  equivalent  of  37,000  tons,  in  order  to  give  accom- 
modation to  these  changes.  The  maximum  tonnage  of 
capital  ships  is  fixed,  for  the  purpose  of  replacement, 
on  the  basis  of  American  standards  of  calculation,  as 
follows : 

The  United  States,  525,000  tons;  Great  Britain, 
525,000;  Japan,  315,000  tons. 

Comparing  this  arrangement  with  the  original  Amer- 
ican proposal,  it  will  be  observed  that  the  United  States 
is  to  scrap  thirty  ships,  as  proposed,  save  that  there 
will  be  scrapped  thirteen  of  the  fifteen  ships  under  con- 
struction, and  seventeen  instead  of  fifteen  of  the  older 
ships. 

The  total  tonnage  of  the  American  capital  ships  to 
be  scrapped  under  the  original  proposal,  including  the 
tonnage  of  ships  in  construction  if  completed,  was 
stated  to  be  845,740  tons.  Under  the  present  arrange- 
ment the  tonnage  of  the  thirty  ships  to  be  scrapped, 
taking  that  of  the  ships  in  construction  if  completed, 
would  be  820,540  tons. 


34  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

The  number  of  the  Japanese  ships  to  be  retained 
remains  the  same  as  under  the  original  proposal.  The 
total  tonnage  of  the  ships  to  be  scrapped  by  Japan  under 
the  original  American  proposal,  taking  the  tonnage  of 
the  new  ships  when  completed,  was  stated  to  be  448,923 
tons.  The  total  tonnage  of  the  ships  to  be  scrapped 
under  the  present  arrangement  is  435,328  tons. 

Under  the  original  proposal  Great  Britain  was  to 
scrap  nineteen  capital  ships  (including  certain  pre- 
dreadnoughts  already  scrapped)  ;  whereas  under  the 
present  arrangement  she  will  scrap  four  more,  or  a  total 
of  twenty-three.  The  total  tonnage  of  ships  to  be 
scrapped  by  Great  Britain,  including  the  tonnage  of  the 
four  Hoods,  to  which  the  proposal  referred  as  laid 
down,  if  completed,  was  stated  to  be  583,375  tons. 
The  corresponding  total  of  scrapped  ships  under  the 
new  arrangement  will  be  22,600  tons  more,  or  605,875 
tons. 

Under  the  American  proposal  there  were  to  be 
scrapped  sixty-six  capital  fighting  ships  built  and  build- 
ing, with  a  total  tonnage  (taking  ships  laid  down  as 
completed)  of  1,878,043  tons.  Under  the  present  ar- 
rangement, on  the  same  basis  of  calculation,  there  are 
to  be  scrapped  sixty-eight  capital  fighting  ships,  with 
a  tonnage  of  1,861,643  tons. 

The  naval  holiday  of  ten  years  with  respect  to  capital 
ships,  as  originally  proposed  by  the  American  Govern- 
ment, is  to  be  maintained  except  for  the  permission  to 
construct  ships  as  above  stated. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE    "FORTIFICATIONS    FOR    PEACE" 

Washington,  February  I,  1922:  The  much  belated 
announcement  of  the  Naval  Armament  Treaty  is  made 
at  last.  It  was  formally  adopted  at  the  fifth  plenary 
session  this  morning  after  a  delay  of  some  five  weeks. 
For  this  undue  delay  Japan  is  to  blame,  because  its  main 
cause  has  been  her  indecisive  attitude  towards  the  forti- 
fication question. 

Into  the  details  of  this  treaty  I  need  not  enter.  From 
the  Japanese  point  of  view,  its  most  important  features 
are  the  provisions  on  the  capital  ship  ratio  and  the  forti- 
fications and  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  As  for 
the  naval  ratio,  it  has  been  fully  discussed  in  my  previ- 
ous letters.  Here  I  must  tell  you  the  real  involution 
of  the  fortification  question. 

When  the  Japanese  delegation  failed  to  secure  the 
alteration  of  the  capital  ship  ratio  and  was  obliged  to 
accept  the  5-5-3  ratio  as  originally  proposed  by  the 
American  delegation,  Admiral  Baron  Kato  approached 
Mr.  Hughes  with  a  view  to  reach  an  agreement  for  the 
cessation  of  further  work  on  the  fortifications  and  naval 
bases  in  the  Pacific.  To  this  idea  the  American  dele- 
gation was  favorably  disposed.  In  several  conversa- 
tions between  Hughes,  Balfour  and  Kato  it  was  agreed 
that  the  status  quo  should  be  maintained  as  to  the  forti- 
fications and  naval  bases  in  the  "region  of  the  Pacific," 
with  the  exception  of  Australia,  New  Zealand,  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands,  and  Japan  proper.  It  was  then  under- 

35 


36  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

stood  that  Japan  proper  did  not  include  the  Bonin 
Islands  and  Amami-Oshima,  and  that  these  islands 
should,  therefore,  come  within  the  zone  in  which  the 
status  quo  was  to  be  maintained.  In  accordance  with 
this  interpretation,  the  original  Article  19  was  drafted. 
There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Admiral  Kato  readily 
subscribed  to  that  interpretation.  Whether  he  did  so 
under  definite  instructions  from  the  home  government 
is  not  known.  Certain  it  is  that  personally  he  saw  no 
reason  why  the  Bonin  group  should  be  excluded  from 
the  status  quo  zone.  As  on  the  ratio  question,  so  on 
the  fortification  question,  he  proved  very  liberal  and 
conciliatory.  He  felt  assured  that  Japan's  safety  was 
fairly  protected  by  the  four-power  Pacific  Treaty  and 
the  abandonment  of  the  American  project  to  develop 
naval  bases  at  Guam  and  the  Philippines. 

To  the  embarrassment  of  the  Japanese  delegation, 
however,  the  home  government  took  the  view  that  the 
Bonin  Islands  should  be  excluded  from  the  status  quo 
zone,  and  that  Japan  should  reserve  the  right  to  fortify 
them  according  to  her  own  needs  and  discretion,  because 
they  formed  a  part  of  Japan  proper.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  the  Government  at  Tokyo  took  this  attitude 
mainly  because  the  United  States  reserved  the  right  to 
strengthen  the  fortifications  and  naval  bases  in  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  Fair-minded  critics  must  admit 
that  this  Japanese  contention  was  not  devoid  of  plausi- 
ble reason.  Hawaii  is  2,100  sea  miles  from  San  Fran- 
cisco, while  the  Bonin  group  is  only  500  sea  miles  from 
Japan.  If  America  must  keep  on  increasing  the  forti- 
fications and  naval  bases  on  islands  whose  distance  from 
its  Pacific  Coast  is  about  four  times  as  great  as  the  dis- 
tance between  Yokohama  and  the  Bonin  group,  Japan 
can  reasonably  advance  strong  arguments  for  the  exclu- 
sion of  that  group  from  the  status  quo  zone.  More- 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  37 

over,  Pearl  Harbor  at  Hawaii  has  already  been  con- 
verted into  a  magnificent  naval  base.  If  America  really 
wished  to  be  a  harbinger  of  peace  and  looked  forward 
to  an  age  of  amity  and  friendliness  in  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
why  should  she  be  so  eager  to  keep  on  strengthening  a 
naval  base  already  well  developed?  It  is  quite  likely 
that  Admiral  Kato  wished  to  bring  out  the  question  of 
the  Hawaiian  fortifications  in  his  conversations  with 
Mr.  Hughes,  but  he  knew  the  American  intention  on 
this  matter  too  well  to  hazard  a  proposal.  To  an 
idealist  it  seems  regrettable  that  America  could  not 
have  played  big  brother  and  decided  of  her  own  accord 
to  stop  work  on  the  Hawaiian  base. 

Acting  upon  instructions  from  Tokyo,  Admiral  Kato 
asked  Mr.  Hughes  whether  he  would  agree  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  Bonin  Islands  from  the  status  quo  region. 
Here  Mr.  Hughes  was  uncompromising.  He  would 
not  listen  to  any  proposal  which  would  permit  Japan  to 
increase  fortifications  in  the  Bonin  group.  As  a  com- 
promise, Kato  proposed  that  the  Bonin  group  be  elimi- 
nated from  the  Naval  Treaty,  but  that  Japan  should 
sign  a  separate  note,  pledging  herself  to  maintain  the 
status  quo  of  the  islands.  Of  course  this  compromise 
was  flimsy  and  meaningless,  because  there  was  no  differ- 
ence between  a  treaty  and  a  note  as  far  as  its  binding 
force  was  concerned.  As  long  as  Japan  insisted  upon 
the  fundamental  point,  namely,  the  exclusion  of  the 
Bonins  from  the  status  quo  zone,  she  had  good  argu- 
ment to  back  her.  Once  that  point  was  conceded,  there 
was  no  reason  why  she  should  hesitate  to  accept  it  in  a 
treaty.  And  yet  Japan  allowed  this  quibbling  to  delay 
the  conclusion  of  the  Naval  Treaty  for  a  month.  The 
only  plausible  explanation  for  this  peculiar  Japanese 
attitude  may  be  found  in  the  prevalent  opinion  in  Japan 
that  no  outside  power  should  be  allowed  to  determine 


38  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

what  islands  constituted  Japan  proper,  and  that  Japan 
proper,  as  understood  among  the  Japanese,  included  the 
Bonins,  which  are,  strangely  enough,  under  the  direct 
control  of  the  metropolitan  government  of  Tokyo.  It 
was  the  hackneyed  conception  of  national  dignity  or 
"face"  which  entered  the  agreement. 

It  was  while  Mr.  Hughes  and  Admiral  Kato  were 
engaged  in  these  unprofitable  conversations  that  Mr. 
Balfour  proposed  the  novel  scheme  of  a  parallelogram 
within  which  all  fortifications  and  naval  bases  were  to 
maintain  the  status  quo.  The  boundary  lines  of  this 
zone  were  to  be  the  equator  on  the  south,  the  30th 
degree  of  latitude  on  the  north,  the  110th  degree  of 
longitude  on  the  west,  and  the  180th  degree  of  longi- 
tude on  the  east.  In  presenting  this  novel  scheme, 
Britain,  it  was  surmised,  had  in  view  the  increase  of 
fortifications  on  certain  islands  south  of  the  equator 
which  were,  in  the  original  American  plan,  included  in 
the  status  quo  zone.  It  also  permitted  the  strengthen- 
ing of  naval  bases  in  the  Aleutian  group.  At  the  same 
time  it  put  the  Bonins  within  the  zone  where  further 
fortifications  were  to  be  prohibited.  Naturally  this 
met  with  vigorous  opposition  on  the  part  of  Japan  and 
was  finally  abandoned. 

After  protracted  negotiations  Japan  withdrew  the 
contention  that  the  Bonin  group  be  excluded  from  the 
status  quo  zone.  Article  19  of  the  Naval  Treaty,  as 
finally  agreed  upon,  reads  as  follows : 

"The  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire 
and  Japan  agree  that  the  status  quo  at  the  time  of  the 
signing  of  the  present  treaty  with  regard  to  fortifica- 
tions and  naval  bases  shall  be  maintained  in  their  respec- 
tive territories  and  possessions  specified  hereunder: 

"1.  The  insular  possessions  which  the  United  States 
now  holds  or  may  hereafter  acquire  in  the  Pacific  Ocean, 


NAVAL    ARMAMENT  39 

except  (a)  those  adjacent  to  the  coast  of  the  United 
States,  Alaska  and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  not  includ- 
ing the  Aleutian  Islands,  and  (b)  the  Hawaiian  Islands; 

"2.  Hongkong  and  the  insular  possessions  which  the 
British  Empire  now  holds  or  may  hereafter  acquire  in 
the  Pacific  Ocean  east  of  the  meridian  of  110  degrees 
east  longitude  except  (a)  those  adjacent  to  the  coast 
of  Canada,  (b)  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  and 
its  territories,  and  (c)  New  Zealand; 

"3.  The  following  insular  territories  and  possessions 
of  Japan  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  to  wit:  The  Kurile 
Islands,  the  Bonin  Islands,  Amami-Oshima,  Loochoo 
Islands,  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores,  and  any  insular 
territories  or  possessions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  which 
Japan  may  hereafter  acquire. 

"The  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  under  the  fore- 
going provisions  implies  that  no  new  fortifications  or 
naval  bases  shall  be  established  in  the  territories  and 
possessions  specified,  that  no  measures  shall  be  taken  to 
increase  the  existing  naval  facilities  for  the  repair  and 
maintenance  of  naval  force,  and  that  no  increase  shall 
be  made  in  the  coast  defense  of  the  territories  and  pos- 
sessions above  specified.  This  restriction,  however, 
does  not  preclude  such  repair  and  replacement  of  worn- 
out  weapons  and  equipment  as  is  customary  in  naval 
and  military  establishments  in  time  of  peace." 

The  above  article  explains  itself.  Japan  has  fore- 
gone the  right  of  increasing  the  fortifications  of  the 
Bonin  group  and  several  other  islands,  but  America  is 
allowed  that  right  with  regard  to  the  Hawaiian  group. 
As  for  Guam,  no  practical  work  has  been  commenced 
on  the  naval  base  project  contemplated  by  the  American 
Government.  The  naval  base  in  the  Philippines  has 
not  yet  assumed  such  a  magnitude  as  to  inspire  fear  in 
the  Japanese  mind.  Although  the  fortifications  there 


40  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

are  understood  to  be  formidable,  they  alone  cannot 
become  a  menace  to  Japan's  safety.  As  for  Brjtain, 
she  is  well  protected  by  her  bases  at  Singapore  and  at 
Hongkong. 

The  maintenance  of  the  existing  status  of  the  fortifi- 
cations and  naval  bases  enumerated  in  Article  19  of 
the  Naval  Treaty  is  calculated  to  remove  a  cause  of 
mutual  fear  and  suspicion  among  the  powers.  Let  us 
hope  that  these  Pacific  fortifications  will  prove  to  be 
the  "fortifications  for  peace"  and  not  for  war.  Rumor 
has  it  that  Article  19,  as  it  now  stands,  was  drafted  by 
Baron  Shidehara.  It  was  a  happy  solution  of  the 
knotty  problem,  and  was  readily  accepted  by  Mr. 
Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour. 


PART  II 
THE   PACIFIC  TREATY 


PART   II 
THE  PACIFIC  TREATY 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE   PARTING   OF   THE   WAYS 

Washington,  November  9,  1921:  On  the  eve  of  the 
Conference  our  thoughts  naturally  turn  to  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  for  the  alliance  is  bound  to  be  dis- 
cussed and  disposed  of  at  this  international  gathering. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  England  and  Japan  stand  at 
the  parting  of  the  ways.  For  twenty  years  they  have 
travelled  hand  in  hand  on  the  road  of  diplomacy.  Will 
they  now  bid  goodbye  to  each  other  without  remorse  or 
regret? 

To  forecast  the  future  of  the  alliance,  it  is  essential 
to  know  something  of  its  past.  The  first  alliance,  con- 
cluded on  January  30,  1902,  conferred  upon  Japan  lit- 
tle material  benefit.  It  was  not  an  offensive  or  defen- 
sive alliance.  It  did  not  obligate  England  to  help 
Japan  in  the  event  of  war  between  Japan  and  Russia, 
although  the  alliance  was  obviously  directed  against 
the  northern  colossus.  As  far  as  Japan  was  concerned, 
the  value  of  the  alliance  was  moral  rather  than  mate- 
rial. Unquestionably  it  elevated  Japan's  prestige 
among  the  nations,  for  it  was  the  first  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  an  Asiatic  nation  was  capable  of  render- 
ing assistance  to  a  foremost  Power  of  the  West.  By  it 

43 


44  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Japan  was  definitely  recognized  as  an  important  factor 
in  world  politics.  No  longer  was  her  voice  to  be  ig- 
nored in  the  disposition  of  Far  Eastern  questions. 

For  Great  Britain  the  advantage  was  more  substan- 
tial. As  Mr.  Alfred  Stead  frankly  admits,  "British 
diplomacy  assumed  a  new  importance  at  Peking  when 
backed  by  Japan,  and,  amongst  other  results,  the  Tib- 
etan expedition  was  rendered  possible.  Since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  the  consequent 
revelation  of  Japan's  power,  the  advantages  to  British 
diplomacy  in  Europe  have  been  very  considerable.  In 
fact,  British  foreign  policy  all  over  the  world  has  been 
influenced  and  strengthened  by  the  alliance.  The  de- 
struction of  the  Baltic  Fleet  enabled  four  British  battle- 
ships to  be  sent  home  to  play  a  very  important  part  in 
the  diplomatic  crisis  in  Europe." 

The  first  alliance  was  renewed  on  August  12,  1905, 
when  Japan  was  still  locked  in  deadly  combat  with 
Russia.  This  second  pact  was  no  longer  a  shadowy 
alliance,  but  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance  in  the 
real  sense  of  the  term.  By  it  Britain  definitely  cast  her 
lot  with  Japan. 

The  second  treaty  of  alliance  was  made  public  when 
the  outcome  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Portsmouth 
was  quivering  in  the  balance.  Unfortunately  for  Japan, 
the  treaty  contained  an  article  forestalling  its  applica- 
tion to  the  war  in  which  Japan  was  then  engaged.  But 
for  that  provision  the  alliance  might  have  been  a  great 
aid  to  Japan  in  obtaining  more  favorable  terms  of  peace 
from  Russia. 

England's  main  object  in  concluding  the  second  alli- 
ance was  to  prepare  against  the  rising  tide  of  German 
influence  which  had  begun  to  manifest  itself  both  in 
Europe  and  in  the  Far  East.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan 
regarded  it  as  a  safeguard  against  Russian  revenge. 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  45 

The  second  alliance  was  to  have  remained  in  force 
for  ten  years,  but  new  factors,  which  had  been  injected 
into  the  Far  Eastern  situation,  necessitated  its  revision 
four  years  before  its  termination.  The  most  impor- 
tant of  such  new  factors  was  the  changed  relationship 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States. 

Due  to  the  California  situation  and  American  at- 
tempts to  undermine  Japanese  influence  in  Manchuria, 
relations  between  the  two  nations  ceased  to  be  entirely 
cordial.  It  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  Japan  never 
so  much  as  dreamed  of  going  to  war  with  America 
because  of  those  questions.  Nevertheless  the  far-see- 
ing statesmen  of  both  Japan  and  England  thought  it  the 
part  of  wisdom  to  make  it  plain  in  black  and  white  that 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  not  applicable  to  a  war 
between  Japan  and  America. 

It  was  with  that  specific  object  in  view  that  the  fol- 
lowing article  was  included  in  the  third  treaty  of  alli- 
ance concluded  on  July  13,  1911 :  "Should  either  High 
Contracting  Party  conclude  a  treaty  of  general  arbitra- 
tion with  a  third  Power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this 
agreement  shall  entail  upon  such  contracting  Power  an 
obligation  to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such 
treaty  of  arbitration  is  in  force. "  Almost  simultane- 
ously the  United  States  signed  a  general  arbitration 
treaty  with  Great  Britain. 

The  above  provision  is  explicit  enough  to  indicate  its 
real  purpose.  But  its  importance  becomes  greater 
when  we  know  the  intentions  of  those  who  were  respon- 
sible for  it.  The  British  and  Japanese  statesmen,  who 
put  this  provision  in  the  third  treaty  of  alliance,  meant 
specifically  to  absolve  England  from  any  obligation  to 
help  Japan  in  case  of  an  American-Japanese  war. 

Unfortunately  the  United  States  Senate  failed  to 
ratify  this  arbitration  treaty.  It  was,  therefore,  through 


46  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

no  fault  of  Japan's  that  the  effect  of  the  new  article  in 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  been  in  a  state  of  abey- 
ance. But,  in  spite  of  the  action  of  the  Senate,  Japan 
was  satisfied  that  the  third  alliance  could  not  be  used 
against  America,  for  the  specific  motive  of  England  and 
Japan  in  revising  the  second  alliance  was  to  exclude 
America  from  its  application. 

Considered  from  the  British  side,  the  third  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  of  1911  had  for  its  object  the  preven- 
tion of  German  aggression  in  China  and  Europe,  as 
well  as  the  possible  renewal  of  Russian  ambition  in  the 
direction  of  Tibet  and  India.  From  the  Japanese  stand- 
point, it  was,  like  the  second  alliance,  a  safeguard 
against  Russian  revenge. 

With  both  Russia  and  Germany  eliminated  from  the 
field  of  international  rivalry,  the  alliance  is  becoming 
even  less  popular  in  England,  for  today  Britain  has  no 
nation  to  fear  save  America.  Small  wonder  that  the 
idea  of  abrogating  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  is  gain- 
ing ground,  and  that  talk  of  an  American-British-Japa- 
nese entente  to  take  the  place  of  that  alliance  is  heard 
more  and  more  frequently,  especially  in  British  quar- 
ters. Is  such  an  entente  possible?  That  will  be  the 
topic  of  my  next  letter. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

A    NEW   ALIGNMENT 

Washington,  November  10,  1921:  It  is  not  only 
in  England  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  been 
severely  criticized.  In  Japan,  too,  its  popularity  has 
been  waning.  And  yet  the  leading  statesmen  and  publi- 
cists of  Japan  are  undoubtedly  for  the  continuation  of 
the  alliance.  They  cherish  something  of  a  sentimental 
affection  for  the  remarkable  pact  by  which  the  two 
island  Powers  have  assisted  each  other  for  two  decades. 
They  know  that  Japan's  continued  association  with  the 
foremost  Power  of  Europe  will  be  an  asset  to  her  yet 
uncertain"  prestige  among  the  nations.  To  put  it 
plainly,  Japan  is  afraid  of  isolation. 

For  this  reason  Japan  will  undoubtedly  welcome  the 
renewal  of  the  alliance  with  England,  even  in  much 
modified  form.  At  the  same  time,  the  Japanese  states- 
men are  well  aware  of  the  sentiment  which  has  been 
steadily  growing  in  America  against  the  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance.  I  do  not  care  to  determine  the  real  cause 
of  this  growing  American  suspicion  towards  the  alli- 
ance. It  may  be  due  to  German  propaganda.  It  may 
be  because  of  the  anti-British  feeling  among  Irish- 
Americans.  Or  it  may  be  because  of  Chinese  propa- 
ganda. Whatever  may  be  the  cause,  it  is  undeniable 
that  the  alliance  has  many  enemies  in  America,  and  the 
far-seeing  statesmen  of  Japan  are  not  unmindful  of  this 
fact. 

Japan,  therefore,  would  not  necessarily  cling  to  the 

47 


48  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

alliance  with  England.  At  the  same  time,  she  would 
welcome  a  pact  which  would  not  be  objectionable  to 
America  and  which  would  be  agreeable  to  England. 
Such  a  pact  cannot  assume  either  the  form  or  the  power 
of  an  alliance.  It  may  perhaps  be  a  shadowy  sort  of 
entente,  not  much  more  than  an  assurance  of  coopera- 
tion and  friendship.  Yet  such  an  entente  will  have  the 
effect  of  silencing  those  international  busybodies  whose 
business  it  is  to  open  a  rift  in  the  lute  of  harmonious 
relations  between  the  three  Powers. 

Supposing  that  such  an  arrangement  could  be  made 
between  America,  Britain,  and  Japan,  what  would  its 
purpose  be  and  what  form  would  it  assume?  Obvi- 
ously it  should  not  be  an  entangling  alliance  against 
which  America  is  irreconcilable.  And  it  should  not 
contravene  the  open  door  principle  for  which  America 
stands  firmly  in  the  Far  East. 

If  one  restricts  the  scope  of  the  suggested  tripartite 
entente  in  conformity  to  American  tradition,  one  natu- 
rally recalls  the  memorable  note  exchanged  between 
Secretary  Root  and  Ambassador  Takahira  on  Novem- 
ber 3,  1908. 

The  Root-Takahira  note  states  that  America  and 
Japan  "are  animated  by  a  common  aim,  policy  and  in- 
tention" in  "the  regions  of  the  Pacific,"  and  that  "a 
frank  avowal  of  that  aim,  policy  and  intention  would 
not  only  tend  to  strengthen  the  relations  of  friendship 
and  good  neighborhood,  which  have  immemorially 
existed  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  but  would 
materially  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  the  general 
peace."  With  this  .preliminary  statement  the  note 
defines  its  object  as  follows : 

"1.  It  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  to  encour- 
age the  free  and  peaceful  development  of  their  com- 
merce on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  49 

"2.  The  policy  of  both  Governments,  uninfluenced 
by  any  aggressive  tendencies,  is  directed  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  existing  status  quo  in  the  region  above  men- 
tioned and  to  the  defense  of  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 

U3.  They  are  accordingly  firmly  resolved  reciprocally 
to  respect  the  territorial  possession  belonging  to  each 
other  in  said  region. 

"4.  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the  com- 
mon interest  of  all  powers  in  China  by  supporting  by 
all  pacific  means  at  their  disposal  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  China  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportu- 
nity for  corftmerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  that 
Empire. 

"5.  Should  any  event  occur  threatening  the  status 
quo  as  above  described  or  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity as  above  defined,  it  remains  for  the  two  Govern- 
ments to  communicate  with  each  other  in  order  to  arrive 
at  an  understanding  as  to  what  measures  they  may  con- 
sider it  useful  to  take." 

As  is  obvious  from  the  above  articles,  the  Root- 
Takahira  note  was  in  perfect  consonance  with  the  Hay 
doctrine  of  the  open  door,  equal  opportunity,  and  the 
preservation  of  China's  integrity.  Surely  it  savors 
nothing  of  an  entangling  alliance.  What  is  equally 
important,  it  does  not  conflict  with  the  underlying  prin- 
ciples of  the  League  of  Nations. 

If  an  American-British-Japanese  entente  is  to  replace 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  I  feel  certain  that  the 
statesmen  of  the  three  countries  will  follow  the  idea 
mapped  out  in  the  Root-Takahira  note. 

If  America  is  to  uphold  in  earnest  the  open  door  and 
integrity  of  China,  she  can  work  for  that  purpose  more 
effectually  by  associating  herself  with  the  other  domi- 
nant Powers.  In  other  words,  she  will  find  it  more 


50  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

advantageous  to  work  from  within,  so  to  speak,  than 
to  work  from  outside.  Even  President  Wilson  learned 
a  lesson  in  this  respect.  In  1913,  Mr.  Wilson  obliged 
the  American  bankers  to  withdraw  from  the  interna- 
tional banking  group  in  China  upon  the  ground  that  the 
conditions  required  of  China  by  the  financing  body  ran 
counter  to  the  American  traditions  of  non-interference. 
In  a  short  time  after  this  announcement  Mr.  Wilson 
had  to  modify  his  views  on  the  question,  with  the  result 
that  the  State  Department,  in  the  summer  of  1918, 
inaugurated  a  new  policy  virtually  reversing  the  Wilson 
idea.  In  accordance  with  this  policy,  the  American 
Government  would  no  longer  stand  aloof  from  Ameri- 
can bankers  interested  in  Chinese  loans,  but  was  "will- 
ing to  aid  in  every  possible  way,  and  to  make  prompt 
and  vigorous  representations,  and  to  take  every  possible 
step  to  insure  the  execution  of  equitable  contracts  made 
by  American  citizens  in  foreign  lands."  More  recently, 
Mr.  Wilson  unmistakably  forsook  the  non-interference 
policy  announced  in  1913  by  endorsing  the  new  Inter- 
national Banking  Consortium  for  China,  initiated  by 
the  State  Department  and  American  financiers. 

I  have  described  Mr.  Wilson's  change  of  attitude 
merely  to  illustrate  that  it  is  easier  and  more  effective 
to  help  China  by  working  from  inside,  or  by  cooperat- 
ing with  other  Powers,  than  by  standing  aloof  from  the 
organized  Powers  in  China.  In  entering  into  a  tripar- 
tite entente  as  above  suggested,  America  will  sacrifice 
nothing  but  will  gain  important  advantages  in  carrying 
out  her  program  of  the  open  door  in  China. 


CHAPTER   IX 
BRITAIN   THINKS 

Washington,  November  27,  1921:  There  are  vari- 
ous indications  that  England  is  trying  to  carry  water 
upon  both  shoulders.  On  the  one  hand,  she  is  eager 
to  make  friends  with  America.  On  the  other,  she  is 
not  quite  ready  to  give  up  the  alliance  with  Japan. 

Since  the  opening  of  the  Armament  Conference, 
powerful  propaganda  against  the  Anglo-Japanese  alli- 
ance has  been  emanating  from  various  sources,  Ameri- 
can, Chinese,  East  Indian,  and  even  British.  Espe- 
cially noticeable  is  Hindu  propaganda  aimed  at  the 
termination  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Several 
pamphlets,  some  anonymous,  some  signed,  have  obvi- 
ously emanated  from  that  source.  I  am  told  that  Dr. 
Reinsch,  ex-American  Minister  to  Peking  and  adviser 
to  the  Chinese  delegation,  is  assisting  the  Hindu  propa- 
gandists for  this  purpose. 

As  for  Downing  Street,  it  is  not  yet  quite  sure 
whether  the  termination  of  the  alliance  is  the  best 
course  for  the  British  Empire.  It  was  indicative  of 
this  attitude  of  doubt  that  certain  spokesmen  for  Great 
Britain  at  Washington  proffered  the  explanation  a  few 
days  ago  that  the  alliance  was  by  no  means  inconsistent 
with  the  British  policy  of  cementing  friendship  with 
America. 

Some  evil-minded  men  are  whispering  that  Britain 
is  keeping  the  alliance  with  Japan  up  her  sleeve,  hoping 
to  utilize  it  in  driving  a  bargain  with  America.  Such 

51 


52  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

insinuations  simply  show  the  baseness  of  the  minds  from 
which  they  proceed.  They  are  as  foolish  as  they  are 
groundless.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  is  unquestionable 
that  England  would  join  hands  with  Japan  and  insist 
upon  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  alliance  if  America 
refused  to  become  a  party  to  a  new  tripartite  arrange- 
ment, for  it  cannot  be  denied  that  Britain  is  in  fear  of 
the  growing  power  of  the  United  States,  against  which 
she  sees  a  safeguard  in  the  alliance  with  Japan. 

As  for  England  and  Japan,  it  would  be  wiset  to  part 
as  gentlemen  and  friends.  Such  hard  words  as  have 
been  uttered  by  Lord  Northcliffe  against  Japan  at  this 
juncture  are  entirely  uncalled  for.  They  will  merely 
serve  to  lower  the  high  estimate  of  England  held  by 
the  Japanese. 

Public  opinion  in  Japan,  as  expressed  in  the  press,  is 
not  excited  over  the  alliance  with  England.  It  does 
not  care  about  it  one  way  or  the  other.  It  is  willing  to 
let  the  alliance  run  its  own  course.  It  expires  in  July, 
1922.  If  Britain  wants  to  end  it  by  that  time,  Japa- 
nese public  opinion  will  say  calmly,  cheerfully,  and  in  a 
friendly  spirit,  "Goodbye,  Britain,  and  good  luck  to 
you."  ' 

One  of  the  reasons  why  England  has  been  doubting 
the  wisdom  of  abrogating  the  alliance  is  the  fear  that 
it  may  have  the  effect  of  encouraging  the  revolutionists 
in  India.  This  view  is  expressed  by  Mr.  Demetrius 
Boulger,  in  a  recent  issue  of  the  Contemporary  Review, 
in  these  words : 

"Japan  has  shown  herself  to  be  not  only  a  useful  but 
loyal  ally,  and  loyalty  between  nations  seems  to  be  as 
rare  as  among  individuals.  When  found  it  is  not  to 
be  slighted  or  lightly  discarded.  On  every  test  Japan 
has  done  always  what  she  promised,  and  her  proffers 
have  gone  much  further.  Which  of  all  our  friends 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  53 

and  allies,  for  instance,  would  offer  to  land  half  a  mil- 
lion men  at  Kurrachee  if  the  need  arose  to  defend  India 
in  earnest?  We  cannot  lightly  dispense  with  such 
friends.  It  is  certainly  a  matter  to  think  over.  It  is 
true  that  we  have  the  alternative  to  let  India  become  a 
world  military  power  by  allowing  her  to  raise  any  num- 
ber of  millions  and  reach  a  position  to  defend  herself. 
But  would  not  that  be  to  promote  the  possible  awaken- 
ing of  Asia,  which  we  are  besought  to  dread  when  Japan 
sounds  the  tocsin?  It  may  be  suggested  that  we  know 
where  we  are  with  the  Japanese  alone,  but  when  it 
comes  to  the  evolution  of  new  forces  from  India  and 
China — and  neither  can  be  kept  in  leading  strings  much 
longer — we  are  brought  up  against  the  unknown. 


"Down  to  the  present  time  the  Japanese  do  not  seem 
to  have  got  much  value  out  of  the  alliance.  It  has  been 
an  arrangement  for  our  benefit.  Perhaps  the  honor 
of  being  the  one  Ally  of  the  British  Empire  may  have 
counted  for  something  in  raising  Japan  to  a  high  place 
in  the  family  of  nations,  but  that  sense  of  satisfaction 
must  have  evaporated  long  ago,  for  nations  do  not  grow 
out  of  sentiment  alone." 

But  as  far  as  the  protection  of  India  is  concerned,  we 
might  as  well  be  frank  and  make  it  plain  now  that  Japa- 
nese public  opinion  will  never  permit  Japan  to  employ 
her  troops  for  England  in  the  event  of  serious  uprising 
in  India,  and  this  for  about  the  same  reason  that 
England  would  not  help  Japan  against  America.  If 
the  alliance  is,  by  any  unexpected  turn  of  diplomacy,  to 
be  continued,  the  above  point  must  be  unmistakably 
stated. 

Another  reason  for  England's  cautiousness  in  deal- 
ing with  the  alliance  lies  in  her  fear  that  her  commer- 


54.  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

cial  interest  in  China  might  be  undermined,  if,  as  a 
result  of  the  abrogation  of  the  alliance  with  Tokyo, 
America  and  Japan  should  become  closer  friends. 
Downing  Street  knows  full  well  that  America  is  a  great 
potential  rival  in  the  commercial  field  of  China,  while 
Japan  has  already  made  considerable  inroads  into  the 
sphere  long  monopolized  by  British  interests.  If  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  is  terminated,  the  British  states- 
men are  afraid  that  American  commercial  interests  may 
cooperate  with  those  of  Japan  to  the  disadvantage  of 
British  interests  in  China.  That  is  why  England  is 
anxious  to  befriend  America  and  thus  prepare  for  the 
day  when  the  alliance  with  Japan  will  be  a  thing  of  the 
past. 

A  third  reason  for  Britain's  doubt  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  terminating  the  Japanese  alliance  without  some  sub- 
stitute is  that  Australia  and  New  Zealand  are  not 
entirely  in  favor  of  its  unconditional  abrogation.  Not 
that  they  have  much  love  for  Japan,  but  because  they 
are  in  fear  of  the  Japanese  navy.  During  the  World 
War,  both  Australia  and  New  Zealand  had  reason  to 
be  grateful  to  the  Japanese  navy,  for  their  ships  carry- 
ing the  "Anzacs"  to  Europe  were  convoyed  by  Japa- 
nese men-of-war.  But  the  proved  efficiency  of  the  Japa- 
nese navy  is  all  the  greater  reason  for  them  to  fear 
Japan.  They  know  that  they  are  not  giving  Japan  the 
square  deal  in  the  matter  of  immigration  and  the  treat- 
ment of  Japanese  subjects,  and  that  is  why  they  feel 
somewhat  uneasy. 

At  heart  England  may  prefer  an  entente  with  Amer- 
ica alone,  leaving  Japan  out  of  the  new  partnership. 
But  she  is  too  proud  of  her  national  honor  to  treat  her 
former  ally  in  such  a  manner.  Downing  Street  knows 
that  Japan  has  been  a  faithful  ally,  and  that  it  ought 
not  to  leave  her  in  the  lurch  now  that  the  elimination  of 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  55 

Britain's  traditional  enemies,  Germany  and  Russia,  has 
lessened  the  usefulness  of  the  alliance.  As  a  graceful 
means  to  terminate  the  alliance  with  Japan,  Britain 
would  advocate  an  American-British-Japanese  entente. 
That  at  least  seems  to  be  the  situation  as  I  see  it  today. 


CHAPTER  X 
JAPAN    DECIDES 

Washington,  December  7,  1921:  There  is  now  lit- 
tle doubt  that  the  Foreign  Office  at  Tokyo,  counselled 
by  the  Advisory  Council  on  Foreign  Affairs,  has  made 
up  its  mind  to  give  up  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  It 
is  also  certain  that  this  decision  is  predicated  upon  the 
materialization  of  an  understanding  or  entente  between 
America,  Britain,  and  Japan,  possibly  to  be  joined  by 
France. 

Today  optimism  prevails  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
Japanese  delegation,  indicating  that  it  is  satisfied  with 
the  development  of  the  situation  both  here  and  at  home. 
The  general  feeling  among  them  is  one  of  gratification 
and  confidence.  They  are  especially  gratified  that  the 
American  Government,  as  well  as  the  American  public, 
has  been  exceedingly  generous  towards  them. 

When  President  Harding's  invitation  to  the  Confer- 
ence reached  Tokyo,  there  was  a  feeling  of  uneasiness 
and  suspicion  among  the  Japanese.  They  knew  that 
the  Senate  at  Washington,  as  well  as  American  public 
sentiment  as  expressed  in  the  press,  had  been  decidedly 
hostile  towards  them.  Some  Japanese  went  as  far  as 
to  say  that  America  summoned  Japan  much  as  a  judge 
would  summon  a  defendant.  Some  newspapers  saw  in 
the  proposed  conference  the  greatest  crisis  in  Japan's 
relations  with  America. 

All  this  feeling  of  suspicion  and  uneasiness  evapo- 

56 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  57 

rated  into  thin  air  soon  after  the  Japanese  delegates 
arrived  at  Washington.  With  the  work  of  the  Con- 
ference half  finished  today,  they  are  confident  that, 
when  the  Conference  comes  to  an  end,  Japan  and  Amer- 
ica will  have  become  better  friends  than  they  have  been 
in  the  past  fifteen  years. 

As  far  as  the  alliance  with  the  British  is  concerned, 
Japan's  attitude  and  the  latest  developments  are  exactly 
what  I  forecast  a  few  days  before  the  opening  of  the 
Conference.  In  arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  the  termi- 
nation of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  is  the  best  thing 
for  Japan,  the  leaders  at  Tokyo  have  been  unquestion- 
ably moved  by  their  knowledge  of  the  antipathy  and 
suspicion  prevailing  in  America  towards  the  alliance. 
They  realize  that  the  Pacific  era,  as  prophesied  by  the 
late  Colonel  Roosevelt,  is  about  to  take  the  place  of  the 
Atlantic  era,  and  that  America  is  bound  to  be  the  great- 
est political  and  economic  factor  in  this  dawning  era. 
It  is  but  natural  that  they  should  be  willing  to  go  a  long 
way  in  meeting  the  American  Government  and  people. 
It  is  even  expected  that  Baron  Kato,  the  head  of  the 
Japanese  delegation,  will  in  some  way  make  this  Japa- 
nese attitude  clear  before  the  close  of  the  Conference. 
Just  how  that  will  be  done  it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain 
at  this  moment. 

Japan  will  part  with  England  with  the  confident  feel- 
ing that  she  has  served  her  ally  honorably  and  faith- 
fully. She  is  in  a  position  to  say  to  the  world  that 
whenever  she  enters  into  an  alliance  with  any  nation 
her  sincerity  and  honesty  can  be  absolutely  relied  upon. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  in  a  recent  address  in  the  House, 
plainly  admitted  this.  A  prominent  British  writer  on 
international  affairs  in  a  recent  essay  agrees  that  the 
Japanese  have  not  got  much  from  the  alliance  and  that 
it  has  been  an  arrangement  for  the  benefit  of  England. 


58  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

This  is  an  extreme  statement,  for  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Japan  owes  much  to  the  alliance.  Nevertheless  Japan 
feels  satisfied  that  she  has  always  adhered  to  the  spirit 
and  letter  of  the  alliance. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  NEW  TREATY 

Washington,  December  10,  1921:  As  the  peals  of 
applause,  which  greeted  the  announcement  by  Senator 
Lodge  of  the  four-power  pact  yesterday,  give  way  to 
calmer  reflection,  we  are  in  a  mood  to  look  upon  the 
new  international  instrument  with  critical  eyes. 

The  heart  of  this  treaty  is,  of  course,  Article  1,  bind- 
ing each  contracting  party  to  respect  the  rights  of  the 
other  in  the  Pacific.  All  other  provisions  matter  little. 
Article  2,  which  has  been  compared  by  some  critics  to 
Article  10  of  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant,  is  not 
important,  because  the  elimination  of  Germany  as  a 
sea  power  has  made  it  impossible  to  think  of  any  nation, 
which  is  outside  of  this  new  international  group,  and 
which  will  be  strong  enough  to  threaten  in  the  coming 
ten  years  any  of  the  Pacific  possessions  and  dominions 
of  the  Powers  bound  by  this  new  treaty. 

In  my  letter  of  November  101  said  that  a  probable 
entente  between  America,  England  and  Japan  would 
adopt  the  principles  embodied  in  the  Root-Takahira 
note  of  1908.  The  substance  of  the  new  pact  justifies 
that  prediction,  with  the  exception  that  France  has  been 
added  to  the  group  and  that  the  problem  of  China  is 
not  dealt  with  in  the  treaty.  As  far  as  the  rights  of 
the  Powers  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  are  concerned, 
the  new  instrument  differs  little  in  principle  from  the 
American-Japanese  understanding  drafted  by  Mr.  Root 
twelve  years  ago. 

59 


60  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

The  value  of  this  four-power  agreement  is  moral. 
Its  importance  lies  not  so  much  in  what  it  says  as  in 
what  it  implies.  As  I  said  in  my  previous  letter,  such 
an  arrangement  uwill  have  the  effect  of  silencing  those 
political  wiseacres  and  international  busybodies  whose 
business  it  is  to  open  a  rift  in  the  lute  of  harmonious 
relations  between  America,  Britain,  and  Japan."  And 
this  is  exactly  what  this  "Pacific  Treaty"  will  do.  As 
a  practical  question,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  any 
conflict  among  the  four  Powers  arising  out  of  questions 
affecting  their  respective  rights  in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

After  all,  the  point  of  danger  is  China.  If  Japan 
and  America  ever  go  to  war,  it  will  be  because  of  dis- 
agreement on  the  Chinese  question.  Once  any  of  the 
four  Powers  are  involved  in  war  over  the  Chinese  ques- 
tion, their  insular  possessions  and  dominions  will,  of 
course,  be  immediately  affected  by  it,  but  these  posses- 
sions and  dominions  will  not  in  themselves  furnish  cause 
for  conflict.  If  this  premise  be  true,  the  course  that 
should  be  taken  by  the  Conference  is  clear.  It  should 
supplement  this  treaty  with  another  instrument  dealing 
specifically  with  the  Chinese  question,  and  including 
China  among  the  signatories.  Unless  this  is  done  this 
four-power  agreement  will  in  itself  hardly  measure  up 
to  the  expectations  of  the  anxious  world. 

If  the  real  purpose  of  this  Pacific  Treaty  is  to  insure 
the  security  of  the  respective  possessions  and  dominions 
of  the  four  Powers  in  the  Pacific,  why  ignore  Holland 
and  admit  France  into  the  entente?  French  posses- 
sions in  the  Pacific  are  negligible.  New  Caledonia, 
7,600  square  miles  in  area,  is  about  the  only  French  ter- 
ritory in  the  Pacific.  On  the  other  hand,  Holland  holds 
735,000  square  miles  of  Pacific  islands,  the  largest  of 
which  are  Java  and  Sumatra.  The  omission  of  Hol- 
land is  another  evidence  that  the  ultimate  and  real 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  61 

objective  of  this  treaty  is  not  the  protection  of  Pacific 
islands,  but  the  moral  effect  which  is  certain  to  be  pro- 
duced upon  the  world  by  the  proclamation,  and  the 
idea  implied  therein,  that  henceforward  the  four  domi- 
nant Powers  are  going  to  act  in  the  spirit  of  perfect  har- 
mony and  cooperation. 

It  is  not  correct  to  say,  as  has  been  said  by  some 
writers,  that  Japan  initiated  this  treaty,  although  there 
is  reason  to  believe  that  its  final  draft,  which  formed 
the  basis  of  the  treaty,  was  Baron  Shidehara's  work. 
Rumor  has  it  that  the  original  draft,  drawn  by  Mr. 
Balfour,  contained  phrases,  the  meaning  of  which  was 
hardly  compatible  with  American  traditions  concerning 
foreign  relations.  If  we  are  to  credit  any  single  nation 
with  the  initiative  of  the  new  treaty,  that  credit  should 
go  to  England.  But  perhaps  it  is  nearer  the  truth  to 
say  that  the  treaty  was  initiated  spontaneously  and 
simultaneously  by  Japan,  Britain,  and  America.  Each 
felt  almost  intuitively  what  the  others  -had  in  mind.  All 
knew  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  had  outlived  its 
necessity,  and  that  it  was  out  of  harmony  with  the  spirit 
of  the  times.  Mr.  Haniharekof  the  Japanese  delega- 
tion, in  comparing  the  new  entente  with  the  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance,  has  hit  upon  this  happy  simile,  "We  have 
discarded  whiskey  and  accepted  water."  It  was  per- 
haps Baron  Shidehara  who  took  the  "kick"  out  of  the 
original  British  draft,  and  thus  converted  the  treaty 
into  wholesome  "water"  acceptable  to  "dry"  America. 

Japan  welcomes  this  new  arrangement  because  it 
terminates  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  which  has  long 
been  a  great  obstacle  to  a  good  understanding  with 
America.  Now  that  this  obstacle  is  removed,  she 
hopes  that  her  efforts  for  winning  the  real  friendship 
of  this  country  will  be  rewarded  with  success.  Its  im- 
mediate benefit  will  be  to  expedite  the  solution  of  the 


62  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

naval  ratio  question.  As  long  as  Japan  was  in  alli- 
ance with  England,  the  United  States  had  justification 
for  fearing  the  Japanese  navy.  Now  that  the  dual 
alliance  is  definitely  dissolved,  the  American  Govern- 
ment will  not  hesitate  to  make  a  few  minor  concessions 
in  order  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Japan  on  the 
naval  ratio  question. 

The  Washington  Conference  and  the  new  Pacific 
Treaty  fulfill  this  prophesy  voiced  by  Colonel  Roosevelt 
twenty  years  ago : 

"The  Mediterranean  era  declined  with  the  Roman 
Empire  and  died  with  the  discovery  of  America.  The 
Atlantic  era  is  now  at  the  height  of  its  development  and 
must  soon  exhaust  the  resources  at  its  command.  The 
Pacific  era,  destined  to  be  the  greatest  of  all,  and  to 
bring  the  whole  human  race  at  last  into  one  great  comity 
of  nations,  is  just  at  the  dawn.  Man,  in  his  migration 
westward,  has  at  last  traversed  the  whole  round  of  the 
planet,  and  the  sons  of  the  newest  West  now  stand  on 
the  Pacific  Coast  of  America  and  touch  hands  across 
the  greatest  of  oceans  with  those  ancient  races  of  Asia 
which  have  from  time  immemorial  dwelt  in  their  pres- 
ent seats.  It  is  the  fate  of  the  American  nation  to  be 
placed  at  the  front  of  the  turmoil  that  must  accompany 
this  new  placing  of  the  peoples." 

The  new  Pacific  Treaty  is  an  announcement  to  the 
world  that  America  is  no  longer  to  stand  aloof  from 
the  adjustment  of  complicated  international  affairs,  and 
that  she  is  ready  to  play  the  most  important  role  upon 
the  new  stage  of  world  politics.  Unmistakably  and 
unhesitatingly  America  has  assumed  leadership  in  the 
adjustment  of  Far  Eastern  affairs. 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  63 

TEXT  OF  THE  PACIFIC  TREATY 
Signed  on  December  13,  1921 

The  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire, 
France  and  Japan,  with  a  view  to  the  preservation  of 
the  general  peace  and  the  maintenance  of  their  rights  in 
relation  to  their  insular  possessions  and  insular  domin- 
ions in  the  regions  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  have  determined 
to  conclude  a  treaty  to  this  effect  and  have  appointed 
as  their  plenipotentiaries  [here  follows  list  of  dele- 
gates], who,  having  communicated  their  full  powers, 
found  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows : 

ARTICLE  I 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  as  between  them- 
selves to  respect  their  rights  in  relation  to  their  insular 
possessions  and  insular  dominions  in  the  region  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean. 

If  there  should  develop  between  any  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  a  controversy  arising  out  of  any  Pacific 
question  and  involving  their  said  rights  which  is  not 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy  and  is  likely  to  affect 
the  harmonious  accord  now  happily  subsisting  between 
them,  they  shall  invite  the  other  high  contracting  parties 
to  a  joint  conference,  to  which  the  whole  subject  will  be 
referred  for  consideration  and  adjustment. 

ARTICLE  II 

If  the  said  rights  are  threatened  by  the  aggressive 
action  of  any  other  Power,  the  high  contracting  parties 
shall  communicate  with  one  another  fully  and  frankly 
in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  the  most 
efficient  measures  to  be  taken,  jointly  or  separately,  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  the  particular  situation. 


64  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


ARTICLE  III 

This  Treaty  shall  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from 
the  time  it  shall  take  effect,  and  after  the  expiration  of 
said  period  it  shall  continue  to  be  in  force  subject  to  the 
right  of  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  terminate 
it  upon  twelve  months'  notice. 

ARTICLE  IV 

This  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as  possible 
in  accordance  with  the  constitutional  methods  of  the 
high  contracting  parties,  and  shall  take  effect  on  the 
deposit  of  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Wash- 
ington, and  thereupon  the  agreement  between  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  which  was  concluded  at  London  on 
July  13,  1911,  shall  terminate.  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  will  transmit  to  all  the  Signatory 
Powers  a  certified  copy  of  the  proces  verbal  of  the  de- 
posit of  ratifications. 


TEXT  OF  AMERICA'S  RESERVATIONS  TO  THE 
PACIFIC  TREATY 

In  signing  the  treaty  this  day  between  the  United 
States  of  America,  the  British  Empire,  France  and 
Japan,  it  is  declared  to  be  the  understanding  and  intent 
of  the  signatory  Powers : 

1 .  That  the  treaty  shall  apply  to  the  mandated  islands 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean ;  provided,  however,  that  the  mak- 
ing of  the  treaty  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  an  assent 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  the  man- 
dates and  shall  not  preclude  agreements  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  mandatory  powers 
respectively  in  relation  to  the  mandated  islands. 

2.  That  the  controversies  to  which  the  second  para- 
graph of  Article  I  refers  shall  not  be  taken  to  embrace 
questions  which  according  to  principles  of  international 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  65 

law  lie  exclusively  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of 
the  respective  powers. 


THE  RESERVATION  ADOPTED  BY  THE 
SENATE,  MARCH  24,   1922 

The  United  States  understands  that  under  the  state- 
ment in  the  preamble  or  under  the  terms  of  this  treaty 
there  is  no  commitment  to  armed  force,  no  alliance,  no 
obligation  to  join  in  any  defense. 


CHAPTER   XII 
THE   AFTERMATH 

Washington,  December  24,  1921:  A  mingled  feel- 
ing of  amusement,  curiosity  and  regret  prevails  among 
the  non-official  Japanese  here  as  to  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  Japan  proper  comes  within  the  scope  of 
Article  II  of  the  four-power  treaty,  a  question  which 
has  blossomed  forth  into  animated  discussion  in  certain 
quarters.  The  more  serious-minded  patriots  from  the 
Mikado's  empire  are  inclined  to  take  it  as  an  affront 
to  Japan's  dignity  that  the  treaty  should  be  interpreted 
as  obligating  the  other  contracting  parties  to  extend 
even  a  moral  assistance  to  the  safeguarding  of  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  Japan  proper.  Quite  properly  they 
think  that  Japan  can  take  care  of  herself  as  far  as  the 
protection  of  her  main  islands  is  concerned,  and  that 
no  outsider  need  worry  about  it.  Meanwhile,  the 
Japanese  delegation  remain  discreetly  silent.  Appar- 
ently they  are  in  an  embarrassing  position. 

This  question  may  be  an  interesting  topic  to  a  hair- 
splitting jurist,  but  as  a  practical  matter  its  discussion 
is  not  worth  the  candle.  For  what  does  the  treaty  say? 
It  says  in  Article  I :  "The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  as  between  themselves  to  respect  their  rights  in 
relation  to  their  insular  possessions  and  insular  domin- 
ions in  the  regions  of  the  Pacific  Ocean."  And  in  Arti- 
cle II  the  treaty  goes  on  to  say:  "If  the  said  rights  are 
threatened  by  the  aggressive  action  of  any  other  Power, 
the  high  contracting  parties  shall  communicate  with 

66 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  67 

one  another  fully  and  frankly  in  order  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  as  to  the  most  efficient  measures  to  be 
taken,  jointly  or  separately,  to  meet  the  exigencies  of 
the  particular  situation." 

Now  where  in  the  whole  world  can  you  find  a  Power 
— a  third  nation  which  is  outside  the  group  formed  by 
this  treaty — strong  enough  to  menace  or  attack  in  the 
coming  ten  years  any  of  the  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
much  less  the  main  islands  of  Japan?  The  duration 
of  the  treaty  is  limited  to  ten  years.  In  ten  years*  time 
neither  Germany  nor  Russia  will  regain  their  former 
prowess.  And  besides  these  two  nations  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  nation  on  earth  which  is  likely  to  spell  danger 
to  the  Pacific. 

How  this  controversy  originated  and  has  become  so 
seriously  considered  is  interesting  only  as  a  matter  of 
history.  When  the  treaty  was  discussed  by  the  "Big 
Three,"  Mr.  Balfour  proposed  that,  inasmuch  as  Aus- 
tralia and  New  Zealand  came  within  its  scope,  Japan 
proper  should  also  be  included  in  it.  The  Japanese 
delegate,  knowing  that  the  point  was  not  very  impor- 
tant, raised  no  objection.  And  so  the  question  was 
readily  disposed  of,  as  far  as  the  three  delegations  were 
concerned. 

For  several  days  after  the  announcement  of  the 
treaty  at  the  plenary  session  of  December  9,  the  matter 
rested  there,  no  outsider  having  raised  a  question  as 
to  the  territorial  scope  of  the  treaty.  Then  came  Mr. 
Hughes'  answer  to  a  newspaper  reporter's  query, 
definitely  stating  that  the  protection  of  the  treaty  was 
applicable  to  Japan  proper. 

In  the  meantime  the  Japanese  delegation  received 
instructions  from  the  home  government,  advising  it  to 
secure  the  exemption  of  Japan  proper  from  the  scope 
of  the  treaty.  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  why  the 


68  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Foreign  Office  at  Tokyo  dispatched  such  instructions 
after  its  delegation  had  definitely  accepted  the  British 
and  American  interpretation  of  the  treaty.  In  view 
of  the  trivial  nature  of  the  question,  it  seems  hardly 
worth  while  for  Japan  to  raise  controversy  over  it  and 
advise  her  delegation  to  go  back  on  the  commitment  it 
had  already  made.  The  only  plausible  explanation 
for  this  peculiar  action  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese 
Government  may  be  found  in  the  objection  raised  by 
a  chauvinistic  section  of  the  Japanese  press,  which 
seems  to  attach  an  exaggerated  importance  to  national 
dignity  and  honor.  At  any  rate  the  eleventh-hour 
objection  of  the  Japanese  delegation  must  have  puzzled 
Mr.  Hughes  and  his  colleagues  and  made  them  think 
that  the  Japanese  were  a  queer  lot. 

When  the  question  of  the  territorial  scope  of  the 
Pacific  Treaty  began  to  attract  public  attention,  Presi- 
dent Harding,  for  some  reason  unknown  to  the  out- 
sider, made  it  known  that  he  believed  the  treaty  to 
exclude  Japan  proper  from  its  scope.  This  of  course 
made  confusion  worse  confounded.  The  President's 
statement  was  particularly  mystifying  because  it  fol- 
lowed upon  the  heels  of  Secretary  Hughes'  statement 
giving  the  contrary  interpretation  of  the  treaty.  Did 
not  the  Secretary  of  State  keep  the  President  posted  as 
to  the  meaning  of  the  treaty?  Was  the  President  too 
busy  to  notice  Mr.  Hughes'  utterances  which  had  been 
widely  published  in  the  newspapers?  These  questions 
perplexed  the  public  mind.  Fortunately,  Mr.  Harding 
had  no  intention  to  enter  into  controversy  with  Mr. 
Hughes  on  this  matter,  and  got  out  of  the  somewhat 
awkward  situation,  or  rather  smoothed  it  over,  with  a 
graceful  and  diplomatic  statement.  Nevertheless,  the 
responsible  Japanese  both  here  and  at  home  have  genu- 
inely regretted  that  the  President  has  been  put  to  an 


THE    PACIFIC    TREATY  69 

embarrassment  which  might  have  been  avoided.  They 
feel  they  are  indirectly  responsible  for  the  President's 
embarrassment  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  interpre- 
tation in  question  concerns  their  own  country. 

The  Japanese  delegation,  acting  upon  the  instruc- 
tions from  Tokyo,  has  asked  Mr.  Hughes  and  Mr. 
Balfour  that  the  treaty  be  so  interpreted  as  to  exempt 
Japan  proper  from  its  purview.  It  goes  without  say- 
ing that  this  request  has  met  with  a  ready  and  favorable 
response.  What  sensible  man  cares  to  make  ado  about 
such  a  trivial  matter  ? 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE   PACIFIC  TREATY 

NOTE:  In  compliance  with  the  request  of  the  Japanese  Delegation, 
the  following  supplement  is  attached  to  the  Four-Power  Treaty,  thus 
excluding  Japan  proper  from  the  scope  of  the  treaty. — THE  AUTHOR. 

The  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire, 
France  and  Japan  have,  through  their  respective  pleni- 
potentiaries, agreed  upon  the  following  stipulations  sup- 
plementary to  the  quadruple  treaty  signed  at  Washing- 
ton, December  13,  1921: 

The  term  "insular  possessions  and  insular  domin- 
ions," used  in  the  aforesaid  treaty  shall,  in  its  applica- 
tion to  Japan,  include  only  Kararuto  (or  the  southern 
portion  of  the  Island  Sakhaline),  Formosa,  and  the 
Pescadores  and  the  islands  under  the  mandate  of  Japan. 

The  present  agreement  shall  have  the  same  force  and 
effect  as  the  said  treaty  to  which  it  is  supplementary. 

The  provision  of  Article  4  of  the  aforesaid  treaty  of 
December  13,  1921,  relating  to  ratification,  shall  be 
applicable  to  the  present  agreement,  which  in  French 
and  English  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified 


70  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government 
to  each  of  the  other  contracting  powers. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  agreement. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington  the  sixth  day  of 
February,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-two. 


PART  III 
THE   RIDDLE   OF   CHINA 


PART   III 
THE   RIDDLE   OF   CHINA 


CHAPTER   XIII 
CHINA'S    "BILL   OF    RIGHTS" 

Washington,  November  17,  1921:  Yesterday  the 
Chinese  delegation  placed  upon  the  conference  table  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  China's  hopes  and  expecta- 
tions at  this  Conference.  Some  of  my  American  col- 
leagues of  the  Fourth  Estate  call  it  China's  "Bill  of 
Rights."  Let  us  hope  that  such  it  will  prove  to  be. 

Gossip  has  been  current  as  to  the  authorship  of  the 
memorandum.  Some  say  Mr.  Lansing  wrote  it,  others 
credit  Dr.  Reinsch  with  its  authorship.  Still  others 
think  that  the  document  is  a  joint  work  of  Messrs. 
Thomas  Millard  and  Putnam  Weale.  The  more  com- 
mon gossip  is  that  Dr.  John  C.  Ferguson  is  responsible 
for  it.  For  China  is  a  country  where  foreign  advisers 
are  "in  flower."  But  the  authorship  question  is  trivial. 
We  must  dismiss  foolish  gossip  and  consider  the  memo- 
randum upon  its  own  merits.  We  must  approach  it, 
moreover,  in  a  friendly  feeling  and  in  the  spirit  of  can- 
dor and  fairness.  (The  full  text  of  the  memorandum 
will  be  found  at  the  end  of  the  chapter.) 

At  the  same  time  we  must  ask  the  Americans  to 
purge  themselves  of  the  mawkish  sentimentality  which 
they  are  prone  to  entertain  in  discussing  China.  That 

73 


74  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

we  must  be  sympathetic  toward  her,  goes  without  say- 
ing, but  sympathy,  divorced  from  frankness  and  critical 
observation,  contributes  nothing  towards  the  clarifica- 
tion of  the  Chinese  question,  much  less  towards  its 
solution. 

It  is  commonly  conceded  that  one  of  the  principal 
objects  of  the  Chinese  memorandum  is  to  forestall  the 
conclusion  of  any  treaty  affecting  China  without  con- 
sulting her.  It  carries  with  it  an  unmistakable  expres- 
sion of  displeasure  over  various  treaties  which  vitally 
affect  her,  but  which  have  been  concluded  without  con- 
sulting her.  Evidently,  the  Chinese  delegates  have  in 
mind  especially  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of  1902 
and  1905,  the  Russo-Japanese  entente  of  1907  and 
1910,  and  the  Franco-Japanese  agreement  of  June, 
1907. 

No  fair-minded  man  can  be  callous  to  China's  con- 
tention that  no  treaty,  affecting  her  interest,  be  con- 
cluded between  Powers  without  first  consulting  her. 
At  the  same  time,  we  must,  in  the  name  of  candor  and 
fairness,  ask  China  to  examine  herself,  and  especially 
her  past.  We  must  ask  her  to  consider  her  own  condi- 
tion in  the  past  several  decades,  and  see  whether  she 
can  find  reason  to  appreciate  those  instruments  con- 
cluded over  her  head. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  China 
stood  upon  the  verge  of  dismemberment.  St.  Peters- 
burg, Berlin,  Paris,  Vienna,  and  London  were  seriously 
talking  of  the  partitioning  of  China.  When  the  cur- 
tain rose  upon  the  twentieth  century,  the  condition  was 
going  from  bad  to  worse. 

Only  by  the  deadly  blow  Japan  dealt  to  the  imperial 
ambition  of  Russia  in  the  titanic  war  of  1904-5,  was 
the  disruption  of  China  prevented.  But  for  that  war 
where  would  China  have  been  today?  America  was 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  75 

friendly  and  sorry  for  China,  but  was  no  more  willing 
to  fight  for  her  against  Russia  than  for  the  Hottentots 
of  Africa.  England,  though  in  alliance  with  Japan, 
did  not  care  to  fight.  Had  Russia  had  her  own  way, 
absorbed  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  and  encroached 
upon  China  proper,  other  powers  would  have  surely 
followed  suit  in  other  parts  of  China. 

It  may  be  hard  for  China  to  admit  this,  but  no  un- 
biased historian  can  deny  it.  Japan,  having  defeated 
Russia,  paved  the  way  to  an  entente  with  her  former 
foe,  for  she  could  not  afford  to  fight  Russia  perpetually 
for  the  sake  of  China.  Thus  the  Russo-Japanese 
entente  of  1907  recognizes  "the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  China,  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity  in  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations 
in  that  country."  The  Franco-Japanese  agreement  of 
June,  1907,  was  concluded  for  a  similar  purpose.  It 
has  also  been  one  of  the  main  objects  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance. 

However  distasteful  to  us  it  may  be,  we  must  admit 
that  China's  territorial  integrity  has  been  saved  mainly 
because  the  Powers,  by  such  instruments  as  I  have  men- 
tioned, agreed  not  to  destroy  it.  Cynical  critics  may 
regard  those  instruments  as  a  manifestation  of  a  sordid 
international  jealousy.  But  the  fact  remains  that  had 
the  Powers  agreed  to  partition,  and  not  to  preserve, 
her,  China  would  have  ceased  years  ago  to  exist  as  an 
independent  nation. 

Frank  admission  of  such  facts  on  the  part  of  China 
would  be  conducive  to  a  harmonious  and  friendly  under- 
standing between  her  and  the  Powers.  Once  this  is 
admitted,  the  interested  powers  may  be  willing  to 
formulate  at  the  present  Conference  a  broad  interna- 
tional understanding,  in  which  China  will  of  course  be 
represented,  and  whose  purpose  will  be  to  insure  China's 


76  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC   POLICY 

existing  integrity.  I  can  see  no  reason  why  such  an 
agreement  should  not  replace  numerous  treaties  and 
understandings  which  have  in  the  past  been  concluded 
among  the  Powers  over  China's  head. 

While  the  Chinese  delegates  are  urging  at  the  Con- 
ference the  abolition  of  extraterritoriality,  the  restora- 
tion of  tariff  autonomy,  the  removal  of  foreign  troops, 
and  so  forth,  what  are  the  Chinese  at  home  thinking 
about  these  things?  Advices  from  various  sources  in 
the  Orient  indicate  that  they  take  little  or  no  interest 
in  the  rights  for  which  their  delegation  at  Washington 
is  fighting  so  valiantly.  They  are  supremely  indiffer- 
ent to  politics,  whether  domestic  or  international. 
Those  of  the  Chinese  who  think  deeply  and  dispassion- 
ately expect  little  from  the  Washington  Conference, 
because  they  know  that  after  all  China's  salvation  must 
come  from  within.  Mr.  George  E.  Soks,  the  Shanghai 
correspondent  of  the  Japan  Advertiser,  the  American 
newspaper  in  Tokyo,  gives  what  appears  to  be  a  cor- 
rect estimate  of  the  real  sentiment  among  the  Chinese 
concerning  this  Conference  and  the  activities  of  the 
Chinese  delegates  here,  when  he  writes  as  follows: 

"The  net  result  of  all  the  agitation  in  China  attend- 
ing the  Paris  Conference  was  that  the  Chinese  people 
became  convinced  that  there  was  no  short  cut  to  the 
rejuvenation  of  China  and  that  it  would  be  a  slow  proc- 
ess in  which  only  the  Chinese  themselves  could  take 
any  active  part.  This  is  not  what  the  foreign  propa- 
gandists of  either  the  Peking  or  the  Canton  govern- 
ment are  saying,  but  it  is  largely  so,  as  one  can  gather 
from  the  better  class  of  the  vernacular  press  and 
through  conversations  with  leaders,  not  among  the  poli- 
ticians, but  among  the  merchants,  bankers,  industrial- 
ists, etc.  .  .  . 

"Nobody  in  China,  except  a  few  returned  students, 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  77 

takes  seriously  the  demands  for  the  full  return  to  China 
of  rights  lost  during  the  past  century.  These  returned 
students  are  out  of  touch  with  their  countrymen  and 
view  China  as  distantly  as  does  the  average  foreigner. 
Many  of  them  are  unable  to  read  Chinese.  Some  of 
the  Chinese  delegates  to  the  Washington  Conference 
are  unable  to  read  or  write  Chinese.  They  of  course 
know  English  or  French.  But  these  languages  are  not 
known  to  the  Chinese  people.  These  returned  students 
gauge  politics  in  China  from  western  standards.  They 
seem  to  be  altogether  oblivious  to  the  needs  of  their 
own  people  and  the  conditions  of  their  country.  It  is 
an  interesting  comment  on  their  ability  to  make  them- 
selves felt  in  China  when  one  realizes  that  there  is  not 
a  single  returned  student  on  any  daily  newspaper  in 
Shanghai  published  in  the  Chinese  language." 


TEXT  OF  THE  CHINESE  MEMORANDUM  SUB- 
MITTED TO  THE  FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE 
BY  MR.  SZE,  NOVEMBER  16,  1921 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  China  must  necessarily  play 
an  important  part  in  the  deliberations  of  this  Confer- 
ence with  reference  to  the  political  situation  in  the  Far 
East,  the  Chinese  delegation  has  thought  it  proper  that 
they  should  take  the  first  possible  opportunity  to  state 
certain  general  principles  which,  in  their  opinion,  should 
guide  the  Conference  in  the  determinations  which  it  is 
to  make. 

Certain  of  the  specific  applications  of  the  principles, 
which  it  is  expected  that  the  Conference  will  make,  it 
is  our  intention  later  to  bring  forward,  but  at  the  pres- 
ent time  it  is  deemed  sufficient  simply  to  propose  the 
principles  which  I  shall  presently  read. 

In  formulating  these  principles,  the  purpose  has  been 


78  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

kept  steadily  in  view  of  obtaining  rules  in  accordance 
with  which  existing  and  possible  future  political  and 
economic  problems  in  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific  may 
be  most  justly  settled  with  due  regard  to  the  rights  and 
legitimate  interests  of  all  the  powers  concerned.  Thus 
it  has  been  sought  to  harmonize  the  particular  interests 
of  China  with  the  general  interests  of  all  the  world. 

China  is  anxious  to  play  her  part,  not  only  in  main- 
taining peace,  but  in  promoting  the  material  advance- 
ments and  the  cultural  developments  of  all  the  nations. 
She  wishes  to  make  her  vast  natural  resources  available 
to  all  peoples  who  need  them,  and  in  return  to  receive 
the  benefits  of  free  and  equal  intercourse  with  them. 

In  order  that  she  may  do  this,  it  is  necessary  that  she 
should  have  every  possible  opportunity  to  develop  her 
political  institutions  in  accordance  with  the  genius  and 
needs  of  her  own  people.  China  is  now  contending 
with  certain  difficult  problems  which  necessarily  arise, 
when  any  country  makes  a  radical  change  in  its  form 
of  government. 

These  problems  she  will  be  able  to  solve  if  given 
the  opportunity  to  do  so.  This  means  not  only  that  she 
should  be  freed  from  the  danger  or  threat  of  foreign 
aggression,  but  that,  so  far  as  circumstances  will  possi- 
bly permit,  she  be  relieved  from  limitations  which  now 
deprive  her  of  autonomous  administrative  action  and 
prevent  her  from  securing  adequate  public  revenue. 

In  conformity  with  the  agenda  of  the  Conference, 
the  Chinese  Government  proposes  for  the  consideration 
of  and  adoption  by  the  Conference  the  following  gen- 
eral principles  to  be  applied  in  the  determination  of  the 
questions  relating  to  China : 

1.  (a)  The  powers  engage  to  respect  and  observe  the 
territorial  integrity  and  political  and  administrative  in- 
dependence of  the  Chinese  Republic. 

(b)  China  upon  her  part  is  prepared  to  give  an 
undertaking  not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  portion  of  her 
territory  or  littoral  to  any  Power. 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  79 

2.  China,  being  in  full  accord  with  the  principle  of 
the  so-called  open  door  or  equal  opportunity  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  the  nations  having  treaty 
relations  with  China,  is  prepared  to  accept  and  apply 
it  in  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  republic  without  exception. 

3.  With  a  view  to  strengthening  mutual  confidence 
and  maintaining  peace  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East, 
the  powers  agree  not  to  conclude  between  themselves 
any  treaty  or  agreement  directly  affecting  China  or  the 
general  peace  in  these  regions  without  previously  notify- 
ing China  and  giving  to  her  an  opportunity  to  par- 
ticipate. 

4.  All  special  rights,  privileges,  immunities  or  com- 
mitments,   whatever    their    character   or    contractural 
basis,  claimed  by  any  of  the  Powers  in  or  relating  to 
China,   are   to   be   declared,   and   all   such   or   future 
claims  not  so  made  known  are  to  be  deemed  null  and 
void.     The  rights,  privileges,  immunities  and  commit- 
ments now  known  or  to  be  declared  are  to  be  examined 
with  a  view  to  determining  their  scope  and  validity  and, 
if  valid,  to  harmonizing  them  with  one  another  and 
with  the  principles  declared  by  this  Conference. 

5.  Immediately,   or   as  soon   as  circumstances  will 
permit,  existing  limitations  upon  China's  political,  juris- 
dictional,  and  administrative  freedom  of  action  are  to 
be  removed. 

6.  Reasonable,  definite  terms  of  duration  are  to  be 
attached  to  China's  present  commitments,  which  are 
without  time  limits. 

7.  In  the  interpretation  of  instruments  granting  spe- 
cial rights  or  privileges,  the  well-established  principle  of 
construction  that  such  grants  shall  be  strictly  construed 
in  favor  of  the  grantors  is  to  be  observed. 

8.  China's  rights  as  a  neutral  are  to  be  fully  re- 
spected in  future  wars  to  which  she  is  not  a  party. 

9.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  international  disputes  in  the  Pacific  and  the 
Far  East 


80  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

10.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  future  conferences 
to  be  held  from  time  to  time  for  the  discussion  of  inter- 
national questions  relative  to  the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East,  as  a  basis  for  determination  of  common  policies 
of  the  signatory  powers  in  relation  thereto. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
CHINA  AT   HOME   AND  AT  WASHINGTON 

Washington,  November  18,  ig2i:  The  more 
closely  one  studies  the  Chinese  "Bill  of  Rights1*  and 
the  utterances  of  the  Chinese  delegates,  the  more  appre- 
hensive one  becomes  of  their  ability  to  "put  it  over"  at 
this  Conference.  One  cannot  but  fear  that  their  pre- 
tentions  may  in  the  end  alienate  the  sympathy  of  the 
well-informed,  who,  however  friendly  towards  China, 
can  not  close  their  eyes  to  the  unhappy  condition  pre- 
vailing in  that  country.  Indeed  one  feels  that  China 
has  hitched  her  wagon  to  a  star,  utterly  ignoring  its 
rickety  condition.  Whether  this  fear  is  justified  we 
shall  know  before  the  Conference  comes  to  an  end. 

Critics  certainly  are  not  lacking  who  think  China's 
case  is  hopeless.  Keen  observers  like  J.  O.  P.  Bland 
are  dead  sure  about  it.  Such  extreme  views  can  not 
be  shared  by  sympathetic  critics.  We  think  that  China, 
in  spite  of  many  discouraging  symptoms,  is  not  hope- 
lessly sick.  With  the  sympathetic  assistance  of  friendly 
nations,  of  which  America  must  be  the  leader,  China 
may  turn  a  new  leaf  and  become  a  united,  orderly  and 
organized  nation. 

China  herself  must  admit  that  foreign  assistance  is 
absolutely  necessary  for  her  regeneration.  Her  memo- 
randum intimates  abhorrence  of  anything  that  savors 
of  foreign  interference.  But  she  must  know  that  for- 
eign supervision  in  some  of  her  administrative  depart- 
ments has  conferred  a  great  material  benefit. 

81 


82  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

One  of  the  most  difficult  problems  for  China  is  the 
readjustment  of  her  finances.  It  is  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge  that  the  Government  at  Peking  has  for  years 
been  upon  the  verge  of  bankruptcy.  Today  the  monthly 
deficit  of  the  Chinese  Government  amounts  to  $9,000,- 
000.  Its  foreign  debts,  making  due  allowance  for  the 
recent  fall  in  foreign  exchange,  exceed  $2,000,000,000. 

With  a  deficit  of  $9,000,000  every  month,  how  does 
the  Chinese  Government  manage  to  continue  its  exis- 
tence? In  the  past  it  has  existed  mainly,  almost  en- 
tirely, by  borrowing  foreign  cash  in  the  most  reckless 
manner.  It  has  been  ready  to  offer  almost  any  con- 
cession for  ready  cash,  for  that  has  been  the  only  means 
by  which  the  Government  could  eke  out  an  existence. 
Foreign  money-lenders,  including  Japanese,  have  vied 
with  one  another  in  taking  advantage  of  this  condition, 
and  offered  money  for  railway  or  mining  concessions.^ 

One  often  hears  superficial  critics  accuse  Japan  or 
taking  undue  advantage  of  China's  financial  chaos. 
But  we  must  sympathize  with  Japan  for  her  peculiarly 
difficult  position  in  dealing  with  China.  China  sorely 
needs  money,  and  she  does  not  care  where  she  gets  it. 
Various  factions — those  in  power  at  Peking  as  well  as 
those  opposing  them — would  say  to  Japan :  "We  want 
you  to  lend  us  money.  You  cannot  afford  to  refuse. 
If  you  do  not  accommodate  us,  we  will  borrow  from 
some  other  nation,  and  that  would  be  detrimental  to 
your  prestige  and  influence  in  our  country."  s 

I  know  for  one  thing  that  the  anti-Japanese  policy  of 
the  Provisional  Government  at  Canton  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  Japan  does  not  advance  any  loan  to  it.  The 
Japanese  Government,  having  recognized  Peking  as 
the  only  legitimate  government  of  China,  does  not  care 
to  carry  water  upon  both  shoulders.  I  know  that  the 
Sun  Yatsen  Government  at  Canton,  while  spreading 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  83 

anti-Japanese  propaganda,  has  at  various  times  sent 
emissaries  to  Tokyo  for  the  purpose  of  exacting  money 
from  the  Japanese  Treasury.  I  am  absolutely  sure 
that  if  Tokyo  allowed  herself  to  be  coaxed,  not  to  say 
blackmailed,  to  lend  money,  the  anti-Japanese  vocifera- 
tions of  the  Canton  Government  will  cease  as  if  by 
magic. 

Fortunately  or  unfortunately  for  China,  the  advent 
of  the  new  International  Consortium  has  put  an  end 
to  reckless  money-borrowing  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese 
Government.  The  interested  Powers  have  agreed  not 
to  compete  with  one  another  in  advancing  loans  to 
China.  The  international  bankers  think  it  unwise, 
under  the  present  chaotic  conditions  in  China,  to  make 
loans  to  Peking.  The  result  is  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment is  at  its  wit's  end. 

I  have  before  me  the  China  Year  Book  for  1921-22. 
It  says : 

"The  reorganization  of  the  whole  financial  system 
of  China,  admitted  by  common  consent  to  be  a  pressing 
necessity,  still  meets  with  insuperable  difficulties,  of 
which  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  country  is  not  the 
least.  Ever  since  the  Chang  Hsun  coup  in  1917,  the 
authority  of  the  Central  Government  has  been  merely 
nominal,  even  in  those  provinces  which  still  recognize 
their  allegiance  to  Peking.  Little  or  no  revenue,  other 
than  that  under  foreign  control,  ever  finds  its  way  from 
the  provinces  to  Peking.  On  the  contrary,  the  Gov- 
ernment is  constantly  blackmailed  by  Tuchuns  [mili- 
tary governors]  and  militarists  for  funds  with  which 
to  pacify  their  huge  standing  armies,  the  pay  of  which 
is  always  in  arrears." 

This  is  the  financial  condition  which  confronts  China 
as  the  representatives  of  the  interested  nations  sit  at 
the  conference  table  at  Washington  and  listen  to  the 


84  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

high  aspirations  voiced  by  China's  delegates.  How 
are  the  friendly  Powers  going  to  meet  that  condition? 
It  must  be  met  somehow  if  their  professed  desire  to 
help  China  means  anything. 

One  thing  the  nations  may  do  for  China  at  this  Con- 
ference is  the  cancellation  of  the  balance  of  the  Boxer 
indemnity.  This  will  relieve  China  of  a  yearly  pay- 
ment of  some  $8,877,000  Mexican. 

Another  thing  the  Conference  may  do  is  to  raise  the 
customs  tariff.  China's  annual  receipts  from  import 
duties  amount  to  some  $60,000,000  Mexican,  almost 
all  of  which  is  devoted  to  payments  on  foreign  loans. 
If  the  present  tariff,  which  was  fixed  more  than  twenty 
years  ago,  is  revised  equitably,  this  revenue  will  increase 
at  least  to  some  $100,000,000. 

I  wish  Japan  were  in  a  position  to  propose  at  this 
Conference  the  cancellation  of  the  Boxer  indemnity 
and  the  revision  of  the  tariff.  Due  to  her  delicate  rela- 
tions with  China,  Japan  would  hesitate  to  offer  such 
proposals,  for  she  is  afraid  of  those  ill-advised  men 
who  would  impute  ulterior  motives  to  every  movement 
Japan  may  make.  These  men  may  interpret  such  pro- 
posals, if  made  by  Japan,  as  a  sop  to  placate  China. 
In  the  opinion  of  authoritative  Japanese,  the  United 
States  should  assume  leadership  in  finding  means  for 
the  alleviation  of  China's  financial  strain. 

Granted  that  the  Conference  agrees  upon  the  can- 
cellation of  the  Boxer  indemnity  and  the  increase  of 
the  tariff,  will  China  rise  to  the  occasion  and  make 
honest  endeavor  to  set  her  finances  aright?  That  is 
the  big  eternal  question. 


CHAPTER   XV 
CHINA'S   CHAOTIC   FINANCES 

Washington,  November  23,  1921:  Five  days  ago 
I  advocated  the  revision  of  the  customs  tariff  of  China, 
and  ventured  the  prediction  that  America  might  assume 
leadership  in  securing  this  measure.  I  had  reason  to 
believe  that  Japan  was  in  favor  of  revising  the  Chinese 
tariff  so  as  to  relieve  the  financial  straits  of  the  Gov- 
ernment at  Peking,  but  that  she  hesitated  to  proffer 
such  a  proposal  because  of  her  delicate  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  China.  America,  I  thought,  was  the  only 
logical  country  to  take  the  initiative. 

The  above  prediction  came  true  yesterday  when  Sena- 
tor Underwood,  on  behalf  of  the  American  delegation, 
proposed  that  an  investigation  be  made  with  a  view  to 
relieving  China's  financial  strain  by  raising  the  rate  of 
the  customs  tariff.  The  next  movement  America  might 
make  would  be  to  propose  the  inclusion  or  admission  of 
Chinese  banking  interests  in  the  International  Financial 
Consortium  organized  in  1919  under  the  leadership  of 
Mr.  Thomas  Lamont. 

The  third  step  America  might  take  for  the  alleviation 
of  China's  financial  predicament  would  be  to  ask  other 
powers  to  cancel  the  balance  of  the  Boxer  indemnity. 
In  all  these  proposals  America  may  count  upon  Japan's 
hearty  cooperation. 

Supposing  that  all  such  favorable  measures  were 
adopted  for  China  through  the  good  will  of  the  nations 

85 


86  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

represented  at  this  Conference,  it  would  be  a  Herculean 
task  to  put  her  finances  upon  a  sound  base. 

Let  us  consider  China's  national  loans.  Under  the 
old  imperial  regime  the  indebtedness  of  the  Chinese 
Government  was  small  as  compared  with  what  it  is 
today.  Up  to  1900,  the  indebtedness  amounted  to 
$278,775,000,  while  by  1910  it  had  increased  to, 
roughly,  $400,000,000.  That  was  the  position  at  the 
time  the  Republic  was  set  up,  soon  after  which  China's 
indebtedness  was  again  increased  by  an  international 
loan  (Reorganization  Loan)  of  $125,000,000.  The 
foreign  debt  had  by  1914  grown  to  $550,000,000,  but 
since  that  time  loan  after  loan  has  been  negotiated  until 
today  China's  internal  as  well  as  external  indebtedness 
is  estimated  to  be  many  times  that  of  her  pre-Republi- 
can  days. 

According  to  the  China  Year  Book  for  1920-21, 
China's  domestic  and  foreign  loans  amount  to  a  billion 
dollars  gold  at  the  present  rate  of  exchange.  It  is 
estimated  that  since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic 
in  1911,  China  has  been  borrowing  at  the  rate  of 
$50,000,000  gold  every  year  for  no  enterprise  of  pro- 
ductive nature  but  purely  for  administrative  expenses. 

The  balance  sheet  of  the  Central  Government  of 
China  shows  enormous  deficit.  When  Mr.  Lament  was 
in  Peking  in  April,  1920,  Premier  Chun  told  him  that 
the  monthly  administrative  expenditure  of  the  Peking 
Government  was  $16,000,000  Mexican  as  against  an 
income  of  $6,000,000.  Here  was  a  clear  deficit  of 
$10,000,000  every  month.  The  China  Year  Book 
estimates  the  deficit  for  last  year  at  $9,000,000  Mex- 
ican per  month. 

More  recently,  the  Yih  Shih  Pao,  one  of  the  leading 
vernacular  papers  in  Peking,  stated  that  in  October, 
1921,  the  civil  and  military  expenses  of  the  Chinese 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  87 

Government  in  arrears  amounted  to  $145,730,000 
Mexican,  against  which  the  only  income  in  sight  was 
$4,000,000,  mostly  from  a  new  wine  and  tobacco  loan. 
This  newspaper  gives  the  following  table  of  the  yearly 
revenue  of  the  Chinese  Government  since  the  seventh 
year  of  the  Republic,  that  is,  1918: 

( 1 )  Land  Taxes,  $85,000,000,  of  which  the  Central 
Government  merely  receives  written  reports,  the  cash 
being  retained  by  the  Provinces. 

(2)  Salt   revenue,    $80,000,000,   of   which   nearly 
$75,000,000  has  gone  to  the  repayment  of  foreign  loans 
while  the  balance  has  been  mortgaged. 

(3)  Customs  receipts,  $65,000,000,  practically  all 
of  which  has  been  set  aside  for  payments  on  foreign 
loans. 

(4)  Domestic   customs    receipts,    such   as   city   or 
provincial   customs,   $7,000,000,   of  which  less   than 
$6,000,000  has  reached  Peking. 

(5)  Taxes  on  goods,  $34,000,000,  all  of  which  has 
been  spent  by  provincial  governments. 

(6)  Stamp  duty,  wine   and  tobacco  duty  and  the 
sale  of  public  properties,  $21,000,000,  most  of  which 
has  been  seized  by  the  Provinces,  so  that  only  a  little 
more  than  $7,000,000  has  reached  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. 

(7)  Other   supplementary  taxes,   of  which   about 
$7,000,000  has  gone  into  the  Peking  treasury. 

The  Yih  Shih  Pao  also  gives  the  following  table  for 
the  expenditure  of  the  Chinese  Government : 

(1)  Reimbursements  on  national  loans,  $115,000,- 
000   of   which   $70,000,000  is   due    to    foreign    and 
$45,000,000  to  domestic  loans. 

(2)  Civil  expenses,  $140,000,000. 

(3)  Amount  drawn  from  the  Peking  Government 
by  the  provincial  governments,  $68,000,000. 


88  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

(4)   Military  expenses,  $210,000,000. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  salaries  of  officials  are 
always  in  arrears.  Many  officials  receive  no  pay  for 
five  to  ten  months.  Chinese  custom  requires  the  pay- 
ment by  all  means  of  salaries  of  officials  and  allowances 
of  soldiers  before  the  autumn  festival  which  this  year 
fell  on  September  16.  At  that  time  salaries  and  allow- 
ances in  arrears  amounted  to  $25,000,000  Mexican. 
To  tide  over  this  difficulty  the  Peking  Government  ap- 
pealed to  the  Association  of  Chinese  Banks,  and  seems 
to  have  succeeded  in  raising  at  least  part  of  the  sum 
needed. 

On  July  20  this  year  the  Chinese  Government  issued 
a  domestic  loan  act,  and  tried  to  raise  $30,000,000  by 
the  aid  of  native  bankers.  But  the  security  offered  was 
not  satisfactory,  and  the  Chinese  bankers  have  not  yet 
taken  action.  This  is  clear  evidence  that  the  Chinese 
Government  has  lost  credit  among  the  native  bankers. 

The  chaotic  condition  of  China's  financial  affairs  may 
be  judged  from  the  fact  that  General  Wu  Peifu,  unable 
to  get  from  Peking  the  necessary  fund  to  maintain 
his  army,  has  arbitrarily  seized  the  receipts  of  the 
southern  section  of  the  Peking-Hankow  railway,  a  gov- 
ernment line. 

Another  instance.  Up  to  July,  1921,  the  Treasury 
owed  the  office  of  the  President  $2,700,000.  After  re- 
peated requests  the  President's  office  received  a  check 
for  only  $50,000,  but  even  this  the  Bank  of  China  re- 
fused to  honor. 

On  August  26  this  year  the  Army  Department 
claimed  the  payment  of  $77,800,000,  which  has  been 
in  arrears  for  two  years.  Needless  to  say,  this  has 
never  been  paid. 

[Seven  weeks  after  this  chapter  was  written,  that  is, 
on  January  13,  1922,  seven  of  the  warships  of  the 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  89 

Peking  Government's  navy  left  Shanghai  for  Shiherh- 
wei,  near  Yangchow,  in  the  Province  of  Kiang-su,  the 
commanders  announcing  their  intention  of  collecting  the 
salt  duties  there  to  obtain  money  with  which  to  buy 
food  for  their  sailors.  The  crews  of  the  vessels  had 
received  no  wages  for  the  last  six  months,  and  their 
officers  asserted  before  sailing  that  their  action  was 
necessary  to  prevent  the  starvation  of  their  men. 
Shiherhwei  is  the  point  at  which  salt  is  trans-shipped 
from  the  region  north  of  the  Yangtse  River  valley.] 

The  only  secure  income  of  the  Chinese  Government 
is  the  surplus  of  receipts  from  the  Customs  tariff  and 
the  salt  gabelle,  that  is,  the  sum  left  after  paying  inter- 
est upon  various  foreign  loans. 

Now  the  foreign  loans  secured  on  the  tariff  and  the 
salt  gabelle  reach  the  enormous  sum  of  $1,230,000,- 
000.  Annual  interest  on  these  loans  amount  to 
some  $70,000,000  which  must  be  paid  from  the  receipts 
from  the  customs  tariff  and  the  salt  gabelle. 

Up  to  1916,  there  was  no  surplus  from  these  receipts, 
but  every  penny  had  been  paid  for  interest  upon  for- 
eign loans.  From  1917  to  1920,  mainly  due  to  the 
abnormal  inflation  of  the  value  of  silver,  customs  re- 
ceipts increased  phenomenally.  The  application  of  the 
new  tariff  rate  in  August,  1918,  also  contributed  to  the 
enhancement  of  the  customs  revenue.  The  result  was 
that  during  those  four  years  the  surplus  from  the  cus- 
toms receipts  ranged  from  $8,571,000  to  $33,000,000. 
This  was  what  relieved  China  considerably  during  the 
last  few  years.  The  postponement  of  the  Boxer  in- 
demnity for  five  years  from  1918  has  also  relieved 
the  situation. 

But  the  price  of  silver  has  again  dropped,  and  cus- 
toms receipts  must  decrease  accordingly.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  the  surplus  from  the  customs  revenue  for 


90  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

1921  will  hardly  reach  $25,000,000.  This  amounts  to 
only  one-fourth  the  annual  deficit  of  the  Government. 
From  next  year,  China  will  have  to  resume  payment 
of  the  Boxer  indemnity.  How  she  will  pay  it  is  beyond 
our  comprehension.  To  make  the  situation  more  diffi- 
cult, even  the  surplus  of  the  customs  receipts  has  been 
offered  as  security  for  various  internal  loans  amounting 
to  some  $182,000,000. 

All  this  goes  to  show  the  great  financial  plight  of  the 
Chinese  Government.  Is  it  any  wonder  that  China  has 
defaulted  on  the  $5,000,000  loan  from  the  Continental 
and  Commercial  Bank  of  Chicago?  Is  it  any  wonder 
that  even  the  bank  notes  issued  by  the  Bank  of  China 
and  the  Bank  of  Communications,  the  two  strongest 
government  banks,  have  depreciated  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  natives  have  lost  confidence  in  them?  At  this 
writing  news  comes  from  China  to  the  effect  that  these 
two  banks  in  Peking  have  surrounded  their  premises 
with  forces  of  police  and  gendarmes  to  guard  against 
the  possible  onslaught  of  the  crowds  gathered  in  front 
of  the  banks  and  clamoring  for  the  redemption  of  the 
paper  money  in  their  possession. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
THE  TARIFF  AND  LIKIN 

Washington,  November  24,  ig2i:  Preceding  the 
adoption  of  Senator  Underwood's  motion  for  the  in- 
crease of  the  maritime  customs  of  China,  Dr.  Welling- 
ton Koo,  on  behalf  of  the  Chinese  delegation,  presented 
a  lengthy  statement,  arguing  for  the  recovery  of  tariff 
autonomy  by  China.  The  Chinese  delegates  are  not 
satisfied  with  Senator  Underwood's  proposal  seeking 
an  increase  in  customs  receipts  for  the  purpose  of 
alleviating  the  financial  strain  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. They  want  something  more  fundamental.  They 
want  the  right  to  fix  the  rates  of  duties  according  to 
the  discretion  of  their  Government. 

Tariff  autonomy  has  two  distinct  aspects.  The  first 
is  administrative,  and  the  second  concerns  the  fixing  of 
the  rates  of  duties. 

First  as  to  customs  administration.  How  China  lost 
the  administrative  autonomy  of  the  customs  is  a  pathetic 
but  interesting  story.  Up  to  1840,  the  local  Viceroys 
and  Intendants  of  Circuits  collected  customs  duties. 
But  the  arbitrary,  irresponsible,  and  corrupt  methods 
usually  employed  by  these  functionaries  called  forth 
storms  of  protests  from  European  merchants.  Conse- 
quently, by  the  Nanking  Treaty  of  1842,  it  was  agreed 
that  foreign  consuls  should  act  as  agents  for  the  Chi- 
nese Government  in  the  collection  of  duties.  But  the 
rapid  increase  of  trade  soon  made  it  impossible  for 
the  consuls  to  discharge  this  duty  efficiently.  To  meet 

91 


92  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

this  condition,  a  board,  consisting  of  the  Intendant  of 
the  Circuit  and  three  foreign  representatives,  was  or- 
ganized in  Shanghai  to  relieve  the  consuls  of  their  re- 
sponsibility. This  plan  proved  as  unworkable  as  it 
was  short-lived. 

In  1854  the  Chinese  Government  created  the  office 
of  Inspector  General  of  Maritime  Customs  and  ap- 
pointed a  Britisher  to  it.  But  the  real  beginning  of  the 
present  tariff  administration  dates  from  1863  when  the 
Englishman  Mr.  (later  Sir)  Robert  Hart  assumed 
charge  of  the  office.  In  1889,  the  Chinese  Government 
agreed  that  the  post  of  inspector-general  be  held  by  a 
British  subject  as  long  as  British  trade  predominated  in 
China.  The  staff  of  the  maritime  customs  includes  all 
nationalities  whose  countries  have  trade  interests  in 
China.  Roughly  speaking,  the  relative  number  of 
foreign  employees  is  fixed  according  to  the  relative 
amount  of  trade  of  their  respective  countries.  At  pres- 
ent the  customs  service  has  a  staff  of  7,500  members,  of 
whom  2,000  are  foreigners  and  the  rest  Chinese. 

All  receipts  from  the  customs  tariff  are  deposited  in 
foreign  banks  designated  for  the  purpose  by  the 
bankers'  commission.  This  commission  allots  the  de- 
posited sum  to  the  payment  of  annual  installments  of 
the  Boxer  indemnity  and  of  interest  on  various  foreign 
loans  secured  on  the  custom. 

This  arrangement  is  not  made  for  the  benefit  of  the 
foreign  banks,  but  for  the  protection  of  the  Chinese 
Government.  It  clearly  shows  that  the  Customs  Ad- 
ministration has  not  enough  confidence  in  the  Chinese 
Government  authorities  or  Chinese  banks  to  entrust 
them  with  the  custody  of  customs  receipts.  That  the 
Chinese  Government  itself  recognizes  the  wisdom  and 
safety  of  this  arrangement  was  well  proved  when,  in 
April,  1921,  it  asked  Sir  Francis  Aglen,  the  Inspector 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  93 

General  of  Customs,  to  assume  the  management  of  the 
Internal  Loans  Consolidated  Debt  Services,  a  new 
office  organized  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  inter- 
ests of  the  bondholders.  This  measure  was  necessary 
because  native  investors  had  little  confidence  in  the 
probity  or  efficiency  of  the  Government. 

As  Dr.  Koo  explained  before  the  Committee  on  Far 
Eastern  and  Pacific  Problems,  China  does  not  propose 
to  disturb  the  present  status  of  customs  administration 
at  least  for  some  years  to  come.  For  the  present  she 
is  willing  to  forego  the  autonomy  of  management.  As  a 
Chinese  writer,  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng,  frankly  confesses, 
"So  long  as  the  loans  and  indemnities  mortgaged  on 
customs  receipts  are  not  redeemed  by  China,  it  will  be 
difficult  to  get  the  foreign  powers,  who  are  distrustful  of 
the  Chinese  on  money  matters,  to  consent  to  a  restora- 
tion of  the  customs  administration  to  the  Chinese." 

What  Dr.  Koo  means  by  tariff  autonomy  is  China's 
right  to  fix  the  rates  of  duties  so  as  to  give  her  a  reason- 
able amount  of  revenue.  The  present  rate  is  five  per 
cent  ad  valorem,  first  fixed  in  the  Nanking  Treaty  con- 
cluded with  England  in  1842  at  the  end  of  the  opium 
war.  When  this  treaty  was  revised  in  1858,  a  tariff 
schedule,  that  is,  a  schedule  of  prices  of  imports,  was 
annexed  thereto.  This  schedule  was  revisable  every  ten 
years  if  requested  by  either  country,  so  as  to  bring  it  up 
to  the  current  market  prices.  Until  1902,  neither 
China  nor  Britain  proposed  a  revision,  probably  be- 
cause there  had  been  no  substantial  increase  in  the  prices 
of  merchandise.  In  that  year,  however,  a  revision  was 
made,  the  prices  adopted  as  the  basis  of  revision  being 
those  prevailing  in  the  three  years  1897-99.  The  sched- 
ule thus  adopted  remained  effective  until  1918.  In  the 
meantime  the  prices  of  imports  increased  phenomenally, 
and  yet  China  levied  duties  according  to  the  schedule  of 


94  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

1902.  When,  in  1918,  China  entered  the  World  War, 
one  of  the  considerations  she  secured  from  the  powers 
was  the  revision  of  the  tariff  schedule  so  as  to  bring  it 
up  to  date.  Thus  a  new  schedule  was  adopted,  which  is 
still  in  effect. 

This  was  a  step  towards  equity,  but  the  step  was  not 
long  enough,  for  the  old  low  tariff  of  five  per  cent  ad 
valorem  remained  unchanged.  "It  should  be  observed," 
writes  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng  in  his  admirable  Modern  China, 
"that  the  revision  of  the  schedule  is  a  quite  different 
thing  from  the  revision  of  the  tariff.  The  tariff  of 
China  is  fixed  for  an  indefinite  period  and  is  subject  to 
no  alteration  so  long  as  the  treaty  of  1858  remains  in 
force.  In  any  Western  State  which  adopts  a  Conven- 
tional tariff  the  treaty,  fixing  the  rates  to  be  imposed 
on  imports  from  another  country,  is  only  valid  for  a 
definite  number  of  years  and  is  terminable  on  due  notice 
given  by  either  side,  but  China  is  refused  the  right 
to  alter  her  tariff  so  long  as  she  has  not  the  sanction  of 
Great  Britain.  Moreover,  the  tariff,  which  was  prima- 
rily enacted  in  favor  of  British  trade  has  been  made 
applicable  to  all  the  treaty  States  entitled  to  the  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  in  China,  and  the  consequence 
is  that  it  cannot  be  altered  without  the  unanimous  con- 
sent of  thirteen  States.  The  difference  in  temperament, 
in  policy,  and  in  interest  has  so  far  made  it  impossible 
for  them  to  arrive  at  any  unanimous  conclusion,  and 
China  can  do  nothing  but  content  herself  with  the  ful- 
filment of  her  treaty  obligations  and  with  the  loss  of  her 
fiscal  independence. " 

The  Chinese  delegation  contends  that  the  rate  of 
customs  duties  should  be  increased  to  12.5  per  cent 
after  January,  1922,  to  give  immediate  relief  to  China's 
financial  straits.  It  also  asks  the  Powers  to  agree  upon 
a  maximum  rate  for  China's  import  tariff,  allowing  her 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  95 

to  differentiate  rates  among  different  classes  of  com- 
modities. (Appendix  V.) 

All  this  seems  reasonable.  And  yet  we  feel  that  Dr. 
Koo  was  not  entirely  frank  in  telling  China's  story  of 
woe.  In  reading  the  official  resume  of  his  address  be- 
fore the  committee,  one  is  impelled  to  think  that  he 
showed  only  one  side  of  the  shield,  guarding  the  re- 
verse side  from  critical  eyes. 

That  the  autonomy  of  the  tariff  belongs  to  the  sov- 
ereign right  of  China  goes  without  saying.  Right,  how- 
ever, is  unthinkable  apart  from  duty.  No  nation  can 
assert  its  rights  without  performing  its  duties. 

Has  it  occurred  to  the  Chinese  delegation  that  the 
recovery  of  tariff  autonomy  carries  with  it  grave  re- 
sponsibilities which  China  is  in  honor  bound  to  fulfill? 
Even  the  apparently  simple  proposition  to  increase 
the  present  rate  of  5  per  cent  to  12.5  per  cent  cannot 
be  carried  out  without  imposing  upon  China  an  onerous 
duty  which  she  will  be  unable  to  perform  for  many  years 
to  come. 

What  is  that  duty  ?  It  is  the  responsibility  of  abolish- 
ing the  likin  system,  by  which  provincial  authorities 
collect  duties  upon  goods  which  enter  into  or  go  out  of 
their  respective  provinces.  These  duties  are  a  sort  of 
transit  duties.  If  an  American  merchant  at  Shanghai 
imports  a  sewing  machine,  for  instance,  he  pays  duty  to 
the  Maritime  Customs  at  Shanghai,  but  once  he  trans- 
ports the  machine  into  the  next  province,  he  has  to  pay 
another  duty  to  the  provincial  coffer.  If  he  sends  it  to 
still  another  province,  it  means  payment  of  another 
duty. 

Now  the  most  objectionable  aspect  of  this  likin  sys- 
tem is  that  duties  are  not  fixed  by  treaty,  but  are  arbi- 
trarily levied  according  to  the  needs  or  whims  of 
provincial  governments.  In  recent  years,  the  civil  au- 


96  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

thorities  in  eigteen  provinces  and  Manchuria  have  been 
superseded  by  military  governors,  who  are  engaged  in 
perpetual  fighting,  the  real  purpose  of  which  no  one  but 
themselves  know.  Since  fighting  means  maintenance  of 
soldiers  and  the  squandering  of  money,  the  military  gov- 
ernors have  become  more  arbitrary  than  ever  in  collect- 
ing taxes  and  transit  duties.  When  they  are  not  fighting, 
they  are  absorbingly  interested  in  lining  their  own 
pockets  at  the  expense  of  innocent  people. 

How  China  hopes  to  reform  this  condition  is  not 
easy  to  see.  The  power  and  authority  of  the  so-called 
Central  Government  of  China  hardly  extends  beyond 
the  narrow  territory  adjacent  to  Peking.  Few  military 
governors  respect  it.  All  will  complacently  ignore  any 
measure  looking  towards  the  curtailment  of  their  au- 
thorities. 

Dr.  Koo  states  that  the  raise  of  the  import  tariff  from 
5  per  cent  to  12.5  is  provided  in  the  treaty  with  Ameri- 
ca, England  and  Japan.  But  we  must  know  that  this 
stipulated  raise  is  predicated  upon  the  fulfillment  of 
the  Chinese  promise  to  abolish  the  likin  system.  The 
treaty  with  England,  for  instance,  has  this  provision : 

"The  Chinese  Government,  recognizing  that  the  sys- 
tem of  levying  likin  and  other  dues  on  goods  at  the 
place  of  production,  in  transit,  and  at  destination,  im- 
pedes the  free  circulation  of  commodities  and  injures 
the  interests  of  trade,  hereby  undertake  to  discard  com- 
pletely those  means  of  raising  revenue." 

It  seems  hardly  fair  on  the  part  of  China  to  demand 
the  increase  of  the  tariff,  completely  ignoring  the  duty 
which  she  has  promised  to  discharge.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  China  will  find  a  solution  for  difficult  and  com- 
plicated domestic  problems,  which  are  largely  respon- 
sible for  her  unhappy  foreign  relations. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
THE    STIGMA   OF   EXTRATERRITORIALITY 

Washington,  November  29,  1921:  Following  up 
her  "Bill  of  Rights"  presented  to  the  Conference  two 
weeks  ago,  China  has  brought  forth  many  demands  one 
after  the  other  in  rapid  succession.  The  more  impor- 
tant of  these  are  the  abolition  of  extraterritoriality, 
the  removal  of  foreign  troops,  foreign  post  offices,  and 
foreign  wireless  stations,  the  restoration  of  tariff  auton- 
omy and  the  abolition  of  leased  territories.  These 
claims  are  receiving  careful  consideration  at  the  hands 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Committee.  To  throw  his  influence 
on  the  Chinese  side  of  the  scale,  Mr.  Root,  on  behalf 
of  the  American  delegation,  presented  to  the  Commit- 
tee on  November  20  a  resolution  setting  forth  the 
American  principles  of  the  open  door  and  administra- 
tive integrity  in  China.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Chinese  case  is  having  a  sympathetic  hearing. 

At  the  same  time  the  Powers  cannot  but  view  the 
present  state  of  chaos  in  China  with  the  utmost  appre- 
hension. That  apprehension  is  expressed  by  the  Far 
Eastern  Committee  when  it  accepted  a  few  days  ago 
China's  request  for  the  removal  of  foreign  post  offices 
only  on  condition  that  the  Chinese  Government  promise 
uto  maintain  an  efficient  postal  service,"  and  to  "make 
no  change  in  the  present  postal  administration  so  far 
as  the  status  of  the  foreign  co-director  general  is  con-  \ 
cerned."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Chinese  postal  serv- 
ice has  been  brought  to  its  present  state  of  efficiency 

97 


98  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

under  the  direction  of  a  Frenchman  assisted  by  a  staff 
of  foreigners.  The  Conference  obligates  China  to 
continue  this  system.  On  various  other  questions  simi- 
lar pledges  will,  in  all  probability,  be  required  of  China. 

The  adjustment  of  Chinese  questions,  such  as  are 
now  being  discussed  at  the  Conference,  hinges  in  the 
last  analysis,  upon  one  central  question,  namely,  the 
administrative  efficiency  and  honesty  of  the  Chinese 
Government. 

Take,  for  instance,  the  question  of  extraterritoriality. 
Foreign  nations  would  not  be  reluctant  to  forego  extra- 
territorial rights  if  they  felt  fairly  sure  that  the  Chi- 
nese administration  would  be  capable  of  protecting  for- 
eigners. Japan,  for  one,  would  welcome  the  day  when 
foreign  jurisdiction  in  China  was  consigned  to  oblivion. 
This  was  made  clear  in  the  Japanese  memorandum  to 
the  Far  Eastern  Committee  on  November  20.  And 
yet  the  Powers  would  hardly  be  doing  justice,  either  to 
themselves  or  to  China,  if  they  were  to  accept  the  Chi- 
nese demand  for  immediate  abolition  of  consular  juris- 
diction. Such  a  radical  change,  under  the  existing  state 
of  administrative  disorganization  in  China,  can  only 
jeopardize  the  welfare  of  foreigners  as  well  as  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Chinese  themselves.  The  consensus  of  opin- 
ion on  this  question  among  the  foreign  residents  in 
China  may  be  seen  in  the  resolution  adopted  by  a  con- 
ference held  in  Shanghai  last  summer  by  all  the  British 
Chambers  of  Commerce  in  China.  That  resolution 
reads  as  follows : 

"While  sympathizing  with  the  Chinese  desire  tc 
abolish  extraterritoriality  and  realizing  the  benefits 
that  would  accrue  by  throwing  the  country  open  to  resi- 
dence and  trade,  this  conference  considers  that  it  is 
essential  to  the  preliminaries  to  surrender  extraterri- 
torial rights,  the  establishment  of  a  stable  government 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  99 

and  a  satisfactory  legal  code  with  satisfactory  arrange- 
ments for  the  administration  thereof.  This  conference 
suggests  that  efforts  be  made  to  carry  into  effect  an 
agreement  whereby  Great  Britain  will  assist  China  in 
reforming  her  judicial  system,  in  pursuance  of  articles 
of  the  1902  treaty." 

No  nation  can  be  more  sympathetic  towards  China 
than  Japan  on  the  question  of  extraterritorial  rights. 
Up  to  1898  Japan  herself  suffered  from  the  same  insti- 
tution which  fixed  upon  her  the  stigma  of  inferiority. 
For  twenty  years,  Japan's  domestic  and  foreign  policy 
had  centered  upon  an  endeavor  to  remove  that  stigma. 

An  impartial  observer  can  not  fail  to  notice  a  radical 
difference  between  the  Japanese  method  and  the  Chi- 
nese tactics  in  dealing  with  extraterritoriality.  Japan 
did  not  go  abroad  to  air  her  grievances  and  demand  its 
abrogation  by  foreign  governments.  Instead  she  stayed 
at  home  and  devoted  all  her  energies  to  the  adminis- 
trative and  judicial  reformation  necessary  to  attain  the 
desired  end. 

Had  China  emulated  the  Japanese  method,  she  would 
have  accomplished  the  same  purpose  long  ago.  Japan 
knew  the  futility  of  attempting  to  shake  off  the  foreign 
yoke  by  anti-foreign  agitation.  The  best  way  was  to 
win  the  confidence  of  foreign  nations  by  rehabilitating 
her  own  affairs. 

The  Japanese  memorandum,  submitted  to  the  Con- 
ference on  November  20,  expresses  the  belief  that 
"existing  difficulties  in  China  lie  no  less  in  her  domestic 
situation  than  in  her  external  relations."  The  signifi- 
cance of  this  statement  may  not  have  been  fully  realized 
by  the  other  delegations.  But  the  time  will  come  when 
the  world  will  heartily  appreciate  and  endorse  that 
statement. 

China's  salvation  must  come  from  within  as  well  as 


100  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

from  without.  It  lies  in  the  removal  of  obstacles  she 
has  placed  in  her  own  way,  as  much  as  in  the  lifting  of 
the  burdens,  imposed  upon  her  by  foreign  nations.  No 
more  convincing  evidence  in  support  of  this  statement 
can  be  found  than  the  following  list  of  internal  troubles 
which  have  taken  place  in  China  in  the  past  one  year. 
This  list  has  been  prepared  after  a  careful  study  of 
Chinese  newspapers : 

( 1 )  Fighting  between  Yunnan  and  Szechuan  troops 
at  Chunking.     An  English  merchant  was  killed  in  the 
riot,  and  a  British  gunboat  fired  at  the  city.     October 
14,  1920. 

(2)  The  troops  at  Hochien,   Chihli  Province,  ex- 
torted money  from  native  merchants  and  looted  the  fifty 
largest  stores.     October  31,  1920. 

(3)  Troops  at  Kaoyang,  Chihli  Province,  demanded 
$100,000  of  merchants,  looted  thirty  neighboring  vil- 
lages and  killed  more  than   100.     November   17-22, 
1920. 

(4)  In  Hsu-chang,  Honang  Province,  a  mob,  con- 
sisting largely  of  soldiers,  looted  1,300  business  houses, 
including  the  Bank  of  China  and  the  post  office.     More 
than  40  were  killed.     November  1,  1920. 

(5)  At  Kwei-yang,  Kweichow  Province,  troops  mu- 
tinied and  plundered,  and  killed  almost  a  hundred,  in- 
cluding a  bank  president  and  a  local  magistrate.     No- 
vember 10,  1920. 

(6)  At  Ping-kiang,  Hunan  Province,  the  troops  shot 
the  commander  and  plundered  the  city.     November  14, 
1920. 

(7)  The  troops  at  Hwang-chow,  Hupeh  Province, 
extorted  a  large  sum  from  local  governors.     Novem- 
ber 18,  1920. 

(8)  At   Chung-hsiang  soldiers  looted  th&  stores. 
November  22-23,  1920. 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  101 

(9)  In  Tienmen,  Hupeh  Province,  troops  had  an 
orgy  of  looting.     November  24,  1920. 

(10)  In  Lin-hsiang,  Hunan  Province,  troops  muti- 
nied and  plundered.     November  25,  1920. 

(11)  At  Yangshing  and  Fuchikow,  Hupeh  Province, 
troops  plundered  the  customs  house  and  many  business 
houses,  and  extorted  large  sums  from  the  local  magis- 
trates and  merchants.     November  25,  1920. 

(12)  In  Ichang,  Hupeh  Province,  a  mob  of  soldiers 
and  coolies  resorted  to  incendiarism  and  looted  stores, 
including  14  Japanese  business  houses.     Storehouse  of 
a  Japanese  steamship  company  was  burned.     Novem- 
ber 29,  1920. 

(13)  At  Tayei,  Hupeh  Province,  the  troops  muti- 
nied and  plundered.     November  30,  1920. 

(14)  Troops  at   Chin-chun,   Hupeh  Province,   ex- 
torted $9,000  from  merchants.     December  10,  1920. 

( 15 )  Soldiers  at  Changsha,  Hunan  Province,  raided 
the  government  printing  office  where  paper  currency 
was  made,  and  looted  the  neighboring  cities.     Decem- 
ber 5-8,  1920. 

(16)  Troops  at  Yochow,  Hunan  Province,  looted 
the  railway  station  and  stores,  and  interrupted  train 
communications.     January  25-27,  1921. 

(17)  At  Hsinyu,  Kiangsih  Province,  fighting  took 
place  between  two  rival  generals,  followed  by  the  usual 
general  looting.     January  26-February  5,  1921. 

(18)  Troops  at  Pactingfu,  Chihli  Province,  looted 
three  thousand  business  houses.     February  13,  1921. 

(19)  At  Shen-hsien,  a  similar  incident  took  place. 
February  22,  1921. 

(20)  At  Shashi,  Hupeh  Province,   the  troops  re- 
sorted to  incendiarism  and  plundered  stores,  resulting 
in  a  damage  of  $10,000,000.     February  23,  1921. 

(21)  At  Changteh,  Honan  Province,  two  rival  gen- 


.'102  :    JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

erals,  with  30,000  soldiers,  had  a  fight.     April  14-22, 
1921. 

(22)  At  Chow-chia-kow,  Honan  Province,  soldiers 
mutinied  and  looted,  March  12,  1921.     A  similar  in- 
cident happened  at  Sinyang.     May  3,  1921. 

(23)  At  Ichang,  Hupeh  Province,  soldiers  killed 
800  and  burned  a  large  number  of  business  houses. 
The  tax  offices,  Bank  of  China,  and  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce were  looted.     British,  American  and  Japanese 
business  firms   suffered  a  heavy  damage.     June   4-5, 
1921. 

(24)  At  Wuchang,  Hupeh  Province,  a  mob  of  sol- 
diers looted  the  government  mint  and  printing  office, 
and  burned  the  Bank  of  China  and  other  banks,  as  well 
as  large  business  houses.     More  than  30  per  cent  of 
the  homes  were  looted.     The  commander  never  pun- 
ished the  soldiers.     June  8,  1921. 

(25)  Troops  at  Wuhu,  Anhui  Province,  demanded 
$350,000    of   the    Chamber   of    Commerce,    and   got 
$70,000.     June  2,  1921. 

(26)  At  Hsiaokan,  Hupeh  Province,   soldiers  de- 
stroyed the  railroad  for  two  miles,  cut  telegraph  wires, 
and  interrupted  communication  on  the  Peking-Hankow 
railway  for  several  days.     August  25,  1921. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 
CHINA    DIVIDED 

Washington,  December  19,  1921:  As  the  Confer- 
ence is  trying  to  solve  the  Chinese  puzzle,  disquieting 
news  comes  from  Peking  only  to  complicate  the  situa- 
tion. The  ministerial  crisis  in  China,  reported  by  Pe- 
king dispatches  this  morning,  is  fraught  with  grave  sig- 
nificance. Although  the  fall  of  the  Peking  Cabinet  has 
long  been  anticipated,  it  is  especially  unfortunate,  com- 
ing at  this  moment  when  its  representatives  at  Wash- 
ington are  striving  to  regain  some  of  the  rights  which 
have  been  taken  away  from  China  because  of  her 
unstable,  disorganized  political  condition. 

To  understand  the  present  crisis  at  Peking,  it  is  essen- 
tial to  keep  in  mind  the  factional  rivalry  which  has 
harassed  the  country  in  the  past  ten  years  or  more. 
This  rivalry  had  been  bad  enough  even  before  the  fall 
of  the  Manchu  dynasty  in  1911,  but  the  substitution  of 
the  so-called  republic  has  made  it  infinitely  worse.  Dur- 
ing the  ten  years  that  have  passed  under  the  republican 
regime,  various  factions  have  risen  and  declined.  As 
the  situation  stands  today  the  political  factions  in  China 
may  be  grouped  as  follows : 

1.  Fengtien  (Mukden)  Faction: — Headed  by  Gen- 
eral Chang  Tsolin  of  Mukden,  who  is  now  in  Peking 
trying  to  organize  a  cabinet  to  suit  his  policy.    His 
"sphere  of  influence"  includes  Manchuria  and  Inner 
Mongolia. 

2.  Chihli  Faction: — Headed  by  General  Tsaokun 

103 


104  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

and    General  Wu  Peifu,  claiming  as  its  sphere  Chihli, 
Shensi,  Hupeh,  and  Honan  Provinces. 

3.  Anhui  Faction: — Headed  by  General  Tuan  Chi- 
jui,  former  prime  minister,  and  including  Chekiang, 
Fukien,  and  Shantung  Provinces  under  its  influence. 

4.  Kwangtung   (Canton)   Faction: — Headed  nomi- 
nally by  Dr.  Sun  Yatsen  but  really  by  General  Chen 
Chien-ming,   and  claiming   Kwangtung   and   Kwangsi 
Provinces  as  its  sphere. 

5.  Kwangsi  Faction: — Headed  by  General  Lu  Yun- 
tien,  an  ex-bandit.     At  present  this  faction  controls  only 
a  section  of  Kwangsi  Province,  but  a  year  ago  it  con- 
trolled the  whole  of  Kwangsi  and  Kwangtung  Prov- 
inces. 

6.  Semi-Independent    Provinces:  —  Hunan,    Kwei- 
chow,  Yunnan,  and  Szechuen  Provinces,  each  claiming 
a  sort  of  autonomy. 

The  faction  which  is  in  the  limelight  at  this  moment 
is  the  first  of  the  above-named  six  groups.  General 
Chang  who  heads  this  faction  is  an  ex-bandit,  who  does 
not  know  how  to  read  or  write.  Nevertheless,  he  is 
a  daring  general,  a  crafty  politician,  a  shrewd  business 
man.  In  appearance  he  is  more  like  a  prosperous 
banker  than  a  bandit-general. 

Now  General  Chang  finds  a  powerful  rival  in  Gen- 
eral Tsaokun,  who  heads  the  Chihli  faction,  and  who 
has  formed  a  coalition  with  General  Wu  Peifu  now 
firmly  entrenched  in  Hupeh  Province.  Up  to  July  of 
this  year,  Hupeh  Province  was  controlled  by  General 
Wang  Chanyuan,  who  was  generally  believed  to  be 
General  Chang's  henchman.  But  last  summer  General 
Wang  was  driven  out  by  General  Wu,  resulting  in  the 
extension  of  the  influence  of  the  Chihli  faction  in  the 
Yangtse  Valley.  Naturally  General  Chang,  the  ex- 
bandit  of  Mukden,  has  been  extremely  uneasy  and  has 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  105 

been  scheming  to  check  the  growing  power  of  the 
Chihli  faction  under  General  Tsao. 

It  has  been  persistently  rumored  in  the  last  year  or 
two  that  Dr.  Sun  Yatsen  of  the  Canton  faction  has 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  General  Chang.  No 
worse  misalliance  than  this  can  be  conceived.  Dr.  Sun 
professes  democracy  and  constitutionalism  and  all  that 
sounds  high  and  advanced.  General  Chang  has  not 
a  spark  of  modernism  in  his  political  creed  and  practice, 
and  is  a  dictator  worse  than  Yuan  Shikai.  How  these 
two  extremes  can  meet  is  beyond  the  comprehension  of 
ordinary  intelligence.  General  Chang  is  jealous  of  the 
ascendency  of  General  Tsaokun  and  the  Chihli  faction, 
and  he  thinks  that  the  best  way  to  undermine  their 
power  is  to  shake  hands  with  the  Canton  faction  under 
£)r.  Sun.  Dr.  Sun  accepts  the  overture,  because  he, 
too,  is  anxious  to  eliminate  the  Chihli  faction  as  a  step 
towards  the  destruction  of  the  Peking  Government. 

Seen  in  that  light,  the  Peking  dispatch  stating  that 
General  Chang  is  urging  the  unification  of  the  North 
and  South  becomes  perfectly  understandable.  It  means 
that  General  Chang  wants  to  eliminate  or  undermine 
the  Chihli  faction  under  General  Tsaokun,  his  arch 
rival,  by  the  alliance  of  his  faction  and  Dr.  Sun's  Can- 
ton faction.  But  Dr.  Sun  will  make  a  great  mistake 
if  he  thinks  that  the  ex-bandit  can  be  tamed  at  his  hands. 
Just  as  the  late  Yuan  Shikai  eliminated  Dr.  Sun  from 
the  political  stage  after  he  had  made  the  most  of  Dr. 
Sun,  the  ex-bandit  of  Mukden  is  sure  to  destroy  Sun's 
influence  once  he  has  succeeded  in  overthrowing  the 
Chihli  faction. 

The  real  difficulty  which  brought  about  the  present 
cabinet  crisis  at  Peking  is  financial.  In  my  letter  of 
November  23,  I  described  the  sad  plight  of  the  Chi- 
nese Treasury.  Even  the  salaries  of  officials  are  in 


106  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

arrears  for  many  months.  The  Presidential  office  has 
not  been  getting  any  money  for  its  current  expenses. 
All  government  departments  are  clamoring  for  pay- 
ments which  have  long  been  withheld. 

Meanwhile,  military  governors  are  waxing  fabu- 
lously rich.  General  Wang,  who  has  recently  been 
driven  out  from  Hupeh  Province  by  the  Chihli  faction, 
has  amassed  $2,500,000  duriag  his  eight  years  as  gov- 
ernor of  the  Province.  The  people  of  the  Province 
say  that  this  sum  was  misappropriated  by  him,  and  are 
demanding  its  restitution  to  the  provincial  treasury. 
General  Wang,  unwilling  to  lose  more  than  is  absolutely 
necessary,  has  in  turn  informed  the  Central  Govern- 
ment in  Peking  that  it  owes  him  $1,500,000.  Last 
May,  when  he  visited  North  China,  he  carried  back 
with  him  $1,000,000  in  Treasury  Bonds  with  which  to 
pay  his  officers  and  soldiers.  The  officers  and  soldiers, 
however,  refused  to  take  paper  money,  so  General 
Wang  sold  the  million  for  $500,000  in  silver.  He 
therefore  asks  that  another  $500,000  in  silver  be  paid 
him  by  Peking,  which  would  now  find  lodging  in  his 
own  pocket  rather  than  those  of  his  former  officers  and 
men.  In  addition  he  announced  that  he  used  $1,000,- 
000  gold  of  his  own  funds  with  which  to  run  the  Pro- 
vincial Government,  so  that  his  bill  to  Peking  is  for 
$1,500,000. 

General  Wang  is  willing  that  the  Government  should 
have  funds  in  spite  of  this,  so  kindly  informs  Peking 
that  after  the  money  is  paid  over  to  him  he  will  found 
a  bank  and  loan  it  back  to  Peking  at  6  per  cent  interest ! 


CHAPTER   XIX 
JAPAN'S   ATTITUDE 

Washington,  December  30,  1921:  Many  sympa- 
thetic critics  think  that  Japan  has  lost  a  golden  oppor- 
tunity to  assume  leadership  in  the  adjustment  of  Far 
Eastern  affairs.  Instead  of  taking  the  initiative  on 
important  questions  on  China,  the  Japanese  delegates 
have  adopted  the  Fabian  tactics  of  wait-and-see.  As 
at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  so  at  Washington,  the 
representatives  from  Tokyo  seem  to  lack  freedom  of 
action,  waiting  oh  their  home  government  for  instruc- 
tions. 

In  the  early  stage  of  the  Conference,  the  Japanese 
delegation  submitted  to  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  Japan's  attitude  towards  the 
Chinese  question.  To  an  unbiased  observer,  the  first 
impression  of  that  statement  is  not  unfavorable  (see 
text  of  memorandum  at  the  end  of  this  chapter).  It 
puts  Japan  on  record  as  "adhering  without  condition  or 
reservation  to  the  principle  of  the  open  door  and  equal 
opportunity  in  China."  It  shows  the  Japanese  delega- 
tion favorably  inclined  toward  the  abolition  of  extra- 
territoriality in  China.  It  expresses  a  belief  in  the 
establishment  of  "policies  and  principles  which  are  to 
guide  the  future  actions  of  the  nations,"  and  avows 
non-interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  China.  All 
these  ideas  are  admirable. 

Upon  second  thought,  however,  one  feels  that  the 
Japanese  statement  lacks  definiteness  and  that  it  is 

107 


108  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

couched  in  language  repeated  only  too  often  in  such 
documents.  Perhaps  this  is  indicative  of  the  general 
attitude  of  the  Japanese  delegation.  The  representa- 
tives of  the  Tokyo  Government,  it  is  understood,  have 
been  acting  upon  the  idea  that  they  are  guests  invited 
by  the  American  Government,  and  that  it  would  be 
improper  for  them  to  press  a  set  program  upon  the 
Conference,  and  urge  its  adoption  by  the  participating 
nations. 

Now  this  attitude  may  seem  to  some  proper  and 
admirable.  But  it  is  not  the  attitude  of  leadership. 
Certainly  it  contributes  little  to  the  much-needed  clari- 
fication of  the  Far  Eastern  situation 

It  would  have  been  perfectly  proper  for  Japan  to  set 
forth  at  the  outset  of  the  Conference  just  what  she 
wanted  to  do  with  regard  to  China.  This  could  have 
been  done  without  offending  any  nation.  Japan  is  in- 
disputably the  mistress  of  the  Far  East.  This  position 
has  been  recognized  by  all.  Naturally  the  nations  par- 
ticipating in  this  Conference  had  anticipated  from  her 
a  definite,  comprehensive,  constructive  program  on  the 
Far  Eastern,  and  especially  Chinese  questions.  Such 
a  program  should  have  been  put  forward  by  Japan 
before  China  presented  her  case  on  November  16. 
Japan  was  in  a  position  to  know  what  problems  were 
China's  most  serious  concern.  Why  did  she  not  come 
out  at  once  with  a  definite  program  for  the  adjustment 
of  those  problems?  Her  unnecessary  diffidence,  in- 
stead of  producing  the  effect  expected  by  her,  has  cre- 
ated a  cause  of  misunderstanding. 

Japan's  Chinese  program,  if  formulated  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Conference,  should  have  been  more  specific 
than  the  Chinese  or  the  American  formula.  It  should 
have  taken  up  such  matters  as  foreign  troops,  foreign 
post  offices,  foreign  leaseholds,  extraterritoriality,  the 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  109 

revision  of  the  tariff,  the  rehabilitation  of  finances,  in 
all  of  which  China  is  apparently  interested.  In  formu- 
lating such  a  program,  Japan  should  have  been  liberal 
and  generous  and  stated  in  no  equivocal  terms  just  how 
far  she  was  prepared  and  willing  to  go  in  the  interest 
of  China  and  for  the  adjustment  of  those  problems, 
just  as  Mr.  Hughes  told  in  his  naval  program  how  far 
America  was  ready  to  go  in  the  reduction  of  tonnage. 
Had  the  Japanese  delegation  put  forth  such  an  all- 
embracing  yet  specific  plan  soon  after  Mr.  Hughes' 
naval  proposal,  it  would  have  been  accepted  by  other 
delegates  as  the  basis  of  deliberation. 

Instead  of  following  this  logical  course,  Japan  has 
allowed  China  to  steal  a  march  upon  her,  thus  assuming 
an  entirely  defensive  position.  Even  a  most  friendly 
critic  can  not  deny  that  the  Japanese  memorandum  of 
November  20,  though  good  enough  as  far  as  it  goes, 
sounds  weak  and  pointless.  As  the  Chinese  delegation 
brings  forth  demand  after  demand  before  the  Far  East- 
ern Committee,  the  Japanese  are  busy  digging  trenches 
to  defend  their  position. 

Even  the  Shantung  question  could  have  been  included 
in  such  a  general  program  as  I  have  suggested,  and  dis- 
cussed before  the  full  Committee  on  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  Problems.  To  one  unaccustomed  to  diplo- 
matic finesse,  it  is  difficult  to  see  much  difference  between 
discussing  the  Shantung  problem  as  a  part  of  the  Con- 
ference program,  and  discussing  it,  as  it  is  being  dis- 
cussed, between  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  delegations 
before  the  official  "spectators"  of  Britain  and  America. 

It  is  said  that  the  American  Government  is  not  in 
favor  of  bringing  the  Shantung  question  before  the 
Conference,  and  that  in  certain  high  quarters  resent- 
ment has  been  expressed  towards  the  Chinese  delega- 
tion which  has  been  clamoring  to  bring  it  up  before 


110  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

the  Conference.  The  American  Government  fears,  it 
is  said,  that  the  injection  of  the  Shantung  controversy 
into  the  Conference  may  embarrass  the  European  dele- 
gations which,  in  the  Versailles  Treaty,  had  agreed  to 
confer  upon  Japan  former  German  rights  in  Shantung. 
This  apprehension  would  have  had  its  reason,  had 
Japan  insisted  upon  holding  all  the  properties  and 
rights  given  her  by  the  Versailles  Treaty. 

But  Japan  has  long  since  decided  to  give  up  most  of 
the  former  German  possessions  and  rights  to  which  she 
has  fallen  heir.  Japan  had  come  to  this  decision  and 
had  announced  it  to  the  world  more  than  two  months 
before  the  opening  of  the  Conference.  She  is  abso- 
lutely convinced  of  the  fairness  and  generosity  of  the 
terms  of  the  Shantung  settlement  she  has  offered  to 
China.  Why,  then,  should  she  hesitate  to  take  the 
offensive  and  place  those  terms  before  the  full  Com- 
mittee? The  offensive  could  have  been  taken  without 
offending  anybody.  By  showing  themselves  too  cau- 
tious and  too  diffident,  the  Japanese  have  invited  the 
suspicion  which  they  do  not  really  deserve. 

After  all  has  been  said  and  done,  however,  it  seems 
fair  to  admit  that  Japan  has  proved  herself  conciliatory 
and  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  other  Powers  in  the 
adjustment  of  various  problems  in  which  Japan  is  most 
vitally  interested.  Of  all  foreign  nations  Japan  has 
the  closest  political  and  commercial  relations  with 
China.  Being  China's  next-door  neighbor,  she  is  most 
deeply  concerned  with  the  present  uncertain  political 
condition  in  China.  There  are  some  171,500  Japanese 
in  different  commercial  centers  in  China,  while  Brit- 
ishers and  Americans  number  but  13,200  and  6,660 
respectively.  Yet  Japan  has  agreed  to  abolish  her 
wireless  station  and  post  offices  in  China  along  with 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  111 

those  established  by  other  nations,  and  to  remove  her 
soldiers  from  Chinese  soil. 

As  to  the  Japanese  troops  in  China,  a  few  words  of 
explanation  are  pertinent.  The  Japanese  barracks  at 
Hankow,  the  most  thriving  commercial  center  on  the 
Yangtse  River,  has  been  a  target  of  severe  criticism. 
At  present  there  are  some  500  soldiers  stationed  there. 
The  Japanese  troops  were  sent  there  in  the  fall  of  1911 
when  the  fighting  between  the  Peking  forces  and  the 
southern  revolutionary  forces  threatened  the  safety  of 
foreigners.  When  the  revolutionary  war  ended,  for 
the  time  being  at  least,  Japan  might  have  withdrawn 
them.  But  some  Japanese  leaders  advocated  their 
continued  retention  upon  the  ground  that  internal 
troubles  on  the  Yangtse  still  spelled  danger  to  foreign 
lives  and  property.  Nevertheless,  public  opinion  in 
Japan  has  not  been  in  favor  of  this  policy.  Unques- 
tionably these  troops  will  be  removed  in  accordance 
with  the  pledge  which  has  been  given  to  the  Conference 
by  the  Japanese  delegation. 

Another  point  where  Japanese  troops  are  stationed 
is  Shantung,  where  they  are  employed  as  railway 
guards.  The  main  railway  is  245  miles  in  length,  and 
has  a  few  short  branch  lines.  The  present  Japanese 
force  protecting  these  lines  consists  of  some  2,500  sol- 
diers. They  are  what  remains  of  much  larger  forces 
sent  to  Shantung  in  1914  to  dislodge  the  Germans  from 
that  Province.  They  have  remained  there  pending  the 
conclusion  of  negotiations  between  China  and  Japan 
as  to  the  final  disposal  of  former  German  rights. 

These  troops  would  have  been  removed  two  years 
ago  had  China  accepted  the  Japanese  invitation  to  dis- 
cuss the  Shantung  question  in  a  friendly  spirit.  When 
the  Peace  Treaty  came  into  effect  in  January,  1919, 


112  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Japan  immediately  addressed  to  China  a  note  contain- 
ing this  passage: 

"It  is  the  intention  of  the  Japanese  Government  to 
withdraw  the  Japanese  troops  from  along  the  Shantung 
Railway  as  a  matter  of  course  upon  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  Governments  with  regard  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  Kiaochow.  In  fact,  the  Japanese  Government 
wished  to  withdraw  the  troops  as  speedily  as  possible 
even  before  an  agreement  was  entered  into;  but,  in  the 
absence  of  any  competent  force  to  assume  the  duty  of 
guarding  the  railway  after  their  evacuation,  they  were 
constrained  to  keep  those  troops  temporarily  stationed 
there  in  order  to  insure  the  security  of  communications 
and  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  Japan  and  China, 
who  are  copartners  in  a  joint  enterprise.  The  Japa- 
nese Government,  therefore,  hope  that  the  Chinese 
Government,  appreciating  the  intentions  of  the  Japanese 
Government,  will  promptly  organize  a  police  force  to 
replace  the  Japanese  troops  guarding  the  railway,  even 
before  an  agreement  is  reached  as  to  other  details." 

There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  these  troops 
will  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  Shantung  question  is 
settled.  Happily  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
this  question  will  be  disposed  of  before  the  end  of  this 
Conference.  

THE  JAPANESE  'MEMORANDUM  SUBMITTED 
TO  THE  FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  NO- 
VEMBER 20,  1921 

1.  It  seems  to  the  Japanese  delegation  that  existing 
difficulties  in  China  lie  no  less  in  her  domestic  situation 
than  in  her  external  relations.  We  are  anxious  to  see 
peace  and  unity  reestablished  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  but  we  want  to  avoid  all  action  that  may  be 
construed  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  113 

China.  All  that  this  conference  can  achieve  is,  it  seems 
to  us,  to  adjust  China's  foreign  relations,  leaving  her 
domestic  situation  to  be  worked  out  by  the  Chinese 
themselves. 

2.  The  Japanese  delegation  wishes  to  assure  the 
Chinese  delegation  and  the  Conference  that  Japan  has 
every  desire  to  cultivate  the  happiest  relations  with 
China.    We  are  solicitous  of  making  whatever  contri- 
butions we  are  capable  of  toward  China's  realization 
of  her  just  and  legitimate  aspirations.    We  are  entirely 
uninfluenced  by  any  policy  of  territorial  aggrandizement 
in  any  part  of  China.    We  adhere  without  condition  or 
reservation  to  the  principle  of  "the  open  door  and  equal 
opportunity"  in  China.    We  look  to  China  in  particular 
for  the  supply  of  raw  materials  essential  to  our  indus- 
trial life  and  for  foodstuffs  as  well.    In  the  purchase  of 
such  materials  from  China,  as  in  all  our  trade  relations 
with  that  country,  we  do  not  claim  any  special  rights 
or  privileges,  and  we  welcome  fair  and  honest  compe- 
tition with  all  nations. 

With  regard  to  the  question  of  the  abolition  of  extra- 
territoriality, which  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant questions  proposed  by  the  Chinese  delegation, 
it  is  our  intention  to  join  with  other  delegations  in  the 
endeavor  to  come  to  an  arrangement  in  a  manner  fair 
and  satisfactory  to  all  parties. 

We  have  come  to  this  conference  not  to  advance  our 
own  selfish  interests,  we  have  come  to  cooperate  with 
all  nations  interested  for  the  purpose  of  assuring  peace 
in  the  Far  East  and  friendship  among  nations. 

3.  The  Japanese  delegation  understands  that  the 
principal  object  of  the  Conference  is  to  establish  in  com- 
mon accord  policies  and  principles  which  are  to  guide 
the  future  actions  of  the  nations  here  represented.    Al- 
though we  are  ready  to  explain  or  discuss  any  problem 
which  in  the  wisdom  of  the  Conference  is  taken  up, 
we  should  regret  undue  protraction  of  the  discussions  by 
detailed  examination  of  innumerable  minor  matters. 


CHAPTER   XX 
QUO   VADIS 

Washington,  January  23,  1922:  On  December  19, 
I  told  my  readers  how  General  Chang,  the  ex-bandit  of 
Mukden,  set  up  a  new  cabinet  with  Liang  Shih-yi  as 
premier.  Only  twenty-five  days  later,  that  is,  on  Janu- 
ary 15,  there  came  to  the  fore  General  Wu  Peifu, 
Inspector  General  of  Hunan  and  Hupeh  Provinces, 
demanding  the  resignation  of  the  new  cabinet  in  three 
days,  and  declaring  that  he  was  ready  to  appeal  to  force 
of  arms  if  the  premier  declined  to  resign.  This  makes 
confusion  worse  confounded.  The  statesmen  sitting 
around  the  conference  table  here  are  wondering  what 
is  going  to  become  of  China.  They  are  wondering  if 
the  Chinese  delegates,  who  are  demanding  so  many 
things,  really  mean  business,  and  expect  their  govern- 
ment to  fulfill  the  obligations  which  the  granting  of 
their  demands  will  naturally  impose  upon  it. 

General  Wu's  ultimatum  to  the  new  Cabinet  is 
exactly  in  line  with  the  forecast  made  in  my  letter  of 
December  19.  Wu  is  one  of  the  dual  leaders  of  the 
Chihli  faction,  and  a  strong  rival  to  General  Chang, 
the  godfather  of  the  new  Cabinet.  That  is  why  Wu 
wants  to  overthrow  the  new  Cabinet. 

To  one  initiated  in  Chinese  politics  General  Wu's 
new  move  is  not  at  all  surprising.  He  is  simply  emu- 
lating other  generals  who  have  done  much  the  same 
thing.  As  an  example,  let  me  tell  you  what  General 
Chang,  Wu's  rival,  did  four  years  ago.  In  the  spring 
of  1918,  this  Manchu  general,  an  ex-bandit,  took  pos- 
session of  the  Peking-Mukden  Railway,  financed  and 

114 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  115 

superintended  by  British  interests,  to  transport  his  sol- 
diers to  Tientsin.  Upon  his  arrival  in  Peking,  Chang, 
confident  of  his  position,  backed  by  his  large  force  of 
soldiers  stationed  within  hailing  distance,  demanded 
of  President  Feng  the  dismissal  of  the  Cabinet,  the 
appointment  of  his  friend  General  Tuan  as  new  prime 
minister,  and  the  discharge  of  three  military  governors 
stationed  in  the  Yangtse  Valley.  On  top  of  these  de- 
mands, Chang  asked  the  President  to  create  the  new 
office  of  Inspector  General  of  Manchuria  and  appoint 
him  to  that  post. 

When  these  demands  were  presented,  what  did  the 
poor  President  do?  He  issued  a  lengthy  "message" 
to  the  people,  giving  a  painful  recital  of  the  chronic 
state  of  chaos  in  his  country,  and  as  usual  invoked 
Heaven  and  Earth  to  witness  the  sincerity  of  his  mo- 
tives. He  declared  that  the  nation  was  faced  with 
bankruptcy.  Provincial  remittances  had  ceased,  for- 
eign loans  were  no  longer  so  easy  as  in  the  pre-war 
days,  while  military  expenditure  had  doubled.  Finally 
he  bemoaned  the  fact  that  although  he  was  nominally 
the  chief  executive  of  China  his  "orders  are  not  obeyed 
outside  the  gates  of  the  capital." 

As  for  General  Chang,  he  got  almost  all  he  de- 
manded. Needless  to  say  that  he  was  appointed  In- 
spector General  of  Manchuria,  and  has  since  become 
more  and  more  powerful. 

"Inspector  General,"  seems  to  be  the  title  favored  by 
many  military  generals  who  think  themselves  powerful 
enough  to  exact  additional  power  and  money  from  the 
Central  Government.  In  1917,  General  Lu  Yung- 
ting,  who  had  risen  to  prominence  from  the  unsavory 
class  of  freebooters,  wrested  from  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment the  high-sounding  title  and  remunerative  post  of 
"Inspector  General  of  the  Two  Kwangs."  Even  more 


116  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

notorious  a  case  of  political  blackmail  is  the  exaction 
by  General  Lung  Chi-kong  of  the  profitable  position  of 
"Inspector  General  of  the  Mines  of  the  Two  Kwangs." 
A  lieutenant  of  the  late  President  Yuan  Shi-kai,  General 
Lung  was  sent  to  Canton  by  the  deceased  President  in 
1915  with  instructions  to  suppress  revolutionary  activi- 
ties there.  When  the  Third  Revolution  came  to  an 
end  by  the  sudden  death  of  Yuan  Shi-kai,  the  new  ad- 
ministration at  Peking  desired  to  remove  General  Lung 
from  Canton.  But  Lung  had  a  formidable  army  which 
he  threatened  to  employ  in  a  manner  by  no  means 
agreeable  to  Peking,  should  the  Central  Government 
deprive  him  of  official  honors.  So  Peking  sought  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty  by  the  usual  expedient  of  creating 
for  the  general  the  remunerative  post  of  "Inspector 
General  of  Mines." 

Early  in  1918,  a  most  glaring  case  of  political  black- 
mail was  reported  from  Peking.  When  Yochow  was 
captured  by  the  Southern  rebels  in  January,  the  Central 
Government  sent  General  Feng  Yu-hsiang  to  the  South, 
authorizing  him  to  combat  the  revolutionary  forces  on 
the  Yangtse.  The  General  started  on  his  way,  but 
when  he  arrived  in  Chi-chow  on  the  Yangtse  he  refused, 
no  one  knows  for  what  reasons,  to  proceed  any  further. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  sent  Peking  telegram  after  tele- 
gram, all  couched  in  dictatorial  terms,  urging  the  imme- 
diate suspension  of  hostilities  between  the  North  and 
the  South.  In  a  most  arbitrary  manner  he  detained  six 
steamers  of  the  China  Merchant  Navigation  Company, 
exacted  money  from  the  revenue  collecting  offices  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Chi-chow,  and  commandeered  $70,000 
from  the  Salt  Transportation  Office  and  the  Central 
Tax  Office.  And  this  is  a  general  who  had  been  very 
much  admired  by  foreign  missionaries  because  of  his 
espousal  of  Christianity! 

The  significance  of  all  these  stories  lies  in  the  utter 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  117 

helplessness  of  Peking  in  dealing  with  refractory  gen- 
erals and  governors.  If  the  Central  Government  fails 
to  accommodate  them,  they  point  to  the  powerful 
troops  under  their  command,  which  usually  has  a  tell- 
ing effect.  The  result  is  the  creation  of  unnecessary 
offices,  depleting  the  national  treasury  already  heavily 
taxed.  Unless  this  condition  is  radically  altered  it  is 
idle  to  speak  of  efficient  administration  in  China,  let 
alone  republican  government. 

The  rival  factions,  eager  to  promote  their  own  self- 
ish interests,  do  not  scruple  at  any  scheme.  If  a  clique 
wanted  to  upset  the  cabinet,  it  would  accuse  the  Gov- 
ernment of  pro-Japanese  policy,  or  anything  that  would 
sound  plausible  as  a  pretext  for  opposing  the  men  in 
power.  For  that  purpose,  politicians  and  military 
chiefs  often  instigate  students.  Let  us  hear  what 
J.  O.  P.  Bland,  a  well-known  British  author  and  for 
many  years  an  official  of  the  Chinese  Maritime  Cus- 
toms, has  to  say  on  this  particular  matter : 

"The  raw  youths  and  school  girls  who  periodically 
parade  the  streets  of  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  Peking, 
demanding  the  execution  of  the  Chiefs  of  Police  or 
denouncing  negotiations  with  Japan,  may  convey  to  the 
uninitiated  observer  a  new  and  vivid  impression  of 
patriotic  national  consciousness,  but  those  behind  the 
scenes  are  well  aware  that  all  this  fervor  and  ferment 
of  turbulent  youth  is  often  skillfully  stimulated  by  the 
opponents  of  the  official  clique  in  power  at  Peking  for 
their  own  sordid  ends.  In  the  case  of  the  student  out- 
break last  winter  [1920]  at  Tientsin,  for  instance, 
there  is  no  doubt  (I  have  seen  documentary  evidence 
of  the  fact)  that  the  anti-Japanese  processions  and 
demonstrations  were  deliberately  organized  by  paid 
agents,  with  a  view  to  embarrassing,  and,  if  possible, 
overthrowing,  the  Cabinet  at  Peking.  The  actual  funds 
employed  (some  $200,000)  were  traced  to  the  estate 


118  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

of  the  late  President,  General  Feng  Kuo-chang,  who 
died  in  possession  of  a  vast  fortune  and  a  deep,  unsat- 
isfied grudge  against  his  Prime  Minister,  Tuan-Chi- 
jui.  In  the  present  state  of  Chinese  politics,  the  fact 
that  Tuan  and  his  adherents  were  maintained  in  power 
(at  a  price)  by  Japan,  was  quite  enough  to  account  for 
much  of  the  fervor  displayed  by  the  Government's 
opponents  on  the  subject  of  Shantung.  Incidentally,  it 
may  be  observed  that  the  Shantung  agitation  has  not 
been  in  any  true  sense  a  national,  or  even  a  provincial, 
movement.  This,  I  think,  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the 
fact  that,  in  Manchuria,  the  Chinese — practically  all 
Shantung  men — have  never  organized  any  boycott  or 
other  manifestation  of  hostility  towards  the  Japanese." 

To  all  appearances,  "civil  war"  in  China  has  become 
a  profession,  and  a  very  profitable  profession,  to  the 
few  military-political  chiefs  who  manipulate  it.  Up  to 
a  year  or  two  ago  the  Western  public  had  been  beguiled 
by  a  vigorous  propaganda  conducted  by  a  coterie  of 
foreigners.  It  had  been  misled  to  believe  that  all 
this  chronic  military  contest  in  China  was  a  clash  be- 
tween constitutionalists  and  reactionaries.  It  is  nothing 
of  the  sort.  It  may  have  been  such  at  the  time  of  the 
first  revolution  of  1911.  As  it  is  today,  this  contest 
is  nothing  but  a  means  of  looting  and  plundering,  and 
of  enabling  a  few  generals  and  politicians  to  roll  in 
opulence  and  luxury. 

All  this  impels  us  to  ask,  What  is  China?  And 
whither  is  she  going?  With  a  well-known  novelist  one 
may  say,  "If  winter  comes,  can  spring  be  far  behind?" 
May  we  hope  that  the  dreary  political  winter  which 
holds  China  in  its  grip  today  may  eventually  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  spring  where  chaos  will  vanish  before  order, 
and  discord  will  give  way  to  harmony? 


CHAPTER   XXI 
SOLVING  THE   RIDDLE 

Washington,  January  30,  1922:  In  my  letter  of 
November  18,  I  voiced  the  apprehension  that  China, 
in  putting  forth  pretentious  claims  in  the  so-called  uBill 
of  Rights,"  hitched  her  wagon  to  a  star,  ignoring  its 
rickety  condition.  I  feared  then  that  her  pretentions 
might  in  the  end  alienate  the  sympathy  of  the  well- 
informed,  who,  however  sympathetic  towards  her, 
could  not  close  their  eyes  to  the  chaotic  conditions  pre- 
vailing in  China.  As  I  have  watched  the  progress  of 
the  Conference  and  the  drift  of  public  sentiment  in  the 
past  two  months,  I  feel  that  my  apprehension  has  been 
unfortunately  justified. 

Edwin  L.  James,  Washington  correspondent  of  The 
New  York  Times,  seems  to  share  this  view  when  he 
writes  on  January  22  as  follows: 

"Indeed,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  in  Washington  confer- 
ence circles  it  is  no  longer  fashionable  to  speak  of  the 
'poor  Chinese' ;  it  is  rather  in  style  at  this  time  to  speak 
of  the  'foolish  Chinese.'  In  other  words,  there  is  less 
talk  of  the  wrongs  others  have  done  to  China  and  more 
talk  about  the  wrongs  China  has  done  to  herself. 

"For  the  past  week  the  American  and  British  spokes- 
men have  been  insisting  upon  the  fact  that  China  can- 
not be  saved  from  herself  by  outside  nations;  that  she 
must  work  out  her  own  salvation;  that  her  present  dis- 
organization places  a  limit  on  what  beneficial  bargains 
may  be  made  with  her." 

119 


120  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

In  writing  these  words,  Mr.  James  certainly  was  not 
actuated  by  antipathy,  much  less  by  malice,  towards 
China.  His  correspondence  throughout  the  Conference 
shows  that  he  is  more  sympathetic  towards  China  than 
towards  Japan.  As  an  honest  reporter,  however,  he 
has  to  report  as  he  observes,  and  he  could  not  fail  to 
notice  that  sympathy  for  China  has  been  waning. 

Not  only  have  the  conferees  intimated  individually 
and  in  private  their  disillusionment  or  disappointment 
about  China,  but  they  have  officially  and  as  a  body  reg- 
istered their  disapproval  of  the  presumptions  of  the 
Chinese  delegation.  The  best  example  is  the  resolu- 
tion adopted  by  the  Conference  in  connection  with  the 
increase  of  the  customs  revenue  of  China.  On  Novem- 
ber 23,  Senator  Underwood  proposed  that,  with  a  view 
to  giving  the  Chinese  Government  more  revenue  from 
the  tariff,  an  inquiry  be  made  as  to  how  customs  receipts 
could  be  increased.  Acting  upon  this  proposal  the 
Committee  on  Far  Eastern  and  Pacific  Problems 
adopted,  on  January  20,  a  resolution  recommending 
the  conversion  of  the  present  virtual  rate  of  5  per  cent 
ad  valorem  into  an  effective  5  per  cent  rate  by  revising 
the  price  schedule  of  imports,  thus  giving  China  a  new 
revenue  of  about  $46,000,000  a  year.  In  adopting  the 
above  plan,  the  Committee  was  animated  by  genuine 
sympathy  for  the  financial  strain  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment. At  the  same  time  it  could  not  fail  to  take 
cognizance  of  China's  failings,  as  numerous  as  they 
are  grave.  The  most  serious  of  these  failings  is  the 
reckless  waste  of  public  funds  by  the  warring  military 
chiefs  maintaining  forces,  whose  size  and  strength  are 
far  beyond  the  needs  of  the  country.  Unless  this  con- 
dition is  reformed,  it  would  be  worse  than  useless  to 
give  the  Chinese  Government  increased  revenue,  much 
less  the  autonomy  of  the  tariff.  The  recognition  of 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  121 

this  fact  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  following  reso- 
lution : 

"Whereas,  the  powers  attending  this  Conference 
have  been  deeply  impressed  with  the  severe  drain  on 
the  public  revenues  of  China  through  the  maintenance 
in  various  parts  of  the  country  of  military  forces,  exces- 
sive in  number,  and  controlled  by  the  military  forces 
of  the  provinces  without  co-ordination. 

"And  whereas  the  continued  maintenance  of  these 
forces  appears  to  be  mainly  responsible  for  China's 
present  unsettled  political  conditions; 

"And  whereas  it  is  felt  that  large  and  prompt  reduc- 
tions of  these  forces  will  not  only  advance  the  cause  of 
China's  political  unity  and  economic  development,  but 
will  hasten  her  financial  rehabilitation; 

"Therefore,  without  any  intention  to  interfere  in 
the  internal  problems  of  China,  but  animated  by  the 
sincere  desire  to  see  China  develop  and  maintain  for 
herself  an  effective  and  stable  government,  alike  in  her 
own  interest  and  in  the  general  interest  of  trade;  and 
being  inspired  by  the  spirit  of  this  Conference,  whose 
aim  is  to  reduce  through  the  limitation  of  armaments, 
the  enormous  disbursements,  which  manifestly  consti- 
tute the  greater  part  of  the  encumbrance  upon  enter- 
prise and  national  prosperity; 

"It  is  resolved  that  this  Conference  express  to  China 
the  earnest  hope  that  immediate  and  effective  steps  may 
be  taken  by  the  Chinese  Government  to  reduce  the 
aforesaid  military  forces  and  expenditures." 

When  the  resolution  for  tariff  increase  was  adopted 
by  the  Far  Eastern  Committee,  Dr.  Koo  thanked  the 
Committee,  but  expressed  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
Chinese  delegation  with  the  fact  that  its  contention  for 
the  restoration  of  tariff  autonomy  was  not  acceptable 
to  the  Committee.  Dr.  Koo's  remarks  evidently  went 


122  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

against  the  grain  of  other  delegations.  Senator  Under- 
wood immediately  arose  and  replied  to  Dr.  Koo  in  this 
plain  language: 

"Any  great  government  naturally  wishes  the  time 
may  come  when  she  may  control  her  own  finances,  not- 
withstanding that  she  yielded  the  control  herself.  So 
far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  gladly  welcome  an  opportunity, 
when  it  can  be  done,  of  restoring  to  China  her  entire 
fiscal  autonomy;  but  I  think  it  is  fair  to  the  subcommit- 
tee and  to  the  members  of  this  committee  to  say  this — 
and  it  is  in  line  with  the  resolution  pending — that  I  am 
sure  this  subcommittee  and  the  committee  to  which  I 
am  addressing  myself  now,  would  gladly  do  very  much 
more  for  China  along  all  lines,  if  conditions  in  China 
were  such  that  the  outside  powers  felt  they  could  do 
so  with  justice  to  China  herself. 

"I  do  not  think  there  was  any  doubt  in  the  minds  of 
the  men  on  the  subcommittee  as  to  the  question  that  if 
China  at  present  had  the  unlimited  control  of  levying 
taxes  at  the  customs  house,  in  view  of  the  unsettled 
conditions  now  existing  in  China,  it  would  probably 
work,  in  the  end,  to  China's  detriment  and  to  the  injury 
of  the  world,  and  I  think  that  had  more  to  do  with 
the  subcommittee  not  making  a  full  and  direct  response 
to  Dr.  Koo's  request  than  anything  else. 

"I  am  sure  there  was  no  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
other  powers  to  be  selfish,  or  not  to  recognize  the  full 
sovereignty  of  China,  and  I  only  rose  to  say  this,  that 
if  I  am  a  judge  of  the  situation,  a  judge  of  the  temper 
of  conditions  in  the  balance  of  the  world,  I  feel  sure 
that  when  China  herself  establishes  a  preliminary  gov- 
ernment of  all  the  provinces  of  China  and  dispenses 
with  the  military  control  that  now  exists  in  many  of 
the  provinces  of  China,  so  that  the  outside  powers  may 
feel  that  they  are  dealing  with  a  government  that  has 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  123 

entire  and  absolute  free  control  of  the  situation,  China 
can  expect  to  realize  the  great  ideals  of  sovereignty 
that  she  asks  for  at  this  table." 

Let  us  now  consider  what  the  Conference  has  done 
for  China.  Some  critics  assert  that  the  Conference 
has  done  little  or  nothing  that  is  really  beneficial  to 
China.  This  is  an  extreme  view.  If  the  Conference 
has  not  done  all  that  it  should  have  done,  it  is  not 
because  it  was  unsympathetic  towards  China,  but  be- 
cause it  realizes  that  the  existing  conditions  in  that 
country  do  not  justify  a  radical  and  sudden  change  by 
outside  influence.  Nevertheless  the  Conference  has 
accomplished  what  no  other  international  conference 
has  done.  The  following  list  will  show  at  a  glance 
what  it  has  achieved  in  the  interest  of  China. 

(1)  Restoration  to  China  of  the  former  German 
territory  of  Kiaochow  and  other  German  rights   in 
Shantung.     Officially  speaking  this  has  been  done  out- 
side the  Conference,  but  to  all  intents  and  purposes  it 
is  one  of  the  accomplishments  of  the  Conference. 

(2)  Increase  of  the  customs  tariff  from  the  present 
virtual  5  per  cent  rate  to  an  effective  5  per  cent  rate  by 
revising  the  schedule  of  imports.     This  will  immedi- 
ately give  China  an  additional  income  of  some  $46,000,- 
000   Mexican.     When  the   Chinese   Government  has 
eventually  abolished  likin,  additional  2.5  per  cent  will 
be  levied,  making  a  total  rate  of  7.5  per  cent.     (See 
Appendix  V.) 

(3)  Abolition  of  foreign  post  offices  after  Janu- 
ary 1,  1922,  on  the  condition  that  the  present  foreign 
supervision  of  the  postal  service  will  not  be  disturbed, 
and  that  China  will  endeavor  to  maintain  the  same  serv- 
ice in  an  efficient  condition.      (See  Appendix  IX.) 

(4)  Organization  of  an  international  commission  to 


124  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

inquire  into  the  practicability  of  abolishing  extraterri- 
toriality in  China.      (See  Appendix  VI.) 

(5)  As  to  the  foreign  troops  in  China  distinction 
has  been  made  between  those  stationed  in  compliance 
with  treaties,  and  those  without  the  authority  of  any 
treaty.     Troops  stationed  by  treaty  will  remain.     As 
to  the  other  class  of  troops,  the  diplomatic  corps  at 
Peking  will  investigate  and  decide  whether  or  not  they 
can  be  removed  without  jeopardizing  the  lives  and 
property  of  foreigners.      (See  Appendix  VIII.) 

(6)  The  question  of  foreign  police  will  be  dealt 
with  in  accordance  with  the  same  principle  as  the  pre- 
ceding. 

(7)  Wireless  stations  established  in  China  by  for- 
eign governments  will  remain  on  condition  that  they 
will  not  handle  private  or  commercial  messages  except 
when  other  means  of  electrical  communication  is  inter- 
rupted by  unexpected  events  such  as  internal  disorder. 
(See  Appendix  X.) 

(8)  The  Hughes  resolution  obligating  the  confer- 
ring Powers  to  list  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Conference  all  the  treaties  and  agreements  between  the 
Chinese  Government  and  their  respective  governments 
or  nationals.     All  future  agreements  with  China  are 
to  be  made  known  among  the  Powers.     This  publicity 
will  protect  not  only  China  but  the  Powers  interested 
in  Chinese  enterprises.      (See  Appendix  IV-C.) 

(9)  The  Root  resolution  to  stop  the  creation  of 
spheres  of  influence.      (See  Appendix  IV-D.) 

(10)  The  adoption  of  the  Root  formula,  binding 
the  powers  represented  at  this  Conference  to  respect 
the  principles  of  the  territorial  and  administrative  in- 
tegrity of  China,  as  well  as  the  open  door  and  equal 
opportunity  for  all  nations  interested  in  China.      (See 
Appendix  IV-A.) 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  125 

(11)  The  adoption  of  the  Hughes  resolution  with 
a  view  to  applying  more  effectively  the  principles  of  the 
open  door  in  China.     As  Mr.  Hughes  puts  it,  this  will 
make  the  open  door  a  "fact  rather  than  a  motto." 
(See  Appendix  I V-B.) 

(12)  The  Nine-Power  Treaty  embodying  the  fore- 
going three  resolutions.      (Appendix  IV-F.) 

(13)  The  Hughes  resolution  recording  the  hope  of 
the  conferring  nations  that  the  future  developments  of 
railways  in  China  shall  be  so  conducted  as  to  enable 
the  Chinese  Governmest  to  effect  the  unification  of  the 
railways  into  a  system  under  Chinese  control  with  such 
foreign   financial   and   technical   cooperation   as   may 
prove  necessary  in  the  interests  of  that  system.      (See 
Appendix  XII-A.) 

All  these  measures  are  well  conceived  and  helpful, 
but  they  will  help  China  little,  if  she  does  not  know 
how  to  help  herself.  As  I  have  reiterated,  China's 
salvation  lies  in  her  own  determination  and  ability  to 
reform  her  own  conditions.  Take  for  instance  the 
question  of  tariff  revision.  If  China  wants  to  regain 
tariff  autonomy,  it  is  imperative  that  she  should  abolish 
likin,  and  prove  the  honesty  and  integrity  of  her  offi- 
cials, for  it  was  primarily  and  originally  administrative 
corruption  as  well  as  the  cumbersome  and  arbitrary 
methods  of  taxing  duties  which  caused  China  to  lose 
the  right  to  administer  her  own  customs.  Suppose  that 
the  Powers  agreed  to  restore  tariff  autonomy  to  China 
under  the  existing  circumstances.  The  increased  revenue 
from  the  customs  would  simply  stimulate  the  cupidity 
and  peculation  of  civil  officials  and  military  chiefs,  while 
the  innocent  populace  would  continue  to  suffer  from 
arbitrary  taxation  and  recurrent  plundering  and  seizure 
at  the  hands  of  warring  militarists  and  their  undisci- 
plined coolie-soldiers. 


126  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Suppose,  again,  that  the  Conference  accepted  the 
Chinese  demand  that  extraterritoriality  be  abolished 
at  once.  The  Chinese  Government  would  prove  utterly 
helpless  in  the  face  of  complicated  international  troubles 
that  would  surely  follow  such  a  sudden  and  radical 
change.  Under  the  present  condition  of  administra- 
tive dislocation,  how  could  China  hope  to  protect  for- 
eign lives  and  property  after  the  abolition  of  extra- 
territoriality? That  she  could  not  protect  them  has 
been  more  than  amply  proved  by  the  abolition  of  Rus- 
sian jurisdiction  in  the  Russian  railway  zone  in  North 
Manchuria.  Taking  advantage  of  the  helplessness  of 
Russia,  the  Chinese  Government  in  September,  1920, 
took  over,  by  force  of  arms,  administrative  and  judi- 
cial authority  which  had  been  exercised  by  Russia  in 
the  railway  zone  in  Manchuria,  which  has  a  Russian 
population  of  some  180,000.  As  a  consequence  the 
Russians  are  groaning  under  an  impossible  medieval 
system  of  judiciary.  According  to  a  publication  of  a 
Russian  patriotic  society  known  as  the  Association  to 
Recover  the  Rights  of  the  Russians,  whose  headquar- 
ters are  in  Harbin,  the  Russian  metropolis  in  Man- 
churia, the  Chinese  judges  are  so  inefficient  that  they 
are  unable  to  dispose  of  cases  that  are  piling  up  upon 
their  desks.  Within  a  few  months  after  the  inaugu- 
ration of  the  Chinese  regime,  no  less  than  5,000  cases 
accumulated  with  no  prospect  of  decision.  The  Rus- 
sian association  also  complained  of  the  corrupt  prac- 
tices prevailing  among  Chinese  judges.  To  make  the 
condition  worse,  the  Chinese  police  and  railway  guards 
who  replaced  the  Russians  in  October,  1920,  have  no 
scruple  in  resorting  to  extortion  and  violence  in  dealing 
with  the  Russians  in  the  railway  zone. 

Fortunately  for  China,  Russia  today  is  in  no  position 
to  protest  effectively  against  the  abuse  of  Russians  in 


THE    RIDDLE    OF    CHINA  127 

Manchuria.  Should  similar  abuses  be  perpetrated  in 
dealing  with  citizens  of  other  countries  in  the  event  of 
the  abolition  of  extraterritoriality,  China  would  imme- 
diately be  greeted  with  vigorous  protests  which,  if  not 
reasonably  met,  would  surely  lead  to  serious  interna- 
tional complications. 

There  is  another  consideration.  The  abolition  of 
extraterritoriality  will  not  only  expose  foreigners  to 
abuse,  but  will  work  against  the  interests  of  the  Chinese 
themselves.  One  cannot  but  agree  with  an  American 
correspondent  at  Shanghai,  when  he  writes  in  the  Japan 
Advertiser,  an  American  journal  in  Tokyo,  as  follows : 

''Should  extraterritoriality  be  abolished  tomorrow 
Chinese  business  men  who  try  to  find  a  way  of  protect- 
ing themselves  against  the  rapacity  of  the  officials,  as 
well  as  the  so-called  politicians,  would  have  to  leave 
the  country.  The  very  men  who  are  now  demanding 
this  abolition  could  not  remain  in  China  for  a  year  when 
extraterritoriality  becomes  a  thing  of  the  past.  Why 
do  they  all  live  in  foreign  concessions  when  they  are 
out  of  power?  Why  is  Sun  Yatsen's  residence  at  Rue 
Moliere  in  the  French  Concession  at  Shanghai?  That 
is  no  reflection  on  Dr.  Sun;  rather  does  it  show  that  he 
has  good  judgment.  But  it  is  a  reflection  on  those 
courageous  Chinese  youths  from  Columbia,  Cornell, 
Harvard,  Yale  and  other  American  universities  who 
demand  the  return  of  all  foreign  rights  in  China  but 
who  will  not  remain  in  their  own  country  to  suffer  for 
it  and  to  improve  it." 

For  some  years  an  international  effort  has  been  made 
to  rid  China  of  the  scourge  of  opium.  The  Chinese 
Government  itself  recognized  its  evil  and  prohibited 
the  use  of  opium  and  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy.  But 
everybody  in  China  knows  that  the  prohibition  is  sim- 
ply nominal.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  honest  effort  has 


128  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

been  made  to  execute  the  prohibition  law.  Even  if  the 
Chinese  Government  had  the  honest  desire  to  execute 
it,  it  has  no  administrative  organization  whose1  probity 
and  efficiency  could  cope  with  the  task.  It  is  now  no 
secret  that  in  most  poppy-growing  provinces,  this  mate- 
rial for  opium  is  openly  raised.  In  Fukien  Province 
the  Government  authorities  are  officially  encouraging 
this  illegal  practice.  In  some  localities  in  Fukien  the 
authorities  are  supplying  the  farmers  with  poppy  seeds, 
and  are  compelling  their  plantation.  In  Canton  Dr. 
Sun  Yatsen,  head  of  the  Provisional  Government, 
issued  in  the  spring  of  1921  an  order  to  all  the  local 
magistrates  of  the  Province,  urging  them  to  encourage 
the  cultivation  of  the  poppy,  so  that  a  thirty  per  cent  tax 
could  be  imposed  upon  the  farmers  out  of  their  profits. 
All  this  leads  us  to  the  conclusion  that  the  riddle  of 
China  cannot  be  solved  by  international  conferences 
and  agreements.  After  all,  the  riddle  must  be  solved 
by  China  herself.  In  the  meantime,  however,  the  out- 
side Powers  must  extend  friendly  assistance  to  any  sin- 
cere effort  which  China  may  make  for  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  her  conditions. 


PART  IF, 
THE  NEW  OPEN   DOOR 


PART  IV 
THE  NEW  OPEN  DOOR 


CHAPTER  XXII 
THE   SPHERES   OF  INFLUENCE 

Washington,  December  14,  1921:  The  Chinese 
delegation  has  proposed  that  the  spheres  of  influence 
set  up  by  various  Powers  in  different  sections  in  China 
be  abolished.  This  proposal  comes  within  the  scope 
of  the  Root  formula  adopted  on  November  20.  The 
first  article  of  that  formula  states  that  the  Powers  par- 
ticipating in  this  Conference  shall  respect  the  sover- 
eignty, independence,  and  the  territorial  and  adminis- 
trative integrity  of  China.  The  second  binds  the 
nations,  morally  at  least,  to  use  their  influence  for  the 
purpose  of  effectually  establishing  and  maintaining  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  throughout  the  territory  of 
China.  Unquestionably  the  Chinese  proposal  will 
receive  favorable  consideration. 

It  is  not  easy  to  ascertain  the  territorial  extent  of 
the  spheres  of  influence.  But  as  generally  understood 
by  authoritative  writers  on  the  subject,  they  may  be 
apportioned  among  four  nations  as  follows : 

131 


132  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

RUSSIA 

Square  Miles 

Outer  Mongolia 1,000,000 

Sinkiang 548,000 

Three-fourths  of  Manchuria 273,000 


Total  for  Russia 1,821,000 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

Tibet 533,000 

Sze-Chuan 218,000 

Kwantung 86,800 

Yangtse  Valley 362,000 


Total  for  Great  Britain 1,199,800 

FRANCE 

Yunnan  146,700 

Kwangsi 77,200 


Total  for  France 223,900 

JAPAN 

South  Manchuria 90,000 

Fukien 46,000 

Section  of  Shantung 18,000 


Total  for  Japan 154,000 

Before  the  war  Germany  claimed  the  whole  Province 
of  Shantung,  55,000  square  miles,  as  her  exclusive 
sphere  of  influence.  Of  course,  she  was  not  satisfied  with 
Shantung.  In  the  empire  scheme  of  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  were  included  several  provinces  adjoining  Shan- 
tung as  ultimate  German  preserves.  With  that  end 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  133 

in  view  she  was  making  steady  inroads  in  the  direction 
of  the  Yangtse  Valley,  the  British  sphere  of  influence. 
To  prepare  against  this  rising  German  tide  in  China 
was  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  second  and  third  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliances. 

Chronologically  speaking,  Germany  was  the  first  to 
initiate  the  idea  of  the  sphere  of  influence  in  a  formal 
treaty  with  China.  In  the  Chino-German  agreements 
of  1898  and  1911,  it  is  provided  that  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung  the  Chinese  Government  and  merchants 
should  give  preference  to  Germany  in  the  employment 
of  foreigners  or  foreign  capital,  as  well  as  in  the  pur- 
chase of  foreign  materials  for  railway  and  other  impor- 
tant enterprises.  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  secure  her 
position  in  the  Yangtse  Valley,  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment with  Germany  recognizing  Germany's  special  po- 
sition in  Shantung  and  the  territory  north  of  the  Yel- 
low River,  in  return  for  which  Germany  recognized 
England's  special  interests  in  the  Yangtse  Valley. 

This  agreement  was  soon  followed  by  a  similar 
understanding  concluded  between  Russia  and  England 
in  1899.  This  has  been  known  as  the  Scott-Muravieff 
agreement.  In  this  agreement  Russia  promised  to  con- 
fine her  activities  north  of  the  Great  Wall,  and  to  rec- 
ognize the  British  sphere  of  influence  in  the  Yangtse 
Valley.  In  the  meantime  France  secured  the  conces- 
sion to  build  a  railway  from  Indo-China  to  Yunnan,  the 
capital  of  a  southern  province  of  the  same  name. 

The  pernicious  effect  of  the  spheres  of  influence  is 
obvious.  Each  Power  has  intrenched  itself  in  its  own 
sphere,  excluding  therefrom  enterprises  of  another 
Power  or  its  nationals.  This  is  especially  true  in  rail- 
way and  mining  enterprises. 

Let  us  explain  this  by  a  remarkable  example.  In 
1916  the  Siems-Carey  Company  of  St.  Paul,  with  the 


134  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

financial  backing  of  the  American  International  Cor- 
poration, secured  from  Yuan  Shi-kai,  then  President 
of  China,  a  huge  concession  to  finance  railways  of  some 
1,500  miles  with  an  option  for  another  1,500.  The 
construction  work  for  these  railways  was  to  be  given 
to  the  Siems-Carey  Company.  The  contract  did  not 
specify  lines.  When  the  American  concessionaires  got 
down  to  business  and  tried  to  define  routes  for  their 
projected  railways,  they  had  to  face  the  stone  wall  of 
spheres  of  influence.  First  they  tried  to  build  a  line 
from  a  point  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kalgan,  near 
Peking,  to  Lanchow  through  Shansi,  Shensi,  and  Kansu 
Provinces.  To  this  project  Russia  objected,  because 
she  had  already  secured  a  railway  concession  in  that 
section.  Then  the  Americans  turned  their  attention  to 
the  South,  and  proposed  to  build  a  line  from  a  seaport 
in  Kwangtung  Province  to  a  point  in  Hunan  Province. 
France  immediately  put  her  foot  upon  this  project  on 
the  ground  that  Kwangsi  Province  was  her  sphere. 
After  that  the  Americans  launched  a  project  to  build 
a  line  in  Chekiang  Province,  south  of  Shanghai.  Here 
England  protested  against  it  because  the  Province  was 
her  railway  preserve. 

Of  course  President  Yuan  Shi-kai  knew  that  the 
Americans  would  encounter  this  difficulty,  but  he  did 
not  care  a  straw  about  it.  All  he  wanted  was  the  ad- 
vance of  money  which  he  expected  to  get  from  the 
American  concessionaires  for  the  privilege  he  had 
given. 

The  organization  of  the  new  International  Consor- 
tium has  been  a  step  toward  the  abolishment  of  the 
spheres  of  influence.  By  pooling  various  railway  con- 
cessions obtained  by  the  Powers,  this  new  financial  or- 
ganization will  have  the  effect  of  obliterating  the 
spheres  of  influence  as  far  as  railway  enterprises  are 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  135 

concerned.  Unfortunately,  the  International  Consor- 
tium has  been  more  or  less  in  a  state  of  abeyance,  be- 
cause China  has  not  yet  recognized  it  for  two  reasons. 
First,  she  has  not  been  admitted  into  the  Consortium 
and,  therefore,  feels  justified  in  refusing  to  recognize 
it.  Secondly,  she  contends  that  this  financial  organiza- 
tion deprives  China  of  the  freedom  to  borrow  money 
in  the  open  market.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  admis- 
sion of  Chinese  bankers  into  the  Consortium  will  soon 
be  forthcoming,  with  the  result  that  China  will  see  the 
wisdom  of  recognizing  it. 

As  far  as  Japan  is  concerned,  she  is  willing  and  ready 
to  abandon  her  spheres  of  influence.  She  has  already 
proved  the  sincerity  of  this  intention  by  various  acts. 
In  Shantung  she  proposed  in  her  memorandum  to  China 
September  7,  1921,  that  she  would  give  up  her  prefer- 
ential rights  which  were  enjoyed  by  Germany  and  to 
which  she  has  fallen  heir  by  virtue  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty.  Again,  in  the  course  of  the  "conversations" 
now  being  held  between  the  Japanese  and  the  Chinese 
delegations  on  the  question  of  Shantung,  Japan  reaf- 
firmed the  same  proposal.  Under  the  German  regime, 
both  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  Chinese  mer- 
chants in  Shantung  obligated  themselves  to  purchase 
railway  and  other  important  materials  exclusively  from 
Germany.  Japan  has  definitely  waived  this  privilege. 
She  has  also  turned  over  to  the  International  Consor- 
tium three  projected  railways,  which  she  contracted  to 
finance  in  1918,  and  for  which  she  has  already  advanced 
$20,000,000  to  the  Chinese  Government. 

In  Manchuria  Japan  is  following  the  same  course. 
She  has  turned  over  to  the  International  Consortium 
two  most  important  projected  railways  in  Manchuria. 
One  of  the  two  lines  runs  from  the  interior  of  Man- 
churia to  a  port  on  the  Gulf  of  Liaotung,  and  is  likely, 


136  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

if  built,  to  compete  with  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 
operated  by  a  Japanese  corporation.  These  two  pro- 
jected lines  are  the  most  important  of  the  railways 
which  Japan  has  contracted  to  finance.  Yet  she  is  will- 
ing to  pool  them  in  the  interest  of  the  International 
Consortium. 

Because  of  their  geographical  advantage,  the  Japa- 
nese seem  confident  that  they  will  not  be  defeated  by 
any  nation  in  a  free  economic  competition  in  Man- 
churia, Siberia,  or  Shantung.  For  that  reason  they 
are  not  only  unafraid  of  the  "open  door"  principle,  but 
are  in  favor  of  it. 

In  the  past  there  were  times  when  some  of  the  Japa- 
nese leaders,  especially  those  of  the  military  type,  urged 
the  necessity  of  excluding  foreign  railway  enterprises 
at  least  from  South  Manchuria.  But  this  was  mainly 
due  to  the  Russian  menace  which  had  long  been  the 
nightmare  of  the  Japanese.  Today  Russia's  fate  in 
eastern  Asia  is  yet  uncertain.  Disorder  and  lawless- 
ness will  undoubtedly  continue  to  prevail  in  Siberia  for 
some  years  or  decades  to  come.  This  condition  must 
be  considered  in  formulating  Japan's  policy  in  South 
Manchuria,  especially  with  reference  to  railway  enter- 
prise, if  she  is  to  be  the  guardian  of  peace  in  that  region. 

And  yet  the  menace  of  a  disorganized  lawless  Russia 
will  be  more  easily  met  than  the  menace  of  a  gigantic 
military  organization  such  as  was  the  Czar's  empire. 
Realization  of  this  changed  situation  cannot  fail  to 
influence  Japan's  policy  in  Manchuria.  There  is  reason 
to  believe  that  in  the  future  Japan  will  welcome  foreign, 
and  especially  American,  capital  and  enterprises  in 
South  Manchuria. 

In  the  past  few  years  events  have  moved  swiftly  in 
Japan.  The  political  and  diplomatic  ideas  that  pre- 
vailed in  the  days  of  the  late  Premier  Marshal  Terauchi 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  137 

no  longer  prevail  in  Japan  today.  This  changed  mental 
attitude  of  the  Japanese  leaders  will  gradually  manifest 
itself  in  the  modification  of  Japanese  policy  in  Man- 
churia. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 
THE    HAY   DOCTRINE 

Washington,  January  17,  1922:  Today  Secretary 
Hughes  has  presented  to  the  Far  Eastern  Committee 
a  resolution  for  the  effective  enforcement  of  the  tradi- 
tional American  policy  of  the  open  door  in  China.  This 
resolution,  coupled  with  the  Root  formula  adopted  by 
the  committee  on  November  21,  will  go  down  in  history 
as  the  uHughes-Root  new  open  door  doctrine"  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  "Hay  open  door  doctrine." 

Before  considering  the  new  doctrine,  let  us  examine 
the  Hay  doctrine  enunciated  in  1899  and  emphasized 
in  1900. 

To  those  who  look  upon  the  Hay  doctrine  of  the  open 
door  as  the  canon  of  American  diplomacy  in  the  Far 
East,  it  may  be  shocking  to  learn  that  Secretary  Hay's 
open  door  principle  was  a  recognition  of  the  spheres 
of  influence  established  by  various  powers  in  China. 
Contrary  to  the  impression  of  the  average  American, 
Mr.  Hay,  in  enunciating  the  open  door,  did  not  attempt 
to  forestall  the  establishment  of  spheres  of  influence. 
Much  less  did  he  attempt  to  abolish  the  spheres  already 
set  up. 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Hay  accepted  the  inevitable, 
and  recognized  the  spheres  of  influence.  He  satisfied 
himself  by  securing  the  promise  of  the  interested 
Powers  that  within  their  respective  spheres  of  influence 
no  commercial  discrimination  would  be  allowed  against 
any  country.  In  September,  1899,  Mr.  Hay  addressed 

138 

V 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  139 

letters  to  American  ambassadors  at  various  European 
capitals,  instructing  them  to  notify  the  European  Gov- 
ernments that  the  American  Government  stood  for 
equal  opportunities  in  China.  In  those  letters  Mr. 
Hay's  open  door  doctrine  was  defined  as  follows : 

(First)  That  no  Power  will  in  any  way  interfere 
with  any  treaty  port  or  vested  interest  within  any  so- 
called  "sphere  of  influence  or  interest"  or  leased  terri- 
tory it  may  have  in  China. 

(Second)  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time 
being  shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped 
to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said  spheres  of  influence 
(unless  they  be  free  ports),  no  matter  to  what  nation- 
ality it  may  belong,  and  that  duties  leviable  shall  be 
collected  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

(Third)  That  no  power  shall  levy  any  higher  harbor 
dues  on  vessels  of  another  nationality  frequenting  any 
port  in  such  sphere  than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of 
its  own  nationality,  or  any  higher  railroad  charges  over 
lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  sphere  on 
merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other 
nationalities  transported  through  such  sphere  than  shall 
be  levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its  own 
nationals  transported  over  equal  distances. 

The  occasion  for  Mr.  Hay's  communication  with 
European  Governments  on  the  question  of  the  open 
door  was  the  establishment  in  China  of  leased  terri- 
tories and  spheres  of  influence  by  various  European 
Powers.  It  was  feared  that  in  such  territories  and 
spheres  discrimination  with  regard  to  railway  rates, 
customs  duties,  and  wharfage,  might  be  practiced  to 
the  detriment  of  international  commerce. 

The  principles  enunciated  by  Mr.  Hay  were  ac- 
cepted by  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Germany.  There 
was,  however,  one  European  Power  which  was  reluc- 


140  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

tant  to  acquiesce  in  the  Hay  doctrine,  and  that  was 
Russia.  Upon  receipt  of  Secretary  Hay's  note,  Russia 
not  only  expressed  herself  in  favor  of  reserving  for 
herself  the  right  to  levy  customs  duty  on  foreign  im- 
ports within  her  sphere  but  demurred  to  the  American 
proposal  with  regard  to  harbor  duties  and  railway 
charges. 

In  July,  1900,  Mr.  Hay  again  sent  instructions  to 
the  American  ambassadors  in  Europe,  enlarging  the 
scope  of  the  first  letters  and  coming  out  squarely  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China. 
The  occasion  for  this  step  was  Russian  encroachment 
upon  Manchuria.  The  Boxer  disturbance  had  supplied 
Russia  with  a  plausible  pretext  to  pour  troops  into 
Manchuria,  although  the  country  was  little  affected  by 
the  uprisings.  Early  in  1900,  General  Gribsky,  Gov- 
ernor of  Amur  Province,  massacred  5,000  defenseless 
Chinese  near  Blagovestchensk.  The  appearance  of  a 
few  bandits  in  the  neighborhood  of  Mukden  was  made 
an  excuse  for  Russian  troops  to  ravage  the  country  and 
to  butcher  the  Chinese  in  a  series  of  so-called  battles. 
The  city  of  Kirin  was  soon  occupied  by  Russian  forces, 
and  by  August  the  treaty  port  of  Newchwang  had 
fallen  into  their  hands.  With  characteristic  audacity 
Russia  seized  the  Newchwang  customs  house  and 
hoisted  her  flag  over  it.  At  the  end  of  1900,  the  whole 
of  Manchuria  was  under  Russian  military  occupation. 

The  end  of  the  Boxer  disturbance  did  not  end  the 
Russian  military  occupation  of  Manchuria.  In  spite 
of  repeated  remonstrances  of  Japan,  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  Russia  still  kept  her  troops  in  that 
country.  But  the  protests  of  the  Powers  were  so  per- 
sistent that  the  Government  of  St.  Petersburg  was  com- 
pelled in  April,  1902,  to  sign  an  agreement  with  China 
consenting  to  evacuate  Manchuria  in  18  months.  But 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR 

as  the  months  passed  it  became  evident  that  Russia  had 
no  sincerity  to  abide  by  that  agreement.  When  the 
time  to  evacuate  the  important  commercial  port  of  New- 
chwang  arrived  in  April,  1903,  Russia  not  only  refused 
to  withdraw,  but  pressed  upon  China  a  series  of  new 
demands,  principal  among  which  were  these: 

1.  China  shall  undertake  not  to  open  any  new  treaty 
ports  in  Manchuria  or  to  permit  new  consuls  without 
the  consent  of  the  Russian  Government. 

2.  No  foreigners  except  Russians  shall  be  employed 
in  any  administrative  capacity  in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia. 

3.  Russia  will  retain  control  of  the  telegraph  line 
between  important  points  in  Manchuria. 

4.  The  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  which  is  purely  a  Rus- 
sian bank,  shall  continue  its  function  as  a  customs  bank. 

5.  All  rights  and  privileges  acquired  in  Manchuria 
by  Russian  subjects  during  the  military  occupation  shall 
remain  in  force  after  the  evacuation. 

Alarmed  by  this  critical  situation,  Japan,  as  early  as 
the  spring  of  1901,  approached  Germany,  England, 
and  the  United  States  with  a  view  to  securing  their  co- 
operation in  checking  the  Russian  absorption  of  Man- 
churia, but  none  would  render  any  assistance  to  Japan. 
How  pitifully  inexperienced  the  Japanese  diplomats 
were  in  those  days  may  be  judged  from  their  childlike 
hope  that  Germany  might  do  something  to  help  her 
against  Russia.  In  the  light  of  authentic  history,^  it  is 
obvious  that  in  those  days  Germany  was  secretly  insti- 
gating Russia  to  expand  in  the  Far  East.  Prince 
Bismarck  once  told  Prince  Von  Bulow:  "In  Russia  there 
is  a  serious  amount  of  unrest  and  agitation  for  terri- 
torial expansion,  which  may  easily  result  in  an  explosion. 
It  would  be  best  for  the  peace  of  the  world  if  the  explo- 
sion took  place  in  Asia  and  not  in  Europe.  We  must 


142  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

be  careful  not  to  stand  in  the  way,  otherwise  we  may 
have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  it." 

England,  though  apprehensive  of  the  Russian  ad- 
vance in  the  East,  was  not  ready  to  render  any  substan- 
tial assistance  to  Japan  in  an  attempt  to  check  that 
advance.  Even  the  United  States,  the  very  sponsor 
of  the  open  door  doctrine,  declined  to  aid  Japan.  Had 
it  not  been  for  Japan's  determination  to  fight  Russia 
single-handed,  the  much-heralded  open  door  proclama- 
tion would  have  become  a  scrap  of  paper.  Had  this 
come  to  pass  other  European  Powers  would  immedi- 
ately have  followed  Russia's  suit  and  sliced  for  them- 
selves large  sections  of  China.  In  challenging  Russia 
in  1904,  therefore,  Japan  fought  not  only  for  her  own 
existence,  but  for  the  integrity  of  China  and  for  the 
open  door  doctrine  of  America. 

And  yet  the  defeat  of  Russia  at  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese  did  not  entirely  remove  the  Russian  menace 
in  the  Orient.  After  the  signing  of  the  Peace  Treaty 
of  Portsmouth  no  one  realized  this  more  keenly  than 
the  Japanese  statesmen.  They  saw  Russia  feverishly 
fortifying  Vladivostok  on  a  tremendous  scale.  They 
saw  Russia  not  only  keeping  by  far  the  largest  portion 
of  Manchuria,  but  including  Mongolia  in  her  sphere 
of  influence.  Far  from  abandoning  her  empire  scheme 
in  the  East,  Russia  only  diverted  her  activities  into 
Mongolia  through  which  she  hoped  to  reach  and  domi- 
nate Peking.  After  a  sacrifice  of  100,000  lives  and  a 
billion  dollars  in  the  titanic  struggle  that  had  just  ended, 
Japan's  position  with  regard  to  Russia  appeared  as 
precarious  as  ever.  Especially  were  the  militarists, 
who  had  faced  the  brunt  of  Russian  onslaught,  fearful 
of  the  Muscovite  revenge  which  they  thought  not  only 
possible  but  probable.  What  could  Japan  do  but 
accept  the  inevitable  and  strengthen  her  foothold  in 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  143 

Manchuria  to  prepare  herself  against  Russia's  fresh 
aggression  ? 

The  Chinese  revolution  of  1911  furnished  Russia 
with  a  golden  opportunity  to  push  her  interests  in  Mon- 
golia. The  result  was  the  Russo-Mongolian  Treaty 
of  October  3,  1912,  establishing  a  Russian  suzerainty 
over  Mongolia. 

England,  ever  on  the  alert  to  counteract  the  Russian 
advance,  at  once  took  action  in  Tibet.  Beginning  with 
Colonel  Younghusband's  spectacular  expedition  to 
Lhassa  in  1905,  she  extended  her  influence  in  Tibet, 
and  by  1912  there  were  stationed  in  that  country  at 
least  5,000  British  troops.  In  that  year  she  entered 
into  a  secret  agreement  with  Russia,  the  two  countries 
dividing  Mongolia  and  Tibet  as  their  respective  spheres 
of  influence.  In  February,  1913,  England  persuaded 
the  Dalai  Lama  to  borrow  $10,000,000  from  her  and 
to  purchase  from  her  manufacturers  all  the  arms  and 
ammunition  Tibet  might  need.  The  Lama  also  agreed 
to  confer  upon  British  capitalists  right  to  exploit  the 
mining  and  other  natural  resources  in  Tibet. 

In  the  meantime,  China,  rent  by  revolution,  was  pow- 
erless to  safeguard  her  interests  in  her  outlying  terri- 
tories. She  made  only  a  feint  of  protest  which  was, 
of  course,  completely  ignored. 

The  collapse  of  Russia  as  a  great  military  power  will 
render  it  easier  to  maintain  and  enforce  the  open  door 
doctrine.  Although  at  this  writing  the  "Red"  or 
"Pink"  forces  of  the  Chita  Government  are  occupying 
Urga,  the  capital  of  Mongolia,  they  will  undoubtedly 
be  withdrawn  in  due  time.  If  the  Soviet  Government 
at  Moscow  or  the  Republican  Government  at  Chita  is 
sincere  in  its  espousal  of  all  that  is  opposed  to  imperi- 
alism or  militarism,  it  will  not  follow  a  policy  of 
aggression  in  Mongolia  or  Manchuria.  This  cannot 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

but  affect  Japan's  policy  in  South  Manchuria.  Under 
the  Czarist  regime  the  menace  of  Russian  militarism 
was  a  nightmare  of  the  Japanese.  Consequently  Japan 
had  to  formulate  her  policy  in  Manchuria  from  a  stra- 
tegical, no  less  than  from  an  economic,  point  of  view. 
In  the  future  economic  considerations  will  outweigh 
strategical,  provided,  of  course,  the  professed  pacifism 
of  the  new  Russia  does  not  prove  a  camouflage.  Today 
Japan  sees  in  Russia  and  China  two  great  enigmas, 
each  as  perplexing  as  the  other.  But  it  is  at  least  com- 
forting to  her  that  a  nightmare  has  changed  to  an 
enigma. 

Meanwhile,  what  will  England  do  in  Tibet?  While 
Japan  regards  Manchuria  as  an  integral  part  of  China, 
England  seems  to  look  upon  Tibet  as  independent  of 
Chinese  sovereignty.  At  a  meeting  of  newspaper  men 
a  few  weeks  ago  Baron  Kato  put  Japan  on  record  as 
believing  Manchuria  to  be  an  integral  part  of  China. 
No  question  has  been  raised  as  to  the  status  of  Tibet 
at  any  of  the  meetings  of  the  Conference,  but  a  mem- 
ber of  the  British  delegation,  in  an  interview  with  a 
New  York  Times  correspondent,  is  reported  to  have 
expressed  the  belief  that  Tibet  was  outside  Chinese 
jurisdiction. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 
THE    HUGHES-ROOT   DOCTRINE 

Washington,  February  i,  1922:  The  fifth  plenary 
session  held  today  might  well  be  called  the  "open  door 
session/'  although  part  of  it  was  also  devoted  to  report 
on  the  limitation  of  naval  armament.  The  session 
lasted  almost  four  hours,  three  of  which  were  consumed 
by  reports  on  agreements  and  resolutions  directly  or 
indirectly  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  open  door. 

These  agreements  and  resolutions,  reported  to  the 
Conference  by  Secretary  Hughes,  may  be  summed  up 
as  follows : 

1.  The  Hughes  resolution  for  enforcing  the  open 
door. 

2.  The  Hughes  resolution  for  listing  China's  exist- 
ing and  future  commitments. 

3.  The  Root  resolution  for  preventing  the  creation 
of  spheres  of  influence. 

4.  Resolution  for  the  removal  of  foreign  troops  and 
police  in  China. 

5.  Resolution  for  the  abolition  of  foreign  post  offices 
in  China. 

6.  Announcement  that  Japan  and  China  had  com- 
posed their  differences  concerning  Shantung,  thereby 
formally  and  definitely  abolishing  the  sphere  of  influ- 
ence which  was  originally  established  by  Germany,  and 
to  which  Japan  succeeded  by  virtue  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty  of  Peace. 

7.  Announcement  by  Mr.   Balfour  that,  following 

145 


146  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Japan's  example,  England  would  give  up  the  leased 
territory  of  Weihaiwei  in  Shantung. 

The  five  resolutions  above  mentioned  had  been 
adopted  by  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  at  various 
times,  and  were  reported  to  this  plenary  session  only 
as  a  matter  of  form.  These  resolutions,  together 
with  the  Japanese  renunciation  of  Shantung  rights  and 
the  British  relinquishment  of  Weihaiwei,  mark  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  China.  In 
the  happy  language  of  Secretary  Hughes,  they  will 
make  the  open  door  "not  only  a  motto  but  also  a  fact." 

Nothing  can  be  a  more  auspicious  augury  for  the 
inauguration  of  this  new  era  and  for  the  practical  en- 
forcement of  the  open  door  doctrine  than  the  Japanese 
withdrawal  from  Shantung  and  the  British  evacuation 
of  Weihaiwei,  thus  eliminating  two  of  five  leased  terri- 
tories in  China.  The  remaining  three  are  the  French 
territory  at  Kwangchow  Bay,  the  British  territory  of 
Kaulung,  and  the  Japanese  territory  of  Kwangtung 
(Port  Arthur  and  Dairen). 

When,  on  December  3,  the  Chinese  delegation 
argued  before  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  for  the 
abolishment  of  leased  territories,  M.  Viviani,  the 
French  delegate,  was  the  first  to  respond,  stating  that 
France  would  give  up  Kwangchow  Bay.  This  was 
followed  by  Mr.  Balfour's  statement  that  England 
might  relinquish  her  claim  to  Weihaiwei,  but  could  not 
abandon  the  Kaulung  Peninsula.  (See  Appendix  VII.) 
Mr.  Hanihara,  the  Japanese  delegate,  announced  that 
Japan  would  give  up  Kiaochow,  the  former  German 
territory  in  Shantung,  but  was  not  in  a  position  to  con- 
sider the  surrender  of  the  Kwangtung  territory  on  the 
tip  of  South  Manchuria.  (See  Appendix  VII.)  After 
listening  to  the  British  and  Japanese  statements,  M. 
Viviani  made  a  second  statement,  qualifying  the  first 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  147 

one  and  announcing  that  France  would  do  as  the  other 
Powers  did.  This  meant  that  France  would  hold 
Kwangchow  Bay  as  long  as  Britain  and  Japan  held 
Kaulung  and  Kwangtung,  respectively.  It  is,  however, 
likely  that  France  will  give  up  Kwangchow  Bay,  for 
she  has  no  practical  use  for  it. 

There  has  been  a  vast  difference  between  the  Euro- 
pean and  the  Japanese  methods  of  acquiring  Chinese 
territories.  In  the  case  of  England  and  France,  the 
leased  territories  were  wrested  from  the  unwilling  hand 
of  China.  They  involved  no  sacrifice  whatever  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers  which  acquired  them.  On  the  con- 
trary Japan  took  neither  Kiaochow  near  Port  Arthur 
from  China.  She  took  Port  Arthur  from  Russia  after 
a  titanic  war  waged  to  preserve  China's  integrity.  To 
her  that  war  meant  a  sacrifice  of  100,000  lives  and  a 
billion  dollars  of  gold.  Again,  Kiaochow  was  taken 
by  Japan  from  Germany  at  a  considerable  sacrifice  of 
lives  and  treasure. 

The  history  of  leased  territories  in  China  is  an  inter- 
esting, almost  fascinating,  study.  England  was  the 
first  to  appear  upon  China's  "happy  hunting  ground" 
of  international  rivalry  for  concessions.  It  was  in 
1861  that  she  leased  the  tip  of  the  Kaulung  Peninsula 
to  protect  Hongkong,  as  well  as  to  extend  her  influence 
to  Canton.  Thirty-five  years  later  this  small  leased 
territory  was  greatly  enlarged.  In  those  days  France 
was  not  friendly  to  England,  but  was  in  alliance  with 
Russia,  the  traditional  enemy  of  Great  Britain.  Natu- 
rally the  Quai  d'Orsay  closely  watched  every  move 
taken  by  England  on  the  political  chessboard  of  China. 
When,  therefore,  England  obtained  the  lease  of  the 
Kaulung  Peninsula,  France  saw  the  necessity  of  coun- 
teracting it  by  leasing  a  territory  on  the  coast  of  South 


148  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

China.  The  result  was  the  French  lease  of  Kwang- 
chowBay  in  1898. 

In  seeking  concessions  and  establishing  spheres  of 
influence  in  the  South,  France  cooperated  closely  with 
Russian  activities  in  North  China.  It  was  the  time 
when  the  chancelleries  of  Europe  were  contemplating 
the  possible  disruption  of  China,  each  eager  to  stake 
out  for  itself  as  wide  a  territory  as  possible.  Russia 
was  busy  absorbing  China's  outlying  possessions  in  the 
North.  The  empire  builders  of  St.  Petersburg  were 
dreaming  of  the  day  when  the  Czar  might  wield  his 
scepter  not  only  over  Mongolia  and  Manchuria  but 
over  Peking  and  even  central  China.  In  the  attempt 
to  realize  that  dream,  Russia  relied  upon  the  coopera- 
tion of  France  which  was  operating  in  South  China. 

Indeed  Russia  and  France  agreed  upon  a  policy  the 
purpose  of  which  was  to  effect  a  junction  between  their 
respective  spheres  of  influence,  and  thus  curb  or  split 
the  British  sphere  in  the  Yangtse  Valley.  Every  move 
was  made  with  that  end  in  view,  France  ascending1 
northward  from  the  South,  Russia  descending  south' 
ward  from  the  North.  Various  railway  concessions 
obtained  in  China  by  Russia  and  France  in  those  days 
were  nothing  but  a  part  of  that  vast  program.  The 
French  occupation  of  Kwangchow  Bay  and  the  adja- 
cent territory  had  for  its  purpose  the  execution  of  that 
program. 

Today  the  French  position  in  South  China  has  been 
greatly  affected  by  the  elimination  of  her  partner,  Rus- 
sia, as  an  empire  builder.  Russia,  by  dint  of  her  vast 
territory  and  great  potential  strength,  may  still  be  re- 
garded with  fear  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  but  as 
far  as  her  scheme  of  joining  hands  with  France  in  Cen- 
tral China  is  concerned,  it  has  been  destroyed  beyond 
any  hope  of  resuscitation.  With  the  destruction  of  the 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  149 

Russo-French  empire  scheme,  the  raison  d'etre  of  the 
Kwangchow  leased  territory  is  gone.  In  this  fact  can 
we  not  see  the  reason  why  M.  Viviani  so  readily  offered 
that  territory  to  China  ? 

The  surrender  of  Kiaochow  and  Weihaiwei  by  Japan 
and  England,  respectively,  has  a  significance  much 
greater  than  can  be  gauged  by  their  area  or  the  material 
benefit  they  may  confer  upon  China.  The  British  ter- 
ritory of  Weihaiwei  has  an  area  of  285  square  miles, 
and  the  Japanese  territory  of  Kaiochow  200  square 
miles.  In  the  vast  dominion  of  China  they  are  but 
specks  of  land.  But  their  restoration  to  China  has  a 
great  moral  and  political  significance.  No  one  can 
fail  to  realize  this  fact  who  has  even  a  slight  idea  of 
what  the  Powers  were  doing  to  China  only  a  score  of 
years  ago.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
all  European  nations  were  thinking  and  talking  of  what 
they  could  take  away  from  China.  None  of  them 
even  so  much  as  whispered  what  it  might  give  up  in  the 
interest  of  China.  The  Powers,  one  and  all,  virtually 
helped  themselves  to  whatever  appealed  to  their  fancy 
or  their  sense  of  usefulness.  Nothing  drives  this  point 
home  more  forcibly  to  our  minds  than  the  following 
chronological  table  : 

England  takes  Hongkong  after  the  Opium  War  .......  .  1842 

China  cedes  Amursk  to  Russia  .....................  1 

China  cedes  Maritime  Province  to  Russia  ............  1860 

England   obtains  lease   of    Kaulung   Peninsula,   opposite 

Hongkong  .....................................  1861 

France  annexes  three  provinces  in  Cochin  China  .......  1867 

France  takes  Tonking  and  Annam  .................  1 

England  takes  Burma  .............................  1886 

France  secures  right  to  extend  the  Annam  railway  to 

China  ........................................  1895 


/  #/    7" 

' 


150  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Cassini  Convention,  by  which  Russia  secures  the  right  to 
build  railway  through  Manchuria 1895 

England  obtains  lease  of  more  territory  on  Kaulung 
Peninsula 1896 

Franco-British  agreement  for  equal  participation  in  rail- 
way building  in  Yunnan  and  Szechuan 1896 

Russia  organizes  a  bank  ( Russo-Chinese  Bank)  to  secure 
control  of  China's  economic  resources 1895 

Russia  rejects  German  participation  in  this  bank 1895 

Germany  retaliates  by  seizing  Kiaochow,  which  Russia 
had  intended  to  lease November,  1897 

Russia,  through  the  dummy  of  a  Belgian  syndicate,  secures 
concession  to  build  the  Peking-Hankow  railway 1897 

France  secures  concession  for  the  Yunnan  railway 1897 

England  declares  the  Yangtse  Valley  her  sphere  of  influ- 
ence   February,  1898 

France  leases  Kwangchow  Bay 1898 

German-Chinese  Convention  leasing  Kiaochow  to  Ger- 
many   March,  1898 

Russo-Chinese  convention  leasing  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 
to  Russia March,  1898 

France  declares  South  China  her  sphere  of  influence 

April,  1898 

England,  to  make  her  position  secure,  recognizes  the  Ger- 
man sphere  of  influence  in  Shantung April  18,  1898 

England  leases  Weihaiwei July,   1898 

British-German  agreement,  recognizing  England's  special 
railway  interests  in  Yangtse,  and  Germany's  special 
position  in  Shantung  and  territory  north  of  the  Yellow 
River  September,  1898 

Italy  demands  lease  of  Sammun  Bay 1899 

Scott-Muravieff  agreement,  by  which  Russia  promises  to 
confine  her  activities  north  of  the  Great  Wall,  recog- 
nizing British  sphere  of  influence  in  the  Yangtse 
Valley  1899 

China  grants  to  Russia  the  exclusive  right  to  construct 
railways  in  Mongolia 1899 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  151 

Even  to  the  eve  of  the  present  Conference,  the  old 
diplomatic  idea  about  China  prevailed  among  the  na- 
tions. Indeed  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  it 
followed  the  foreign  delegations  to  the  very  door  of 
the  conference  hall.  It  is  the  American  leadership  dis- 
played at  this  Conference  that  the  world  has  to  thank 
not  only  for  the  birth  of  a  new  international  ideal  about 
China  but  for  the  practical  application  of  that  ideal. 
Thanks  to  that  leadership,  the  Shantung  controversy 
has  been  settled,  not  along  the  lines  of  old  diplomacy, 
but  in  accordance  with  new  ideals  that  have  dawned 
with  the  Conference.  Because  of  that  settlement,  Brit- 
ain has  also  been  obliged  to  give  up  Weihaiwei.  All 
the  Powers  assembled  at  the  Conference  have  bound 
themselves  by  agreements  or  resolutions  not  to  return 
to  the  old  practice  of  spheres  of  influence  or  special 
interests.  They  have  obligated  themselves,  moreover, 
to  abolish  their  post  offices  in  China  and  to  withdraw 
their  troops  from  Chinese  soil. 

Pessimists  may  belittle  the  work  of  the  Conference 
and  say  that  it  has  done  little  that  is  really  beneficial  to 
China.  But  even  they  must  recognize  the  tremendous 
and  refreshing  change  that  has  come  over  the  attitu4e 
of  the  Powers  towards  China.  This  change  is  no  shad- 
owy thing.  It  is  as  definite  as  it  is  real.  Twenty  years 
ago,  aye,  a  few  years  ago  the  Powers  were  talking  only 
of  what  they  could  take  from  China.  Today  they  are 
talking  of  what  they  can  give  her.  Certainly  that  indi- 
cates a  vast  moral  progress.  But  that  is  not  all.  The 
Powers  are  not  indulging  in  empty  talk,  but  have  actu- 
ally begun  to  give  China  something  substantial. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  fair  to  give  the  Conference  all  the 
credit  for  the  inauguration  of  this  new  era  in  interna- 
tional diplomacy  with  regard  to  China.  We  would 
do  ex-President  Wilson  gross  injustice  if  we  were  to 


152  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

ignore  the  significant  part  he  has  played  in  awaking  the 
international  conscience  from  its  slumber  of  centuries. 
Whatever  may  be  said  for  or  against  his  "Fourteen 
Points,"  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  his  idealism,  and 
especially  his  conception  of  "self-determination,"  has 
been  a  great  political  factor  in  the  adjustment  of  con- 
ditions not  only  in  Europe  but  in  Asia.  It  has  cast  a 
ray  of  hope  in  many  a  darkened  corner  of  the  world. 
It  stirred  the  dormant  consciousness  of  freedom  and 
independence  in  the  bosoms  of  peoples  long  oppressed 
by  foreign  overlords.  To  it  was  mainly  due  the  Korean 
uprising  of  1919,  which  happily  convinced  the  Japanese 
that  something  was  fundamentally  wrong  with  their 
administration  in  Korea.  The  smoldering  dissatisfac- 
tion in  India,  which  may  yet  ignite  a  revolution,  has  de- 
rived its  inspiration  partly  from  Wilsonian  idealism. 

In  the  particular  case  of  China,  no  one  can  fail  to 
see  that  her  resistance  to  Japanese  pressure  has  been 
inspired  and  encouraged  by  the  same  idealism.  But 
for  that  encouragement  China  would  not  have  hung  on 
to  Shantung  so  tenaciously.  True,  Mr.  Wilson,  for 
reasons  now  obvious  to  all,  had  to  give  up  his  fight  for 
Shantung  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  but  his  oppo- 
nents in  the  Senate  stole  his  thunder,  and  took  up  the 
same  fight  where  he  left  off.  To  the  extent  that  the 
Wilsonian  doctrine  of  self-determination  was  and  has 
been  an  inspiration  to  China,  we  must  credit  Mr.  Wil- 
son with  the  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Shantung 
question  and  all  that  it  means  to  her. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  series  of  resolutions  adopted 
by  the  Conference  for  the  enforcement  of  the  open  door 
in  China.  Cynics  may  say  that  these  resolutions  are 
nothing  new,  that  they  will  soon  be  consigned  to  desue- 
tude, and  that  the  foreign  delegates  will  go  home,  ac- 
cepting them  only  in  principle  but  making  mental  reser- 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  153 

vation  to  go  their  own  old  way  in  practice.  I  cannot 
share  such  cynical  views.  These  resolutions,  though 
valuable  in  themselves,  must  be  considered  in  the  light 
of  the  new  spirit  which  has  been  injected  into  inter- 
national diplomacy  concerning  China.  That  new  spirit, 
already  in  practice,  is,  as  I  have  noted,  to  give  back 
to  China  some  of  the  rights  that  have  been  taken  away 
from  her.  The  process  of  restitution  has  already 
begun. 

Herein  lies  a  significant  difference  between  the  Hay 
doctrine  of  the  open  door  and  the  Hughes-Root  doc- 
trine. When,  twenty-three  years  ago,  the  late  Sec- 
retary Hay  launched  the  famous  doctrine,  no  nation 
took  it  very  seriously.  All  chancelleries  accepted  it 
politely,  but  exercised  their  own  sweet  will  which  usu- 
ally proved  to  be  a  bitter  pill  for  China.  None  ever 
thought  of  giving  up  anything  for  China  because  of 
the  Hay  doctrine.  Today  this  condition  has  changed 
signally.  The  Powers  are  now  in  responsive  mood,  and 
are  willing  to  make  the  "open  door"  not  a  motto  but 
a  fact. 

The  novel  method  of  launching  the  new  open  door 
adds  to  its  efficacy.  There  is  an  important  difference 
in  psychological  effect  between  addressing  a  note  to 
foreign  governments  on  the  open  door  doctrine,  and 
adopting  that  doctrine  at  an  international  conference 
convened  especially  for  that  purpose.  A  doctrine  sol- 
emnly adopted  by  the  conferring  nations  after  free  and 
frank  discussions  is  not  going  to  be  easily  forgotten  or 
discarded. 

But  it  is  not  in  the  method  of  adoption  alone  that  the 
Hughes-Root  doctrine  differs  from  the  Hay  doctrine. 
As  I  have  said  in  the  preceding  chapter,  Mr.  Hay 
accepted  the  inevitable  and  recognized  the  spheres  of 
influence.  Nor  did  he  make  any  effort  to  forestall  the 


154  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

creation  of  such  spheres.  The  Root  resolution,  at- 
tached to  the  Hughes  resolution  for  the  listing  of 
China's  commitments,  definitely  provides  against  the 
establishment  of  such  spheres  in  the  future.  By  list- 
ing and  making  public  all  treaties  and  agreements 
which  China  has  made,  or  may  hereafter  make,  as 
provided  by  the  Hughes  resolution,  the  Powers  will  be 
in  a  position  to  detect  any  agreement  that  may  be 
detrimental  to  the  principles  of  the  open  door.  This 
is  the  application  of  the  Wilsonian  doctrine  of  "open 
covenants  openly  arrived  at."  Moreover,  the  Hughes 
resolution,  as  amended  by  Mr.  Balfour,  obligates 
China  to  notify  the  interested  Powers  of  every  treaty 
or  contract  which  has  been  or  may  be  concluded  by 
the  Chinese  Government,  central  or  local,  with  any 
foreign  Power  or  its  nationals.  This  is  a  new  depar- 
ture in  the  method  of  enforcing  the  open  door.  In 
the  past  China  has  shouldered  no  obligation  in  the 
effective  execution  of  the  open  door  doctrine.  If  the 
Chinese  Government  is  efficient  enough  to  perform 
this  new  duty  effectively,  there  is  little  need  of  other 
Powers  listing  their  agreements  with  China. 

Another  important  feature  of  the  new  open  door  is 
he  creation  in  China  of  a  Board  of  Reference  whose 
:unction  will  be  to  examine  and  pass  judgment  upon 
my  question  which  may  affect  the  principles  of  the 
)pen  door  and  which  may  be  submitted  to  it.  The 
detailed  plan  for  this  board  is  to  be  worked  out  at 
the  special  conference,  which  will  meet  at  Shanghai 
soon  after  the  Washington  Conference,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  revising  the  schedule  of  the  Chinese  customs 
tariff.  This  new  idea  was  advanced  by  Sir  Auckland 
Geddes,  British  delegate,  and  was  adopted  by  the  Con- 
ference. Such  a  board,  if  organized  and  established  in 
Shanghai,  as  it  surely  will  be,  will  prove  a  great  ad- 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  155 

vantage  to  British  commercial  interests  in  China,  for 
Britain  will  unquestionably  have  a  preponderating  posi- 
tion on  the  board.  Nevertheless,  the  British  sense  of 
honor  and  fair  play  can  be  relied  upon  in  the  execution 
of  its  duties.  The  British  management  of  the  Chinese 
customs  and  of  the  salt  gabelle  is  a  shining  example  of 
British  probity. 


CHAPTER   XXV 
JAPAN'S   "SPECIAL   INTERESTS" 

Washington,  January  22  y  1922:  The  presentation 
by  Secretary  Hughes  of  the  American  conception  of  the 
open  door  before  the  Committee  on  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  Problems  awakens  interest  in  what  is  fre- 
quently termed  Japan's  "special  interests"  in  China. 
The  "open  door"  is  the  antithesis  of  "special  interest." 
Does  Japan  claim  an  exception  to  the  general  applica- 
tion of  the  American  principles  of  the  open  door? 
What  does  Japan  really  mean  when  she  says  she  has 
a  "special  position"  in  China  or  Manchuria? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  these  questions  are  not  new. 
Ever  since  the  exchange  of  the  celebrated  Lansing- 
Ishii  notes  in  the  winter  of  1917,  the  public  has  heard 
much  about  Japan's  special  rights  or  interests  in  China. 
Those  notes  recognize  that  "Japan  has  special  interests 
in  China,  particularly  in  the  part  to  which  her  posses- 
sions are  contiguous."  Unfortunately  no  one  seems  to 
know  just  what  is  meant  by  Japan's  special  position  in 
China.  No  definition  has  been  given  by  any  one. 
Neither  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  nor  the  American 
State  Department  has  explained  its  meaning  in  plain, 
unmistakable  language.  If  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes  are 
to  remain  valid,  and  if  America  and  other  leading 
Powers  are  to  recognize  Japan's  "special  position"  in 
China,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  we  should  have 
a  clear  understanding  of  that  position. 

156 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  157 

The  only  attempt  that  has  been  made  to  clear  the 
mystery  surrounding  Japan's  special  position  in  China 
is  seen  in  the  numerous  documents  which  have  passed 
between  the  American,  British,  and  Japanese  Govern- 
ments concerning  the  International  Consortium  organ- 
ized at  the  instance  of  the  State  Department  for  the 
purpose  of  financing  the  Chinese  Government,  and  of 
pooling  foreign  loans  for  future  economic  enterprises 
in  China. 

When  the  Japanese  Government  was  invited  to  join 
this  organization,  it  feared  that  the  new  project  might 
undermine  Japan's  "special  position"  in  Manchuria. 
For  that  reason  the  Tokyo  Government  asked  the  other 
interested  governments  to  endorse  the  following  for- 
mula for  Japan's  self-protection : 

"In  matters  relating  to  loans  affecting  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  which,  in  their 
[Japanese  Government's]  opinion,  are  calculated  to 
create  a  serious  impediment  to  security  of  the  economic 
life  and  national  defence  of  Japan,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment reserve  the  right  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
guarantee  such  security." 

Mr.  Lament,  the  promoter  of  the  Consortium,  com- 
menting upon  the  above  formula  in  a  letter  addressed 
to  the  Japanese  banking  group,  said  that  Japan's  "spe- 
cial interests  have,  in  our  opinion,  never  had  to  do  with 
economic  matters."  Thus  Mr.  Lamont  intimated  that 
Japan's  special  interests  may  be  recognized  for  reasons 
other  than  economic. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  British  Government,  in  a 
note  addressed  to  Japan,  May  19,  1920,  was  willing 
to  "recognize  the  legitimate  desire  of  the  Japanese  na- 
tion to  be  assured  of  the  supplies  of  food  and  raw  ma- 
terial necessary  to  her  economic  life  and  her  justifiable 
wish  strategically  to  protect  and  maintain  the  Korean 


158  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

frontier."  The  British  Government  did  not  think  it 
feasible  to  accept  the  Japanese  formula,  because  it 
would  create  a  Japanese  sphere  of  interest  wider  than 
required  by  Japan's  needs  of  national  defense  or  eco- 
nomic existence.  Nevertheless  it  was  "prepared  to 
subscribe  to  a  written  assurance  to  the  effect  that  the 
Japanese  Government  need  have  no  reason  to  appre- 
hend that  the  Consortium  would  direct  any  activities 
affecting  the  security  of  the  economic  life  and  national 
defence  of  Japan."  It  also  assured  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment that  it  could  "firmly  rely  upon  the  good  faith 
of  the  Powers  concerned  to  refuse  to  countenance  any 
operations  inimical  to  such  interests"  of  Japan. 

The  American  Government,  in  a  note  addressed  to 
Japan,  on  March  16,  1920,  expressed  much  the  same 
opinion.  It  stated  that  there  was  uno  occasion  to  ap- 
prehend on  the  part  of  the  Consortium  any  activities 
directed  against  the  economic  life  or  national  defence 
of  Japan."  The  note  further  said  that  the  "recognition 
of  the  principle  [set  forth  in  the  Japanese  formula] 
is  implied  in  the  terms  of  the  notes  exchanged  between 
Secretary  Lansing  and  Viscount  Ishii  on  November  2, 
1917,"  and  that  the  same  principle  had  undoubtedly 
been  recognized  by  other  nations  participating  in  the 
Consortium.  "It  is  therefore  felt,"  the  note  concluded, 
"that  Japan  could  with  entire  assurance  rely  upon  the 
good  faith  of  the  other  two  Powers  associated  in  the 
Consortium  to  refuse  their  countenance  to  any  action 
inimical  to  the  vital  interests  of  Japan." 

Relying  upon  these  assurances  from  the  British  and 
American  Governments,  Japan  withdrew  her  formula. 
She  was  satisfied  that  these  assurances,  coupled  with 
the  provision  of  Article  I  of  the  inter-group  agreement 
of  May  11,  1919,  sufficiently  protected  her  safety.  That 
article  provides  that  agreements  and  options  relating 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  159 

to  industrial  undertakings  in  China,  including  railways, 
upon  which  substantial  progress  has  been  made,  need 
not  be  pooled  in  the  Consortium.  Thus  the  scope  of 
the  Consortium  is  definitely  limited  to  the  financing  of 
future  undertakings  in  China,  and,  to  use  Lord  Curzon's 
language,  uwas  never  meant  to  extend  to  established 
industrial  enterprises." 

Applying  the  above  principle,  and  in  accordance  with 
the  assurance  given  to  the  Japanese  Government  by 
England  and  America,  the  final  agreement  reached 
in  May,  1920,  disposed  of  the  Japanese  railways  and 
railway  enterprises  in  South  Manchuria  as  follows : 

I.  Not  to  be  pooled  in  the  Consortium: 

(a)  South  Manchuria  railway  and  its  branches,  698  miles. 
Owned  and  operated  by  Japanese. 

(b)  Projected  line  from  Kirin  to  Huining,  on  the  Korean 
boundary,  about  277  miles.    To  be  built  and  owned  by 
the   Chinese  Government,   financed   by  Japanese   capi- 
talists. 

(c)  Projected  Kirin-Kaiyuan  line,  about  230  miles,  running 
through  territory  contiguous  to  Korea.    To  be  built  and 
owned  by  the  Chinese  Government,  financed  by  Japan- 
ese capitalists. 

(d)  Kirin-Changchun  line,  79  miles.     Owned  and  operated 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  financed  by  Japanese  capi- 
talists. 

(e)  Projected  Changchun-Taonanfu  line,  about  180  miles. 
To  be  built  and  owned  by  the  Chinese  Government, 
financed  by  Japanese  capitalists. 

(f)  Shinminfu-Mukden  line,  36  miles.     Owned  and  oper- 
ated by  the  Chinese  Government,  financed  by  Japanese 
capitalists. 

(g)  Supingkai-Taonanfu  line,  190  miles,  partly  in  operation, 
partly  under  construction.    Owned  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, financed  by  Japanese  capitalists. 


160  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY! 

II.  To  be  pooled  in  the  Consortium: 

(a)  Projected    Taonanfu-Jehol    line,    470    miles.      To   be 
financed  by  Consortium  for  Chinese  Government. 

(b)  Projected  line  from  a  point  on  the  above  line  to  a 
seaport,  about  200  miles.     To  be  financed  by  Consor- 
tium for  Chinese  Government. 

These  statements  in  the  Consortium  documents  bring 
out  two  important  points.  First,  Japan's  special  posi- 
tion is  restricted  to  that  part  of  South  Manchuria  which 
is  contiguous  to  Korea.  Secondly,  it  relates  particu- 
larly to  railway  enterprises. 

The  above  interpretation  does  not  seem  any  too 
clear,  but  it  is  the  clearest  statement  that  has  ever  been 
made.  Apart  from  the  more  or  less  vague  "special 
position"  as  above  interpreted,  the  Japanese  enjoy  no 
rights  or  privileges  that  are  not  equally  enjoyed  by 
other  nationals  in  Manchuria  or  any  other  part  in 
China.  True,  the  treaty  of  1915,  resulting  from  the 
so  called  twenty-one  demands,  permits  the  Japanese  to 
travel  and  reside,  as  well  as  to  lease  land  for  farming 
and  commercial  purposes  in  all  parts  of  South  Man- 
churia. But  this  privilege  is  by  no  means  exclusive  to 
the  Japanese.  By  reason  of  the  "most-favored  nation 
clause,"  provided  in  China's  treaties  of  commerce  and 
amity  with  American  and  European  countries,  the  above 
privilege  can  be  participated  in  by  all  Americans  and 
Europeans.  If  they  do  not  take  advantage  of  that  pro- 
vision, that  is  simply  because  they  see  no  necessity  or 
wisdom  in  going  into  the  interior  of  that  distant  country 
to  engage  in  farming  or  manufacturing  enterprises. 

It  has  been  suspected  that  Japan  has  been  enjoying 
the  special  and  exclusive  privilege  of  a  low  tariff  for 
her  goods  entering  Manchuria  through  the  Korean 
boundary.  She  has  also  been  suspected  of  discrimina- 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  161 

ting  against  foreign  goods  in  the  matter  of  railway 
freight  charges. 

As  to  the  first  charge,  it  is  true  that  goods  imported 
into  or  exported  from  Manchuria  through  the  Korean 
border  enjoy  a  reduction  of  one-third  of  the  regular 
Chinese  tariff.   But  this  applies  to  goods  of  any  and  all 
origin,  and  is  not  restricted  to  Japanese  goods.     This 
arrangement  originated  in  the  Russo-Chinese  conven- 
tion of  1907,  which  provided  that  "for  the  goods  trans- 
ported from  Manchuria  to  Russia  and  from  Russia  to 
Manchuria  via  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  [Russian' 
line]  rates  will  be  reduced  by  one-third  as  comparecft 
with  the  conventional  tariff  agreed  upon  by  treaties."! 
Nor  was  Russia  the  only  country  to  secure  this  privilege  \ 
from  China.    France  enjoys  the  same  privilege  in  Yun-  \ 
nan,  and  England  in  Tibet.    Japan,  from  the  necessity 
of  meeting  Russian  competition,  obtained  in  1913  a  sim-  / 
ilar  privilege  for  goods  entering  Manchuria  through  the  f 
Korean  border. 

At  the  Washington  Conference  the  above  matter  was 
brought  before  the  Sub-Committee  on  the  Tariff.  At 
first,  France  vigorously  insisted  upon  the  continuation 
of  the  present  preferential  arrangement,  but  finally 
agreed  to  its  abolition.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
from  the  beginning  favorably  inclined  towards  its  dis- 
continuation. The  consequence  was  Article  VI  of  the 
Nine  Power  Treaty  on  the  tariff,  providing  for  the 
early  abolition  of  the  preferential  tariff  levied  at  the 
land  and  maritime  frontiers  of  China  (Appendix  V-C). 

The  second  charge  concerning  railway  freightage  is 
equally  groundless.  In  March,  1914,  the  Japanese 
Railway  Bureau,  in  conference  with  the  Korean  Railway 
and  the  South  Manchuria  Railway,  adopted  a  measure 
by  which  all  goods,  Japanese  and  foreign,  entering 
Manchuria  via  the  Antung-Mukden  line,  were  to  be 


162  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

carried  at  rates  thirty  per  cent  less  than  the  regular 
rates.  The  underlying  motive  was  to  make  the  Korean 
and  the  Antung-Mukden  railways  the  main  artery  of 
trade  and  communication  between  Japan  and  Man- 
churia and  thus  bring  the  two  countries  into  closer 
touch.  When  this  schedule  for  the  Antung-Mukden 
route  became  applicable,  American  cotton  merchants 
complained  a  great  deal,  not  because  the  new  rates  were 
not  applicable  to  their  goods,  but  because  American 
goods,  on  account  of  more  convenient  steamship  service, 
were  accustomed  to  enter  Manchuria  through  the  port 
of  Dairen,  and  not  through  Korea  and  thence  by  the 
Antung-Mukden  Railway.  The  Japanese  railway  au- 
thorities argued  that  the  new  schedule  did  not  discrim- 
inate against  American  merchandise,  and  that  it  was 
through  no  fault  of  theirs  that  the  Americans  could 
not  avail  themselves  of  the  advantages  equally  afforded 
to  all  traders.  Yet  the  Americans  continued  to  protest, 
urging  that  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  should  adopt 
the  same  low  rates  for  goods  imported  into.  Manchuria 
through  the  port  of  Dairen  or  Newchwang  via  foreign 
ships,  so  that  such  foreign  goods  should  not  have  to 
compete  at  a  disadvantage  with  goods  entering  Man- 
churia from  the  Korean  side.  In  March,  1915,  the 
American  merchants  won  the  point.  Since  then  there 
has  been  no  occasion  for  complaint  on  the  part  of  for- 
eign trading  interests. 

Japan  has  always  adhered  to  the  principles  of  the 
open  door  and  equal  opportunity,  whether  in  Korea  or 
Manchuria,  in  Shantung  or  any  other  part  of  China. 
Not  only  that,  but  Japan  believes  she  has  been  instru- 
mental in  opening  doors  which  were  formerly  closed 
by  other  nations. 

Contrary  to  the  assumption  of  many  Americans, 
wherever  Japanese  enterprise  extends  its  influence 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  163 

American  trade  is  certain  to  increase,  and  increase  by 
leaps  and  bounds.  A  good  example  in  the  case  is  Shan- 
tung. Under  the  German  regime,  not  an  American  nail 
was  used  on  the  Shantung  Railway.  Under  the  Chino- 
German  agreements  of  1898  and  1911,  both  the  Chinese 
Government  and  merchants  forfeited  the  right  of  buy- 
ing in  the  open  market  foreign  materials  and  machinery 
to  be  used  in  Shantung,  but  promised  to  purchase  them 
from  Germany.  It  was  but  natural  that  American  rail- 
way materials  and  American  machinery  were  completely 
barred  from  this  province. 

Japan  has  entirely  reversed  this  exclusive  German 
policy.  In  the  five  years  from  1916  to  1920,  Japan 
expended  $10,397,000  gold  on  materials  and  machinery 
for  the  Shantung  Railway — a  sum  almost  equal  to  the 
original  cost  of  the  line.  Of  this  amount  about  one- 
third,  or  $3,046,468,  went  to  American  manufacturers. 
The  budget  for  1921  calls  for  the  purchase,  mostly 
from  America,  of  18  locomotives,  293  thirty-ton  coal 
cars,  11  passenger  cars,  and  12  cabooses.  The  above 
figures  are  only  for  purchases  made  directly  by  the 
Japanese  management  of  the  Shantung  Railway,  and  do 
not  include  imports  by  private  business  firms. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  South  Manchuria.  Just  as  the 
Shantung  Railway  was  built  and  equipped  exclusively 
with  German  materials  and  rolling  stock,  so  the  Man- 
churian  railways  were  built  with  Russian  material  and 
equipped  with  Russian  rolling  stock.  Under  the  Rus- 
sian regime,  American  trade  in  Manchuria  was  a  neg- 
ligible quantity. 

The  appearance  of  the  Japanese  there  after  the  Rus- 
sian war  completely  changed  this  condition  in  favor  of 
American  commerce.  In  the  fifteen  years  from  1907  to 
1919  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  Company,  under 
Japanese  management,  bought  American  materials  to 


164  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

the  extent  of  $93,790,000  gold.  In  addition  American 
machinery  and  materials  to  the  sum  of  $60,000,000 
gold  were  imported  to  Manchuria  in  the  same  period 
by  the  leading  business  firms  of  Japan.  In  1920,  the 
South  Manchuria  Railway  expended  almost  $20,000,- 
000  for  American  materials. 

Of  328  locomotives  now  used  by  the  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company  more  than  300  were  ifnported 
from  America.  The  company  has  298  passenger  cars, 
of  which  about  100  were  made  in  the  United  States, 
while  the  remaining  198  were  built  of  American  ma- 
terials in  the  shops  of  the  company.  Of  4,339  freight 
cars  of  the  American  pattern,  1,500  were  imported 
from  America.  Recently  the  company  has  bought  eight 
electric  locomotives  from  America. 

Turn  now  to  Korea.  Here  we  see  the  same  progress 
achieved  by  American  trade  because  of  the  advent  of 
Japanese  enterprise.  In  the  decade  following  the  in- 
auguration of  Japanese  rule  in  Korea  in  1903,  Ameri- 
can exports  for  that  country  increased  twentyfold.  In 
1903,  that  is  the  year  before  the  establishment  of  the 
Japanese  protectorate,  American  exports  to  Korea 
amounted  to  only  $199,188.  In  the  next  year,  when 
Japan  became  the  mistress  of  the  peninsula,  American 
exports  to  the  same  country  suddenly  swelled  to  $906,- 
557  gold.  By  1913  they  reached  the  handsome  figure 
of  $3,920,000.  Since  then  American  export  trade  in 
Korea  has  progressed  steadily.  In  the  face  of  these 
indisputable  facts,  one  wonders  why  some  Americans 
talk  so  much  about  the  closing  of  the  door  in  Korea, 
Manchuria,  or  Shantung. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  great  trade  opportu- 
nities and  vast  commercial  fields  in  China.  But  when 
we  get  down  to  brass  tacks,  American  export  trade  to 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  165 

China  is  not  much  more  than  one-sixth  of  American 
exports  to  Japan. 

China  is  said  to  have  a  population  of  400,000,000, 
but  her  purchases  from  America  in  1918  amounted  to 
only  $43,000,000.  Japan,  with  a  small  population  of 
60,000,000,  bought  in  the  same  year  $275,000,000 
worth  of  American  goods.  In  other  words  Japanese 
purchases  of  American  goods  are  $4.50  per  capita, 
while  Chinese  purchases  amount  to  only  10  cents  per 
capita. 

It  is  generally  known  that  America  is  Japan's  best 
customer.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  well  to  remember 
that  Japan  is  by  far  the  best  customer  of  American 
goods  in  the  whole  Orient.  But  for  the  Japanese 
market,  American  trade  in  Asia  must  for  many  years 
to  come  remain  a  negligible  quantity. 

[Twenty-five  days  after  this  letter  was  written,  Baron 
Shidehara,  the  Japanese  delegate,  in  a  statement  (Ap- 
pendix XIV)  before  the  final  plenary  session  of  Feb- 
ruary 4,  1922,  had  this  to  say:  "To  say  that  Japan 
has  special  interests  in  China  is  to  state  a  plain  and 
actual  fact."  This  is  an  interesting  and  significant  state- 
ment. No  one  can  deny  the  "plain  and  actual  fact" 
that  Japan  is  China's  next  door  neighbor,  that  170,000 
Japanese  live  in  China,  and  that  in  Manchuria  in  par- 
ticular the  Japanese  have  established  enormous  eco- 
nomic enterprises.] 


CHAPTER   XXVI 
JAPAN   IN    MANCHURIA 

Washington,  January  25,  1922:  The  injection  of 
the  so-called  twenty-one  demands  into  the  Conference 
naturally  directs  public  attention  to  Japan's  position  in 
Manchuria.  When  the  Chinese  speak  of  the  twenty- 
one  demands,  they  mean,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
Japanese  rights  in  South  Manchuria.  Of  the  original 
Japanese  demands  of  January,  1915,  fourteen  were 
accepted  by  China.  Of  these,  the  treaty  and  notes  con- 
cerning Shantung  have  been  discarded  by  the  voluntary 
act  of  Japan,  for  the  Japanese  have  adjusted  the  Shan- 
tung controversy  independently  of  the  agreement  of 
1915.  What  remains  of  the  agreements,  which  re- 
sulted from  the  twenty-one  demands,  concerns  Japan's 
rights  in  Manchuria. 

Quite  apart  from  the  pro  and  con  of  the  historic 
demands,  it  is  essential  for  the  public  to  keep  clearly 
in  view  what  Japan  owns  and  what  she  is  doing  in  Man- 
churia. Let  us  first  of  all  take  a  glance  at  Japanese 
holdings  in  Manchuria.  The  Japanese  Government 
holds  under  a  99-year  lease  Port  Arthur  and  the  adja- 
cent territory  (commonly  known  as  the  Kwantung  Pe- 
ninsula) about  1,203  square  miles  in  area,  that  is 
34/10,OOOths  of  Manchuria,  a  country  whose  entire 
area  measures  382,630  square  miles.  This  lease  expires 
in  1997.  The  South  Manchuria  Railway  operates  698 
miles  of  lines,  and  owns  about  50  square  miles  of  lands 
scattered  along  them.  The  lease  of  the  railway,  also 

166 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  167 

for  99  years,  expires  in  2002.  Outside  these  small 
areas  the  Japanese,  either  governmentally  or  privately, 
enjoy  no  privilege  that  cannot  be  equally  enjoyed  by 
other  nationals.  Needless  to  say  that  the  leased  terri- 
tory and  the  railway  zone  are  open  to  the  economic 
activities  of  the  nationals  of  all  countries. 

Compare  these  Japanese  holdings  with  those  of  Rus- 
sia in  North  Manchuria.  The  Russian  railways  total 
1,075  miles,  while  the  lands  appurtenant  thereto  have 
an  aggregate  area  of  513  square  miles.  Moreover, 
Russia  has  the  exclusive  right  to  navigate  the  rivers  in 
North  Manchuria. 

Under  the  Russian  regime,  the  Kwantung  leased 
territory  was  purely  a  military  zone,  covered  with  forti- 
fications and  bristling  with  arms.  Port  Arthur,  a  mili- 
tary and  naval  port,  was  closed  to  merchant  ships. 
Even  the  port  of  Dairen  was  half  devoted  to  the  ex- 
clusive use  of  the  navy.  This  condition  has  been  com- 
pletely changed  by  Japan.  Soon  after  the  Russian  War 
Port  Arthur  was  thrown  open  to  commerce.  Japan 
has  not  spent  a  single  cent  on  the  fortifications,  mostly 
destroyed  during  the  war  of  1904.  In  fact  Port  Arthur, 
including  the  fortifications,  has  been  converted  into 
a  sort  of  recreation  ground,  As  for  Dairen,  it  has  be- 
come a  commercial  port,  pure  and  simple. 

The  one  outstanding  economic  and  civilizing  factor 
in  Manchuria  is  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Com- 
pany. This  company  was  organized  in  1906  in  accord- 
ance with  the  commercial  law  of  Japan.  Its  authorized 
capital  was  $100,000,000,  shares  of  which  were  equally 
divided  between  the  general  public  and  the  Japanese 
Government.  The  Chinese  Government  was  invited  to 
take  some  of  the  shares  allotted  to  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, but  the  invitation  was  declined  on  the  ground 
that  China  had  no  substantial  fund  available  for  the 


168  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

purpose.  The  Company  operates  437  miles  of  the  main 
line  from  Changchun  to  Dairen,  together  with  six 
branch  lines  totaling  261  miles.  In  addition,  it  under- 
takes mining,  iron  works,  marine  transportation,  man- 
agement of  lands  and  buildings  in  the  railway  zone, 
public  works,  sanitation  and  education  in  the  same  zone. 
In  a  word,  the  administration  of  the  railway  zone,  ex- 
cept policing  and  judiciary  functions,  is  entrusted  to  the 
Company. 

These  railway  lands,  though  but  specks  in  the  vast 
area  of  Manchuria,  have  become  centres  from  which 
the  influence  of  modern  civilization  radiates  into  a 
country  yet  under  the  influence  of  medievalism.  The 
South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  has  provided  these 
lands  with  modern  schools,  hospitals,  water  works, 
sewerage,  electric  lighting  and  telephone  systems,  and 
well-paved  roads.  The  cities  and  towns  that  have  sprung 
up  along  the  railways  are  more  sanitary  and  better 
planned  than  perhaps  any  city  in  Japan.  Especially 
impressive  is  the  city  of  Dairen,  the  commercial  metrop- 
olis of  South  Manchuria.  Its  streets  are  adorned  with 
beautiful  trees  and  lined  with  modern  buildings,  some 
of  them  quite  imposing.  It  has  up-to-date  electric  tram- 
ways and  all  other  modern  conveniences.  Its  hospital, 
its  technical  college,  its  normal  school  and  public 
schools  would  do  credit  to  any  modern  city. 

At  all  the  leading  stations  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway  Company  has  established  schools  both  for 
Chinese  and  Japanese  children.  In  Mukden  there  is 
an  admirable  college,  training  both  Japanese  and  Chi- 
nese for  medical  practice.  In  Port  Arthur  a  school  of 
technology  has  been  organized  for  the  benefit  of  Chi- 
nese and  Japanese  students.  In  1917  the  hospitals 
maintained  by  the  Company  treated  about  1,388,000 
patients,  most  of  whom  were  Chinese.  The  traffic 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  169 

department  of  the  Company  employs  7,800  Japanese 
and  3,000  Chinese  in  various  official  capacities,  as  well 
as  19,400  Chinese  coolies  for  menial  labor. 

I  have  said  that  outside  the  leased  territory  and  the 
railway  lands  the  Japanese  citizens  enjoy  no  special 
rights  or  prerogatives.  True,  the  treaty  of  1915,  re- 
sulting from  the  twenty-one  demands,  permits  the  Jap- 
anese to  travel  and  reside,  as  well  as  to  lease  land  for 
farming  and  commercial  purposes,  in  all  parts  of  South 
Manchuria.  But  this  privilege  is  by  no  means  exclusive 
to  the  Japanese.  By  reason  of  the  "most-favored  na- 
tion clause,"  provided  in  China's  treaties  of  commerce 
and  amity  with  American  and  European  countries,  the 
above  privilege  can  be  participated  in  by  all  Americans 
and  Europeans. 

President  Hayakawa,  of  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way Company,  in  instructions  recently  issued  to  the 
officials  and  employees  of  the  Company,  defines  the 
policy  of  the  railway  in  these  words : 

"Towards  all  nationalities,  we  must  observe  loyally 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  be  guided  by  the 
spirit  of  harmony  and  co-operation,  and  should  demon- 
strate to  the  world  the  open  and  fair  attitude  of  the 
Japanese  people.  Free  competition  is  what  we  do  expect 
and  welcome  heartily.  We  shall  meet  any  and  every 
competitor  like  a  sportsman  and  should  hope  to  win 
by  merit  only." 

Under  the  Russian  regime,  American  trade  in  Man- 
churia was  not  great.  The  appearance  of  the  Japanese 
after  the  Russian  War  changed  this  condition  in  favor 
of  American  commerce.  In  the  twelve  years  from  1907 
to  1919  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  Company  alone 
bought  American  materials  to  the  extent  of  $93,790,000 
gold.  In  addition,  American  machinery  and  materials 
to  the  sum  of  $60,000,000  gold  were  imported  to  Man- 


170  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

churia  in  the  same  period  by  the  leading  business  firms 
of  Japan.  In  1920,  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 
Company  expended  almost  $20,000,000  for  American 
materials.  The  Company  has  just  adopted  a  gigantic 
improvement  program  which  will  call  for  an  expendi- 
ture of  $200,000,000  in  the  following  five  years.  At 
least  half  of  this  sum  will  go  to  American  manufac- 
turers. 

Under  the  Russian  regime,  the  Manchurian  railways 
were  essentially  military  roads  and  were  practically  ex- 
clusively devoted  to  military  purposes.  The  advent  of 
the  Japanese  completely  changed  that  condition,  making 
the  railways  purely  commercial.  This  is  undoubtedly 
chiefly  responsible  for  the  rapid  strides  made  by  the 
trade  of  Manchuria.  In  1908  the  import  and  export 
trade  of  the  country  amounted  to  some  95,800,000  taels 
($71,850,000) .  In  1919  this  increased  to  377,000,000 
taels  ($282,750,000).  In  other  words,  Manchurian 
trade  increased  almost  fourfold  in  eleven  years.  In 
this  phenomenal  progress  Dairen,  Manchuria's  com- 
mercial metropolis  built  by  the  Japanese,  has  played  a 
great  role.  In  1908  this  city,  in  respect  of  trade,  occu- 
pied the  fifth  place  among  Chinese  ports,  and  was  pre- 
ceded by  Shanghai,  Hankow,  Canton,  and  Tientsin  in 
the  order  named.  Today  it  ranks  second,  preceded  only 
by  Shanghai. 

The  rapid  commercial  advance  of  Manchuria  is 
largely  due  to  the  enormous  bean  industry,  also  created 
by  the  Japanese.  Before  the  appearance  of  the  Japa- 
nese, the  natives  of  Manchuria  barely  eked  out  a  living 
by  planting  small  areas  to  beans.  The  demand  for  the 
pulse  was  restricted  to  their  own  localities,  and  the  price 
was  very  low.  Then  came  the  Chino-Japanese  War, 
and  the  Japanese,  having  realized  the  value  of  the  Man- 
churian produce,  became  its  most  liberal  purchaser. 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  in 

So  rapidly  had  Japanese  purchases  of  the  pulse  and 
bean-cake  multiplied  that  by  1899  they  exceeded  the 
total  export  to  southern  China.  The  Japanese  knew 
how  to  utilize  beans  and  bean-cake.  The  white,  red, 
and  small  green  beans — for  there  are  six  varieties  of 
beans — they  manufactured  into  various  foodstuffs; 
from  the  yellow,  black  and  large  green  beans  they  made 
bean-cake  and  bean-oil.  The  bean-cake  they  used  as 
fertilizer  and  animal  feed,  and  the  bean-oil  for  culinary 
and  other  purposes.  They  found  out  that  Manchurian 
beans  could  be  laid  down  in  Japan  at  less  than  it  cost 
to  produce  the  same  varieties  in  their  own  country. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  proved  a  golden  oppor- 
tunity for  Japanese  traders  to  establish  direct  business 
relations  with  the  native  producers  of  beans  or  native 
dealers  in  the  commodity,  thus  doing  away  with  the 
medium  of  foreign  merchants  in  Newchwang. 

Not  content  with  developing  the  bean  trade  in  the 
Far  East,  the  Japanese  in  1908  began  to  export  the 
Manchurian  product  to  Europe.  To  quote  from  a 
report  of  the  Maritime  Customs  of  China: 

"It  was  in  November,  1908,  that  Messrs.  Mitsui  & 
Co.  made  the  first  considerable  trial  shipment  to  En- 
gland. The  result  was  so  satisfactory  that  an  order  for 
a  large  consignment  followed,  and  in  March,  1909, 
the  first  large  cargo — 5,200  tons — was  landed  in  Hull. 
Contracts  were  at  once  made,  as  the  suitability  of  the 
new  oil  seeds  for  many  purposes  became  known  and  the 
good  condition  in  which  they  arrived.  During  the 
season  400,000  tons  were  exported,  almost  all  to  En- 
gland, and  many  of  the  large  oil-crushing  mills  set 
their  entire  plant  to  work  on  the  crushing  of  the  beans, 
to  the  exclusion  of  cotton  seed,  linseed,  and  other  ole- 
aginous seeds.  The  supposed  shortage  of  the  flax  and 
cotton  crops  in  the  United  States  and  the  anticipated 


172  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

shortage  of  linseed  in  the  Argentine,  with  the  resultant 
scarcity  of  cotton  and  linseed  products,  found  the  En- 
glish market  comparatively  unperturbed,  for  the  rea- 
son that  soya  oil  and  cake  can  supply  most  of  the  re- 
quirements as  well." 

Twenty  years  ago  the  export  of  Manchurian  beans 
and  their  by-products,  bean-cake  and  bean-oil,  was 
practically  nil.  Thanks  to  Japanese  enterprise,  this 
export  from  South  Manchuria  alone  had  by  1920  grown 
to  some  95,000,000  taels  ($71,250,000)  in  value. 

The  great  significance  of  the  part  played  by  Japan 
in  the  development  of  the  bean  industry  and  trade  of 
Manchuria  was  clearly  foreseen  by  an  American  critic 
ten  years  ago  when  he  said : 

"It  is  a  far  cry  from  high  diplomacy  to  the  humble 
soya  beans,  yet  we  hold  to  the  belief  that  the  past  and 
present  commercial  situation  and  ultimate  solution  of 
the  vexatious  Manchurian  question  is  bound  up  in  the 
control  of  this  one  product." 

The  rapid  increase  of  Japan's  exports  to  Manchuria 
is  due,  more  than  anything  else,  to  the  fact  that  of  all 
countries  she  is  the  most  liberal  purchaser  of  the  most 
important  Manchurian  product  consisting  of  beans, 
bean  cake  and  bean  oil.  In  the  last  ten  years  or  so 
70  to  85  per  cent  of  Manchuria's  total  exports  have 
been  to  Japan.  It  is  but  natural  that  Japan  should  also 
sell  to  Manchuria  more  goods  than  other  countries. 
The  real  basis  of  Japan's  commercial  success  in  that 
country,  then,  is  nothing  but  the  operation  of  the  funda- 
mental economic  law  that  the  country  consuming  the 
major  portion  of  the  exports  of  another  country  holds 
the  most  advantageous  position  in  supplying  its  neces- 
sary imports.  Moreover,  the  vessel,  bound  for  Man- 
churian ports  from  Japan  to  carry  back  beans  and  bean- 
cake  on  their  return  trip,  would  naturally  seek  to  fill 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  173 

their  hatches  on  their  outward  trip,  thus  facilitating  the 
reduction  of  freight  charges  for  goods  from  Japan  to 
those  ports  to  an  extent  impossible  under  other  circum- 
stances. 

The  above  advantage  has  been  mainly  responsible 
for  the  rapid  advance  of  Japan's  export  trade  to  Man- 
churia. Fifteen  years  ago  the  cotton  goods  trade  of 
Manchuria  was  practically  monopolized  by  England 
and  America.  England  held  the  leading  place  in  shirt- 
ings and  yarns,  while  America  was  preponderant  in 
sheetings,  drills  and  jeans.  After  the  Manchurian 
War,  however,  Japanese  cotton  goods  entered  the  field, 
and  have  so  successfully  competed  with  their  rivals 
that  today  most  cotton  goods  used  in  Manchuria,  except 
the  finest  kinds,  are  supplied  by  Japan.  In  1917,  Man- 
churia's total  imports  of  cotton  piece  goods  and  yarns 
amounted  to  38,825,603  taels  ($29,119,202).  These 
were  followed  by  iron,  steel,  railway  materials,  and 
machinery  supplied  mostly  by  America.  In  other 
words,  American  trade  in  Manchuria  today  is  repre- 
sented by  iron  and  steel  in  much  greater  magnitude  than 
it  was  formerly  represented  by  cotton  goods. 


CHAPTER   XXVII 
THE   TWENTY-ONE    DEMANDS 

Washington,  February  3,  1922:  Yesterday  Baron 
Shidehara,  on  behalf  of  the  Japanese  delegation,  pre- 
sented to  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  Japan's  official 
view  of  the  so-called  "twenty-one  demands."  Today 
Dr.  Wang,  of  the  Chinese  delegation,  replied  to  Baron 
Shidehara.  Upon  the  close  of  the  Chinese  statement, 
Mr.  Hughes  presented  American  observations,  thus 
bringing  to  an  end  the  more  or  less  academic  discussion 
of  the  twenty-one  demands.  (Appendix  III.) 

Baron  Shidehara's  statement  proved  a  surprise.  In 
some  quarters  it  had  been  expected  that  he  would  make 
laconic  remarks,  flatly  refusing  to  discuss  these  de- 
mands. Quite  to  the  contrary,  the  statement  by  Baron 
Shidehara  was  conciliatory  in  spirit  and  moderate  in 
tone.  The  Japanese  delegation,  he  declared,  "cannot 
bring  itself  to  the  conclusion  that  any  useful  purpose 
will  be  served  by  research  and  reexamination  at  this 
Conference  of  old  grievances  which  one  of  the  nations 
represented  here  may  have  against  another."  Never- 
theless, Japan  was,  he  announced,  ready  to  make  the 
following  concessions  in  the  interest  of  international 
amity : 

1.  To  throw  open  to  the  common  activity  of  the 
International  Financial  Consortium,  organized  at  the 
instance  of  the  American  State  Department,  the  right 
of  option  obtained  by  Japanese  capitalists  with  regard 
to  certain  Manchurian  railway  loans  and  loans  to  be 
secured  on  local  taxes  in  South  Manchuria. 

174 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  175 

2.  Not  to  insist  on  the  preferential  right  obtained 
by  Japan  in  1915  concerning  the  engagement  by  China 
of  Japanese  advisers  in  South  Manchuria. 

3.  To  give  up  definitely  and  with  no  reservation 
Group  V  of  the  so-called  "twenty-one  demands." 

The  burden  of  Mr.  Hughes'  observations  is  the  re- 
assertion  of  the  stand  taken  by  the  Wilson  administra- 
tion at  the  time  when  China  and  Japan  concluded 
treaties  upon  the  basis  of  the  twenty-one  demands.  That 
stand  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

First,  America  cannot  recognize  any  agreement 
which  will  impair  her  treaty  rights  in  China. 

Second,  America  cannot  recognize  any  agreement 
impairing  the  political  or  territorial  integrity  of  China, 
or  the  principles  of  the  open  door. 

Japan  contends,  and  justly,  that  none  of  the  treaties 
and  agreements  resulting  from  the  twenty-one  demands 
violates  the  rights  of  the  American  Government  or  of 
American  citizens  in  China.  She  contends  also  that 
the  principle  of  the  open  door  or  the  integrity  of  China 
has  not  been  violated  by  those  treaties  or  agreements. 
For  what  are  the  demands,  and  the  final  agreement 
growing  out  of  them?  To  begin  with,  the  name  "twenty- 
one  demands"  is  a  misnomer.  It  was  arbitrarily  coined 
by  an  indiscriminate  writer  or  writers  for  the  purpose 
of  misleading  the  public.  When  analyzed  and  grouped 
logically,  those  demands  number  19  instead  of  21,  of 
which  the  last  7,  constituting  famous  Group  V,  were 
not  demands  but  suggestions.  That  the  terms  of 
Group  V  were  not  regarded  as  demands  is  seen  in  the 
following  passage  from  the  instructions  sent  to  the 
Japanese  minister  at  Peking  by  the  Foreign  Office  at 
Tokyo  on  December  3,  1914,  that  is,t  forty-five  days 
before  the  presentation  of  the  demands. 


176  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

"As  regards  the  proposals  contained  in  the  fifth 
Group,  they  are  presented  as  the  wishes  of  the  Imperial 
Government.  The  matters  which  are  dealt  with  under 
this  category  are  entirely  different  in  character  from 
those  which  are  included  in  the  first  four  Groups.  An 
adjustment,  at  this  time,  of  these  matters,  some  of 
which  have  been  pending  between  the  two  countries, 
being  nevertheless  highly  desirable  for  the  advancement 
of  the  friendly  relations  between  Japan  and  China  as 
well  as  for  safeguarding  their  common  interests,  you 
are  also  requested  to  exercise  your  best  efforts  to  have 
our  wishes  carried  out." 

Nevertheless,  to  the  outside  world  these  so-called 
"wishes"  were,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  nothing  less 
than  demands.  We  will,  therefore,  count  them  among 
the  demands,  and  make  the  following  table,  comparing 
the  original  demands,  19  in  reality  and  not  21,  with  the 
final  agreements: 

SUMMARIZED  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  JAPAN'S 
ORIGINAL  PROPOSALS,  JANUARY  18,  1915,  AND 
THE  FINAL  AGREEMENTS,  MAY  25,  1915 

ORIGINAL  PROPOSALS  FINAL  AGREEMENTS 

GROUP  I  GROUP  I 

Concerning  Shantung*  Concerning  Shantung* 

1.   China  to  assent  to  1.  Accepted    and   em- 

all   agreements  transfer-         bodied  in  the  Treaty  on 
ring    to    Japan    former         Shantung,  May  25,  1915. 
German  rights  and  privi- 
leges. 

*  Provisions  concerning  Shantung  have  been  discarded  by  the  Wash- 
ington treaty  signed  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  delegations, 
February  3,  1922. 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR 


177 


2.  China  not  to  cede 
any  part  of  Shantung  to 
any  third  power. 


3.  Privilege  for  Japan 
to    build    railway    from 
Chef oo  or  Lungkow  to  a 
point  (preferably  Weih- 
sien)    on    the    Shantung 
Railway. 

4.  To     open     certain 
cities  in  Shantung  to  for- 
eign trade. 


2.  This  proposal  was 
not  entered  in  the  Shan- 
tung Treaty  of  May  25, 
1915,   but   the   principle 
was  accepted  by  China  in 
a  note  in  which  the  non- 
alienation  principle  is  ap- 
plicable   to    all    foreign 
powers,    instead    of    to 
third  powers  as  original- 
ly proposed  by  Japan. 

3.  Accepted  by  China, 
and     embodied     in     the 
Shantung   Treaty,    May 
25,  1915. 


4.  Accepted  and  em- 
bodied in  the  Shantung 
Treaty,  May  25,  1915. 


GROUP  II 
Concerning  Manchuria 

5.  Extension    of    the 
lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny,    and    the    South 
Manchuria    Railway    to 
99  years. 

6.  To  allow  Japanese 
to   travel   and   reside   in 
South     Manchuria     and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 


GROUP  II 
Concerning  Manchuria 

5.  Accepted  by  China 
and     embodied     in     the 
Manchuria  Treaty,  May 
25,  1915. 

6.  This  proposal  was 
only  partly  accepted.    In 
the  Manchuria  Treaty  of 
May  25,  1915,  Japanese 


178 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


and  to  lease  or  own  land 
for  farming  and  trade 
purposes  in  those  coun- 
tries. 


7.  To  allow  Japanese 
mining  privileges  in 
South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 


are  allowed  to  lease,  but 
not  to  own,  land  in  South 
Manchuria  only.  In  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  only 
joint  undertakings  of  Chi- 
nese and  Japanese  in  ag- 
riculture are  permitted. 
Likewise  Japanese  are  al- 
owed  to  travel  and  reside 
in  South  Manchuria,  but 
not  in  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia.  But  China 
agrees  to  open  in  the 
near  future  suitable  cities 
in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia for  foreign  trade 
and  residence. 

7.  This  proposal  was 
not  embodied  in  the  Man- 
churia Treaty,  May  25, 
1915,  but  was  accepted 
by  China,  with  qualifica- 
tions, in  a  note  (May  29, 
1915)  from  the  Chinese 
Foreign  Minister  to  the 
Japanese  Minister  to  Pe- 
king. In  that  note  China 
permits  Japanese  to  work 
mines  in  ten  mining  lots 
in  Fentien  and  Kir  in 
Provinces  (South  Man- 
churia), but  refuses  to 
allow  similar  privileges 
in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia. 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR 


179 


8.  China  not  to  grant 
to  a  third  power  or  its 
subject,    railway    conces- 
sion in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia, or  to  mortgage  to 
a  third  power  local  taxes 
of  those  regions,  without 
the  consent  of  Japan. 

9.  China  to  hand  over 
to  Japan  the  management 
of  the   Kirin-Changchun 
Railway  for  99  years. 


8.  This  proposal  is  ac- 
cepted, not  in  the  Treaty 
of  May  25,  1915,  but  in 
a  note  (of  the  same  date) 
from   the    Chinese    For- 
eign Minister  to  the  Jap- 
anese   Minister    to    Pe- 
king. 

9.  This  proposal  was 
not  accepted,  but  in  the 
Manchuria  Treaty,  May 
25,   1915,   China   agrees 
to  revise  various  agree- 
ments    relating    to    the 
Kirin  -  Changchun    Rail- 
way on  the  basis  of  the 
terms    of   other    foreign 
railway  loans  contracted 
by  her. 


GROUP  III 

Concerning   Hanyehping 

(Iron  Mining  and  Iron 

Works)    Company 

10.  China  not  to  dis- 
pose of  rights  and  prop- 
erty of  the  Hanyehping 
Company  without  Japan's 
consent,  and  not  to  object 
to  any  agreement  that 
may  be  made  with  a  view 
to  joint  undertaking  be- 


GROUP  III 

Concerning   Hanyehping 

(Iron  Mining  and  Iron 

Works)    Company 

10.  This  proposal  was 
not  embodied  in  the 
Treaty  of  May  25,  1915, 
but  its  principle  was  ac- 
cepted in  a  note  (of  the 
same  date)  from  the  Chi- 
nese Foreign  Minister  to 
the  Japanese  Minister  to 


180 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


tween  the  company  and 
Japanese  capitalists. 


11.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment not  to  permit, 
without  the  Hanyehping 
Company's  consent,  the 
exploitation,  by  any  per- 
son not  connected  with 
the  company,  of  any  mine 
in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  company's  mines. 


Peking.  This  note  is 
couched  in  somewhat  dif- 
ferent language  from  the 
language  of  the  original 
Japanese  proposal. 

11.  This  proposal  was 
not  accepted. 


GROUP  IV 

Non-Alienation  of  Terri- 
tory 

12.  China  not  to  cede 
or  lease  to  any  third 
power  any  harbor  or  bay 
or  island  on  the  Chinese 
Coast. 


GROUP  IV 

Non-Alienation  of  Terri- 
tory 

12.  This  proposal  was 
not  embodied  either  in 
treaty  or  note. 


GROUP  V 
Miscellaneous 

13.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  employ  Japa- 
nese as  political,  financial 
and  military  advisers. 


GROUP  V 
Miscellaneous 

13.  This  proposal  was 
not  accepted  in  the  Treaty 
of  May  25,  1915.  But  in 
the  note  (same  date) 
from  the  Chinese  For- 
eign Minister  to  the  Jap- 


THE    NEW   OPEN   DOOR 


181 


14.  Privilege   to   own 
land   in   the    interior   of 
China  by  Japanese  hos- 
pitals,     churches 
and  schools. 

15.  In    certain    large 
Chinese  cities  where  Jap- 
anese reside  in  consider- 
able numbers,  the  police 
department,  in  order  to 
avoid    complications,    to 
be    jointly    administered 
by  Chinese  and  Japanese, 
or   to   employ   Japanese 
police  officers. 

16.  China  to  buy  from 
Japan  certain  per  cent  of 
munitions  used  by  China, 
or  to  establish  a  Chino- 
Japanese  arsenal. 

17.  China    to    permit 
Japan  to  build  Wuchang- 
Nanchang  and  Nanchang- 
Hangchow  railways. 

18.  China    to    consult 
Japan  before  raising  for- 


anese  Minister  to  Peking, 
Japan  is  given  preference 
in  the  employment  of  ad- 
visers in  South  Manchu- 
ria, but  not  in  other  parts 
of  China. 

14.  This  proposal  was 
not  accepted  either  in 
treaty  or  in  note. 


15.  Not    accepted   in 
treaty  or  in  note. 


16.  Not    accepted    in 
treaty  or  in  note. 


17.  Not    accepted    in 
treaty  or  in  note. 


18.  This  proposal  was 
not     embodied     in     the 


182  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

eign  loans  for  mining,  Treaty  of  May  25,  1915, 
and  railway  and  harbor  but  its  principle  was  ac- 
construction  in  Fukien  cepted  in  a  note  from  the 
Province.  Chinese  Foreign  Minister 

to  the  Japanese  Minister 

to  Peking. 

19,  China    to    permit  19.  Not    accepted    in 

Japanese     subjects         treaty  or  in  note, 
the  same  privilege  of  re- 
ligious propaganda  as  en- 
joyed by  other  foreigners. 

From  the  above  comparison  it  will  be  seen  that  out 
of  19  demands  (including  seven  "wishes")  five  were 
accepted  in  treaties,  six  in  notes  exchanged  between  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Japanese  Minister 
at  Peking,  while  eight  were  rejected  or  withdrawn. 
Some  of  the  demands  were  accepted  only  after  consid- 
erable modifications. 

Group  V  was  virtually  withdrawn  in  the  later  stage 
of  the  Chino-Japanese  negotiations  of  1915.  It  is  now 
definitely  renounced  by  the  pronouncement  of  Baron 
Shidehara  before  the  Far  Eastern  Committee.  As  a 
matter  of  history,  however,  it  still  is  an  interesting 
topic  of  discussion.  When  we  look  at  those  "wishes" 
coldbloodedly,  we  can  see  no  reason  why  we  should  be 
excited  even  if  China  accepted  them.  In  wish  No.  1, 
Japan  did  not  mean  to  prohibit  China  from  employing 
advisers  other  than  Japanese.  She  simply  asked  the 
Chinese  Government  to  engage  Japanese  advisers  along 
with  advisers  of  other  nationalities.  Certainly  this  was 
no  infringement  upon  the  sovereignty  of  China.  In 
1915,  China  employed  1,105  Englishmen,  1,003 
Frenchmen,  530  Germans,  463  Russians,  and  174 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  183 

Americans.  While  many  of  these  served  in  minor 
capacities,  some  occupied  high  positions  as  adminis- 
trators or  advisers.  Japan,  whose  destiny  was  most 
closely  interwoven  with  that  of  China,  had  only  207 
officials  employed  by  the  Chinese  Government.  In 
wishes  No.  2  and  No.  7,  Japan  asked  only  for  the  usual 
privileges  enjoyed  by  the  American  or  European  mis- 
sion boards.  In  wish  No.  3,  Japan  wanted  to  cooper- 
ate in  an  effective  way  with  the  Chinese  police  in  certain 
localities  where  her  nationals  resided  in  large  numbers. 
In  wish  No.  4,  Japan  wanted  to  supply  China  with  a 
certain  percentage  of  arms  required  by  the  latter  or 
to  establish  an  arsenal  in  China  as  a  joint  enterprise 
between  the  two  countries  or  their  nationals.  Cer- 
tainly this  was  not  a  novel  proposal.  In  No.  5,  Japan 
wished  to  construct  certain  railways,  and  in  No.  6,  she 
wanted  to  establish  a  sphere  of  influence  in  Fukien, 
for  in  those  days  the  idea  of  sphere  of  influence  was 
still  in  vogue. 

Such  was  Group  V.  Only  to  the  subtle  artist  who 
knows  how  to  make  a  mountain  out  of  a  molehill,  may 
it  appear  a  monstrosity  destructive  of  China's  sover- 
eignty and  independence.  In  saying  this,  I  have  no 
idea  of  defending  those  wishes,  which  I  believe  to  be 
foolish  and  unnecessary.  But  I  cannot  help  laughing 
at  the  credulous  who  swallow  everything  served  out 
by  propagandists,  and  pitying  those  who  are  addicted 
to  seeing  things  at  night. 

The  essence  of  the  "twenty-one"  proposals  was  the 
Japanese  desire  to  secure  the  Japanese  position  in  Man- 
churia and  Shantung.  Had  Japan  wisely  confined  her- 
self to  demands  relating  to  those  territories,  that  desire 
would  have  been  more  readily  recognized  by  China. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Chinese  Government,  as  early 
as  February  12,  1915,  that  is,  only  twenty-four  days 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

after  the  presentation  of  the  Japanese  proposals,  offered 
to  Japan  a  counter  project,  accepting  practically  all 
the  Japanese  proposals  relative  to  Shantung  and  Man- 
churia. In  that  project  China  willingly  agreed  to  ex- 
tend to  99  years  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dairen, 
as  well  as  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway.  She  also 
agreed  to  recognize  Japan's  succession  to  former  Ger- 
man rights  in  Shantung.  All  this  is  plainly  written  in 
the  Chinese  diplomatic  document  handed  to  the  Japa- 
nese Minister  at  Peking  on  February  12,  1915,  that  is, 
about  a  hundred  days  before  Japan  had  to  resort  to 
an  ultimatum  to  end  the  parley  which  was  unnecessarily 
protracted.  By  April  17,  all  the  essential  points  had 
been  agreed  upon  between  the  two  governments,  Japan 
having  virtually  withdrawn  Group  V,  and  having  made 
further  concessions  in  other  respects.  And  yet  China, 
for  some  incomprehensible  reasons,  sought  to  prolong 
the  negotiations  indefinitely.  It  seemed  to  the  Japa- 
nese that  something  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum  was 
the  only  way  to  put  an  end  to  the  unnecessary  delay. 
That  is  Japan's  justification  for  the  ultimatum  of 
May  7,  1915. 

But  the  fact  is  on  record  that,  more  than  three  months 
before  the  ultimatum,  China  had  in  black  and  white 
agreed  to  extend  Japan's  leaseholds  to  99  years  In  the 
face  of  that  record,  how  can  China  say  that  the  exten- 
sion was  wrested  from  her  under  duress,  and  upon  that 
ground  seek  its  annulment  at  an  international  confer- 
ence? 

China  not  only  agreed  to  extend  the  terms  of  Japa- 
nese leaseholds  in  South  Manchuria  immediately  upon 
the  presentation  of  the  Japanese  proposals,  but  she 
recognized  irrevocably  all  the  treaties  and  agreements 
growing  out  of  those  proposals,  when  in  1918,  that  is, 
almost  four  years  after  the  signing  of  the  treaties  of 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  185 

1915,  China  took  advantage  of  these  treaties  and  asked 
Japan  to  advance  a  handsome  sum  on  certain  railway 
projects  in  Shantung.  This  negotiation  was  initiafed 
by  the  Chinese  Government.  As  a  result  the  Japanese 
Government  persuaded  Tokyo  bankers  to  advance 
$10,000,000  gold  to  China  in  September,  1918.  By  this 
deal  China  not  only  confirmed  the  validity  of  the  treaties 
of  1915,  but  derived  material  benefit  from  them.  Now 
she  comes  to  Washington  blandly  disputing  their  valid- 
ity. Is  this  not  a  cynical  and  sinister  practice  of  diplo- 
macy? 

Unquestionably,  the  most  important  sections  of  the 
Chino-Japanese  agreements  of  1915  are  those  provid- 
ing for  the  extension  of  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dairen,  as  well  as  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway. 
Those  concerning  Shantung  have  already  been  con- 
verted to  dead  letters  through  the  Washington  agree- 
ment just  reached  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
delegations.  Can  it  be  that  Japan's  concessions  with 
regard  to  Shantung  have  merely  stimulated  the  cupidity 
of  China  whose  delegation  is  now  clamoring  to  invali- 
date the  Manchurian  agreements  which  she  had  will- 
ingly accepted? 

It  would  be  fine  for  China  if  Japan  could  be  altru- 
istic enough  to  withdraw  immediately  and  completely 
from  Manchuria.     But  this  would  be  asking  Japan  t( 
perform  the  impossible.     No  one  can  ignore  the  fac 
that  the  Manchuria  soil  she  now  holds  and  the  vas 
territories  around  it  were  anointed  with  Japanese  bloo 
in  the  titanic  war  that  was  forced  upon  her  by  Russi 
because  of  the  intrigue  concocted  by  the  late  Li  Hung 
Chang.     It  is  now  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  tha 
Li  Hung-Chang,  having  been  defeated  by  Japan  in  a 
war  which  he  had  forced  upon  Japan  in  1894,  secretly 
invited  Russia  to  Manchuria  in  the  hope  of  wreaking 


186  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

vengeance  upon  Japan.  But  in  satisfying  his  grudge 
against  Japan,  Li  cut  off  his  nose  to  spite  his  face,  for 
the  Russians  all  but  gobbled  up  the  whole  of  Man- 
churia. Had  not  Japan  taken  up  cudgels  against  Rus- 
sia in  the  war  of  1904,  China  would  have  ceased  to 
exist  as  an  independent  state.  Japanese  policy  in  Man- 
churia has  ever  since  been  formulated  with  a  view  to 
the  possible  renewal  of  Russian  onslaught  in  the  Far 
East.  When  the  agreements  of  1915  were  obtained 
from  China,  Japan  was  still  in  fear  of  Russian  revenge, 
for  the  great  military  power  of  the  Czar  was  still  pre- 
ponderant. Though  apparently  in  the  relationship  of 
an  entente  with  Russia,  Japan  had  taken  every  precau- 
tion to  forestall  any  such  disastrous  events  as  she  had 
to  face  in  1904  in  dealing  with  Russia. 

Today  Russia's  fate  in  the  Far  East  is  still  uncertain. 
Whether  her  political  color  is  ured"  or  upink,"  Russia 
still  remains  a  cause  of  apprehension  to  the  Japanese. 
With  China  yet  in  a  state  of  chaos,  Japan  feels  that 
she  is  not  yet  in  a  position  to  withdraw  from  Manchuria. 

As  a  practical  matter,  any  idea  for  the  abrogation  of 
the  Manchurian  agreements  of  1915  seems  futile.  If 
China  wants  to  abrogate  those  agreements  and  secure 
the  ownership  of  the  leased  territory  and  the  railroads 
now  operated  by  the  Japanese  under  a  99-year  lease, 
she  would  have  to  pay  several  billions  of  dollars.  There 
is  absolutely  no  source  from  which  China  can  hope  to 
get  such  an  enormous  sum.  Japan,  for  reasons  of 
national  defense  and  her  "special  position"  in  Man- 
churia, recognized  by  the  leading  Powers,  has  the  right 
to  veto  a  loan  which  China  might  raise  from  a  third 
Power  for  the  purpose  of  buying  the  properties  now 
owned  by  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria.  She  is  justified 
in  insisting  that  those  properties  shall  not  be  mortgaged 
to  a  third  Power.  Moreover,  no  third  Power,  opulent 


THE    NEW    OPEN    DOOR  187 

enough  to  advance  single-handed  such  a  gigantic  loan, 
can  be  found. 

As  for  the  new  International  Consortium,  it  will  not 
and  cannot  finance  China  for  the  purpose  of  buying  the 
Manchurian  railways  and  other  improvements  made  by 
the  Japanese,  because  this  new  organization  deals  with 
future  economic  concessions  or  enterprises  but  not  with 
established  ones.  This  point  is  made  plain  in  Article  I 
of  the  agreement  of  the  Consortium  concluded  in  Paris 
on  May  11,  1919.  Furthermore,  both  the  British  and 
American  Governments,  in  a  series  of  notes  addressed 
to  the  Japanese  Government  in  the  course  of  1919  and 
1920,  clearly  stated  that  the  Japanese  railways  then  in 
operation  in  Manchuria  were  outside  the  scope  of  the 
Consortium. 

If  China  were  guided  by  statesmen  of  vision,  courage, 
and  sound  sense,  she  would  realize  the  folly  of  the  nag- 
ging and  pin-pricking  attitude  she  is  taking  toward 
Japan,  and  would  see  the  wisdom  of  burying  the  hatchet 
and  shaking  hands  with  Japan,  to  which  country  she  is 
bound  by  ties  of  racial  and  cultural  similarity,  and 
whose  cooperation  she  will  in  the  end  have  to  seek. 
A  farseeing,  courageous  China  might  say  to  Japan 
something  like  this : 

"Japan,  we  do  not  like  some  of  the  things  you  have 
done  to  us  in  recent  years.  We  want  you  to  mend 
your  ways,  and  undo  some  of  the  bad  things  you  have 
done.  At  the  same  time,  we  realize  our  past  mistakes 
in  dealing  with  you.  We  admit  that  it  was  China  which 
provoked  the  war  of  1895  over  Korea.  And  when  we 
were  defeated  by  you  we  invited  Russia  to  Manchuria 
for  the  purpose  of  wreaking  revenge  upon  you.  It  was 
due  to  our  intrigue  that  you  had  to  fight  Russia  and 
stake  your  very  existence  upon  that  struggle.  You  had 
to  sacrifice  a  hundred  thousand  lives  and  a  billion  dol- 


188  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

lars  because  of  our  folly  and  intrigue.  We  repent  our 
sin.  We  will  not  ask  you  to  give  up  the  leased  terri- 
tory at  Dairen  or  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  as 
long  as  the  lease  of  99  years,  acquired  by  treaty,  lasts. 
Moreover  we  will  cooperate  with  you  in  the  economic 
development  of  Manchuria,  for  we  appreciate  your  pre- 
dicament due  to  lack  of  raw  materials  in  your  country. 
On  your  part  you  must  give  up  the  policy  of  aggression 
to  which  your  militarists  have  been  inclined.  You  must 
be  more  considerate  and  sympathetic  toward  us.  We 
are  neighbors.  We  are  of  the  same  blood  and  culture. 
Let  us  be  friends,  and  cooperate  with  each  other  for 
the  shaping  of  Asia's  destiny." 

If  China  takes  this  attitude,  Japan  will  be  more  than 
glad  to  accept  the  overture,  and  establish  relations  of 
sincere  friendship  with  her.  There  is  now  nothing  to 
be  said  about  the  twenty-one  demands,  except  that  they 
are  buried  in  the  grave  of  history.  If  the  validity  of 
the  agreements  based  upon  those  proposals  is  to  be 
disputed  seven  years  after  their  conclusion,  Japan  may 
be  justified  in  asking  China  to  scrap  many  of  the  treaties 
and  agreements  she  has  concluded  with  other  foreign 
powers  under  circumstances  similar  to  those  in  which 
the  Chino-Japanese  agreements  of  1915  were  born. 
Is  there  at  this  Conference  any  nation  whose  record  is 
clean  enough  to  act  as  a  judge  on  international  morality 
and  point  an  accusing  finger  at  a  younger  nation  which 
may  have  erred  somewhat  in  its  struggle  for  existence 
in  a  hard  world  where  all  available  lands  have  been 
preempted  by  the  bigger  and  older  powers? 


PART  V 
THE   SHANTUNG    DISPUTE 


PART   V 
THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 
SHANTUNG    COMES    TO    WASHINGTON 

Washington,  December  i,  1921:  The  world 
breathed  a  sigh  of  relief  last  evening  when  it  was  known 
that  the  Shantung  question  would  be  solved  at  Wash- 
ington through  the  good  offices  of  the  American  and 
British  delegates.  Thanks  to  organized  Chinese  prop- 
aganda, aided  by  internal  politics  in  America  during  the 
Wilson  administration,  the  question  has  assumed  a  mag- 
nitude altogether  out  of  proportion  to  its  real  impor- 
tance. Certain  foreign  advisers,  whose  main  function 
is  to  help  drain  the  impecunious  exchequer  at  Peking, 
have  been  holding  out  glowing  promises  before  the 
Chinese,  encouraging  them  to  believe  that  the  American 
Government  will  pick  their  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire, 
and  oust  Japan  from  Shantung  and  everywhere  else  in 
China.  Heartened  by  such  promises,  the  Chinese  have 
carried  on  a  vigorous  propaganda  abroad  through  the 
agency  of  their  numerous  foreign  advisers,  and  have 
spread  in  their  own  country  the  gospel  of  American  aid. 

However  that  may  be,  it  is  a  fact  that  Shantung  has 
been  a  disturbing  factor  in  the  Far  Eastern  situation. 
The  sooner  it  is  settled  one  way  or  the  other,  the  better 
will  it  be  for  the  two  countries  concerned  and  for  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

191 


192  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

What  is  Shantung?  Let  me  mention  a  few  outstand- 
ing facts  relative  to  this  province  and  involved  in  the 
controversy : 

Area  of  Shantung 55,970  square  miles 

Area  of  Kiaochow  now  held  by  Japan  and  to  be  returned  to 

China 200  square  miles 

Area  of  Weihaiwei  held  by  England 285  square  miles 

Native  population  of  Shantung   25,810,000 

Japanese  population  of  Shantung about  21,000 

Tsingtao-Tsinan   railway,   which  Japan   proposes   to   make   a 

Chino- Japanese  enterprise  250  miles 

Japanese  expenditure  for  improving  this  road,  $10,397,000  gold 

Mines  appurtenant  to  this  railway one  iron  mine  area 

and  two  collieries 

Chinese  employed  on  this  railway 7,315 

Japanese  employed  on  this  railway 2,126 

Three  projected  railways  to  be  turned  over  by  Japan  to  In- 
ternational Consortium about  575  miles 

Japanese  loan  to  China  on  these  lines $10,000,000  gold 

Japanese  troops  now  guarding  railways about  2,500 

To  set  the  history  of  the  Shantung  controversy 
straight  in  the  public  mind,  we  must  hark  back  to  the 
Peace  Conference  at  Paris.  Before  the  Powers  at 
the  Conference  agreed  to  hand  over  to  Japan  German 
rights  in  Shantung,  President  Wilson,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  M.  Clemenceau,  and  Baron  Makino  had  fre- 
quent conferences.  As  the  result  of  these  conferences, 
and  at  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Wilson  and  the  British 
and  French  representatives,  Baron  Makino,  the  Japa- 
nese delegate,  on  May  4,  1919,  issued  the  following 
statement  to  the  press,  thus  announcing  to  the  world 
that  Japanese  interests  to  be  retained  in  Shantung  would 
be  purely  economic : 

"In  an  interview  with  representatives  of  Reuter 
(Associated  Press  or  Havas),  Baron  Makino  wished 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  193 

to  make  clear,  by  way  of  explanation  of  Japan's  posi- 
tion in  reference  to  Shantung  questions,  that  the  policy 
of  Japan  is  to  hand  back  Shantung  Peninsula  in  full 
sovereignty  to  China,  retaining  only  economic  privileges 
granted  to  Germany,  and  right  to  establish  settlement 
under  usual  conditions  at  Tsingtao.  Regarding  the 
railway,  which  is  to  become  a  Chino-Japanese  joint 
undertaking,  the  Baron  further  stated  that  owners  of 
the  railway  will  use  special  police  only  to  insure  security 
for  traffic,  that  they  will  be  used  for  no  other  purpose, 
that  the  police  force  will  be  composed  of  Chinese,  and 
that  such  Japanese  instructors  as  the  directors  of  the 
railway  may  select  will  be  appointed  by  the  Chinese 
Government. " 

It  was  rumored  in  Paris  at  that  time  that  the  above 
statement  was  drafted  as  suggested  by  Mr.  Wilson. 
In  pursuance  of  the  pledge  contained  therein,  Japan, 
as  soon  as  the  Peace  Treaty  came  into  effect  in  Janu- 
ary, 1920,  invited  China  to  enter  into  negotiations  to 
agree  upon  details  which  had  to  be  settled  in  order  to 
restore  Kiaochow  to  China  and  to  withdraw  troops 
from  along  the  railway. 

China  did  not  accept  this  overture  on  the  ground 
that  she  had  not  signed  the  Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace. 
Japan,  anxious  to  settle  the  matter  amicably,  repeated 
the  above  overture  at  various  times,  but  China  pre- 
ferred to  defer  the  settlement  of  the  question  for  vari- 
ous reasons. 

The  first  reason  was  that  the  Peking  Government 
was  fearful  of  the  opposition  of  various  hostile  ele- 
ments to  direct  negotiations  with  Japan.  The  power 
of  Peking  is  precarious.  The  factions  arrayed  against 
it,  especially  those  of  the  south,  are  always  on  the  alert 
to  denounce  it  on  every  conceivable  occasion.  The 
Shantung  question  furnishes  those  factions  with  a  splen- 


194  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

did  weapon  with  which  to  assail  Peking.  Then  there 
are  student  groups  which  are  as  often  as  not  utilized 
or  instigated  by  politicians  scheming  to  undermine  the 
Peking  authorities. 

It  has  been  known  in  well-informed  quarters  that  as 
far  as  the  Chinese  Government  was  concerned,  it  was 
more  than  willing  to  settle  the  Shantung  question  by 
direct  negotiations  with  Japan,  especially  after  Japan 
offered  terms  far  more  favorable  to  China  than  were 
agreed  upon  in  the  Versailles  Treaty.  Since  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference,  Japan  has  made  substantial  conces- 
sions in  favor  of  China,  forfeiting  most  of  the  rights 
formerly  enjoyed  by  Germany. 

As  for  China's  contention  that  the  leased  territory 
of  Kiaochow  naturally  reverted  to  Chinese  sovereignty 
when  she  declared  war  upon  Germany  in  August,  1917, 
no  one  takes  it  seriously.  To  all  intents  and  purposes, 
Kiaochow,  though  nominally  a  leased  territory,  was 
ceded  to  Germany.  In  the  Chino-German  agreement 
of  March,  1900,  it  is  provided  that  "in  the  German 
leased  territory  the  rights  of  sovereignty  are  safe- 
guarded by  the  German  governor  at  Tsingtao.n  It  is 
evident  that  sovereignty  to  that  territory  was  handed 
over  to  Germany  for  the  period  of  lease.  In  the  ac- 
cepted theory  of  international  law,  a  mere  declaration 
of  war  is  not  enough  to  restore  a  ceded  territory  to  the 
nation  from  which  it  was  taken.  To  establish  her  claim 
to  Kiaochow  China  should  not  only  have  declared  war 
but  should  have  taken  it  from  Germany  by  force  of 
arms. 

But  as  China  was  neither  capable  nor  willing  to  drive 
Germany  from  Kiaochow,  Japan  had  to  undertake  that 
task.  From  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  in 
August,  1914,  to  August,  1917,  China  remained  a  neu- 
tral spectator.  For  almost  two  years  after  Japan  dis- 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  195 

lodged  Germany  from  Shantung,  in  the  fall  of  1914, 
China  afforded  shelter  and  hospitality  to  Germans.  Aus- 
trian and  German  ships  were  safely  moored  at  Shanghai. 
Austrian  and  German  flags  floated  on  its  quays.  Had 
China  been  actively  engaged  on  the  part  of  the  Allies, 
there  might  have  been  some  force  in  the  plea  that  she 
preferred  to  resume  the  German  rights  for  herself.  But 
China  never  did  this.  Japan  and  Britain  attacked  and 
took  the  German  colony. 

China's  hope  for  direct  restitution  of  Kiaochow  by 
Germany  was  totally  destroyed  when  on  May  20,  1920, 
the  Berlin  Government  notified  Peking  that  by  virtue 
of  the  Versailles  Treaty  Germany  had  renounced  in 
favor  of  Japan  all  rights  and  interests  formerly  enjoyed 
by  her  under  the  Chino-German  agreement,  and  that 
she  was  no  longer  capable  of  restoring  them  direct  to 
China.  China  was  plainly  told  by  Germany  that  she 
must  negotiate  with  Japan  if  she  wanted  to  recover 
those  rights. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
CHINA  MEETS  JAPAN 

Washington,  December  2,  1921:  With  the  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  delegates  holding  their  first  meeting 
this  afternoon  as  arranged  through  the  good  offices  of 
Secretary  Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour,  Shantung  continues 
to  be  the  outstanding  question  of  the  Conference.  The 
Japanese  delegates  welcome  this  opportunity  of  discuss- 
ing this  vexatious  matter  in  public  view.  They  are 
confident  that  the  terms  of  settlement  they  now  offer 
to  the  Chinese  delegation  will  meet  the  approval  of  all 
fair-minded  men.  They  think  that  these  terms  should 
be  clearly  understood  by  the  world,  and  that  all  the 
data  bearing  upon  the  question  should  be  given  the 
widest  publicity.  For  the  same  reason  they  welcome 
the  presence  of  two  American  and  two  British  repre- 
sentatives at  the  meetings  on  the  Shantung  question. 

To  an  unbiased  critic  it  seems  that  all  that  is  needed 
to  settle  this  controversy  is  the  usual  amount  of  common 
sense,  and  little  else.  China  is  making  a  mistake  in 
"demanding"  the  unconditional  surrender  of  all  the 
former  German  possessions  in  Shantung,  as  though  she 
had  undisputed  right  to  them.  She  would  do  well  to 
remember  that  the  former  German  possessions  were 
taken  by  the  Japanese,  not  from  China,  but  from  Ger- 
many. The  Japanese  took  nothing  from  China.  And 
in  dislodging  the  Germans  from  Shantung,  Japan's  loss 
was  2,000  killed  and  wounded,  as  well  as  $15,000,000. 

196 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  197 

Japan  reduced  Kiaochow  and  drove  Germany  from 
Shantung,  when  China  was  torn  by  discord  and  had 
neither  the  will  nor  the  ability  to  attack  the  German 
stronghold. 

According  to  the  new  Japanese  proposal  China  may 
not  get  everything  she  wants,  but  she  certainly  gets  sub- 
stantial benefits  which  would  have  never  been  given 
her,  had  not  Japan  ousted  the  Germans.  The  Peace 
Treaty  of  Versailles  conferred  upon  Japan  all  the  pos- 
sessions and  rights  formerly  enjoyed  by  Germany  in 
Shantung.  But  since  then,  Japan  has  modified  her 
claim  to  those  rights  in  order  to  come  to  terms  with 
China.  Indeed  Japan  has  signified  her  intention  to 
give  up  everything  for  China  except  a  half  share  in  the 
Shantung  Railway  and  two  coal  mining  lots  and  an  iron 
mining  lot.  Briefly  stated,  the  basis  of  settlement,  upon 
which  the  Japanese  delegates  hope  to  solve  the  question, 
consists  of  these  eight  terms : 

First,  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  200  square 
miles  in  area,  will  be  returned  to  China. 

Secondly,  Japan  does  not  seek  to  establish  an  exclu- 
sive, or  even  international,  settlement  in  Tsingtao,  the 
capital  of  the  leased  territory,  but  will  place  the  whole 
territory  under  Chinese  administration.  In  return 
Japan  asks  China  to  open  the  whole  leased  territory 
to  foreign  trade. 

Thirdly,  Japan  wants  the  Shantung  Railway,  only 
250  miles  long,  together  with  mines  appurtenant 
thereto,  to  be  worked  as  a  joint  enterprise  in  which 
Japanese  and  Chinese  will  be  equally  represented,  both 
as  to  capital  and  as  to  the  personnel  of  the  manage- 
ment. 

Fourthly,  Japan  gives  up,  in  favor  of  the  Interna- 
tional Financial  Consortium  (in  which  America  figures 
most  prominently),  privileges  she  had  obtained  for 


198  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

the  construction  of  three  new  lines,  namely:  the  Tsinan- 
Shunteh  line,  156  miles;  the  Kaomi-Shuchou  line,  239 
miles;  and  the  Weichien-Yentai  line,  180  miles. 

Fifthly,  Japan  renounces  all  preferential  right,  for- 
merly enjoyed  by  Germany  and  transferred  to  Japan  by 
the  Versailles  Treaty,  with  regard  to  the  employment 
of  foreigners  and  foreign  capital  and  material. 

Sixthly,  Japan  will  withdraw  her  troops,  now  only 
2,500,  guarding  the  Kiaochow-Tsinan  Railway,  the 
moment  China  is  ready  to  place  her  own  guards  along 
the  line. 

Seventhly,  the  Tsingtao  Customs  will  become  an 
integral  part  of  the  Maritime  Customs  system  of 
China. 

Eighthly,  Japan  will  hand  over  to  China  all  public 
property  used  for  administrative  purposes  within  the 
leased  territory. 

When  the  Shantung  articles  in  the  Versailles  Treaty 
of  Peace  were  made  public,  American  opposition  cen- 
tered upon  the  Japanese  plan  to  establish  in  Tsingtao 
an  exclusive  Japanese  settlement.  But  Japan  has  defi- 
nitely abandoned  that  plan.  She  is  not  asking  even  for 
an  international  settlement.  She  will  not  have  any  set- 
tlement of  any  character,  but  will  return  the  entire  terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow  to  China  in  full  sovereignty.  Under 
the  German  regime,  China  forfeited  the  right  to  employ 
any  foreigner  in  Shantung  except  Germans.  She  also 
obligated  herself  to  purchase  only  from  Germany  any 
material  or  machinery  that  might  be  needed  in  Shan- 
tung. Japan,  in  the  interest  of  the  open  door,  is  will- 
ing to  give  up  such  preferential  rights.  She  has  turned 
over  to  the  International  Consortium  even  the  three 
projected  railways,  totalling  575  miles,  for  which  she 
advanced  $10,000,000  to  the  Chinese  Government  in 
1918. 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  199 

No  one  can  fail  to  sympathize  with  the  Chinese  dele- 
gation in  the  extremely  difficult  position  in  which  it  finds 
itself.  Its  home  government,  confronted  with  fac- 
tional feuds,  has  no  courage  to  do  what  it  really  wants 
to  do.  Out  of  sympathy  for  this  condition,  the  Japa- 
nese delegates  should  make  the  greatest  possible  sac- 
rifices. At  the  same  time  Japan,  too,  should  be 
given  a  square  deal.  It  will  never  do  for  America  and 
Britain  to  let  Japan  go  home  with  the  feeling  that  fair- 
ness has  been  denied  her  at  this  Conference. 

Shantung  is  a  province  of  55,970  square  miles.  In 
such  a  large  province,  a  half  share  to  be  retained  by/ 
Japan  in  a  railway  of  only  250  miles,  two  collieries/ 
and  an  iron  mine,  cannot,  by  any  stretch  of  the  imagi- 
nation, be  regarded  as  a  menace,  for  Japan's  participa- 
tion in  these  enterprises  is  to  be  purely  economic.  Tnere 
will  be  no  Japanese  soldiers  or  police  guarding  the 
railway  or  the  mines.  The  Japanese  civil  population 
in  Shantung,  at  present  only  22,000  as  against  the  Chi- 
nese population  of  25,810,000,  will  decrease  consider- 
ably with  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops,  be- 
cause much  of  that  population  consists  of  tradesmen 
who  followed  in  the  train  of  soldiers,  and  who  are 
more  than  likely  to  go  home  with  them. 


CHAPTER   XXX 
THE  RAILROAD  BLOCKS  THE  WAY 

Washington,  December  if,  1921:  In  spite  of 
roseate  official  statements  emanating  from  the  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  delegations,  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  Shantung  "conversations"  permit  of  no  hasty 
optimism.  It  is  yet  possible  that  the  parley  may  come 
to  an  impasse.  In  deference  to  the  good  offices  of  the 
American  Government  which  have  made  these  conver- 
sations possible,  both  delegations  will  make  the  utmost 
efforts  to  arrive  at  an  agreement,  but  there  exists  a 
serious  disagreement  on  the  most  vital  aspect  of  the 
Shantung  Railway  question. 

The  Chinese  delegation  has  conducted  the  negotia- 
tions with  remarkable  skill  and  tact,  and  has  won  almost 
every  point,  including  the  disposition  of  public  proper- 
ties in  Kiaochow  and  the  future  status  of  the  Maritime 
Customs  at  Tsingtao.  Throughout  the  parley,  good 
nature  has  prevailed  on  both  sides.  But  on  the  railway 
question  the  two  delegations  have  struck  a  reef. 

The  disagreement  between  China  and  Japan  on  this 
question  is  fundamental.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  dollars 
and  cents,  but  a  question  of  efficient  and  honest  man- 
agement essential  to  a  railway  as  a  public  carrier.  Be- 
cause the  question  involves  the  integrity  and  efficiency 
of  the  future  management  of  the  Shantung  line,  it  is 
almost  impossible  for  the  Japanese  delegates  to  discuss 
it  without  reserve.  The  reappearance  at  the  Confer- 

200 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  201 

ence  of  Ambassador  Baron  Shidehara,  who  has  just 
recovered  from  a  protracted  illness,  may  help  to  cut 
the  Gordian  knot,  but  the  situation  appears  extremely 
embarrassing  for  the  Japanese. 

To  all  familiar  with  the  railways  in  China,  the  unsat- 
isfactory administrative  condition  of  the  Chinese-man- 
aged lines  is  well  known.  True,  official  reports  of  the 
Chinese  railway  administration  show  a  fair  margin  of 
profit  from  the  railways.  But  this  profit  is  made  pos- 
sible by  neglecting  sorely  needed  repair  and  replenish- 
ment as  to  both  the  roads  and  the  equipment.  Apart 
from  occasional  arbitrary  seizure  of  trains  by  military 
governors,  their  essential  function  as  public  highways 
is  often  made  difficult  of  fulfillment  by  reason  of  univer- 
sal miscarriage  of  administration.  That  this  appre- 
hension is  well  founded  is  fully  proven  by  the  following 
statement  made  in  a  New  York  magazine  by  an  Ameri- 
can businessman  who  has  lived  in  China  for  thirty  years, 
several  of  which  have  been  spent  in  Shantung: 

"The  real  difficulty  in  the  whole  scheme  is  that  the 
Chinese  officials  haven't  the  administrative  honesty  to 
preserve  their  own  interests.  Take  their  own  railways, 
like  the  Tientsin-Pukow  Railway,  which  runs  through 
this  same  Shantung  Province  from  north  to  south. 
What  happens?  The  likin,  the  interprovincial  duties 
and  squeezes,  the  military  usurpations  of  cars  and 
materials,  the  want  of  honest  administration,  makes 
this  road  of  practically  little  value  in  the  transfer  of 
merchandise.  This  road  traverses  excellent  coal  fields, 
and  has  connections  in  the  north  with  Tientsin  and  in 
the  south  with  Shanghai.  An  excellent  coal  mine,  which 
was  operated  for  local  uses  before  the  railway  was 
built,  finds  it  impossible  to  market  its  coal  either  in 
Shanghai  or  Tientsin  because  of  the  inefficient  manage- 
ment of  the  Tientsin-Pukow  Railway.  There  is  a  mine 


202  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

of  excellent  coal  within  thirty  miles  of  Tsinan,  and 
within  two  miles  of  the  track  of  the  Tientsin-Pukow 
Railway,  and  sixty  miles  nearer  to  Tsinanfu  by  the 
Tientsin-Pukow  Railway  than  the  Japanese  mines  on 
the  Tsinanfu-Tsingtao  Railway,  and  yet  Tsinanfu  is 
supplied  by  the  Japanese  mines !  The  reason  why  the 
Chefoo-Tsinanfu  Railway  is  not  built  is  that  all  con- 
cerned know  that  it  would  be  ridden  by  a  horde  of 
greedy  parasites  which  would  sap  the  life  of  it  and 
make  it  of  no  effect." 

No  one  will  deny  that  the  Shantung  Railway  has, 
under  the  Japanese  management,  attained  a  degree  of 
efficiency  unequalled  by  any  Chinese-managed  line. 
Even  a  casual  traveler  cannot  fail  to  notice  a  refresh- 
ing change  when  he  leaves  a  Chinese  train  and  takes  a 
Japanese  train  in  Shantung  or  in  Manchuria.  I  have 
on  my  desk  a  recent  issue  of  the  Central  China  Post, 
an  English  newspaper  published  by  a  Britisher,  contain- 
ing an  editorial  objecting  for  obvious  reasons  to  the 
transfer  of  the  Shantung  Railway  to  the  Chinese  man- 
agement. 

The  Shantung  Railway,  though  its  main  line  is  only 
250  miles  long,  is  one  of  the  principal  arteries  of  trade. 
The  prosperity  and  even  existence  of  the  city  of  Tsing- 
tao  is  dependent  upon  its  efficient  management.  This 
commercial  metropolis  of  Shantung  has,  under  the  Jap- 
anese regime,  made  a  phenomenal  progress.  Under 
German  administration  it  had  60,000  inhabitants. 
Today  this  population  has  increased  to  108,000,  of 
which  about  80,000  are  Chinese  and  20,000  Japanese. 
The  Japanese  administration  has  expended  $15,000,- 
000  for  public  improvements,  while  some  $70,000,000 
has  been  invested  by  Japanese  firms  in  factories  and 
other  business  enterprises.  Should  the  Shantung  Rail- 
way be  managed  haphazard,  or  ever  be  liable  to  arbi- 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  203 

trary  seizure  by  military  chiefs,  the  city  of  Tsintao 
must  suffer  incalculable  damage. 

The  value  of  the  railway  is  estimated  at  53,000,000 
gold  marks  by  the  reparations  committee.  To  this 
must  be  added  some  $10,400,000  gold,  which  has  been 
expended  by  the  Japanese  for  improvement. 

There  are  a  group  of  iron  mines  and  two  groups  of 
coal  fields  along  and  appurtenant  to  the  railway.  On 
those  mines  considerable  Japanese  capital  has  been  in- 
vested. Whether  or  not  these  mines  are  turned  over 
to  China,  their  output  will  unquestionably  be  purchased 
by  Japanese  concerns.  If  the  railways  are  ridden  with 
mismanagement,  the  transportation  of  the  mineral 
products  is  bound  to  encounter  hindrance. 

All  these  circumstances  are  responsible  for  the 
Japanese  desire  to  have  a  voice  in  the  management  of 
the  railway.  Japan  is  willing  to  confer  upon  China 
the  absolute  ownership  of  the  line,  but  she  thinks  it 
not  only  to  her  interest  but  to  the  interest  of  all  the 
public,  the  most  important  of  which  is  Chinese,  that 
she  should  be  placed  in  a  position  to  insure  its  effi- 
cient management. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 
WHO  MANAGE  RAILWAYS  FOR  CHINA? 

Washington,  December  24,  1921:  As  I  predicted 
a  week  ago  the  Shantung  "conversations"  have  reached 
an  impasse  on  the  railway  question.  The  Japanese 
delegation  is  convinced  that  it  has  made  every  possible 
concession  to  China,  going  even  beyond  the  authority 
allowed  by  the  home  government.  Its  position  is  made 
more  difficult  by  the  uncompromising  attitude  assumed 
by  the  public  at  home,  which  believes  that  Japan's  terms 
of  settlement,  sent  China  on  September  7,  were  the  irre- 
ducible minimum.  The  Japanese  delegates  are  receiv- 
ing cablegrams  reporting  newspaper  editorials  vigor- 
ously protesting  against  making  any  further  concessions 
to  China.  Some  newspapers  think  that  it  would  have 
been  better  for  Japan  to  decline  the  good  offices  of 
Secretary  Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour,  and  insist  upon 
the  terms  presented  to  China  in  September.  Others 
assert  that  those  terms  are  most  generous,  and  should 
be  accepted  by  the  Chinese  delegation  without  modifica- 
tion. All  agree  that  Japan  has  given  up  in  favor  of 
China  everything  except  a  half  share  in  the  Shantung 
Railway  and  the  mines  appurtenant  thereto,  and  that 
this  last  vestige  of  Japanese  interest  should  be  main- 
tained by  all  means. 

Now  the  Japanese  delegates  have,  against  the  popu- 
lar will  at  home,  offered  to  waive  even  a  half  share  in 
the  line,  and  transfer  absolute  ownership  to  China.  All 
that  they  ask  is  the  usual  privilege  of  supervision  ac- 

204 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  205 

corded  to  foreign  capitalists  financing  Chinese  railways. 
Moreover,  their  terms  of  loan  are  far  more  liberal  than 
those  of  other  railway  loans  in  China. 

The  Chinese  delegates  propose  to  buy  the  railway 
and  pay  cash  for  it.  The  proposal  is  deceptive.  To  the 
public  it  conveys  the  idea  that  the  Chinese  Government 
or  some  Chinese  financial  institution  has  the  necessary 
sum  all  ready  for  the  purpose.  Quite  to  the  contrary, 
nowhere  is  such  ready  cash  to  be  found.  When  China 
says  she  will  pay  cash  for  the  railway,  she  means  either 
that  she  will  hand  to  Japan  a  Government  note,  or  that 
she  will  let  some  financial  organization,  possibly  an 
association  of  native  banks,  underwrite  the  project. 
In  either  case  she  will  have  to  float  a  domestic  loan. 
Such  a  loan  can  be  successfully  raised  only  by  stirring 
up  anti-Japanese  feeling  among  the  masses.  Unques 
tionably  various  associations  will  be  mobilized  for  the 
purpose.  They  will  picture  the  Japanese  in  Shantung 
in  the  blackest  color,  and  tell  the  public  that  unless  th< 
necessary  money  is  raised  to  buy  the  railway  Japan  wil 
gobble  up  the  whole  of  China.  The  consequence  wil 
be  that  Japan  will  suffer  a  double  loss  and  find  herseli 
in  a  very  awkward  position.  She  will  give  up  the  rail 
way  in  the  hope  of  keeping  China's  good  will,  bu 
instead  of  realizing  that  hope,  will  have  to  face  a  wide 
spread  anti-Japanese  agitation  in  China  certain  to  ac 
company  a  movement  to  collect  the  necessary  sum  to 
buy  the  railway. 

As  for  raising  a  foreign  loan,  China,  if  she  has  any 
sense  of  honor,  cannot  borrow  money  from  financiers 
of  any  third  country  and  thus  mortgage  the  Shantung 
Railway  to  them.  In  the  accepted  code  of  political  or 
business  morality,  such  a  deal  will  be  considered  a  foul 
play.  If  she  has  to  rely  upon  foreign  money  for  the 
purchase  of  the  road,  the  logical  and  only  country  to 


206  JAPAN/S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

which  she  must  turn  is  Japan,  whose  financiers  are  will- 
ing to  advance  the  necessary  fund  on  terms  more  rea- 
sonable than  those  exacted  by  other  foreign  capitalists 
interested  in  Chinese  railways. 

The  Japanese  proposal,  as  it  stands  today,  provides 
for  a  20-year  loan,  with  an  option  for  China  to  redeem 
it  at  the  end  of  ten  years.  Compare  this  with  other 
railway  loans.  The  British  loan  for  the  Shanghai- 
Nanking  Railway  is  for  50  years;  the  Anglo-German 
loan  for  the  Tientsin-Pukow  line,  30  years;  the  British 
loan  for  the  Shanghai-Ningpo  line,  30  years;  the  Brit- 
ish, American,  German,  French  loan  for  the  Hankow- 
Canton  line,  40  years;  the  Belgian  loan  for  the  Lung- 
tsing-Uhai  Railway,  40  years;  the  British  loan  for  the 
Pukow-Sinyang  road,  40  years;  the  British  loan  for 
the  Shanghaikwan-Newchwang  line,  45  years. 

Again  the  Japanese  proposal  provides  for  the  ap- 
pointment by  the  Chinese  Government  of  three  railway 
experts;  namely,  a  chief  engineer,  an  accountant,  and 
a  traffic  manager  to  be  recommended  by  the  Japanese 
capitalists. 

This  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  broad  ques- 
tion of  foreign  railway  supervision  in  China.  So  im- 
portant is  this  question  that  I  feel  justified  in  imposing 
upon  the  patience  of  my  readers  and  present  a  brief 
account  of  various  railway  contracts  between  the  Chi- 
nese Government  and  foreign  capitalists. 

We  must  always  bear  in  mind  that  foreign  railway 
loans  in  China  are  not  commercial  transactions  pure 
and  simple.  They  have  been  negotiated  by  foreign 
financiers  with  the  support  of  their  respective  govern- 
ments. British,  Russian,  French,  German,  Belgian, 
Japanese,  and  even  American  financiers  interested  in 
Chinese  railways  have  invariably  followed  the  same 
course. 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  207 

The  typical  case  of  foreign  participation  in  the  financ- 
ing of  the  Chinese  railways  is  the  loan  contract  for  the 
Shanghaikwan-Newchwang  Railway.  This  loan  con- 
tract was  concluded  in  1898  between  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment and  a  British  corporation  called  the  British 
and  Chinese  Corporation,  Ltd. 

According  to  this  contract,  the  chief  engineer  of  the 
railway  is  to  be  a  British  subject,  and  the  principal  mem- 
bers of  the  railway  staff  are  to  be  capable  and  experi- 
enced Europeans.  Although  the  members  of  the  staff 
are  nominally  appointed  by  the  Chinese  administration 
of  the  railways,  they  are,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  appointed 
by  the  chief  engineer.  In  case  a  new  chief  engineer  is 
to  be  appointed,  the  change  can  be  made  only  in  con- 
sultation with  the  British  corporation. 

In  addition  to  this  a  capable  and  efficient  European 
railway  accountant  is  appointed  with  full  powers  to 
organize  and  direct  the  keeping  of  the  railway  accounts 
and  to  act  with  the  administrative  agent  and  the  chief 
engineer  in  the  supervision  of  receipts  and  expenditures. 
All  receipts  and  earnings  of  the  lines  are  paid  in  to  the 
credit  of  the  Chinese  Railway  Administration  with  the 
[British  bank  called  the  Hongkong  and  Shanghai  Bank- 
ing Corporation,  together  with  50,000  taels  annually 
to  be  paid  by  each  of  the  provinces  of  Shansi,  Shensi, 
Honan  and  Anhui  for  ten  years.  The  loan  is  secured 
on  the  permanent  way,  rolling  stock  and  entire  prop- 
erty, together  with  the  freight  and  earnings  of  the 
Peking-Shanghaikwan  Railway,  which  was  already  in 
operation  when  the  loan  was  contracted,  as  well  as  earn- 
ings of  the  new  lines  when  constructed. 

Moreover,  the  principal  and  interest  of  the  loan  was 
guaranteed  by  the  Chinese  Government.  In  the  event 
of  default  in  payment  of  interest  or  repayment  of  prin- 
cipal at  due  date,  the  corporation  shall  immediately 


208  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

notify  the  Chinese  Government  thereof,  whereupon  the 
Chinese  Government  shall  immediately  provide  the 
funds  necessary  to  meet  such  payment.  If  the  Chinese 
Government  is  unable  to  meet  this  obligation,  the  rail- 
ways and  the  entire  property  shall  be  handed  over  to 
the  British  corporation  which  has  financed  the  loan. 
The  term  of  the  loan  is  45  years  and  repayment  of  prin- 
cipal is  made  so  far  as  regards  the  bondholders,  in  40 
equal  annual  installments  commencing  with  the  sixth 
year  of  the  loan. 

These  are  the  main  points  of  the  loan  contract  for 
the  Shanghaikwan-Newchwang  Railway.  It  has  been 
taken  as  a  model  in  almost  all  railway  loan  contracts 
accepted  by  China  between  1898  and  1908.  Speaking 
on  the  foreign  financial,  administrative  and  engineer- 
ing supervision  of  Chinese  railways,  an  able  Chinese 
scholar,  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng,  in  his  admirable  book,  "Mod- 
ern China, "  has  this  to  say: 

"Science  is  a  new  study  to  the  Chinese,  and  techno- 
logical skill  can  only  be  acquired  with  experience.  The 
work  of  training  native  engineers  has  only  begun  so 
recently  that  there  has  not  yet  been  time  to  produce  a 
sufficient  number  of  them  to  undertake  railway  con- 
struction on  an  extensive  scale.  That  the  Chinese 
themselves  when  properly  trained  and  employed  can 
construct  railways,  with  the  best  results,  has  already 
been  proved  by  the  Peking-Kalgan  Railway,  a  Govern- 
ment line  built  by  Chinese.  As  to  the  control  of  the 
proceeds  of  loans  by  the  issuing  banks,  the  raisan  d'etre 
for  such  control  is  that  the  Chinese  officials  have  not 
proved  themselves  worthy  of  confidence  in  the  matter 
of  handling  money,  and  that  as  they  are  inexperienced 
in  railway  work,  they  can  hardly  be  expected  to  main- 
tain the  same  standard  of  vigilance  and  efficiency  as  is 
found  in  most  European  railway  managing  depart- 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  209 

ments.  But  the  successful  construction  and  the  good 
management  of  the  Tientsin-Pukow  line  have  already 
justified  the  belief  that,  provided  they  are  equipped 
with  the  proper  staff  and  are  under  proper  supervision, 
they  can  be  trusted." 

The  Tientsin-Pukow  Railway  referred  to  by  Mr. 
Cheng  calls  for  explanation.  It  is  financed  jointly  by 
England  and  Germany.  It  connects  Tientsin  and  Nan- 
king and  runs  through  three  provinces,  but  mostly 
through  Shantung.  This  loan  contract,  made  in  1908, 
marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  period  in  foreign  railway 
enterprise  in  China.  Before  that  time  the  European 
powers  interested  in  Chinese  railways  competed  with 
one  another  in  the  most  strenuous  manner.  Russia, 
not  satisfied  with  her  railway  activities  in  Manchuria, 
acquired,  through  the  agency  of  a  Belgian  syndicate, 
the  right  to  finance  the  Peking-Hankow  Railway,  run- 
ning from  the  Chinese  capital  into  the  heart  of  the 
Yangtse  Valley.  She  also  offered,  through  French  and 
Belgian  bankers,  to  finance  the  railways  of  Shansi,  for 
the  purpose  of  exploiting  the  coal  mines  in  that  province. 

These  Russian  activities  were  a  cause  of  grave 
anxiety  to  British  interests  in  Central  China.  In  conse- 
quence, Great  Britain  obtained  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment a  contract  to  finance  the  Shanghaikwan-New- 
chwang  Railway,  which  we  have  above  described.  This 
British  move  was  made  for  the  specific  purpose  of  cut- 
ting off  any  possible  connection  between  the  Russian 
railways  in  the  interior  of  China  and  those  in  Man- 
churia. 

But  England  gradually  came  to  realize  that  such 
strenuous  international  competition  was  unprofitable 
and  harmful.  Consequently  she  came  to  an  agreement 
with  Russia,  allotting  to  herself  the  Yangtse  Valley  as 


210  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

her  sphere  of  influence  and  giving  Russia  the  vast  terri- 
tory north  of  the  Great  Wall. 

This  British-Russian  agreement  was  soon  followed 
by  a  British-German  understanding,  as  the  result  of 
which  the  bankers  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
agreed  jointly  to  finance  the  Chinese  railroad  between 
Tientsin  and  Nanking,  commonly  known  as  the  Tien- 
tsin-Pukow  Railway.  This  agreement  was  made  in 
1908.  The  British  firm  interested  in  it  was  the  Hong- 
kong and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation,  while  the 
German  firm  was  the  Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank.  These 
two  institutions  negotiated  jointly  with  the  Chinese 
Government  for  a  loan  and  divided  it  into  two  parts,  to 
be  floated,  respectively,  in  London  and  Berlin  at  the 
same  price  and  bearing  the  same  interest.  The  north- 
ern section  of  the  railroad  was  assigned  to  a  German 
engineer  and  the  southern  section  to  a  British. 

On  the  whole,  the  railway  loan  agreement  of  1908 
between  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  British  and 
German  bankers  was  more  favorable  to  China  than  the 
preceding  loans.  The  term  of  the  loan  is  30  years,  the 
repayment  of  principal  commencing  after  the  end  of 
ten  years  from  the  date  of  the  loan.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment reserves  the  right  to  redeem  the  whole  loan 
after  a  lapse  of  ten  years.  The  loan  is  secured  by: 

1.  Likin  and  internal  revenues  of  the  province  of 
Chihli  to  the  amount  of  1,200,000  Haikuan  taels  a 
year. 

2.  Likin  and  internal  revenues  of  the  province  of 
Shantung  to  the  amount  of  1,600,000  Haikuan  taels  a 
year,  and 

3.  The  revenues  of  the  Nanking  likin  collector  ate 
(to  the  amount  of  900,000  Haikuan  taels  a  year)   in 
the  Province  of  Kiangsu. 

It  is  provided  that  in  case  the  revenues  from  the 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  211 

above  sources  are  insufficient  to  meet  the  obligations 
of  the  railway,  these  revenues  will  be  transferred  to  and 
administered  by  the  Maritime  Customs,  which  is  con- 
trolled by  foreigners,  mostly  Britishers.  The  proceeds 
of  the  loan,  as  well  as  the  receipts  of  the  railroad,  are 
paid  to  the  credit  of  the  railway  with  the  Hongkong 
and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  and  the  Deutsch- 
Asiatische  Bank  in  China,  London  or  Berlin,  as  the 
case  may  be. 

The  original  contract  provides  for  two  chief  engi- 
neers, one  British  and  one  German.  Whenever  ap- 
pointments are  to  be  made  or  functions  to  be  defined  of 
the  technical  employees  on  the  railway  staff,  as  well  as 
in  the  case  of  their  dismissal,  the  chief  engineers  must 
be  consulted.  The  director-general  of  the  railway  is 
Chinese,  but  the  real  authority  rests  with  the  chief  engi- 
neers. The  auditor  is  appointed  by  the  British-German 
syndicate.  In  the  construction  of  the  northern  section 
of  the  railway,  the  German  bank  has  the  privilege  of 
purchasing  all  materials  required  for  it,  while  in  the 
southern  section  the  British  concern  enjoys  the  same 
privilege.  After  the  railway  is  constructed,  these  Ger- 
man and  British  firms  in  their  respective  sections  are 
given  the  preference  for  such  agency  business  for  the 
supply  of  foreign  materials  as  the  railway  administra- 
tion may  require. 

In  this  respect  even  American  financiers  are  no  more 
generous  than  others.  In  1916  the  Siems-Carey 
Company,  of  St.  Paul,  with  the  financial  backing  of  the 
American  International  Corporation,  obtained  the  right 
to  construct  railways  in  China  aggregating  1,500  miles, 
with  an  option  for  another  1,500.  The  Company 
agreed  to  finance  the  Chinese  Government  in  this  rail- 
way enterprise,  and  advanced  $1,000,000  as  the  first 
installment  of  the  loan.  After  that  the  company  was 


212  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

to  advance  funds  not  to  exceed  $10,000,000  in  any  one 
year.  The  American  Company  was  to  hold  a  first-trust 
mortgage  upon  the  entire  railroads  which  were  to  be 
built,  as  well  as  upon  "all  rolling  stock,  equipment,  real 
estate,  machinery,  buildings,  tools,  and  all  of  the  physi- 
cal property  in  connection  with  or  appurtenant  thereto 
on  hand  or  to  be  added."  First  repayment  of  the  prin- 
cipal was  to  be  made  after  the  lapse  of  25  years  from 
the  date  of  the  loan. 

The  director-general  of  the  railroad  was  to  be  a  Chi- 
nese appointed  by  the  Chinese  Government.  But  the 
chief  engineer,  traffic  manager,  and  auditor  were  to  be 
chosen,  recommended  and  vouched  for  by  the  American 
Company,  which  is  a  euphonic  way  of  saying  that  these 
officials  should  be  Americans.  The  American  Com- 
pany was  to  furnish  all  the  materials  required  in  the 
construction  of  these  railways,  receiving  a  commission 
of  five  per  cent  on  all  the  sales.  This  commission  is, 
of  course,  in  addition  to  eight  per  cent  interest  to  be 
paid  on  the  principal.  Furthermore,  the  Company 
was  to  receive  20  per  cent  of  net  profits  of  the  rail- 
ways as  compensation  for  handling  and  selling  the 
bonds,  which  were  to  be  floated  in  the  United  States  to 
finance  the  railways.  From  this  description  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  terms  of  this  loan  were  even  more  un- 
favorable to  China  than  other  railway  loans. 


TABLE  OF  FOREIGN  RAILWAY  LOANS  FOR 
CHINA 

Principal      Duration 

Title  and  Date                     £              of  Loan  Security 

British  loan  for  Im-  Government  guar- 

perial    Railway    of  antee  and   reve- 

North  China,  1898     2,300,000        45  nue  of  railway 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE 


213 


Title  and  Date 
Franco-Belgian     loan 
for  Peking-Hankow 
Railway,    1898    .. 


Principal 
£ 


Duration 
of  Loan 


Security 


4,500,000         30        Redeemed  in  1909 


Russian  loan  for 
Shansi  Railway, 
1902 1,600,000  30 

Franco-Belgian  loan 
for  Honan  Rail- 
way, 1903  1,000,000  30 


Franco-Belgian  loan 
for  Kaifengfu-Ho- 
nan  Railway,  1907 


640,000        25 


British  loan  for 
Shanghai  -  Nanking 
Railway,  1904  ...  2,250,000 


British  loan  for  the 
same,  1907 

Hongkong  govern- 
ment loan  for  re- 
demption of  Can- 
ton-Hankow Rail- 
way contract,  1905 


50 


650,000        47 


British  loan  for  Can- 
ton-Kaulung  Rail- 
way, 1907  1,500,000  30 

British-German  loan 
for  Tientsin-Pukow 
Railway,  1908  . . .  3,000,000  30 


Government  guar- 
antee and  reve- 
nue of  railway 

Government  guar- 
antee and  reve- 
nue of  railway 

Government  guar- 
antee and  reve- 
nue of  railway 

Profits  of  and 
mortgage  upon 
railway 

Profits  of  and 
mortgage  upon 
railway 


1,100,000         10        Redeemed 


Profits  of 
mortgage 
railway 


and 
upon 


First  charge  upon 
llkin  and  inter- 
nal  revenue  of  3 
provinces 


214 


JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 


Principal 
£ 


Duration 
of  Loan 


Title  and  Date 
The  same,  1909  .  2,000,000        29 


British  loan  for 
Shanghai  -  Ningpo 
Railway,  1908  ...  1,500,000  20 

Anglo  -  French  loan 
to  redeem  Peking- 
Hankow  Railway, 
1908 5,000,000  30 


Japanese  loan  for 
Kirin  -  Changchun 
Railway,  1908  ... 

Japanese  loan  for  Sim- 
mintun  -  Mukden 
line,  1909 


215,000  .      25 


32,000        18 


Anglo-German  loan 
for  Tientsin  -  Pu- 
kow  line,  1910  . .  3,000,000  30 


British  loan  for  Pe- 
king-Hankow line, 
1910 450,000  10 

Japanese  loan  for  the 

same,  1910 220,000         10 

Japanese  loan  for  the 

same,  1911 1,000,000         25 


Security 

First  charge  upon 
likin  and  inter- 
nal revenue  of  3 
provinces 

Surplus  earnings  of 
Peking-  Mukden 
Railway 

Surplus  taxes  of 
Chekiang,  Ki- 
angsu,  Hupeh 
and  Chihli 


Revenue  of  rail- 
way 

Revenue  of  rail- 
way 

First  charge  upon 
likin  and  other 
internal  taxes  of 
4  provinces 

Government  guar- 
antee 

Government  guar- 
antee 

Government  guar- 
antee and  tribute 
grain  conversion 
tax  of  Kiangsu 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE 


215 


Title  and  Date 

British  -  American  - 
German  -  French 
loan  for  Hankow- 
Canton  line,  1911 

Japanese  loan  for 
Nanchang  -  Kiuki- 
ang  line,  1912.  . .  . 


Principal 
£ 


Duration 
of  Loan 


6,000,000        40 


500,000        15 


Belgian  loan  for 
Lungtsiang  -  Uhai 
line,  1912 4,000,000  40 

British  loan  for  Sin- 
yang-Pukow  line, 
1913 3,000,000  40 

American  loan  to  four 
lines  of  1,500,000 
miles,  1916  (first 
installment)  $1,000,000  25 


Security 

Hupeh  and  Hunan 
salt  and  likin 
revenues  and 
Hupeh  rice  tax 

Hupeh  and  Hunan 
salt  and  likin 
revenues  and 
Hupeh  rice  tax 

Government  guar- 
antee and  mort- 
gage on  railway 

Government  guar- 
antee and  mort- 
gage on  railway 


Mortgage  on  rail- 
way and  its 
property 


CHAPTER   XXXII 
SETTLED   AT    LAST! 

Washington,  February  I,  1922:  The  Shantung 
dispute  is  settled  at  last!  Whatever  be  the  terms  of 
settlement,  the  world  is  glad  that  it  can  now  forget  the 
controversy  which  has  seemed  everlasting.  For  this 
good  riddance  we  have  to  thank  President  Harding  and 
Mr.  Hughes,  as  well  as  Mr.  Balfour,  for  it  was  their 
good  offices  which  have  made  it  possible  to  compose 
the  differences  between  China  and  Japan. 

The  Shantung  settlement  is  a  diplomatic  victory  for 
China.  Whatever  the  Chinese  factions  and  politicians 
opposing  Peking  may  say  against  it,  there  can  be  no 
question  about  that.  To  realize  this  fact  we  must  know 
what  China  did  at  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris. 

At  Paris  China  demanded  the  unconditional  restitu- 
tion of  Kiaochow  and  the  Shantung  Railway.  But  when 
it  became  evident  that  this  demand  was  going  to  be 
turned  down  by  the  Conference,  China  quietly  ap- 
proached Japan  with  a  modified  claim.  The  main  fea- 
tures of  that  proposal  were  the  conversion  of  the  Shan- 
tung Railway  into  a  Chino-Japanese  joint  enterprise  and 
the  establishment  at  Tsingtao  of  an  international  settle- 
ment instead  of  an  exclusive  Japanese  settlement. 
China  urged,  almost  implored,  Japan  to  settle  the  Shan- 
tung question  on  these  terms.  The  Japanese  statesmen 
undoubtedly  had  the  wit  to  see  the  wisdom  of  accepting 
the  Chinese  proposal,  and  thus  end  the  controversy  then 
and  there.  But  the  statesmen  and  diplomats  had  not 

216 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  217 

the  courage  to  take  the  action  which  they  knew  ran  di- 
rectly counter  to  the  popular  wish.  The  masses  of 
Japan,  intoxicated  with  their  military  and  commercial 
successes  in  Shantung,  and  confident  of  the  recognition 
of  their  rights  at  the  Peace  Conference,  urged  their 
Government  and  its  delegates  at  Paris  to  take  a  firm 
attitude  and  make  no  concessions.  The  only  alterna- 
tive to  their  acquiescence  in  this  popular  clamor  would 
have  been  the  downfall  of  the  cabinet.  The  Japanese 
statesmen,  rather  than  face  a  ministerial  crisis,  danced 
to  the  music  of  the  masses  and  turned  deaf  ears  to  the 
Chinese  overture.  For  the  moment  that  appeared  a 
victory  for  Japanese  diplomacy.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  sowed  the  seeds  of  trouble  from  which  the  Japa- 
nese delegation  at  Washington  has  reaped  a  harvest  of 
defeat. 

Soon  after  the  Paris  Conference,  Japan  invited  Pe- 
king to  enter  into  negotiations  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining terms  on  which  she  would  return  the  former 
German  rights  to  China.  By  this  time  the  situation 
had  become  extremely  complicated,  mainly  because  the 
Republican  Senate  at  Washington  had  taken  up  cudgels 
against  Japan,  or  rather  against  Mr.  Wilson,  which 
encouraged  China  to  believe  that  the  American  Senate 
would  eventually  compel  Japan  unconditionally  to  sur- 
render Kiaochow  and  all  that  went  with  it.  Undoubt- 
edly this  encouragement  was  fostered  by  American  ad- 
visers to  China  who  conducted  vigorous  propaganda 
among  the  Senators  and  before  the  American  public. 
Heartened  by  this,  China  declined  the  Japanese  invita- 
tion to  negotiate.  Japan,  eager  to  settle  the  matter, 
patiently  repeated  the  invitation  two  or  three  times, 
modifying  her  terms  a  little  each  time  in  favor  of  China. 
By  September,  1921,  she  was  impelled  to  offer  to  China 
the  very  terms  on  which  the  latter  had  implored  Japan 


218  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

to  settle  the  dispute  at  the  Paris  Conference.  And  yet 
the  Chinese  Government  declined  to  negotiate — so  com- 
pletely had  the  tables  been  turned  against  Japan.  Each 
concession  made  by  Tokyo  must  have  appeared  to  Pe- 
king a  promise  for  further  concessions.  I  can  well 
imagine  how  the  diplomats  at  Peking  smiled  in  their 
sleeves  each  time  Japan  came  forth  with  modified  terms. 

While  the  matter  was  in  this  unsettled  condition, 
there  came  to  China  an  invitation  to  the  Washington 
Conference.  To  her  that  invitation  was  heaven-sent. 
Surely  the  Republican  leaders,  who  had  so  vigorously 
championed  her  cause,  would  help  win  her  fight  for 
Shantung.  It  was  in  this  hope  that  China  sent  her  dele- 
gates to  the  Conference.  Of  course,  the  Chinese  were 
not  guileless  enough  to  ignore  the  fact  that  much  of  the 
heat  for  the  Shantung  debate  in  the  American  Senate 
proceeded  from  motives  of  domestic  politics,  and  that 
America  would  hesitate  to  pick  China's  chestnuts  out  of 
the  fire  at  the  risk  of  burning  her  fingers.  The  Chinese 
delegates,  therefore,  never  thought  that  they  could  get 
at  this  Conference  anything  like  the  unconditional  sur- 
render of  Kiaochow,  or  the  Shantung  Railway,  but  they 
at  least  hoped  that  at  Washington  the  Japanese  might 
be  induced  to  make  concessions  more  favorable  to  China 
than  they  would  make  at  Peking.  That  this  hope  has 
been  fulfilled  is  plainly  shown  in  the  treaty  just  an- 
nounced. 

I  need  not  dwell  upon  the  details  of  the  treaty,  for 
it  explains  itself.  (See  Appendix  II,  section  D.)  In 
the  main  the  agreement  follows  the  lines  mapped  out 
in  Japan's  last  memorandum  addressed  to  China  on 
September  7,  1921,  although  Japan  has  made  more 
sweeping  concessions  than  in  that  memorandum.  (See 
Appendix  II,  section  C.) 

The  ratifications  of  the  treaty  are  to  be  exchanged 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  219 

at  Peking  not  later  than  four  months  from  February  3, 
the  date  on  which  the  treaty  will  be  signed  at  the  Pan- 
American  Union  by  the  representatives  of  Japan  and 
China.  Japan  is  to  transfer  to  China  the  administra- 
tion, as  well  as  the  public  properties,  of  Kiaochow 
within  six  months  after  the  treaty  comes  into  effect. 
The  Japanese  troops,  including  those  along  the  Tsintao- 
Tsinanfu  Railway,  are  to  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the 
Chinese  police  or  military  are  provided  to  take  over 
the  protection  of  the  railway.  This  may  be  done  in 
sections,  the  date  in  each  instance  to  be  arranged  in 
advance  beween  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  authorities, 
and  the  complete  withdrawal  to  be  effected  within  three 
months,  if  possible,  and  not  later  than  six  months  after 
the  signing  of  the  treaty. 

The  Japanese  garrison  at  Tsingtao  is  to  be  with- 
drawn simultaneously,  if  possible,  with  the  transfer  of 
the  administration  of  the  leased  territory,  and  in  any 
case  within  thirty  days  thereafter.  The  Japanese  wire- 
less stations  at  Tsingtao  and  Tsinanfu  are  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  China  upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese 
troops  from  those  cities.  The  customs  house  at  Tsing- 
tao is  to  become  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  mari- 
time customs  as  soon  as  the  treaty  comes  in  force. 

As  to  the  railway,  which  has  been  the  crux  of  the 
whole  question,  China  undertakes  to  pay  Japan  53,- 
406,141  gold  marks,  the  value  placed  on  the  road  by 
the  reparations  commission  under  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, plus  Japanese  expenditures  for  permanent  im- 
provements and  additions,  minus  an  allowance  for 
depreciation.  A  joint  Chino-Japanese  commission  will 
be  appointed  to  agree  on  these  values. 

The  actual  transfer  of  the  railway  properties  is  to 
be  completed  as  soon  as  possible,  and  not  later  than 
nine  months  after  the  treaty  becomes  effective.  Pay- 


220  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

ment  is  to  be  made  in  Chinese  treasury  notes,  secured 
on  the  properties  and  revenues  of  the  roads,  and  run- 
ning for  a  period  of  fifteen  years  but  redeemable  after 
five  years  at  China's  option.  Until  these  notes  are 
redeemed  a  Japanese  will  occupy  the  post  of  traffic  man- 
ager, and  another  Japanese  will  be  chief  accountant 
jointly  with  a  Chinese  chief  accountant  with  coordinate 
functions.  These  officials  "shall  all  be  under  the  direc- 
tion, control  and  supervision  of  the  Chinese  managing 
director,  and  removable  for  cause." 

The  extensions  of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway, 
for  which  Japan  was  to  finance  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, is  to  be  opened  uto  the  common  activity  of  an 
international  financial  group  on  terms  to  be  arranged 
between  this  group  and  the  Chinese  Government." 

The  former  German-operated  mines  in  the  province 
will  be  handed  over  to  a  company  to  be  formed  under 
a  special  charter  of  the  Chinese  Government,  in  which 
the  Japanese  capital  shall  not  exceed  the  Chinese  capital. 

Japan  undertakes  not  to  seek  the  establishment  of 
an  exclusive  Japanese  or  international  settlement  in 
Kiaochow,  while  China  agrees  to  open  the  entire 
former  leased  territory  to  international  trade  and  resi- 
dence. 

Japan  is  to  give  back  to  China  the  former  German 
submarine  cables  between  Tsingtao  and  Cheefoo  and 
between  Tsingtao  and  Shanghai.  She  renounces,  fur- 
thermore, all  preferential  rights,  formerly  enjoyed  by 
Germany,  with  respect  to  foreign  assistance  in  persons, 
capital  and  material,  thus  completely  abolishing  the 
sphere  of  influence  established  in  Shantung  by  the 
Chino-German  Treaty  of  1898. 

Such  are  the  terms  upon  which  the  Chinese  and  Japa- 
nese delegations  have  settled  the  Shantung  dispute. 
Had  the  Japanese  statesmen  in  power  been  courageous 


THE    SHANTUNG    DISPUTE  221 

enough  to  offer  such  liberal  terms  to  China  soon  after 
the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  China  would  have  ac- 
cepted them  and  the  dispute  would  have  been  settled 
long  ago.  But  they  were  afraid  of  the  clamoring  pub- 
lic, and  had  neither  the  courage  nor  the  foresight  to 
adopt  such  a  course.  Instead,  they  made  concessions 
by  piecemeal,  each  a  little  more  generous  than  the  pre- 
ceding one.  What  wonder  that  the  adroit  diplomats 
at  Peking  lost  respect  for  the  Japanese  statesmen  and 
made  sport  of  those  concessions! 

But  let  the  dead  past  bury  its  dead.  The  world  is  glad 
that  it  will  not  have  to  hear  about  the  dispute  any  more. 
Furthermore,  the  apparent  defeat  of  Japanese  diplo- 
macy may  yet  prove  to  be  a  victory  in  disguise.  If  the 
sweeping  concessions  made  by  Baron  Shidehara  and 
Mr.  Hanihara  will  serve  to  convince  the  Chinese  of 
Japan's  sincere  desire  to  be  friendly  towards  them, 
those  concessions  certainly  have  not  been  made  in  vain, 
On  the  eve  of  his  departure  from  Washington  Dr. 
Wang,  the  Chief  Justice  of  China  and  one  of  the  Chi- 
nese delegates,  made  this  statement  to  the  press : 

"The  settlement  of  the  Shantung  question  is  the  first 
and,  I  believe,  an  important  step  in  the  direction  of 
bringing  about  a  better  understanding  between  China 
and  Japan.  The  Chinese  people  confidently  hope  that 
this  Conference  will  mean  not  only  a  new  era  in  the 
internal  condition  of  China,  but  also  open  a  new  page 
in  Japan's  policy  towards  China." 

If  this  statement  voices  the  real  sentiment  of  Chinese 
leaders,  if  not  the  general  public  of  China,  Japan  has 
good  reason  to  congratulate  herself  upon  the  conces* 
sions  her  delegates  have  made  at  this  Conference. 

In  many  respects  this  treaty  is  a  most  extraordinary 
international  instrument.  The  negotiations,  which  have 
consummated  in  the  treaty,  haveibeen  conducted  in  Eng- 


222  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

lish,  a  language  foreign  to  either  of  the  two  parties. 
Naturally,  the  original  of  the  treaty  is  in  English,  the 
translations  to  be  made  in  Japanese  and  Chinese.  The 
minutes  of  the  "conversations"  have  been  written  in 
English  by  two  Japanese  secretaries,  Mr.  Shiratori  and 
Mr.  Saito,  and  consist  of  almost  a  thousand  pages. 
At  each  meeting  the  minutes  for  the  preceding  session 
were  neatly  typewritten  and  placed  before  the  delegates, 
as  well  as  before  the  four  official  "spectators,"  two  each 
from  the  British  and  the  American  delegations.  It  was 
a  remarkable  feat.  Its  difficulty  may  be  the  more  fully 
appreciated  when  we  know  that  the  minutes  were  taken 
in  a  foreign  language,  and  that  the  Shantung  "conver- 
sations" were  held  every  day,  often  twice  a  day,  except 
during  the  brief  period  when  the  negotiations  were  in 
a  state  of  deadlock  on  the  railway  question.  At  the 
first  two  or  three  meetings,  two  Chinese  secretaries  also 
took  minutes  and  were  to  collaborate  with  the  Japanese 
secretaries,  but  somehow  they  soon  gave  up  the  task, 
and  accepted  the  Japanese  version  as  the  only  authentic 
document.  And  the  remarkable  fact  is  that  neither  of 
the  two  Japanese  secretaries  who  wrote  the  document 
had  any  schooling  in  America  or  England. 


PART  VI 

JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE 


PART  VI 
JAPAN'S  SIBERIAN  VENTURE 


CHAPTER   XXXIII 
"LET   HER   BUY   SIBERIA!" 

Washington,  January  2;  1922:  "Japan  has  got  to 
have  elbow  room.  Let  her  buy  Siberia  !" 

Pray  be  not  shocked,  my  dear  readers,  for  I  am  not 
quoting  from  any  resolution  passed  by  the  Conference. 
I  am  quoting  Mr.  Thomas  A.  Edison,  the  wizardly 
American  inventor.  An  inventive  genius,  like  a  poet, 
must  have  license  as  well  as  vision. 

Mr.  Edison,  in  a  recent  remarkable  interview,  dis- 
cusses the  problems  of  Japan  in  a  big  way  characteristic 
of  the  great  inventor.  He  admits  that  Japan,  deprived 
of  the  common  freedom  of  immigration  into  countries 
controlled  by  the  Caucasian  Powers,  must  be  given 
a  breathing  space  somewhere  else,  logically  in  eastern 
Asia.  It  is,  he  thinks,  not  militarism  which  is  behind 
Japan's  national  desire  for  expansion,  but  the  economic 
pressure  brought  about  by  overpopulation  and  the  lack 
of  land.  "Japan's  problem  is  commercial,"  he  says, 
"no  more  political  than  mine  when  I  need  to  build  an 
addition  to  my  factory.  I  am  certain  that  to  help 
Japan  get  new  and  large  area  on  which  to  live  would 
be  far  cheaper  than  to  build  warships  with  which  to 
fight  her."  Then  Mr.  Edison  suggests  that  the  Con- 

225 


226  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

ference  at  Washington  agree  to  let  Japan  buy  part  of 
Siberia,  giving  in  payment  bonds  guaranteed  by  the 
Powers. 

Mr.  Edison's  sympathetic  interpretation  of  the  Japa- 
nese problem  no  one  will  fail  to  appreciate.  Not  many 
Japanese  are,  however,  enthusiastic  about  his  idea  of 
letting  Japan  purchase  territory  in  Siberia  or  anywhere 
else.  For  it  is  not  territorial  expansion  which  Japan 
has  been  and  is  seeking.  What  she  is  seeking  is  nothing 
more  than  the  freedom  of  peaceful  economic  activities 
in  countries  which  offer  opportunity  to  honest  enter- 
prises. 

Japan  has  accepted  the  inevitable  and  is,  for  the  sake 
of  the  peace  of  the  world,  reconciled  to  the  fact  that 
Europe  and  America  have  erected  a  barrier  against 
apanese  immigration  and  enterprises  in  the  countries 
mder  their  control.    She  must  perforce  turn  her  atten- 
ion  towards  the  Far  East,  and  seek  new  fields  of  activ- 
ity in  the  countries  on  the  Asian  continent.    To  attain 
this  end,  it  is  not  necessary  that  Japan  should  put  Asiatic 
territories  under  her  flag.    She  would  be  satisfied  if  she 
could  secure  the  unobstructed  privilege  of  working  re- 
sources, building  railroads,  promoting  trade  in  those 
countries  whose  natural  wealth  remains  undeveloped  by 
the  native  population.     It  matters  little  whether  those 
countries  are  under  Russian  or  Chinese  jurisdiction. 

What  annoys  Japan  is  the  peculiar  fact  that  whenever 
;he  secures  some  economic  privilege,  railway  or  mining, 
ishery  or  lumbering,  in  Siberia,  Manchuria,  Mongolia, 
or  China,  a  hue  and  cry  is  sure  to  be  raised  in  Europe 
and  America.  Such  movements  on  the  part  of  Japan 
lave  been  branded  as  acts  of  aggression  and  encroach- 
ment, even  though  such  privileges  were  obtained  by  the 
usual  methods  of  negotiation.  If  the  Powers  assume 
the  attitude  of  the  dog  in  the  manger  and  object  even 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  227 

to  Japanese  acquisition  of  a  few  economic  privileges  on 
the  Asiatic  continent,  how  can  we  hope  to  secure  their 
endorsement  of  a  plan  to  let  Japan  own  outright  a  sec- 
tion of  Siberia  or  Manchuria?  We  should  be  sur- 
prised if  the  Powers  would  go  as  far  as  to  recognize 
Japan's  right  to  unhindered  economic  activities  in  those 
countries.  Yet  this  recognition  is  absolutely  necessary 
if  Japan  is  to  have  a  breathing  space  and  elbow-room. 

I  am  in  a  mood  to  take  my  readers  into  confidence 
this  morning,  and  tell  them  just  what  I  think  about  the 
Japanese  in  Siberia.    I  think  that  nothing  is  the  matter 
with  Japan  in  Siberia,  except  that  she  has  appeared 
upon  the  scene  of  international  land-grabbing  just  a 
little  too  late.     Nothing  except  that  she  was  sleeping  a 
saintly  sleep  when  the  great  nations  of  Christendom 
were  busy  practicing  the  moral  code  of  the  dying  patri- 
arch, "My  son,  get  money — honestly,  if  you  can,  but 
get  money !"    Japan's  sin,  if  sin  it  be,  lies  in  her  elevent 
hour  entrance  into  the  company  of  international  free 
booters,   who,   having  divided   among  themselves   a! 
the  riches  of  the  world,  are  now  putting  forth  a  Sunda 
front  and  preaching  morals  to  the  belated  Japanese 
Had  Japan  joined  the  merry  company,  say  a  century  of 
even  fifty  years  earlier,  things  would  have  been  very 
different  for  her.     She  might  have  acquired  rich  coun- 
tries in  the  South  Seas  and  on  the  Asian  Continent,  and 
have  by  now  become  so  opulent  and  self-sufficient  that 
she  could  pull  herself  to  her  full  height  and  proudly  talk 
about  international  charity  and  ethics.    Am  I  an  enfant 
terrible?    Is  it  not  true  that  truth  is  usually  terrible? 

Do  not  misunderstand  me.  I  am  not  lamenting 
Japan's  fate.  Much  less  am  I  disposed  to  argue  for  the 
restoration  of  the  regime  of  international  freebooting, 
which  has  happily  gone  by.  Only  I  can  not  help  think- 
ing that  the  established  and  staid  powers  lack  a  sense 


228  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

of  humor  when  they  look  upon  themselves  as  the 
world's  custodians  of  justice  and  crown  themselves 
with  halos  of  righteousness. 

Of  all  nations  America,  perhaps,  has  the  cleanest 
record  in  her  international  dealings.  And  yet  in  the 
history  of  the  development  of  the  American  people 
there  was  a  period  when  the  national  slogan  was  "mani- 
fest destiny."  Only  seventy  years  ago  the  country 
resounded  with  such  cries  as : 

"Fifty-four  forty  or  fight!" 

"The  whole  of  Oregon  or  none  I" 

"The  Reoccupation  of  Oregon  and  Reannexation  of 
Texas!" 

It  was  the  "manifest  destiny"  of  the  American 
people  to  expand  westward  under  the  guidance  of  the 
star  of  empire.  In  that  westward  advance,  the  Amer- 
ican fathers  overcame  every  obstacle  that  lay  in  their 
path.  They  brought  under  their  control  territory 
after  territory,  sometimes  peacefully,  sometimes  by 
conquest,  until  their  empire  extended  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific,  and  from  Canada  to  Mexico.  It  was 
their  "manifest  destiny"  that  they  should  become  the 
masters  of  the  continent  and  extend  their  power  and 
authority  even  beyond  the  shores  of  the  Pacific.  Will 
you  permit  me  to  tell  you  how  America  annexed  Hawaii 
only  twenty-five  years  ago  ?  Says  Mr.  Wilson : 

"The  Hawaiian  Islands  were  subject  to  a  sovereign 
queen  whose  power  had  been  reduced  by  constitutional 
changes  to  the  merely  administrative  function  of  execu- 
ting the  laws  passed  by  a  representative  chamber,  to 
which,  and  not  to  herself,  her  ministers  were  respon- 
sible. Property  and  political  power  in  the  Islands  had, 
by  processes  which  seemed  to  change  the  very  character 
of  the  kingdom,  come  chiefly  into  the  hands  of  for- 
eigners; and  in  January,  1893,  the  queen  determined 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  229 

to  promulgate,  upon  her  own  sole  authority,  a  new 
constitution  which  should  deprive  them  of  the  suffrage 
and  bring  the  legislature  again  under  the  control  of 
the  crown.  The  foreigners  at  Honolulu,  the  capital, 
chiefly  Americans,  at  once  bestirred  themselves  to  de- 
feat her  purpose  and  get  the  government  into  their  own 
hands,  and  the  resident  minister  of  the  United  States 
lent  them  his  open  aid.  Marines  and  pieces  of  artillery 
were  ordered  on  shore  from  a  United  States  man-of- 
war  lying  in  the  harbor;  under  their  protection  a  revolu- 
tionary provisional  government  was  set  up  which  thrust 
the  queen  aside  'until  terms  of  union  with  the  United 
States  had  been  negotiated  and  agreed  upon*;  and  on 
the  16th  of  February,  1893,  but  a  little  more  than  two 
weeks  before  the  expiration  of  his  term  as  President, 
Mr.  Harrison  hurried  a  message  to  the  Senate  sub- 
mitting an  annexation  treaty,  and  recommending  its 
ratification.  Meanwhile,  on  the  9th  of  February,  the 
minister  of  the  United  States,  at  Honolulu,  acting  with- 
out instructions,  had  proclaimed  a  protectorate  of  the 
United  States  over  the  islands." 

If  that  was  the  "manifest  destiny"  of  America,  is 
it  not  equally  evident  that  Japan's  "manifest  destiny" 
lies  in  eastern  Asia?  Of  course  our  "manifest  destiny" 
must  have  a  different  meaning.  We  live  in  the  twentieth 
century.  The  sires  of  America  whose  slogan  was  "man- 
ifest destiny"  lived  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Between 
the  two  centuries  lies  a  vast  difference  in  national  and 
international  ideals. 

When  we  say  that  Japan's  "manifest  destiny"  lies 
in  eastern  Asia,  we  do  not  mean  that  we  must  extend 
our  territory  in  that  direction.  We  mean  nothing  but 
peaceful  economic  development,  dissociated  from  any 
desire  for  territorial  acquisition. 

Japan's  economic  relations  with  Manchuria  and  Si- 


230  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

beria  are  not  the  same  as  the  economic  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico,  for  example.  These 
great  United  States  have  everything  within  their  own 
territory.  They  are  self-supporting.  I  presume  the 
Americans  could  stay  at  home,  if  they  would,  and  still 
be  comfortable.  The  Japanese  could  not  stay  at  home 
even  if  they  would.  If  they  do  not  go  out  to  Man- 
churia or  Siberia  to  obtain  the  necessaries  of  life,  as 
well  as  the  materials  of  industry,  the  only  alternative 
will  be  their  gradual  decline  and  ultimate  suicide. 

Japan  proper  consists  of  four  main  islands,  compris- 
ing some  150,714  square  miles,  that  is,  25,000  square 
miles  less  than  the  area  of  California.  The  average 
density  of  these  islands  is  396.2  per  square  mile.  If 
we  leave  Hokkaido,  the  north  island,  out  of  considera- 
tion, the  density  increases  to  485.2.  Compare  this  with 
corresponding  figures  for  other  countries.  Belgium  has 
659  per  square  mile;  Holland,  474;  England,  370; 
Germany,  310;  Italy,  316;  France,  193;  the  United 
States,  25;  Canada,  2;  Australia,  1.5;  Siberia,  2;  South 
America,  7.  Some  of  the  European  countries  are  more 
densely  populated  than  Japan,  but  these  countries,  as 
well  as  others,  have  vast  colonies  which  either  offer 
room  for  surplus  population  at  home,  or  produce  raw 
material  to  feed  the  mills  and  factories  of  the  mother 
countries. 

The  actual  density  of  Japan  is  much  greater  than  the 
average  density,  because  the  country  consists  of  volcanic 
ranges  and  is  traversed  by  chains  of  high  mountains. 
According  to  the  investigations  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, mountains  occupy  52.86  per  cent  of  Japan's 
total  land  area.  The  balance  consists  of  35  per  cent 
for  agricultural  land,  2.58,  for  residential  land,  8.79, 
for  meadows  and  pastures.  What  wonder  that  Rudyard 
Kipling,  travelling  in  Japan  some  years  ago,  got  the 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  231 

impression  that  the  density  of  population  in  Japan  was 
2,256  per  square  mile! 

As  against  Japan's  35  per  cent  for  agricultural  land, 
Great  Britain  has  77.20  per  cent;  Italy,  75.25;  Ger- 
many, 64.84;  and  the  United  States,  46. 

The  limited  area  of  farm  land  in  Japan  has  neces- 
sitated the  most  intensive  cultivation.  In  Japan  the 
average  farming  land  per  capita  is  less  than  a  quarter 
of  an  acre,  as  against  5.5  acres  in  the  United  States. 
The  consequence  is  that  the  soil  of  Japan  is  on  the 
verge  of  exhaustion  and  that  the  stern  law  of  diminish- 
ing returns  has  long  since  begun  to  operate  in  spite  of 
the  most  painstaking  fertilizing  processes. 

But  the  lack  of  farming  land  and  overpopulation  are 
not  the  only  cause  of  Japan's  predicament,  for  she  has 
to  contend  with  another  disadvantage  which  is  equally 
serious — I  mean  the  lack  of  raw  materials  and  the  three 
essentials  of  modern  industry:  iron,  coal  and  petroleum. 
Japan  hopes  to  solve,  partly  at  least,  the  vexed  question 
of  overpopulation  by  becoming  a  great  industrial  and 
trading  nation.  But  in  becoming  an  industrial  nation 
she  must  have  raw  materials.  Unhappily,  Japan  is  the 
poorest  country  in  respect  of  the  supply  of  raw  material, 
especially  iron,  coal  and  petroleum. 

These,  in  short,  are  the  factors  which  go  to  make  u 
the  so-called  militarism  or  imperialism  of  Japan.     Cal 
it  what  you  will,  Japan's  national  desire  for  expansio 
is  based  upon  economic  necessity.     I  know  that  Japa 
has  her  military  clique  whose  power  and  influence  must 
be  curbed,  and  that  her  militarists  have  blundered  badly 
in  Siberia,  in  Korea,  in  Manchuria,  in  Shantung.     But 
we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  military  aggres- 
sion is  only  incidental  to  Japan's  popular  clamor  for 
economic  expansion.     The  militarists  know  that  the 
sixty  million  souls  of  Japan  are  worried  for  the  bread 


232  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

of  the  morrow,  and  that  they  see  the  only  alternative 
to  starvation  in  the  freedom  of  utilizing  the  yet  unex- 
ploited  resources  in  territories  lying  not  far  from  home. 
This  fear  of  starvation  may  have  been  exploited  by 
militarists,  but  to  denounce  Japan's  militarism,  without 
offering  any  solution  for  her  problem  of  life  and  death, 
is  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse.  You  may  destroy 
Japan's  military  faction,  but  the  popular  clamor  for 
a  breathing  space  and  elbow-room  will  continue  to  as- 
sert itself  in  ways  perhaps  no  less  dangerous  than  mili- 
tarism. So  in  dealing  with  Japan,  the  powers  must  con- 
sider her  most  vital  problems  with  sympathy  and  in  a 
conciliatory  spirit. 

If  anything  is  the  matter  with  Japan  in  Siberia, 
something  more  serious  is  the  matter  with  the  existing 
order  of  the  world.  Look  at  the  map,  and  study 
statistics.  Even  today  the  world  has  plenty  of  lands 
available  for  settlement.  Some  of  the  richest  terri- 
tories have  only  a  few  inhabitants  to  the  square  mile. 
Yet  none  of  these  countries  is  open  to  the  Japanese. 
Russia,  for  instance,  has  annexed  6,785,133  square 
miles  of  Asiatic  territories,  where  the  population  per 
square  mile  is  only  eight.  And  yet  even  Russia  is 
playing  the  dog  in  the  manger. 

Mr.  H.  G.  Wells,  apparently  racking  his  brain  to 
think  of  something  to  write  about  on  the  Conference, 
hits  upon  the  happy  idea  that  no  nation  has  the  right 
to  let  its  population  "slop  over"  (to  quote  Mr.  Wells) 
its  territorial  confines,  and  that  the  solution  of  Japan's 
population  problem  lies  in  the  gospel  of  Margaret 
Sanger ! 

An  excellent  idea!  But  "my  dear  Wells"  has  for- 
gotten that  England,  when  the  rate  of  increase  in  her 
population  was  highest,  not  only  permitted  but  en- 
couraged her  surplus  to  "slop  over"  the  British  Isles 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  233 

by  the  hundreds  of  thousands.  He  has  also  forgotten 
that  England  has  acquired  vast  colonies  totaling  12,- 
624,435  square  miles,  from  which  all  Asiatics  are  rig- 
idly excluded,  though  most  of  them  have  but  a  few 
people  to  the  square  miles. 

It  would  have  been  more  like  Mr.  Wells,  the  liberal, 
had  he  admitted  that  Japan's  population  problem  is 
but  an  aspect  of  the  broad  problem  of  the  inequitable 
distribution  of  land  among  the  nations.  He  should 
admit  that  the  empire  building  schemes  of  the  great 
Powers  of  the  West  is  mainly  responsible  for  the  pre- 
dicament of  a  growing  population  such  as  that  of  Japan. 

But  here's  good  news  for  Mr.  Wells.  Mrs.  Margaret 
Sanger  is  really  going  to  Japan  to  deliver  lectures !  And 
what  is  more  interesting,  the  invitation  came  from  a 
Japanese  magazine.  Surely  something  must  be  the 
matter  with  Japan ! 


CHAPTER   XXXIV 
CHITA   "ARRIVES" 

Washington,  January  iot  1922:  The  Armament  Con- 
ference has  brought  to  Washington  several  "uninvited 
delegations"  from  different  parts  of  the  world.  Of 
these  delegations,  that  representing  the  Chita  Govern- 
ment of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  has  attracted  a  great 
deal  of  attention  by  publishing  a  number  of  sensational 
diplomatic  documents  alleged  to  have  passed  between 
Japan  and  France.  Both  Tokyo  and  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
have  denied  their  authenticity,  and  in  no  uncertain  terms 
branded  them  as  fabrications. 

Reprehensible  as  these  tactics  are,  they  have  suc- 
ceeded in  compelling  the  indifferent  public  to  recognize 
that  there  existed  in  Siberia  such  a  thing  as  the  Chita 
Government.  Thanks  to  those  tactics,  characteristic, 
perhaps,  of  the  race  which  the  delegates  represent, 
Chita  has  unquestionably  "arrived"  in  the  mind  of 
many  an  American. 

Apart  from  this  incident,  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
furnishes  an  interesting  topic  of  study.  The  seat  of 
its  government  is  Chita,  Transbaikal  Province,  Siberia. 
Nominally  it  came  into  existence  in  September,  1920, 
after  a  conference  held  at  Chita  by  the  representatives 
of  the  Vladivostok,  Blagovestchensk,  and  Verkneudinsk 
Governments,  among  which  Far  Eastern  Siberia  had 
been  divided.  The  conference  formed  a  provisional 
government  as  a  step  towards  the  organization  of  a 

234 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  285 

permanent  government  to  be  called  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic. 

In  January,  1921,  the  Provisional  Government  held 
an  election  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  a  constituent 
assembly.  As  a  result  of  this  election,  an  assembly  sat 
at  Chita  in  February  and  adopted  a  constitution.  Thus 
the  Far  Eastern  Republic  became  officially  a  reality. 
According  to  the  constitution,  the  Republic  has  no 
functionary  which  corresponds  exactly  to  presidents  in 
other  republics.  The  government  may  be  said  to  con- 
sist of  a  National  Assembly  and  a  Council  of  seven 
members.  The  National  Assembly  elects  the  council 
of  seven  who  in  turn  elect  from  among  themselves  a 
Chairman,  who  presides  over  the  Council,  and  who  is, 
for  lack  of  a  better  term,  commonly  referred  to  in  for- 
eign countries  as  President  of  the  Far  Eastern  Repub- 
lic. Under  the  Council  are  eight  administrative  De- 
partments; namely:  Foreign  Affairs,  War,  Agriculture, 
Finance,  Home  Affairs,  Communication,  Education,  and 
Labor,  each  represented  by  a  secretary. 

The  Chita  Government  is  often  called  a  "Pink"  gov- 
ernment, because  it  is  considered  not  as  radical  as  the 
"Red"  Government  at  Moscow.  It  recognizes  private 
property,  except  in  the  case  of  land,  forest,  water,  and 
mines  which  belong  to  the  state.  But  it  believes  in  the 
state  control  of  banks,  factories,  and  mining  enterprises. 

Nominally  this  Government  controls  three  provinces 
in  eastern  Siberia.  They  are  Transbaikal,  Amur,  and 
Maritime  Province,  with  an  aggregate  area  of  659,000 
square  miles.  Since  last  May,  however,  Maritime 
Province,  266,000  square  miles  in  area,  has  seceded 
from  the  Republic,  and  has  been  controlled  by  a  seces- 
sionist government  set  up  in  Vladivostok  by  a  mod- 
erate Social  Democrat  named  S.  D.  Merkulov. 

To  explain  the  origin  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic, 


236  JAPAN'S   PACIFIC    POLICY 

we  must  go  back  to  the  fall  of  the  Kerensky  administra- 
tion in  1917.  From  the  chaos  that  prevailed  in  Siberia 
in  the  wake  of  that  political  upheaval  emerged  the 
figure  of  Admiral  Kolchak,  whose  military  successes 
offered  the  promise  of  a  unified  Russia  under  a  stable 
government.  By  the  fall  of  1918  Kolchak  had  become 
a  predominant  political  factor  in  western  Siberia,  and 
in  the  spring  of  1919  he  established  at  Omsk  the  so- 
called  All-Russia  Government. 

Upon  the  appearance  of  this  new  government  Amer- 
ica, as  well  as  the  other  allied  Powers,  was  inclined  to 
the  idea  that  it  might  become  a  unifying  force  in  Siberia. 
Consequently,  in  May,  1919,  the  five  allied  and  asso- 
ciated Powers  sent  a  joint  note  to  Kolchak,  promising 
support  to  his  efforts  for  the  unification  of  Russia.  In 
the  summer  of  the  same  year  Mr.  Roland  S.  Morris, 
the  American  ambassador  at  Tokyo,  was  instructed  to 
go  to  Omsk  to  investigate  the  real  status  of  the  Kolchak 
administration.  Ambassador  Morris  returned  to  Tokyo 
favorably  impressed  with  Kolchak  and  his  government. 

But  the  Kolchak  administration  was  destined  to  fall. 
The  Admiral  himself  may  have  been  an  honest  and 
well-meaning  man,  but  he  was  surrounded  by  arch- 
reactionaries  who  had  no  clear  conception  of  the  new 
era  which  had  dawned  upon  Russia  with  the  downfall  of 
the  Czarist  regime.  Baffled  by  the  Russian  enigma, 
the  allied  Powers  were,  however,  ready  to  seize  upon 
any  military  or  political  factor  which  they  thought  might 
serve  as  a  means  to  stabilize  conditions  in  Russia.  En- 
gland was  particularly  anxious  to  help  Kolchak.  By 
the  fall  of  1919,  Britain  had  sent  to  the  Kolchak  army 
200,000,000  cartridges.  Every  cartridge  which  the 
anti-Bolshevist  forces  in  Siberia  fired  in  the  summer  of 
1919  was  supplied  by  the  British  Government.  It  was 
estimated  that  England  had  supplied  Kolchak  with 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  237 

200,000  rifles,  300,000  pairs  of  boots,  200,000  com- 
plete sets  of  uniform,  500,000  hand  grenades,  70  can- 
non with  200,000  shells,  10,000  sets  of  harness  and 
saddlery,  400,000  blankets,  and  numerous  other  ma- 
terials. By  November,  1919,  however,  the  British 
Government  had  become  somewhat  chary  of  its  Siberian 
venture.  Speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  No- 
vember 17,  Premier  Lloyd  George  said: 

"There  are  countries  in  a  much  better  position  to 
help  Kolchak  than  we.  These  powers  are  next  door — 
they  are  in  the  alliance.  I  do  not  wish  to  be  considered 
as  criticising  them,  but  if  there  has  been  a  failure,  it  is 
not  our  failure." 

In  this  language  the  British  Premier  clearly  intimated 
that  Japan  and  America  should  shoulder  the  Siberian 
burden,  and  that  Britain  was  not  willing  to  go  on  any 
further  with  the  Siberian  undertaking. 

As  was  expected,  the  star  of  Kolchak  began  to  wane 
towards  the  fall  of  1919,  when  the  Red  forces  in  wes- 
tern Siberia  gained  the  upper  hand.  In  November, 
Omsk,  the  seat  of  his  government,  was  captured  by  the 
Reds,  Kolchak  fled  to  Irkutsk,  on  Lake  Baikal,  where 
he  managed  to  set  up  a  new  government.  Again  the 
rising  tide  of  the  Reds  overtook  him,  and  by  the  end 
of  December  his  political  and  military  power  com- 
pletely collapsed. 

By  this  time  the  American  Government  realized  the 
futility  of  trying  to  do  anything  for  Siberia,  and  saw 
the  wisdom  of  immediate  evacuation.  Consequently 
the  American  troops  were  ordered  home  in  March, 
1920.  The  American  evacuation  was  followed  by  the 
withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops  from  Transbaikal  and 
Amur  Provinces.  By  June,  1920,  Japan  completed  the 
evacuation  of  these  provinces  and  concentrated  her 
troops,  some  20,000  in  number,  within  a  radius  of  some 


238  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

150  miles  from  Vladivostok.  About  the  same  time 
Japan  changed  her  attitude  towards  the  Reds,  and  with- 
drew the  support  she  had  given  Semenov  and  Kharmi- 
kov  who  had  been  operating  against  the  Bolshevik 
forces. 

The  fall  of  Kolchak  was  followed  by  a  period  of 
chaos.  The  three  provinces  of  eastern  Siberia  were 
divided  among  as  many  governments.  For  Transbaikal 
Province  a  government  was  set  up  at  Verkneudinsk; 
for  Amur  Province,  at  Blagovestchensk;  and  for  Mari- 
time Province,  at  Vladivostok;  all  dominated  by  radi- 
cals of  the  Red  type. 

Meanwhile  Ataman  Semenov  was  conducting  desul- 
tory warfare  against  the  Reds  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Chita.  Shortly  before  the  downfall  of  Admiral  Kol- 
chak, Semenov  was  appointed  by  the  Admiral  com- 
mander-general of  the  anti-Bolshevist  forces  in  eastern 
Siberia.  But  the  Cossack  Ataman,  too,  met  the  samel 
fate  as  Kolchak,  and  was  overwhelmed  by  the  Red 
tide  which  had  risen  around  the  small  territory  in  which 
he  was  operating.  Early  in  September,  1920,  Semenov 
fled  from  Chita  in  an  airplane,  and  eventually  sought 
refuge  in  Port  Arthur.  That  was  practically  the  end 
of  the  checkered  career  of  the  picturesque  Cossack 
leader.  When  the  conservative  Merkulov  Government 
was  set  up  in  Vladivostok  last  May,  Semenov  went  there 
hoping  that  he  would  be  heartily  welcomed  by  Merku- 
lov. He  had  to  charter  a  steamer  for  the  trip,  because 
no  Japanese  steamer  would  accommodate  him  for  fear 
that  he  might  be  involved  in  trouble  with  the  Vladi- 
vostok authorities.  As  was  expected,  Sernenov  met 
with  a  cold  reception.  Soon  he  left  Vladivostok  and 
went  to  Shanghai  or  Tientsin.  Now  that  Japan  re- 
fuses to  support  him,  he  will  become  an  anti-Japanese 
propagandist  to  give  vent  to  his  grudge. 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  239 

Up  to  the  spring  of  1921,  Japan  had  been  acting 
upon  the  principle  that  the  Bolsheviki  were  her  enemy. 
Her  military  measures  had  been  taken  with  that  point 
in  view.  By  the  summer  of  that  year,  however,  the 
Japanese  authorities  had  gradually  changed  their  atti- 
tude. They  had  come  to  recognize  a  certain  power  of 
stability  in  the  "Pink"  government  at  Chita.  Thus 
the  Japanese  determination  of  driving  the  Bolsheviki 
from  eastern  Siberia  gradually  changed  to  the  com- 
promising policy  of  recognizing  certain  radical  elements 
in  Siberia.  The  only  elements  which  seemed  to  offer 
a  promise  of  a  stable  government  were  those  at  Chita. 

As  the  result  of  this  modified  Japanese  attitude,  a 
conference  between  the  Tokyo  and  Chita  representa- 
tives was  opened  last  August  at  Dairen,  South  Man- 
churia. At  this  conference,  Japan  is  reported  to  be  urg- 
ing Chita  to  make  "peace"  on  these  terms: 

1.  Japan  will  seek  no  special  privileges  in  Siberia, 
and  the  Chita  Government  will  undertake  to  observe 
the  principles  of  equal  opportunity  in  commerce  and 
industry  for  all  nations. 

2.  The  Chita  Government  will  undertake  to  abolish 
various  harmful  administrative  practices  which  have 
been  prevailing  at  Vladivostok,  and  which  have  proved 
a  great  obstacle  to  the  trade  of  that  port. 

3.  The  Chita  Government  will  assure  Japan  that  it 
will  undertake  to  guarantee  the  safety  of  lives  and 
property  in  eastern  Siberia. 

4.  The    formidable    fortifications    at    Vladivostok, 
which  are  obviously  directed  against  Japan,  shall  be 
materially  decreased,  thus  removing  a  serious  menace 
to  Japan. 

5.  The  Chita  Government  will  promise  not  to  carry 
Bolshevist  propaganda    into   Korea    or   the   Japanese 
zone  in  South  Manchuria. 

6.  The   Chita   Government   shall   assume   responsi- 


240  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

bility  for  the  massacre  of  700  Japanese,  including  the 
Japanese  Consul,  at  Nikolaievsk  in  March,  1920. 

7.  If  the  Chita  Government  pledges  itself  to  under- 
take the  tasks  above  mentioned  Japan  will  withdraw 
all  troops  without  delay. 

The  latest  advices  from  Dairen  indicate  that  the 
conference  may  yet  reach  an  agreement.  The  chief 
difficulty  now  seems  to  center  upon  the  Japanese  occu- 
pation of  northern  Saghalien  which  was  undertaken  as 
the  result  of  the  Nikolaievsk  massacre  of  March,  1920. 
Undoubtedly,  Japan  is  now  insisting  that  the  Chita 
Government  shall  shoulder  the  responsibility  for  that 
incident  and  agree  upon  a  plan  of  settlement  before  she 
will  remove  her  troops  from  Saghalien. 

The  chief  obstacle  to  the  Chita  Government  is  the 
secession  of  Maritime  Province,  which  deprives  the 
Far  Eastern  Republic  of  the  all-important  port  of 
Vladivostok,  the  key  to  Siberia.  When  the  Chita  Gov- 
ernment was  organized  a  year  ago,  it  sent  to  Vladivos- 
tok a  man  named  Antonov  as  its  representative.  But 
last  May  the  Antonov  administration  at  Vladivostok 
was  overthrown  by  S.  D.  Merkulov,  a  lawyer,  who 
called  himself  a  moderate  Social  Democrat.  Merku- 
lov was  supported  by  the  Kappel  forces,  a  part  of  what 
was  left  of  the  Kolchak  army.  The  radicals  who  were 
ousted  by  Merkulov  did  not  fail  to  blame  the  Japanese 
for  their  downfall.  They  asserted  that  the  Japanese 
commander  secretly  aided  the  conservative  leader  and 
thus  enabled  him  to  defeat  their  government.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Japanese  military  authorities  in  Vladi- 
vostok emphatically  stated  that  they  maintained  a  strict 
neutrality  in  the  conflict  and  that  their  entire  interest 
was  in  the  preservation  of  law  and  order. 

Nevertheless  the  feeling  seems  to  be  universal  both 
among  the  Russians  and  among  the  Japanese  at  Vladi- 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  241 

vostok  that  the  Merkulov  Government  will  not  be  able 
to  stand  once  the  Japanese  troops  are  withdrawn.  Its 
existence  is  made  possible  by  the  peace  and  order  main- 
tained by  the  Japanese.  The  Bolsheviki  and  other 
radical  elements  are  acquiescing  in  the  new  administra- 
tion mainly  because  of  the  presence  of  the  Japanese 
troops.  It  is,  therefore,  but  natural  that  the  Chita 
Government  should  denounce  the  Japanese  troops.  It 
is  the  avowed  intention  of  Chita  to  destroy  the  present 
conservative  government  at  Vladivostok  and  install  in 
its  place  a  radical  government  which  will  faithfully 
represent  the  Far  Eastern  Republic. 

Another  obstacle  to  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  is  the 
increasing  control  by  the  Chinese  authorities  of  the 
Russian  line  called  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  which 
runs  through  Manchuria  and  links  Chita  with  the  Pacific 
metropolis  of  Vladivostok.  Since  the  fall  of  the  Ker- 
ensky  Government  this  railroad,  some  900  miles  long, 
has  gradually  passed  under  Chinese  control.  The  Rus- 
sians have  been  accusing  the  Chinese  railway  authorities 
of  mismanagement,  corruption,  and  discrimination.  Of 
this  railway  I  shall  have  more  to  say,  for  the  Confer- 
ence is  now  considering  it. 


CHAPTER   XXXV 
SHIDEHARA  TAKES  } THE   OFFENSIVE 

Washington,  January  33,  1922:  Baron  Shidehara, 
the  Japanese  delegate,  took  the  Siberian  bull  by  the 
horns  today  and  put  Japan's  case  in  Siberia  squarely 
before  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  before  any  other 
delegation  brought  out  the  question.  It  was  good 
strategy.  For  the  first  time  the  Japanese  have  taken 
the  offensive.  A  similar  course  should  have  been  fol- 
lowed with  regard  to  China,  as  I  argued  in  my  letter 
of  December  30. 

Baron  Shidehara  recapitulates  the  history  of  the 
allied  military  action  in  Siberia,  and  states  that  at  pres- 
ent no  part  of  Siberia  is  under  Japanese  "military  occu- 
pation." Although  Japanese  troops  are  still  stationed 
in  the  southern  part  of  Maritime  Province,  they  have 
nowhere  set  up  any  civil  or  military  administration  to 
displace  the  local  authorities.  These  troops  will  be 
retained  pending  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  now 
going  on  at  Dairen.  In  Baron  Shidehara's  language, 
those  negotiations  have  "in  view  the  conclusion  of  pro- 
visional commercial  arrangements,  the  removal  of  the 
existing  menace  to  the  security  of  Japan  and  to  the  lives 
and  property  of  Japanese  residents  in  eastern  Siberia, 
the  provision  of  guarantees  for  the  freedom  of  lawful 
undertakings  in  that  region,  and  the  prohibition  of  Bol- 
shevist propaganda  over  the  Siberian  border.  Should 
adequate  provisions  be  arranged  on  the  lines  indicated 
the  Japanese  Government  will  at  once  proceed  to  the 

242 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  243 

complete  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops  from  Mari- 
time Province." 

In  the  case  of  Saghalien,  the  Japanese  delegate 
makes  exception  to  the  above  statement.  He  says  that 
Japan  will  occupy  certain  points  on  that  island,  pending 
the  "establishment  of  a  responsible  authority  with 
whom  Japan  can  communicate  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining due  satisfaction"  for  the  massacre  of  700  Japa- 
nese by  Russians  at  Nikolaievsk  in  the  spring  of  1920. 

Such,  in  short,  is  the  Japanese  official  view  of  the 
Siberian  situation.  (See  Appendix  XIII,  A.)  But  a 
historian's  point  of  view  is  somewhat  different.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  Japanese  public  opinion  has  been 
almost  unanimous  in  opposing  the  Siberian  policy  of 
the  Government.  Since  last  August,  the  Foreign  Office 
at  Tokyo  has  been  negotiating  with  the  Chita  Govern- 
ment, with  a  view  to  obtaining  some  sort  of  a  pledge 
for  the  guarantee  of  life  and  property  in  Siberia.  But 
the  Japanese  press  believes  that  the  attitude  of  the  For- 
eign Office  is  wrong.  In  the  opinion  of  the  newspaper, 
Japan  should  withdraw  her  troops  without  exacting  any 
pledge  from  the  Far  Eastern  Republic.  For  what  is 
the  Chita  Government  after  all?  Is  it  in  a  position  to 
guarantee  the  security  of  foreign  lives  and  property? 
It  is  not  sure  whether  it  can  protect  itself.  No  one 
knows  how  long  that  government  is  going  to  last.  What 
is  the  use  of  obtaining  any  pledge  from  such  a  shaky 
government?  This,  in  short,  is  the  general  attitude  of 
the  Japanese  press. 

The  Government  at  Tokyo  is  in  a  very  awkward 
position.  It  knows  that  the  Siberian  expedition  has 
been  a  failure,  but  it  is  afraid  to  decide  upon  evacua- 
tion without  obtaining  some  plausible  promise  from  the 
Siberian  Government,  which  will  enable  it  to  go  before 
the  people  and  tell  them  that  the  expedition  has  ao 


244  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

complished  its  purpose  The  Conference  at  Dairen, 
from  the  non-official  Japanese  point  of  view,  has  been 
arranged  mainly  for  political  effect  at  home. 

The  Chita  Government,  instead  of  giving  Japan  the 
pledge  which  it  can  afford  to  give,  has  followed  a  mis- 
taken course.  It  was  the  height  of  folly  on  the  part  of 
the  Chita  delegation  at  Washington  to  publish  the  ob- 
viously fabricated  documents  alleged  to  have  passed 
between  France  and  Japan,  because  such  acts  will  not 
only  alienate  the  sympathy  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Powers  associated  with  it,  but  will  make  the  Japa- 
nese militarists  all  the  more  stubborn,  thus  deferring 
to  a  more  distant  date  the  Japanese  evacuation  of 
Siberia. 

In  retrospect  the  interallied  Siberian  expedition  is 
an  extremely  interesting  subject  of  study.  Of  course 
Japan  blundered  most,  but  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  are  not  free  from  mistakes.  From  the  begin- 
ning, the  Siberian  policies  of  the  Powers  have  been 
vacillating,  uncertain,  and  feeble.  Japan  is  probably 
the  only  country  which  has  followed  a  consistent  policy, 
even  though  that  policy  was  based  upon  a  mistaken  idea. 
Japan's  primary  purpose  in  the  Siberian  expedition 
was  to  oppose  the  spread  of  Bolshevism  and  to  re- 
store law  and  order,  and  she  has  consistently  pur- 
sued that  policy.  But  Bolshevism  is  an  ideal,  an  intan- 
gible thing,  whose  spread  cannot  be  prevented  by  a 
"sanitary  cordon1*  formed  by  the  guns  of  soldiers.  The 
best  way  to  prevent  its  propagation  in  Japanese  terri- 
tories would  be  to  recall  Japanese  soldiers  from  Siberi- 
an soil  and  expend  the  money  thus  saved  on  necessary 
internal  reform  both  in  Korea  and  in  Japan.  As  for 
the  restoration  of  law  and  order  in  Siberia,  Japan  cer- 
tainly is  not  in  a  position  to  undertake  such  an  inter- 
minable task  at  the  sacrifice  of  countless  treasure.  No 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN   VENTURE  245 

one  can  tell  how  long  the  present  state  of  chaos  and 
disintegration  in  Siberia  will  continue,  and  Japanese 
public  opinion  will  not  permit  our  troops  to  remain 
there  indefinitely. 

The  history  of  Siberian  intervention  may  be  briefly 
told.  Towards  the  end  of  January,  1918,  the  world 
began  to  talk  about  possible  intervention  in  Siberia.  It 
was  rumored  at  that  time  that  the  Japanese  foreign 
minister  informally  consulted  the  British,  American  and 
French  Governments  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  their 
attitude  towards  the  Siberian  situation  which  had  be- 
come extremely  dangerous  by  reason  of  the  downfall  of 
the  Kerensky  Government  and  the  appearance  of  the 
Bolshevist  regime.  France  immediately  responded  in 
favor  of  intervention.  In  the  judgment  of  the  Quai 
d'Orsay,  intervention  was  not  only  Japan's  right  but 
her  duty.  England,  though  somewhat  undecided,  was 
favorably  inclined  towards  intervention.  President 
Wilson,  on  the  other  hand,  could  not  see  his  way  to 
agree  with  the  French  and  British  foreign  offices  on 
this  question.  In  March,  1918,  Mr.  Wilson  addressed 
a  note  to  the  Japanese  Government  setting  forth  his 
view  on  the  Siberian  question. 

In  the  meantime,  anti-Bolshevik  Russians  throughout 
Siberia  appealed  to  Japan  for  aid.  In  their  judgment  a 
vigorous  intervention,  backed  by  a  strong  army,  was  the 
only  salvation  for  Siberia.  Certain  elements  in  the  re- 
sponsible quarters  in  Japan  were  undoubtedly  inclined 
to  lend  ear  to  this  appeal.  This  attitude  of  the  Japa- 
nese was  evidently  strengthened  by  the  ascendancy 
which  the  Bolsheviki  were  gaining  in  Eastern  Siberia. 
It  was  reported  that  the  Soviet  Government  at  Moscow 
had  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  German  General 
Staff,  promising  to  send  Russian  agitators  and  agents 
of  destruction  out  of  Vladivostok  and  to  the  ports  of 


246  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

the  United  States,  Japan  and  the  British  colonies.  They 
had  also  agreed  to  ship  across  Siberia  three  submarines 
in  parts,  to  be  put  together  at  Vladivostok,  and  em- 
ployed in  the  Pacific  for  the  detriment  of  allied  ship- 
ping. That  these  rumors  were  well  founded  was  later 
proven  by  the  evidence  made  public  by  the  American 
Committee  on  Public  Information  on  September  14, 
1918.  To  make  the  situation  worse,  the  Bolsheviki 
were  everywhere  fraternizing  with  German  and  Aus- 
trian prisoners  of  war  whom  they  had  released.  East 
of  Lake  Baikal  they  were  fighting  against  General 
Semenov,  the  leader  of  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  in 
Eastern  Siberia.  The  number  of  liberated  war  prison- 
ers in  that  region  was  estimated  variously  at  between 
30,000  and  60,000. 

All  these  conditions  intensified  Japanese  fear  of  the 
Bolshevist  advance  towards  the  Pacific.  By  May,  1918, 
the  British  and  French  Governments  recognized  more 
clearly  than  ever  the  necessity  of  an  intervention.  Pres- 
ident Wilson  was  also  compelled  to  see  the  danger  that 
was  developing  in  Siberia.  By  June  Mr.  Wilson  had 
entirely  changed  his  mind  on  the  Siberian  question  and 
took  the  initiative  to  negotiate  with  Japan  for  an  allied 
intervention  or  military  action.  He  found  a  plausible 
reason  for  intervention  in  the  appearance  of  a  large 
number  of  Czecho-Slovaks  who  had  deserted  the  Aus- 
trian army  and  were  forcing  their  way  through  Siberia 
in  an  effort  to  reach  Vladivostok.  The  rescue  of  these 
Czecho-Slovaks  was  the  primary  reason  attributed  by 
Mr.  Wilson  to  the  allied  action.  On  August  3,  the 
American  Government,  having  arrived  at  an  agreement 
with  the  Government  at  Tokyo,  issued  a  statement 
defining  its  attitude  towards  Siberia.  The  statement 
said: 

"As  the  Government  of  the  United  States  sees  the 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  247 

present  circumstances,  military  action  is  admissible  in 
Russia  now  only  to  render  such  protection  and  help 
as  is  possible  to  the  Czecho-Slovaks  against  the  armed 
Austrian  and  German  prisoners  who  are  attacking  them, 
and  to  steady  any  efforts  at  self-government  or  self- 
defense  in  which  the  Russians  themselves  may  be  will- 
ing to  accept  assistance.  .  .  . 

"In  taking  this  action,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  wishes  to  announce  to  the  people  of  Russia  in 
the  most  public  and  solemn  manner  that  it  contemplates 
no  interference  with  the  political  sovereignty  of  Russia, 
no  intervention  in  her  internal  affairs — not  even  in  the 
local  affairs  of  the  limited  areas  which  her  military 
force  may  be  obliged  to  occupy — and  no  impairment  of 
her  territorial  integrity,  either  now  or  hereafter,  but 
that  what  we  are  about  to  do  has  as  its  single  and  only 
object  the  rendering  of  such  aid  as  shall  be  acceptable 
to  the  Russian  people  themselves  in  their  endeavors  to 
regain  control  of  their  own  affairs,  their  own  territory, 
and  their  own  destiny." 

On  the  same  date  the  Japanese  Government  also 
issued  a  statement  conveying  much  the  same  message 
as  was  contained  in  the  American  statement.  The 
Japanese  note  said: 

"In  adopting  this  course,  the  Japanese  Government 
remain  constant  in  their  desire  to  promote  relations  of 
enduring  friendship,  and  they  reaffirm  their  avowed 
policy  of  respecting  the  territorial  integrity  of  Russia, 
and  of  abstaining  from  all  interference  in  her  internal 
politics.  They  further  declare  that  upon  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  objects  above  indicated  they  will  immediately 
withdraw  all  Japanese  troops  from  Russian  territory, 
and  will  leave  wholly  unimpaired  the  sovereignty  of 
Russia  in  all  its  phases,  whether  political  or  military." 

As  the  result  of  the   agreement  reached  between 


248  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Japan  and  America  the  first  contingent  of  allied  forces 
landed  at  Vladivostok  on  August  10,  1918,  and  was 
received  with  great  enthusiasm  by  the  Russians.  But 
this  enthusiasm  soon  faded  and  in  its  place  a  feeling  of 
disappointment,  suspicion,  and  fear  began  to  assert 
itself. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 
JAPAN'S   DISCORD   WITH   AMERICA 

Washington,  January  25,  1922:  The  Chita  Govern- 
ment holds  the  American  Government  partly  respon- 
sible for  the  continued  stay  of  Japanese  troops  on  Si- 
berian soil.  On  April  10,  1921,  the  National  Assembly 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  addressed  a  note  to  the 
American  Government,  arguing  that  the  United  States 
was  under  obligation  to  compel  the  withdrawal  of  Japa- 
nese soldiers  simultaneously  with  American  evacuation. 

Upon  receipt  of  this  note,  the  State  Department 
ordered  Dr.  Abbott  and  Colonel  Davis,  the  commercial 
and  the  military  attache,  respectively,  of  the  American 
Embassy  at  Tokyo,  to  proceed  to  Chita  and  investigate 
the  real  status  of  the  new  Republic.  The  American 
mission  was  most  cordially  received  by  the  authorities 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  who  hoped  that  American 
recognition  would  soon  follow.  Upon  their  return  to 
Washington,  Dr.  Abbott  and  Colonel  Davis  submitted 
to  the  State  Department  a  report  which  is  said  to  be 
very  favorable  to  Chita.  And  yet  no  step  has  been 
taken  by  the  American  Government. 

In  the  eyes  of  the  Chita  Government,  the  American 
initiative  taken  in  the  organization  of  the  interallied 
expedition  imposes  upon  America  the  responsibility  of 
ending  that  expedition,  not  independently  of,  but  con- 
currently with,  her  allies  and  associates  interested  in 
the  undertaking.  But  in  January,  1920,  the  American 
Government,  without  consulting  Japan,  suddenly  de- 

249 


250  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

cided  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Siberia,  and  ty 
March  the  American  soldiers  had  actually  left  tha 
country.  Had  the  Washington  Government  takei 
Japan  into  confidence  and  conferred  with  her  frankb 
and  earnestly,  as  it  did  in  the  summer  of  1918,  a  com 
plete  and  simultaneous  evacuation  in  the  spring  of  192( 
might  have  been  possible.  Such  a  course  might  hav< 
delayed  evacuation  for  a  few  months,  but  the  end  woul< 
have  fully  justified  the  delay. 

Perhaps  the  American  failure  to  consult  Japan  01 
this  important  matter  was  a  case  of  tit  for  tat.  W> 
recall  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  allied  intervention 
Japan  failed  to  enter  into  clear  understanding  witl 
America  in  sending  to  Siberia  an  army  very  much  large 
than  had  been  agreed  upon  between  the  two  govern 
ments.  From  that  time  on,  harmony  between  the  Japa 
nese  and  American  armies  in  Siberia  was  conspicuou 
mainly  by  its  absence.  To  understand  the  real  cause  fo 
this  discord  we  must  note  the  fundamental  differenc 
between  the  American  and  Japanese  conceptions  of  th 
intervention. 

From  the  beginning,  the  American  idea  of  the  Sibe 
rian  undertaking  was  different  from  that  of  the  Japa 
nese.  The  Americans  believed  that  they  had  nothing  t< 
do  with  the  internal  political  conditions  of  Russia  an< 
that  they  were  not  in  Siberia  to  attack  Bolshevism  o 
the  Bolsheviki.  On  the  contrary  the  Japanese  soldier 
believed,  or  were  made  to  believe,  that  the  Bolshevik 
were  their  enemies  and  that  they  were  sent  to  Siberi; 
to  combat  Bolshevism.  On  the  whole,  the  America! 
attitude  was  wise  and  right. 

To  the  Russians,  however,  neither  the  Japanese  no 
the  American  attitude  was  satisfactory.  We  must  re 
member  that  there  were  and  are  two  classes  of  Russians 
one  strongly  opposed  to  Bolshevism,  and  the  othe 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  251 

either  entirely  identified  with  or  sympathetic  towards  it. 
The  American  policy  did  not  please  those  Russians  who 
were  opposed  to  Bolshevism  and  who  expected  the  allied 
forces  to  carry  on  a  vigorous  military  campaign  against 
the  Bolshevist  forces.  To  these  Russians  the  American 
soldiers  appeared  unduly  friendly  and  sympathetic 
towards  the  Bolsheviki.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
conservative  elements  in  Siberia  were  not  only  disap- 
pointed but  became  somewhat  antagonistic  towards  the 
Americans. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  soldiers  invited  the 
hostility  of  the  radical  elements,  although  they  were 
kindly  received  by  the  conservatives.  On  several  oc- 
casions the  Japanese  attacked  what  they  believed  to  be 
Bolshevist  forces,  while  the  Americans  never  attacked 
them.  The  hostility  of  the  Bolsheviki  towards  the 
Japanese  army  manifested  itself  at  various  times  in  a 
deplorable  manner.  The  most  notable  example  is  the 
annihilation  of  250  Japanese  soldiers  on  February  26, 
1919,  at  a  small  village  called  Yufuka  in  the  Amur 
district.  On  such  occasions  the  American  soldiers  failed 
to  cooperate  with  the  Japanese.  Although  plausible 
official  explanations  were  offered  for  such  failures,  the 
real  and  fundamental  reason  was  in  the  difference  be- 
tween the  American  and  the  Japanese  attitude  towards 
the  Bolsheviki. 

As  the  Japanese  idea  of  the  intervention  was  the 
preservation  of  law  and  order  in  Siberia,  the  Japanese 
Government,  or  at  least  the  military  wing  of  it,  was  not 
in  entire  accord  with  the  American  Government  in 
regard  to  the  number  of  troops  to  be  sent  to  Siberia. 
The  American  proposal  limited  the  number  to  8,000 
each  for  Japan  and  America.  Thus  in  August,  1918, 
America  sent  the  Twenty-Seventh  and  Thirty-First  Reg- 
iments and  established  headquarters  at  Vladivostok  and 


252  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

at  Habarovsk.  Japan  sent  the  Twelfth  Division,  which 
established  its  headquarters  at  Habarovsk. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  the  situation  in  Trans- 
baikal  Province  became  so  ominous  that  the  Japanese 
Government  thought  it  imperative  to  send  two  more 
divisions  in  that  direction.  In  the  judgment  of  the 
Japanese  Government,  this  was  justifiable  by  reason  of 
her  geographical  proximity  to  the  regions  disturbed  by 
the  Bolsheviki  and  the  German  and  Austrian  prisoners 
of  war  who  had  been  set  free  by  the  Russian  revolution. 
Thus,  in  the  fall  of  1918,  the  Seventh  Division  of  the 
Japanese  army  established  itself  at  Manchuli,  while  the 
Third  Division  was  stationed  at  Chita.  By  the  end  of 
the  year,  Japan  had  70,000  soldiers  in  Siberia  and  Man- 
churia. As  late  as  September  15,  1919,  Mr.  Baker, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  told  the  military  committee  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  that  there  were  at  that 
time  60,000  Japanese  troops  in  Siberia  as  against  8,477 
Americans,  1,429  British,  1,400  Italians,  and  1,076 
French. 

America  was  wise  in  recalling  her  troops  as  soon  as 
she  found  that  the  Siberians  were  getting  tired  of  for- 
eign intervention.  Had  the  Americans  stayed  in  Si- 
beria they  would  have  become  just  as  unpopular  as  the 
Japanese.  In  fact  the  popularity  of  American  troops 
lasted  only  for  six  or  seven  months  after  their  appear- 
ance in  Siberia.  As  they  settled  down  for  the  winter 
with  no  enemy  to  fight  and  without  any  particular  work 
to  do,  they  fretted  and  chafed  and  became  unruly.  That 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  Russian  revulsion.  As  early 
as  March,  1919,  the  Associated  Press  reported  from 
Vladivostok  that  the  newspapers  were  full  of  tirades 
and  distortions  of  facts  calculated  to  sow  discord 
among  Americans,  Russians  and  their  allies.  The  re- 
port continued : 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  253 

"Diatribes  have  been  received  in  silence  and  as  a 
consequence  the  loyal  friends  of  the  United  States 
among  the  Russians  are  wavering.  The  silence  and  do- 
nothing  policy  of  the  Americans  is  plainly  getting  on  the 
nerves  of  the  Russians.  France  and  England  have  few 
troops  here  and  these  are  not  actively  engaged,  but  their 
commissioners  are  visiting  and  counselling  the  Omsk 
Government,  with  the  result  that  they  are  being  credited 
with  being  the  best  friends  of  Russia.  The  Japanese 
are  regarded  as  having  rendered  positive  service  in  a 
military  way.  Only  the  Americans,  to  whom  the  Rus- 
sians looked  for  help  and  sympathy,  are  considered 
to  have  failed,  not  because  of  their  failure  to  send  more 
troops,  but  for  lack  of  moral  and  material  support,  such 
as  other  nations  are  giving." 

In  May,  1919,  the  All-Russia  Government,  estab- 
lished in  Omsk,  requested  Major  General  Graves,  the 
American  commander,  not  to  send  American  troops 
farther  into  the  interior  of  Siberia  than  they  were  at 
that  time.  The  Omsk  Government  stated  in  effect  that 
this  was  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  what  was  left 
of  friendly  relations  with  America,  thus  plainly  inti- 
mating that  the  advance  of  American  soldiers  was  not 
desired.  The  Omsk  note  read  in  part  as  follows: 

"The  attitude  of  the  Washington  Government  is 
being  used  by  certain  political  groups  to  create  discord 
among  the  Russian  people  and  thus  weaken  this  govern- 
ment. It  ought  to  be  said  that  every  Russian  is  con- 
cerning himself  with  the  question  of  the  attitude  of 
Americans  towards  Bolshevism,  and  it  is  the  most  demo- 
cratic element  of  the  people  here  who  are  opposed  to 
the  troops  advancing  farther." 

As  the  days  passed  Russian  sentiment  towards  the 
American  troops  became  worse.  In  August,  1919,  the 
Golos  Primoria,  a  liberal  organ  in  Vladivostok,  minced 


254  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

no  words  in  expressing  displeasure  towards  American 
policy.  "After  a  year  of  intervention  in  Siberia,"  it 
said,  "Washington  does  not  understand  the  trend  of 
events  now  going  on  in  Siberia."  Continuing  this  news- 
paper assailed  the  American  Government  in  the  follow- 
ing vehement  language : 

"The  American  Government  means  only  Admiral 
Kolchak's  armies  when  speaking  of  the  negotiations 
carried  on  for  the  purchase,  by  the  American  Secretary 
of  War,  of  drugs  and  other  goods  necessary  for  the 
Red  Cross.  In  short,  the  American  Government  is 
fixing  up  a  separate  Siberian  state  and  a  separate  Sibe- 
rian people,  while  it  has  no  power  or  right  to  do  so. 
We  understand  perfectly  well  this  policy  of  Washing- 
ton. //  is  a  policy  to  divide  and  dismember  Russia 
into  sections,  a  policy  which  American  official  circles 
carry  on  with  extraordinary  stubbornness." 

These  quotations  sufficiently  show  which  way  the 
wind  was  blowing  in  Siberia.  Note  how  similar  these 
denunciations  are  to  those  now  directed  against  the 
Japanese.  The  Americans  had  the  wit  to  see  that  it 
was  futile  for  them  to  remain  in  that  country.  They 
had  come  to  know  that  any  further  delay  of  evacuation 
would  simply  develop  bitter  feelings  among  the  Rus- 
sians in  Far  Eastern  Asia.  The  consequence  was  the 
American  withdrawal  of  March,  1920. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  Japan  blundered  badly 
when  she  failed  to  evacuate  Siberia  at  the  same  time  as 
the  American  withdrawal.  Had  the  Japanese  troops 
left  Siberia  at  that  time  the  Government  at  Tokyo 
could  have  told  the  public  that  the  action  was  taken 
after  full  consultation  with  the  American  Government, 
thus  disarming  the  press  and  the  public,  which  were 
exceedingly  censorious  towards  the  Siberian  policy  of 
the  Government. 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  255 

Soon  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  American  troops, 
however,  Japan  decided  to  evacuate  Transbaikal 
and  Amur  Province.  By  the  end  of  May,  1920,  all  the 
Japanese  forces  in  those  regions  were  recalled.  Even 
Habarovsk,  an  important  center  of  communication  on 
the  junction  of  the  Amur  and  Ussuri  rivers,  was  evacu- 
ated. Thus  the  Japanese  troops,  some  20,000  in  num- 
ber, were  concentrated  within  a  radius  of  some  150 
miles  from  Vladivostok. 

In  the  meantime  public  opinion  in  Japan  had  been 
growing  stronger  in  favor  of  complete  evacuation.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  unfortunate  incident  which  took 
place  in  Nikolaievsk  on  March  13,  1920,  the  Japanese 
Government  might  have  been'  compelled  to  heed  this 
growing  public  sentiment.  But  the  Nikolaievsk  inci- 
dent in  which  700  Japanese,  including  the  Japanese 
Consul,  were  most  cruelly  murdered  by  an  army  of 
Russian  desperadoes,  furnished  the  Japanese  militarists 
with  a  new  pretext  for  the  continued  stay  of  Japanese 
troops  in  Siberia.  The  Japanese  militarists  blame  the 
Bolsheviki  for  the  incident.  But  it  is  difficult  to  ascer- 
tain whether  those  desperadoes  were  Bolsheviki.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Russian  radicals  claim  that  the 
Nikolaievsk  massacre  was  due  to  a  scheme  deliberately 
concocted  by  the  Japanese  agents  of  provocation.  The 
Japanese  Government,  of  course,  vigorously  refutes 
such  insinuations  and  argues  that  the  Japanese  in  Niko- 
laievsk had  done  nothing  to  provoke  the  Bolsheviki. 
When  the  incident  took  place,  the  Japanese  militarists 
did  not  fail  to  take  the  opportunity  to  exaggerate  the 
horrors  of  Bolshevist  agitation,  and  picture  the  immi- 
nent danger  of  a  hostile  influence  menacing  Japan  across 
a  narrow  sea.  At  any  rate  the  Japanese  Government 
decided  not  only  to  leave  the  soldiers  in  the  Vladivos- 


256  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

tok  region,  but  also  to  occupy  the  northern  part  of 
Saghalien. 

The  Siberian  expedition  has  been  a  great  fiasco  for 
which  all  the  allied  nations  must  be  blamed.  It  was 
a  great  mistake  to  send  any  expedition  at  all.  America 
should  have  stood  firm  upon  her  original  stand,  refus- 
ing to  subscribe  to  any  idea  of  intervention.  When  the 
American  Government  changed  its  mind  in  the  summer 
of  1918,  it  committed  a  most  deplorable  blunder.  Of 
course  England  blundered  just  as  badly  as  Japan  and 
the  United  States.  It  was  British  policy  which  set  up 
the  Kolchak  government  at  Omsk.  To  further  that 
policy  Britain  supplied  Kolchak  with  money  and  muni- 
tions. 

It  would  have  been  a  good  thing  for  Japan  if  the 
Conference  had  adopted  a  resolution  with  a  view  to 
facilitating  the  complete  evacuation  of  Siberia.  Such 
a  resolution  should  of  course  have  been  couched  in  very 
diplomatic  language  so  as  not  to  hurt  the  susceptibilities 
of  the  Japanese.  I  am  certain  that  Japanese  public  opin- 
ion would  have  welcomed  such  a  resolution,  even  though 
it  might  have  been  resented  by  Japanese  militarists. 


CHAPTER   XXXVII 
THE   IRONY   OF   FATE 

Washington,  January  24,  1922:  Today  Mr.  Hughes, 
on  behalf  of  the  American  delegation,  responded  to  the 
statement  made  by  Baron  Shidehara  yesterday.  He 
accepts  the  Baron's  assurance  that  "it  is  Japan's  fixed 
policy  to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  Russia,  and 
to  observe  the  principle  of  non-intervention  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  that  country,  as  well  as  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations  in  every  part  of  the  Russian  possessions." 
This  is  the  language  used  by  Baron  Shidehara  himself 
in  his  statement  yesterday. 

Mr.  Hughes  goes  a  step  further,  and  puts  on  record 
the  American  interpretation  of  the  Japanese  assurance. 
"These  assurances,"  he  says,  "are  taken  to  mean  that 
Japan  does  not  seek,  through  her  military  operation  in 
Siberia,  to  impair  the  rights  of  the  Russian  people  in 
any  respect,  or  to  obtain  any  unfair  commercial  ad- 
vantages, or  to  absorb  for  her  own  use  the  Siberian 
fisheries,  or  to  set  up  an  exclusive  exploitation  either 
of  the  resources  of  Saghalien  or  of  Maritime  Prov- 


ince." 


Thus  has  the  Conference  disposed  of  the  Siberian 
question.  Japan  is  not  asked  to  set  a  date  for  the  with- 
drawal of  her  troops.  Nor  has  the  Conference  adopted 
any  resolution  defining  the  attitude  of  the  Powers 
towards  Siberia.  How  could  it  do  anything  more? 
How  could  the  Conference  criticise  or  censure  Japanese 

257 


258  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

policy  in  Siberia,  when  most  of  the  nations  represented 
here  have  at  various  times  in  the  past  done  in  different 
parts  of  the  world  much  the  same  thing  as  the  Japanese 
are  doing  across  the  Japan  Sea? 

Nevertheless  Baron  Shidehara's  statement,  coupled 
with  Mr.  Hughes'  response,  imposes  upon  Japan  a 
grave  moral  obligation  to  do  right  by  Russia  and  to 
withdraw  from  Siberia  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
To  all  intents  and  purposes,  those  two  statements  have 
a  binding  force  as  strong  as  a  resolution  adopted  by  the 
Conference.  In  other  words,  they  put  Japan  on  pro- 
bation, from  which  she  must  come  out  honorably  if  she 
is  to  win  the  confidence  and  respect  of  the  Powers. 

And  yet  is  it  not  the  greatest  irony  of  fate  that 
Russia  should,  through  the  instrumentality  of  this  Con- 
ference, be  given  guarantee  for  the  territorial  integrity 
of  Siberia  ?  For  the  territories  which  Russia  now  holds 
on  the  Pacific  were  robbed  from  China  and  Japan  only 
50  or  60  years  ago,  when  these  nations  were  utterly  un- 
familiar with  the  ways  of  Occidental  diplomacy.  Let 
us  first  see  how  Russia  usurped  Chinese  territories  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Amur  and  Ussuri  rivers. 

The  story  of  the  Russian  advance  toward  the  Far 
East  must  begin  with  the  story  of  Yermak.  Toward 
the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century  this  warrior,  with  a  band 
of  Cossacks,  crossed  the  Ural  Mountains.  In  1587 
Tobolsk  was  established;  in  1604,  Tomsk;  in  1619, 
Yenisseisk;  in  1638,  Okhotsk.  In  a  century  and  a  half 
the  whole  country  from  the  Urals  to  the  Okhotsk,  a 
distance  of  6,000  miles,  was  brought  under  the  rule  of 
the  White  Czar. 

Russia's  next  step  was  to  descend  southward  and  find 
an  outlet  which  would  not  be  sealed  by  ice  most  of  the 
twelve  months.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that,  in  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  Cossacks  forced 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  259 

their  way  beyond  Lake  Baikal  and  into  the  yet  unknown 
region  bordering  the  mighty  stream  of  the  Amur. 

Here  they  came  in  collision  with  the  Chinese  garri- 
sons, for  the  country  was,  at  least  nominally,  under 
the  suzerainty  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  In  that  period 
the  far  eastern  boundary  of  the  empire  of  Muscovy 
was  the  Yablonoi  and  Stanovoi  ranges,  which,  rising  not 
far  from  Lake  Baikal,  extend  their  course  in  a  north- 
easterly direction  to  the  frozen  shores  of  the  Okhotsk 
Sea.  When  the  Russians  made  their  advent  in  the  re- 
gions east  of  the  Yablonoi  mountains,  they  were  greeted 
with  desultory  assaults  at  the  hands  of  the  Chinese,  who 
had  already  established  outposts  at  various  strategical 
points  and  who  had  been  extorting  from  the  aboriginal 
tribes  sables  and  other  valuable  skins.  Yet  the  Cos- 
sacks pressed  forward,  and  established  in  1685  a  foot- 
hold at  Albazin,  on  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Amur. 

Alarmed  by  this  Russian  invasion,  the  Chinese  au- 
thorities in  that  region  entered  into  negotiations  with 
the  Russian  representatives.  The  parley  resulted  in 
the  Nerchinsk  Treaty  of  1689,  the  purpose  of  which 
was,  to  quote  the  preamble  to  that  instrument,  to  "re- 
press the  insolence  of  certain  rascals,  who  make  hunting 
incursions  beyond  the  limits  of  their  territories,  and 
pillage,  murder  and  stir  up  trouble  and  quarrels,  as 
well  as  to  determine  clearly  and  distinctly  the  bounda- 
ries of  the  two  empires  of  China  and  Muscovy." 

By  virtue  of  the  Nerchinsk  Treaty,  Russia  recog- 
nized the  Stanovoi  mountains  as  the  northern  boundary 
of  her  territory,  and  made  inroads  across  the  Yablonoi 
ranges  and  into  Chinese  territory  as  far  as  the  Aigun 
river. 

In  1741  Behring  and  Tchirikoff  discovered  what  is 
now  the  Territory  of  Alaska.  This  memorable  event 
was  followed,  in  1797,  by  the  establishment  by  Em- 


260  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

peror  Paul  of  the  Russo-American  Company,  the  object 
of  which  was  fishery  and  trade  in  the  Northern  Pacific. 
In  1850  Captain  Nevelskoi  sailed  southward  along  the 
coasts  of  Kamchatka  and  Okhotsk,  and  in  185 1  founded 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Amur  a  victualing  post  destined  to 
become  a  thriving  port  known  as  Nikolaievsk.  In  1858 
more  naval  posts  were  established  in  Castries  Bay  and 
at  Port  Imperial.  In  1857  the  Russian  scientist  Veniu- 
koff  explored  the  vast  region  traversed  by  the  Ussuri 
River,  a  tributary  of  the  Amur. 

But  the  most  important  step  taken  by  Russia  in 
these  Far  Eastern  regions  was  the  exploration  by  Count 
Muravieff,  Governor-General  of  Irkutsk,  of  the  great 
country  washed  by  the  Amur  River.  In  1854  the  daring 
Count  improvised  a  flotilla  of  flat-bottomed  barges  and 
sailed  down  the  winding  course  of  the  turgid  waters  for 
almost  2,000  miles  from  Stretinsk  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Amur.  The  discovery  of  this  waterway  from  the 
Transbaikal  region  to  the  Okhotsk  Sea  opened  the 
eyes  of  the  Russians  to  the  boundless  possibilities  which 
were  in  store  for  them  in  the  country  along  the  Amur. 
Russia's  exultation  upon  this  great  discovery  may  well 
be  imagined  from  these  effusive  words  of  joyful  excla- 
mation addressed  by  Count  Muravieff  to  the  Cossacks 
who  followed  him  in  the  adventure: 

"Comrades,  I  congratulate  you!  Our  efforts  were 
not  in  vain.  The  Amur  has  become  the  property  of 
Russia.  The  Holy  Orthodox  Church  prays  for  you; 
Russia  is  grateful.  Long  live  the  Czar  Alexander! 
May  the  newly  acquired  territory  prosper  under  his 
mighty  protection !  Hurrah !" 

The  Amur  did  indeed  become  Russia's  property,  not- 
withstanding China's  remonstrances.  Soon  after  its 
exploration — that  is,  in  1858 — Count  Muravieff  suc- 
ceeded in  persuading  the  local  Chinese  authorities  to 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  261 

sign  at  Aigun  a  treaty  formally  recognizing  the  Russian 
occupation  of  the  vast  territory  stretching  from  the 
Stanovoi  ranges  on  the  north  down  to  the  Amur  River 
on  the  south — a  country  to  which  China  had  claimed  a 
right  of  eminent  domain.  In  1860,  two  years  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Aigun  Treaty,  Russia  scored  another 
diplomatic  coup  in  the  signing  of  the  Peking  Treaty, 
obliging  China  to  forfeit  another  vast  territory  lying 
between  the  Amur  River  and  the  Japan  Sea.  In  the 
year  following  the  foundation  was  laid  for  the  city  of 
Vladivostok,  an  impressive  name  meaning  "Dominion 
of  the  East."  Thus,  without  firing  a  shot,  without  sac- 
rificing a  single  life,  Muravieff,  the  daring  Count  of  the 
Amur,  added  to  the  map  of  Russia  half  a  million  square 
miles  of  territory. 

Not  satisfied  with  the  annexation  of  such  vast  terri- 
tories on  the  continent,  Russia  sent  out  marauding  war- 
ships to  the  Japan  Sea  and  in  1875  practically  swindled 
Japan  out  of  the  Saghalien  Island.  This  island  has  an 
area  of  29,100  square  miles.  Japan  had  claimed  owner- 
ship for  this  island  by  reason  of  discovery.  Upon  the 
termination  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1905,  Russia 
agreed  to  retrocede  to  Japan  only  that  part  of  the  island 
lying  south  of  the  fiftieth  degree  of  north  latitude.  That 
section  is  2,200  square  miles  in  area,  about  two-fifths 
of  the  entire  territory. 

We  have  seen  that  by  the  treaties  of  Nerchinsk, 
Aigun,  and  Peking  Russia  obtained  territories  which  are 
now  known  as  Transbaikal,  Amur,  and  Maritime 
Provinces,  with  a  combined  area  of  659,589  square 
miles.  This  vast  country  has  a  population  of  only 
1,695,000,  making  a  density  of  2.4  to  the  square  mile. 
Much  of  this  population  consists  of  semi-civilized  na- 
tives, as  well  as  Chinese  and  Koreans.  In  the  fifty 
years  which  followed  the  Russian  annexation  of  the 


262  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

country,  the  Russian  Government  has  succeeded  in  send- 
ing thither  only  some  800,000  immigrants  from  Euro- 
pean Russia.  And  why  should  Russians  come  so  far 
for  colonization,  when  they  had  nearer  home  more 
land  than  they  could  possibly  utilize  for  many  genera- 
tions to  come?  One  enthusiastic  writer,  an  English- 
man, estimates  the  arable  land  of  Siberia  at  one  billion 
acres,  most  of  which  is  located  in  western  and  middle 
Siberia.  This  of  course  does  not  include  2,500,000 
square  miles  of  inhospitable  lands  north  of  the  sixty- 
fifth  degree  of  north  latitude. 

Yet  even  the  Siberians — even  those  of  them  who  pro- 
fess Socialism  or  Communism — assume  the  attitude  of 
the  "dog  in  the  manger"  towards  their  neighbor  strug- 
gling to  subsist  in  a  country  choked  by  overpopulation ! 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII 
AN   INTERNATIONAL   TRUSTEE 

Washington,  February  4,  1922:  The  Far  Eastern 
Committee  has  agreed  not  to  agree  on  any  definite  plan 
for  the  safekeeping  and  improvement  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway,  the  Russian  line  running  through 
North  Manchuria.  Although  this  matter  has  been 
treated  by  the  Conference  as  a  Chinese  question,  it  is 
in  reality  a  part  of  the  Siberian  question,  because  the 
railway  forms  an  important  section  of  the  trans-Sibe- 
rian line  and  is  Russian  property. 

The  resolution  announced  by  the  Committee  yester- 
day states  that  the  present  condition  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway  requires  "a  more  careful  selection  of 
personnel  to  secure  the  efficiency  of  service,  and  a  more 
economical  use  of  funds  to  prevent  waste  of  the  prop- 
erty." It  insists,  furthermore,  "upon  the  responsibility 
of  China  for  performance  or  non-performance  of  the 
obligations  towards  the  foreign  stockholders,  bondhold- 
ers and  creditors, "  as  well  as  the  "obligations  which 
they  [interested  Powers]  deem  to  be  in  the  nature  of 
a  trust  resulting  from  the  exercise  of  power  by  the  Chi- 
nese Government  over  the  possession  and  administra- 
tion of  the  railroad."  (Appendix  XII,  section  C.) 
This  is  an  unmistakable  reflection  upon  the  Chinese 
administration. 

Beyond  this  the  Conference  does  not  go.  In  view 
of  the  limited  time  at  its  disposal  and  of  the  compli- 
cated nature  of  the  problem,  the  Conference  has  agreed 

263 


264  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY         > 

to  deal  with  it  in  the  immediate  future  through  the 
"proper  diplomatic  channels." 

To  understand  the  Siberian  railway  question  intelli- 
gently, we  must  begin  with  the  Root  Mission  to  Russia. 
When  in  June,  1917,  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  heading  the 
American  Mission,  went  to  Petrograd,  he  was  reported 
to  have  come  to  a  certain  understanding  with  the  Keren- 
sky  Government  with  regard  to  the  control  of  the  Sibe- 
rian railway  as  a  war  measure.  Perhaps,  in  pursuance 
of  that  understanding,  Colonel  John  F.  Stevens,  with 
some  three  hundred  American  railway  engineers,  ar- 
rived in  the  Far  East  in  the  fall  of  1917.  We  will  let 
ex-President  Wilson  explain  how  this  was  done.  In  his 
letter  addressed  to  the  Senate  on  July  25,  1919,  the 
ex-President  said: 

"It  is  to  be  recalled  that  John  F.  Stevens,  in  response 
to  a  request  of  the  provisional  (Kerensky)  government 
of  Russia,  went  to  Russia  in  the  spring  of  1917.  A  few 
months  later  he  was  made  official  adviser  to  the  Min- 
ister of  Ways  and  Communications  at  Petrograd  under 
the  provisional  government. 

"At  the  request  of  the  provisional  government  and 
with  the  support  of  John  F.  Stevens,  there  was  organ- 
ized the  so-called  Russia  Railway  Service  Corps  com- 
posed of  American  engineers.  As  originally  organized 
the  personnel  of  this  corps  constituted  fourteen  skeleton 
division  units  as  known  in  this  country,  the  idea  being 
that  these  skeleton  units  would  serve  as  practical  ad- 
visers and  assistants  on  fourteen  sections  of  the  Siberian 
Railway  and  assist  the  Russians  by  their  knowledge  of 
long  haul  problems  as  known  in  this  country  and  which 
are  the  rule  and  not  the  exception  in  Siberia. 

"Owing  to  the  Bolshevik  uprising  and  the  general 
chaotic  conditions  neither  Mr.  Stevens  nor  the  Russia 
Railway  Service  Corps  was  able  to  begin  work  in  Siberia 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  265 

until  March,  1918.  They  have  been  able  to  operate 
effectively  only  since  the  railway  plan  was  adopted  in 
February,  1919." 

Mr.  Wilson's  reference  to  the  railway  plan  adopted 
in  February,  1919,  calls  for  further  explanation.  This 
plan  was  an  outcome  of  the  interallied  intervention, 
which  commenced  in  August,  1918.  At  that  stage  the 
Siberian  railway  question  was  more  complicated  than 
in  1917.  The  intervention  was  undertaken  by  all  the 
entente  Powers.  As  a  war  measure,  therefore,  the 
control  and  improvement  of  the  Siberian  lines  could 
no  longer  be  undertaken  by  the  United  States  alone. 

In  January,  1919,  however,  a  satisfactory  agreement 
was  reached  between  Tokyo  and  Washington.  By  that 
time  the  demoralization  of  the  Siberian  and  Manchuria 
railways  was  complete,  and  their  effective  control  by 
an  inter-allied  organization  was  most  urgent.  Conse- 
quently in  accordance  with  the  above  agreement  the  fol- 
lowing four  bodies  were  organized: 

1.  The  Inter-allied  Committee  at  Vladivostok,  pre- 
sided over  by  a  Russian,  and  including  one  representa- 
tive   each    from    Japan,    the    United    States,    Britain, 
France,  Italy  and  Czecho-Slovakia.     This  was  a  dip- 
lomatic and  administrative  body. 

2.  The  Railway  Technical  Board,  presided  over  by 
John  F.  Stevens,  an  American  engineer,  and  consisting 
of  one   representative   each    from   England,    France, 
Japan,  Italy,  Russia,  and  Czecho-Slovakia.    The  office 
of  this  board  was  established  in  Harbin  in  the  heart 
of  North  Manchuria. 

3.  The  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Committee,  consist- 
ing of  American,  Japanese,  British,  French,  and  Rus- 
sian representatives.     This  office  was  placed  in  Vladi- 
vostok.    The  Committee  attended  to  the  purchasing 
of  materials  necessary  for  the  upkeep  of  the  railways. 


266  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

For  this  purpose  Japan  and  America  advanced  $4,000,- 
000  each. 

4.  The  Board  of  Military  Transportation,  presided 
over  by  a  Japanese  officer,  and  organized  for  the  pur- 
pose of  superintending  the  transportation  of  allied 
troops. 

Of  these  four  bodies  the  Board  of  Military  Trans- 
portation and  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Committee 
have  ceased  to  exist,  while  the  Inter-Allied  Committee 
has  been  converted  into  an  organization  of  various  for- 
eign consuls  stationed  at  Vladivostok. 

The  Inter-Allied  Railway  Technical  Board,  the  most 
important  of  the  four  bodies,  continues  to  function  and 
is  still  presided  over  by  Colonel  John  F.  Stevens,  the 
American  engineer.  When  this  board  came  into  exis- 
tence, Japan  and  America  were  the  only  nations  which 
could  render  effective  service  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  Russian  railways.  Although  all  the  allied  nations 
were  represented  on  the  board,  the  two  nations  had  to 
assume  the  practical  control  of  the  railways.  To  expe- 
dite their  work,  the  Russian  railways  were  divided  into 
two  sections,  one  assigned  to  American  supervision,  the 
other  to  Japanese.  To  Japan  were  assigned  the  Ussuri 
and  Amur  lines,  totalling  some  1,730  miles,  while 
America  took  control  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  (Man- 
churia) and  the  Transbaikal  lines,  totalling  some 
1,700  miles.  The  lines  assigned  to  Japan  passed 
through  the  regions  infested  with  turbulent  elements, 
and  were  considered  far  more  difficult  to  operate  than 
the  lines  assigned  to  America.  But  Japan  was  asked 
to  take  them,  because  she  had  a  larger  army,  and  was 
in  a  position  to  increase  it  in  case  of  necessity. 

When  America  withdrew  from  Siberia  in  March, 
1925,  the  Inter-Allied  Technical  Board  might  have 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  267 

been  abolished.  But  the  railways  required  continued 
supervision,  and  Mr.  Stevens  and  the  Japanese  repre- 
sentatives have  been  obliged  to  continue  their  office  at 
Harbin. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  soldiers,  Japan  also  withdrew  her  troops 
from  the  interior  of  Siberia.  Consequently  she  has 
long  since  ceased  to  superintend  the  Amur  and  Ussuri 
railways,  which  are  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Chita 
authorities. 

The  only  line  which  is  at  present  under  the  supervi- 
sion of  the  Inter-Allied  Technical  Board  is  the  Chinese 
Eastern  or  Manchurian  line.  This  railway,  involving 
an  enormous  outlay  by  the  Czarist  Government,  is  a 
purely  Russian  line.  Russia  was  shrewd  enough  to 
appoint  a  few  Chinese  to  nominally  high  positions  in 
the  railway  company  and  thus  save  the  face  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  but  its  actual  administration  was 
exclusively  in  Russian  hands. 

During  the  period  of  chaos  which  followed  the  fall 
of  the  Kerensky  Government,  the  Chinese  authorities 
gradually  extended  their  influence  over  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  Manchurian  Railway.  When,  in  March, 
1920,  Russian  military  guards  mutinied,  the  Chinese 
authorities  disarmed  them  and  completely  replaced 
them  with  Chinese  soldiers.  In  October,  1920,  the 
Chinese  Government,  after  successful  negotiations  with 
the  Russo-Asiatic  Bank,  which  represented  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway,  issued  an  ordinance  allowing  itself 
greater  power  in  the  management  of  the  railway.  In 
pursuance  of  this  ordinance,  the  Chinese  Government 
appointed  five  directors  for  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way, while  five  others  were  appointed  by  the  Russo- 
Asiatic  Bank.  It  also  created  four  departments  for 
the  railway,  each  having  a  Russian  chief  and  a  Chinese 


268  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

assistant  chief.  Other  officials  were  to  be  chosen  im- 
partially from  Russians  and  Chinese.  This  was  a  great 
victory  for  China  because  under  the  previous  railway 
administration  she  had  practically  no  power. 

In  the  meantime,  dissatisfaction  has  been  expressed 
on  all  sides  because  of  the  inefficiency  of  Chinese  offi- 
cials and  the  lack  of  discipline  among  the  Chinese  rail- 
way guards.  There  are  some  180,000  Russians  living 
in  the  railway  zone  in  North  Manchuria.  Some  of 
these  Russians  organized  in  Harbin,  the  metropolis  of 
North  Manchuria,  a  patriotic  society  known  as  the 
Association  to  Recover  the  Rights  of  Russia.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1920,  it  published  a  pamphlet  in  the  Russian 
language  and  circulated  it  among  the  Russians  in  the 
Far  East.  In  this  pamphlet  the  Association  bitterly 
complained  about  the  inefficiency  and  corruption  of  the 
Chinese  administration  which  replaced  the  Russian  ad- 
ministration in  the  railway  zone,  and  enumerated  six 
hundred  cases  in  which  the  Chinese  railway  guards 
attacked  Russian  railway  officials  without  any  provoca- 
tion, and  resorted  to  brutality  and  extortion  in  dealing 
with  Russian  residents  along  the  railway.  Let  me  cite 
a  few  instances.  A  Chinese  guard  would  beat  a  Russian 
conductor,  if  the  conductor  refused  to  let  a  Chinese 
ride  without  a  ticket.  If  a  Russian  railway  official  re- 
quested the  arrest  of  a  Chinese  who  stole  things  from 
a  station  or  a  train,  the  Chinese  guards  would  immedi- 
ately come  to  the  rescue  of  the  Chinese  and  assault  the 
Russian  official.  Even  the  Russian  women  have  not 
been  free  from  insults.  The  pamphlet  gives  the  exact 
date  and  place  for  each  of  such  incidents.  It  is  monot- 
onous, uninteresting  reading,  but  in  it  you  hear  a  bitter 
cry  of  a  proud  race  which  once  dominated  the  Chinese 
territory  but  which  is  now  dominated  by  the  very  people 
whom  it  had  lorded  it  over. 


JAPAN'S    SIBERIAN    VENTURE  269 

Colonel  John  F.  Stevens,  the  American  engineer  and 
head  of  the  Inter-Allied  Technical  Board,  has  been 
supervising  the  operation  of  the  railway  in  cooperation 
with  the  Chino-Russian  management.  To  make  this 
cooperation  more  effective,  the  authority  of  the  Tech- 
nical Board  must  be  increased.  Before  the  Board 
began  to  supervise  operation,  the  deficit  of  the  road  was 
enormous,  mainly  due  to  the  disorganized  conditions 
of  Siberia.  But  Colonel  Stevens  has  managed  to  re- 
store order  in  the  operation  of  the  railway  and  thus 
bring  about  a  substantial  increase  in  its  revenue.  Still 
the  road  is  far  from  paying  its  own  expenses.  Further- 
more, some  $10,000,000  is  immediately  required  to 
restore  the  road  and  equipment  to  their  pre-war  condi- 
tion, for  the  railway  has  been  badly  abused  in  the  past 
seven  years.  American  experts  on  the  Inter-Allied 
Technical  Board  at  Harbin  are  frankly  disappointed 
with  the  administrative  integrity  and  efficiency  of  the 
Chinese  who  are  connected  with  the  Manchurian  Rail- 
way. It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  Conference  has 
adopted  a  resolution  which  I  have  quoted  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  letter.  If  the  Powers  are  to  safeguard 
legitimate  Russian  interests  in  this  road,  they  must 
devise  a  better  plan  for  its  management  and  operation. 
France  is  particularly  anxious  to  see  such  a  plan  devel- 
oped, because  French  capital  has  been  heavily  invested 
in  the  Siberian  Railway  through  the  Russo-Asiatic  Bank 
financed  largely  by  French  capitalists.  Japan  is  equally 
eager  for  the  improvement  of  the  road,  because  her 
South  Manchurian  Railway,  unless  connected  with  an 
ably  managed  Russian  line  to  the  northward,  cannot 
become  a  part  of  the  world's  highway  which  the  railway 
is  anxious  to  be. 


APPENDICES 

TREATIES  AND  RESOLUTIONS  ADOPTED  BY  AND 

OFFICIAL   STATEMENTS   SUBMITTED  TO 

THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE 


Appendix  I 
AGENDA   OF  THE   CONFERENCE 


A.    LIMITATION    OF    ARMAMENTS 

1.  Limitation  of  naval  armament  under  which  shall  be  dis- 
cussed : 

(a)  Basis  of  limitation. 

(b)  Extent. 

(c)  Fulfillment. 

2.  Rules  for  control  of  new  agencies  of  warfare. 

3.  Limitation  of  land  armament. 

B.    PACIFIC  AND   FAR  EASTERN   QUESTIONS 

1.  Questions  relating  to  China: 

First — Principles  to  be  applied. 
Second — Application. 
Subjects — 

(a)  Territorial  integrity. 

(b)  Administrative  integrity. 

(c)  Open    Door — equality   of   commercial    and 

industrial  opportunity. 

(d)  Concessions,     monopolies     or     preferential 

economic  privileges. 

(e)  Development   of    railways,    including  plans 

relating  to  Chinese  Eastern  Railway. 

(f)  Preferential  railroad  rates. 

(g)  Status  of  existing  commitments. 

2.  Siberia. 

3.  Mandated  islands   (unless  questions  earlier  settled). 

4.  Electrical  communications  in  the  Pacific. 

273 


Appendix  II 
SHANTUNG 


A.     ARTICLES  IN  THE  VERSAILLES  TREATY  TRANSFER- 
RING TO  JAPAN   GERMAN  RIGHTS  IN   SHANTUNG. 

Article  156 

Germany  renounces,  in  favor  of  Japan,  all  her  rights,  title 
and  privileges — particularly  those  concerning  the  Territory  of 
Kiaochow,  railways,  mines,  and  submarine  cables — which  she 
acquired  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  concluded  by  her  with  China 
on  March  6,  1898,  and  all  other  arrangements  relative  to  the 
Province  of  Shantung. 

All  German  rights  in  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway,  in- 
cluding its  branch  lines,  together  with  its  subsidiary  property 
of  all  kinds,  stations,  shops,  fixed  and  rolling  stock,  mines,  plant 
and  material  for  the  exploitation  of  the  mines,  are  and  remain 
acquired  by  Japan,  together  with  all  rights  and  privileges 
thereto. 

The  German  State  submarine  cables  from  Tsingtao  to  Shang- 
hai, and  from  Tsingtao  to  Chef oo,  with  all  the  rights,  privileges, 
and  properties  attaching  thereto,  are  similarly  acquired  by  Japan 
free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  encumbrances. 

Article  757 

The  movable  and  immovable  property  owned  by  the  Ger- 
man State  in  the  Territory  of  Kiaochow,  as  well  as  the  rights 
which  Germany  might  claim  in  consequence  of  the  works  or 
improvements  made  or  of  the  expenses  incurred  by  her  directly 
or  indirectly  in  connection  writh  this  territory,  are  and  remain 
acquired  by  Japan,  free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  encum- 
brances. 

274 


APPENDIX  275 

Article  158 

Germany  shall  hand  over  to  Japan  within  three  months  from 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty,  the  archives,  regis- 
ters, plans,  title-deeds  and  documents  of  every  kind,  wherever 
they  may  be,  relating  to  the  administration,  whether  civil,  mili- 
tary, financial,  judicial,  or  other,  of  the  Territory  of  Kiaochow. 

Within  the  same  period  Germany  shall  give  particulars  to 
Japan  of  all  treaties,  arrangements,  or  agreements  relating  to 
the  rights,  title  or  privileges  referred  to  in  the  two  preceding 
Articles. 

B.    JAPAN'S    MEMORANDUM    TO    CHINA    CONCERNING 
SHANTUNG,  SEPTEMBER  7,  1921 

NOTE: — The  following  outline  of  the  terms  of  settlement  concerning 
Shantung  were  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  by  the  Japanese 
Minister  at  Peking  on  September  7,  1921.  These  are  the  last  pro- 
posals made  by  Japan  before  the  opening  of  the  Washington  Con- 
ference. Note  the  difference  from  the  Shantung  provisions  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty.— The  Author. 

1.  The    leasehold    of    Kiaochow    and    the   rights   originally 
granted  to  Germany  with  regard   to  the  fifty-kilometre  zone 
around  the  Kiaochow  Bay  shall  be  restored  to  China. 

2.  The  Japanese  Government  will   abandon  plans  for   the 
establishment    of    a   Japanese    exclusive    settlement    or    of    an 
international  settlement  in  Tsingtao:  provided  that  China  en- 
gages to  open  of  its  own  accord  the  entire  Leased  Territory  of 
Kiaochow  as  a  port  of  trade,  and  to  permit  the  nationals  of 
all  foreign  countries  freely  to  reside  and  to  carry  on  commerce, 
industry,  agriculture  or  any  other  lawful  pursuits  within  such 
territory,  and  that  she  further  undertakes  to  respect  the  vested 
rights  of  all  foreigners. 

China  shall  likewise  carry  out  forthwith  the  opening  of 
suitable  cities  and  towns  within  the  Province  of  Shantung  for 
residence  and  trade  of  the  nationals  of  all  foreign  countries. 

Regulations  for  the  opening  of  places  under  the  foregoing 
clauses  shall  be  determined  by  the  Chinese  Government  upon 
consultation  with  the  Powers  interested. 


276  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

3.  The  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway  and  all  mines  appur- 
tenant thereto  shall  be  worked  as  a  joint  Chino- Japanese  enter- 
prise. 

4.  Japan  will  renounce  all  preferential  rights  with  regard 
to  foreign  assistance  in  persons,  capital  and  material,  stipulated 
in  the  Chino-German  Treaty  of  March  6,  1898. 

5.  Rights  relating  to  the  extensions  of  the  Kiaochow-Tsin- 
anfu Railway,  as  well  as  options  for  the  construction  of  the 
Yentai-Weishien  Railway,  will  be  thrown  open  for  the  common 
activity  of  the  International  Financial  Consortium  in  China. 

6.  The  status  of  the  Customs  House  at  Tsingtao  as  forming 
an  integral  part  of  the  general  customs  system  of  China  shall 
be  made  clearer  than  under  the  German  regime. 

7.  Public  property  used  for  administrative  purposes  within 
the  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  will,  in  general,  be  trans- 
ferred to  China;  it  being  understood  that  the  maintenance  and 
operation  of  public  works  and  establishments  shall  be  previously 
arranged  between  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  Governments. 

8.  With  a  view  to  arranging  detailed  plans  for  carrying  into 
effect  the  terms  of  settlement  above  indicated,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  adjusting  other  matters  not  embodied  therein,  the  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  Governments  shall  appoint  their  respective 
commissioners  as  soon  as  possible. 

9.  The  Japanese  Government  have  on  more  than  one  occa- 
sion declared  willingness  to  proceed  to  the  recall  of  Japanese 
troops  now  stationed   along  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu   Railway 
upon  organization  by  China  of  a  police  force  to  assume  pro- 
tection of  the  Railway.     As  soon  as  the  Chinese  Government 
shall  have  organized  such  a  police  force  and  notify  the  Japanese 
Government  to  that  effect,  Japanese  troops  will  be  ordered  to 
hand  over  to  the  Chinese  police  the  charge  of  the  railway  pro- 
tection, and  thereupon  immediately  to  withdraw.     It  is,  how- 
ever, to  be  understood  that  the  question  of  the  organization  of 
a  special  police  guarding  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway  shall 
be  reserved  for  future  consideration  between  Japan  and  China. 


APPENDIX  277 

C.  TREATY  FOR  THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  OUTSTANDING 
QUESTIONS  RELATIVE  TO  SHANTUNG,  SIGNED  AT 
WASHINGTON,  FEBRUARY  3,  1922 

China  and  Japan,  being  equally  animated  by  a  sincere  desire 
to  settle  amicably  and  in  accordance  with  their  common  interest 
outstanding  questions  relative  to  Shantung,  have  resolved  to 
conclude  a  treaty  for  the  settlement  of  such  questions,  and  have 
to  that  end  named  as  their  plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic; 

Sao-Ke  Alfred   Sze,   Envoy  Extraordinary  and   Minister 
Plenipotentiary  ; 

V'ikyuin  Wellington  Koo,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary;  and 

Chung-Hui  Wang,  Former  Minister  of  Justice; 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan: 

Baron  Tomosaburo  Kato,  Minister  of  the  Navy; 

Baron  Kijuro  Shidehara,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary;  and 

Masanao  Hanihara,  Vice  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs; 

Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective 
full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed 
upon  the  following  articles: 

Restoration  of  the  Former  German  iLeased  Territory  of 
Kiaochow 

Article  I 

Japan  shall  restore  to  China  the  former  German  Leased 
Territory  of  Kiaochow. 

Article  II 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  shall  each  appoint  three  commissioners  to  form 
a  joint  commission,  with  powers  to  make  and  carry  out  de- 
tailed arrangements  relating  to  the  transfer  of  the  administra- 
tion of  the  former  German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  and 


278  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

to  the  transfer  of  public  properties  in  the  said  territory  and  to 
settle  other  matters  likewise  requiring  adjustment. 

For  such  purposes  the  joint  commission  shall  meet  imme- 
diately upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty. 

Article  III 

The  transfer  of  the  administration  of  the  former  German 
Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  and  the  transfer  of  public  prop- 
erties in  the  said  territory,  as  well  as  the  adjustment  of  other 
matters  under  the  preceding  article,  shall  be  completed  as  soon 
as  possible,  and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than  six  months  from 
the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  IV 

The  Government  of  Japan  undertakes  to  hand  over  to  the 
Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  upon  the  transfer  to 
China  of  the  administration  of  the  former  German  Leased 
Territory  of  Kiaochow,  such  archives,  registers,  plans,  title- 
deeds  and  other  documents  in  the  possession  of  Japan,  or  certi- 
fied copies  thereof,  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  transfer  of  the 
administration,  as  well  as  those  that  may  be  useful  for  the 
subsequent  administration  by  China  of  the  said  territory  and 
of  the  50-kilometer  zone  around  Kiaochow  Bay. 

Transfer  of  Public  Properties 

Article  V 

The  Government  of  Japan  undertakes  to  transfer  to  the 
Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  all  public  properties 
including  land,  buildings,  works  or  establishments  in  the  former 
German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow,  whether  formerly  pos- 
sessed by  the  German  authorities,  or  purchased  or  constructed 
by  the  Japanese  authorities  during  the  period  of  the  Japanese 
administration  of  the  said  territory,  except  those  indicated  in 
Article  VII  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  VI 

In  the  transfer  of  public  properties  under  the  preceding 
article,  no  compensation  will  be  claimed  from  the  Government 


APPENDIX  279 

of  the  Chinese  Republic:  Provided,  however,  that  for  those 
purchased  or  constructed  by  the  Japanese  authorities,  and  also 
for  the  improvements  on  or  additions  to  those  formerly  pos- 
sessed by  the  German  authorities,  the  Government  of  the  Chi- 
nese Republic  shall  refund  a  fair  and  equitable  proportion  of 
the  expenses  actually  incurred  by  the  Government  of  Japan, 
having  regard  to  the  principle  of  depreciation  and  continuing 
value. 

Article  VII 

Such  public  properties  in  the  former  German  Leased  Terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow  as  are  required  for  the  Japanese  Consulate 
to  be  established  in  Tsingtao  shall  be  retained  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan,  and  those  required  more  especially  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Japanese  community,  including  public  schools, 
shrines  and  cemeteries,  shall  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  said 
community. 

Article  VIII 

Details  of  the  matters  referred  to  in  the  preceding  three 
articles  shall  be  arranged  by  the  joint  commission  provided  for 
in  Article  II  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Withdrawal  of  Japanese  Troops 

Article  IX 

The  Japanese  troops,  including  gendarmes,  now  stationed 
along  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway  and  its  branches,  shall 
be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  Chinese  police  or  military  force 
shall  have  been  sent  to  take  over  the  protection  of  the  railway. 

Article  X 

The  disposition  of  the  Chinese  police  or  military  force  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops  under  the  preceding 
article  may  be  effected  in  sections. 

The  date  of  the  completion  of  such  process  for  each  section 
shall  be  arranged  in  advance  between  the  competent  authorities 
of  China  and  Japan. 

The   entire  withdrawal   of   such   Japanese   troops   shall   be 


280  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

effected  within  three  months,  if  possible,  and,  in  any  case,  not 
later  than  six  months,  from  the  date  of  the  signature  of  the 
present  Treaty. 

Article  XI 

The  Japanese  garrison  at  Tsingtao  shall  be  completely  with- 
drawn simultaneously,  if  possible,  with  the  transfer  to  China 
of  the  administration  of  the  former  German  Leased  Territory 
of  Kiaochow,  and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than  30  days  from 
the  date  of  such  transfer. 

Maritime  Customs  at  Tsingtao 

Article  XII 

The  custom  house  of  Tsingtao  shall  be  made  an  integral 
part  of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs  upon  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  XIII 

The  provisional  agreement  of  August  6,  1915,  between  China 
and  Japan,  relating  to  the  reopening  of  the  office  of  the  Chinese 
maritime  customs  at  Tsingtao  shall  cease  to  be  effective  upon 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway 

Article  XIV 

Japan  shall  transfer  to  China  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Rail- 
way and  its  branches,  together  with  all  other  properties  appur- 
tenant thereto,  including  wharves,  warehouses  and  other  similar 
properties. 

Article  XV 

China  undertakes  to  reimburse  to  Japan  the  actual  value  of 
all  the  railway  properties  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article. 

The  actual  value  to  be  so  reimbursed  shall  consist  of  the 
sum  of  fifty-three  million,  four  hundred  and  six  thousand,  one 
hundred  and  forty-one  (53,406,141)  gold  marks  (which  is 
the  assessed  value  of  such  portion  of  the  said  properties  as  was 


APPENDIX  281 

left  behind  by  the  Germans),  or  its  equivalent,  plus*  the  amount 
which  Japan,  during  her  administration  of  the  railway,  has 
actually  expended  for  permanent  improvements  on  or  additions 
to  the  said  properties,  less  a  suitable  allowance  for  depreciation. 
It  is  understood  that  no  charge  will  be  made  with  respect 
to  the  wharves,  warehouses  and  other  similar  properties  men- 
tioned in  the  preceding  article,  except  for  such  permanent  im- 
provements on  or  additions  to  them  as  may  have  been  made 
by  Japan,  during  her  administration  of  the  railway,  less  a 
suitable  allowance  for  depreciation. 

Article  XVI 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  shall  each  appoint  three  commissioners  to  form 
a  joint  railway  commission,  with  powers  to  appraise  the  actual 
value  of  the  railway  properties  on  the  basis  defined  in  the  pre- 
ceding article,  and  to  arrange  the  transfer  of  the  said  prop- 
erties. 

Article  XVII 

The  transfer  of  all  the  railway  properties  under  Article  XIV 
of  the  present  Treaty  shall  be  completed  as  soon  as  possible, 
and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than  nine  months  from  the  date  of 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  XVlll 

To  effect  the  reimbursement  under  Article  XV  of  the  present 
Treaty  China  shall  deliver  to  Japan  simultaneously  with  the 
completion  of  the  transfer  of  the  railway  properties,  Chinese 
Government  treasury  notes,  secured  on  the  properties  and  rev- 
enues of  the  railway,  and  running  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years, 
but  redeemable,  whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  at  the  option  of 
China,  at  the  end  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  delivery 
of  the  said  treasury  notes,  or  at  any  time  thereafter  upon  six 
months'  previous  notice. 

Article  XIX 

Pending  the  redemption  of  the  said  treasury  notes  under  the 
preceding  article,  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  will 


282  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

select  and  appoint,  for  so  long  a  period  as  any  part  of  the  said 
treasury  notes  shall  remain  unredeemed,  a  Japanese  subject  to 
be  traffic  manager,  and  another  Japanese  subject  to  be  chief 
accountant  jointly  with  the  Chinese  chief  accountant  and  with 
coordinate  functions. 

These  officials  shall  all  be  under  the  direction,  control  and 
supervision  of  the  Chinese  managing  director,  and  removable 
for  cause. 

Article  XX 

Financial  details  of  a  technical  character  relating  to  the  said 
treasury  notes,  not  provided  for  in  this  section,  shall  be  deter- 
mined in  common  accord  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
authorities  as  soon  as  possible,  and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than 
six  months  from  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
Treaty. 

Extensions  of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway 

Article  XXI 

The  concessions  relating  to  the  two  extensions  of  the  Tsing- 
tao-Tsinanfu Railway,  namely,  the  Tsinanfu-Shunteh  and  the 
Kaomi-Hsuchowfu  lines,  shall  be  made  open  to  the  common 
activity  of  an  international  financial  group,  on  terms  to  be 
arranged  between  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic 
and  the  said  group. 

Mines 

Article  XXII 

The  mines  of  Tsechwan,  Fangtze  and  Chinlingchen,  for 
which  the  mining  rights  were  formerly  granted  by  China  to 
Germany,  shall  be  handed  over  to  a  company  to  be  formed 
under  a  special  charter  of  the  Government  of  the  Chinese 
Republic,  in  which  the  amount  of  Japanese  capital  shall  not 
exceed  that  of  Chinese  capital. 

The  mode  and  terms  of  such  arrangement  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  the  joint  commission  provided  for  in  Article  II  of 
the  present  Treaty. 


APPENDIX  283 

Opening  of  the  Former  German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow 

Article  XXIII 

The  Government  of  Japan  declares  that  it  will  not  seek  the 
establishment  of  an  exclusive  Japanese  settlement,  or  of  an 
international  settlement,  in  the  former  German  Leased  Terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow. 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  on  its  part,  de- 
clares that  the  entire  area  of  the  former  German  Leased  Ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow,  will  be  opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  that 
foreign  nationals  will  be  permitted  freely  to  reside  and  to 
carry  on  commerce,  industry  and  other  lawful  pursuits  within 
such  area. 

Article  XXIV 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  further  declares 
that  vested  rights  lawfully  and  equitably  acquired  by  foreign 
nationals  in  the  former  German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiao- 
chow, whether  under  the  German  regime  or  during  the  period 
of  the  Japanese  administration,  will  be  respected. 

All  questions  relating  to  the  status  or  validity  of  such  vested 
rights  acquired  by  Japanese  subjects  or  Japanese  companies 
shall  be  adjusted  by  the  joint  commission  provided  for  in 
Article  II  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Salt  Industry 

Article  XXV 

Whereas  the  salt  industry  is  a  government  monopoly  in 
China,  it  is  agreed  that  the  interests  of  Japanese  subjects  or 
Japanese  companies  actually  engaged  in  the  said  industry  along 
the  coast  of  Kiaochow  Bay  shall  be  purchased  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Chinese  Republic  for  fair  compensation,  and  that 
the  exportation  to  Japan  of  a  quantity  of  salt  produced  by 
such  industry  along  the  said  coast  is  to  be  permitted  on  reason- 
able terms. 

Arrangements  for  the  above  purposes,  including  the  transfer 
of  the  said  interests  to  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic, 


284  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

shall  be  made  by  the  joint  commission  provided  for  in  Article 
II  of  the  present  Treaty.  They  shall  be  completed  as  soon  as 
possible,  and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than  six  months  from  the 
date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Submarine  Cables 

Article  XXVI 

The  Government  of  Japan  declares  that  all  the  rights,  title 
and  privileges  concerning  the  former  German  submarine  cables 
between  Tsingtao  and  Chefoo  and  between  Tsingtao  and 
Shanghai  are  vested  in  China,  with  the  exception  of  those  por- 
tions of  the  said  two  cables  which  have  been  utilized  by  the 
Government  of  Japan  for  the  laying  of  a  cable  between  Tsing- 
tao and  Sasebo;  it  being  understood  that  the  question  relating 
to  the  landing  and  operation  at  Tsingtao  of  the  said  Tsingtao- 
Sasebo  cable  shall  be  adjusted1  by  the  joint  commission  provided 
for  in  Article  II  of  the  present  Treaty,  subject  to  the  terms 
of  the  existing  contracts  to  which  China  is  a  party. 

Wireless  Stations 

Article  XXVII 

The  Government  of  Japan  undertakes  to  transfer  to  the 
Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  the  Japanese  wireless 
stations  at  Tsingtao  and  Tsinanfu  for  fair  compensation  for 
the  value  of  these  stations,  upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japa- 
nese troops  at  the  said  two  places,  respectively. 

Details  of  such  transfer  and  compensation  shall  be  arranged 
by  the  joint  commission  provided  for  in  Article  II  of  the  pres- 
ent Treaty. 

Article  XXVIII 

The  present  Treaty  (including  the  annex  thereto)  shall  be 
ratified,  and  the  ratifications  thereof  shall  be  exchanged  at 
Peking  as  soon  as  possible,  and  not  later  than  four  months 
from  the  date  of  its  signature. 

It  shall  come  into  force  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of 
ratifications. 


APPENDIX  285 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  Treaty  in  duplicate,  in  the  English  language, 
and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

ANNEX 

I.     Renunciation  of  Preferential  Bights 

The  Government  of  Japan  declares  that  it  renounces  all 
preferential  rights  with  respect  to  foreign  assistance  in  persons, 
capital  and  material  stipulated  in  the  treaty  of  March  6,  1898, 
between  China  and  Germany. 

n.     Transfer  of  Public  Properties 

It  is  understood  that  public  properties  to  be  transferred  to 
the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  under  Article  V  of 
the  present  Treaty  include  ( 1 )  all  public  works,  such  as  roads, 
waterworks,  parks,  drainage  and  sanitary  equipment,  and  (2) 
all  public  enterprises  such  as  those  relating  to  telephone,  electric 
light,  stockyard  and  laundry. 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  declares  that  in 
the  management  and  maintenance  of  public  works  to  be  so 
transferred  to  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  the 
foreign  community  in  the  former  German  Leased  Territory 
of  Kiaochow  shall  have  fair  representation. 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  further  declares 
that,  upon  taking  over  the  telephone  enterprise  in  the  former 
German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow,  it  will  give  due  con- 
sideration to  the  requests  from  the  foreign  community  in  the 
said  territory  for  such  extensions  and  improvements  in  the 
telephone  enterprise  as  may  be  reasonably  required  by  the  gen- 
eral interests  of  the  public. 

With  respect  to  public  enterprises  relating  to  electric  light, 
stockyard  and  laundry,  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Repub- 
lic, upon  taking  them  over,  shall  retransfer  them  to  the  Chinese 
municipal  authorities  of  Tsingtao,  which  shall,  in  turn,  cause 
commercial  companies  to  be  formed  under  Chinese  laws  for 
the  management  and  working  of  the  said  enterprises,  subject 
to  municipal  regulation  and  supervision. 


286  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

m.     Maritime  Customs  at  Tsingtao 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  declares  that  it 
will  instruct  the  inspector  general  of  the  Chinese  maritime 
customs  (1)  to  permit  Japanese  traders  in  the  former  German 
Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  to  communicate  in  the  Japanese 
language  with  the  custom  house  of  Tsingtao;  and  (2)  to  give 
consideration,  within  the  limits  of  the  established  service  regu- 
lations of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs,  to  the  diverse  needs 
of  the  trade  of  Tsingtao,  in  the  selection  of  a  suitable  staff 
for  the  said  custom  house. 

IV.     Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway 

Should  the  joint  railway  commission  provided  for  in  Article 
XVI  of  the  present  Treaty  fail  to  reach  an  agreement  on  any 
matter  within  its  competence,  the  point  or  points  at  issue  shall 
be  taken  up  by  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  and 
the  Government  of  Japan  for  discussion  and  adjustment  by 
means  of  diplomacy. 

In  the  determination  of  such  point  or  points,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Chinese  Republic  and  the  Government  of  Japan 
shall,  if  necessary,  obtain  recommendations  of  experts  of  a 
third  power  or  powers  who  shall  be  designated  in  common 
accord  between  the  two  Governments. 

V.     Chefoo-Weihsien  Railway 

The  Government  of  Japan  will  not  claim  that  the  option 
for  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  Railway  should  be  made 
open  to  the  common  activity  of  the  International  Financial 
Consortium,  provided  that  the  said  railway  is  to  be  constructed 
with  Chinese  capital. 

VI.     Opening  of  the  Former  German  Leased  Territory  of 
Kiaochow 

The  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  declares  that, 
pending  the  enactment  and  general  application  of  laws  regu- 
lating the  system  of  local  self-government  in  China,  the  Chi- 
nese local  authorities  will  ascertain  the  views  of  the  foreign 
residents  in  the  former  German  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow 


APPENDIX  287 

in  such  municipal  matters  as  may  directly  affect  their  welfare 
and  interests. 

D.     UNDERSTANDINGS    RECORDED    IN    THE    MINUTES 
OF  CHINO-JAPANESE  CONVERSATIONS 

I.     Transfer  of  Public  Properties 

1.  Japanese  subjects  will  be  permitted,  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  Chinese  law,  to  become  members  or  shareholders  of 
any  of  the  commercial  companies  to  be  formed  with  respect 
to  public  enterprises  mentioned  in  Paragraph  4  of  Annex  II 
of  the  Treaty. 

n.     Withdrawal  of  Japanese  Troops 

2.  After  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops  provided  for 
in  Article  IX  of  the  Treaty,  no  Japanese  military  force  of  any 
kind  will  remain  in  any  part  of  Shantung. 

m.     Tstngtao-Tsinanfu  Railway 

3.  All  light  railways  constructed  by  Japan  in  Shantung  and 
all  properties  appurtenant  thereto  shall  be  considered  as  part 
of  the  properties  of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway. 

4.  The  telegraph  lines  along  the  Railway  shall  also  be  con- 
sidered as  part  of  the  Railway  properties. 

5.  The  Chinese  authorities,  upon  taking  over  the  Railway, 
shall  have  full  power  and  discretion  to  retain  or  to  remove  the 
present  employees  of  Japanese  nationality  in  the  service  of  the 
Railway.     In  replacing  such  employees,  reasonable  notice  shall 
be  given  before  the  date  of  the  transfer  of  the  Railway.     De- 
tailed arrangements  regarding  the  replacements  to  take  effect 
immediately  on  the  transfer  of  the  Railway  are  to  be  made  by 
the  Joint  Railway  Commission  provided  for  in  Article  XVI 
of  the  Treaty. 

6.  The  entire  subordinate  staff  of  the  Japanese  Traffic  Man- 
ager and  the  Japanese  Chief  Accountant  of  the  Railway  is  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Chinese  Managing  Director.     After  two 
years  and  a  half  from  the  date  of  the  transfer  of  the  Railway, 
the    Chinese   Government    may    appoint    an    Assistant   Traffic 
Manager  of  Chinese  nationality  for  the  period  of  two  years 


288  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

and  a  half,  and  such  Chinese  Assistant  Traffic  Manager  may 
likewise  be  appointed  at  any  time  upon  notice  being  given  for 
the  redemption  of  the  Treasury  Notes  under  Article  XVIII 
of  the  Treaty. 

7.  The  Chinese  Government  is  under  no  obligation  to  ap- 
point Japanese  subjects  as  members  of   the  subordinate  staff 
above  mentioned. 

8.  The  redemption  of  the  Treasury   Notes  under  Article 
XVIII  of  the  Treaty  will  not  be  effected  with  funds  raised 
from  any  source  other  than  Chinese. 

9.  The  Chinese  Government  will  ask  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment for  such  information  as  may  be  useful  in  making  the 
selection  of  the  Japanese  Traffic  Manager  and  the  Japanese 
Chief  Accountant  of  the  Railway. 

10.  All  questions  relating  to  the  existing  contracts  or  commit- 
ments made  by  the  Japanese  authorities  in  charge  of  the  Rail- 
way shall  be  settled  by  the  Joint  Railway  Commission;  and, 
prior  to  the  transfer  of  the  Railway,  the  said  Japanese  author- 
ities will  not  make  any  new  contracts  or  commitments  calcu- 
lated to  be  harmful  to  the  interests  of  the  Railway. 

IV.     Opening  of  the  Former  German  Leased  Territory  of 
Kiaochow 

11.  The  term  "lawful  pursuits"  used  in  Article  XXIII  of 
the  Treaty  shall  not  be  so  construed  as  to  include  agriculture, 
or  any  enterprise  prohibited  by  Chinese  law  or  not  permitted 
to  foreign  nationals  under  the  treaties  between  China  and  for- 
eign Powers,  it  being  understood  that  this  definition  shall  be 
without  prejudice  to  the  question  of  the  salt  industry  provided 
for  in  Article  XXV  of  the  Treaty  or  to  any  question  relating 
to  vested  rights  which  shall  be  determined  in  accordance  with 
Article  XXIV  of  the  Treaty. 

V.     Post  Offices 

12.  All  the  Japanese  Post  Offices  outside  of  the  former  Ger- 
man Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  shall  be  withdrawn  simul- 
taneously with  the  transfer  of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway, 
if  such  transfer  shall  take  place  before  January  1,  1923,  and, 
in  any  case,  not  later  than  the  said  date. 


APPENDIX  289 

13.  All  the  Japanese  Post  Offices  within  the  former  German 
Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow  shall  be  withdrawn  simultane- 
ously with  the  transfer  of  the  administration  of  the  said  Ter- 
ritory. 

VI.    Claims 

14.  The  omission  of  any  reference  in  the  Treaty  to  the  ques- 
tion of  claims  which  Chinese  citizens  may  have  against  the 
Japanese  authorities  or  Japanese  subjects,   for  the   restitution 
of  real  property  in  Shantung  or  for  damages  to  the  persons  and 
property  of  Chinese  citizens  in  Shantung,  shall  not  prejudice 
such  claims. 

15.  The    Chinese    authorities    shall    furnish    the    Japanese 
authorities  with  a  list  of  such  claims  together  with  all  available 
evidence  in  support  of  each  claim.    Justice  shall  be  done  through 
diplomatic  channel  as  regards  the  claims  against  the  Japanese 
authorities,  and  through  ordinary  judicial  procedure  as  regards 
the  claims  against  Japanese  subjects.    With  respect  to  the  latter 
class  of  claims,  the  investigation  into  actual  facts  of  each  case 
may,   if   necessary,   be  conducted   by   a  Joint   Commission   of 
Japanese  and  Chinese  officials,  in  equal  number,  to  be  specially 
designated  for  that  purpose. 

16.  The  Japanese  Government  shall  not  be  held  responsible 
for  any  damages  which  may  have  been  directly  caused  by  mili- 
tary operations  of  Japan,  during  the  late  war. 


Appendix  III 
THE  TWENTY-ONE   DEMANDS 


A.    BARON    SHIDEHARA'S    STATEMENT'   BEFORE    THE 
FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  FEBRUARY  2,  1922 

"At  a  previous  session  of  this  Committee,  the  Chinese  dele- 
gation presented  a  statement  urging  that  the  Sino-Japanese 
Treaties  and  Notes  of  1915  be  reconsidered  and  cancelled.  The 
Japanese  delegation,  while  appreciating  the  difficult  position  of 
the  Chinese  delegation,  does  not  feel  at  liberty  to  concur  in 
the  procedure  now  resorted  to  by  China  with  a  view  to  cancel- 
lation of  international  engagements  which  she  entered  into  as 
a  free  sovereign  nation. 

"It  is  presumed  that  the  Chinese  delegation  has  no  intention 
of  calling  in  question  the  legal  validity  of  the  compacts  of  1915, 
which  were  formally  signed  and  sealed  by  the  duly  authorized 
representatives  of  the  two  Governments,  and  for  which  the 
exchange  of  ratifications  was  effected  in  conformity  with  estab- 
lished international  usages.  The  insistence  by  China  on  the 
cancellation  of  those  instruments  would  in  itself  indicate  that 
she  shares  the  view  that  the  compacts  actually  remain  in  force 
and  will  continue  to  be  effective,  unless  and  until  they  are 
cancelled. 

"It  is  evident  that  no  nation  can  have  given  ready  consent 
to  cessions  of  its  territorial  or  other  rights  of  importance.  If 
it  should  once  be  recognized  that  rights  solemnly  granted  by 
treaty  may  be  revoked  at  any  time  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  conceded  against  the  spontaneous  will  of  the  grantor,  an 
exceedingly  dangerous  precedent  will  be  established,  with  far- 
reaching  consequences  upon  the  stability  of  the  existing  inter- 
national relations  in  Asia,  in  Europe  and  everywhere. 

"The  statement  of  the  Chinese  delegation  under  review 

290 


APPENDIX  291 

declares  that  China  accepted  the  Japanese  demands  in  1915, 
hoping  that  a  day  would  come  when  she  should  have  the  oppor- 
tunity of  bringing  them  up  for  reconsideration  and  cancellation. 
It  is,  however,  difficult  to  understand  the  meaning  of  this 
assertion.  It  cannot  be  the  intention  of  the  Chinese  delegation 
to  intimate  that  China  may  conclude  a  treaty,  with  any  thought 
of  breaking  it  at  the  first  opportunity. 

"The  Chinese  delegation  maintains  that  the  Treaties  and 
Notes  in  question  are  derogatory  to  the  principles  adopted  by 
the  Conference  with  regard  to  China's  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence. It  has,  however,  been  held  by  the  Conference  on 
more  than  one  occasion  that  concessions  made  by  China  ex  con- 
tractu,  in  the  exercise  of  her  own  sovereign  rights,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  inconsistent  with  her  sovereignty  and  independence. 
"It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  the  term  'Twenty  One 
Demands,'  often  used  to  denote  the  Treaties  and  Notes  of 
1915,  is  inaccurate  and  grossly  misleading.  It  may  give  rise 
to  an  erroneous  impression  that  the  whole  original  proposals 
of  Japan  had  been  pressed  by  Japan  and  accepted  in  toto  by 
China.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  not  only  'Group  V  but  also  sev- 
eral other  matters  contained  in  Japan's  first  proposals  were 
eliminated  entirely  or  modified  considerably,  in  deference  to 
the  wishes  of  the  Chinese  Government,  when  the  final  formula 
was  presented  tq  China  for  acceptance.  Official  records  pub- 
lished by  the  two  Governments  relating  to  those  negotiations 
will  further  show  that  the  most  important  terms  of  the  Treaties 
and  Notes,  as  signed,  had  already  been  virtually  agreed  to  by 
the  Chinese  negotiators  before  the  delivery  of  the  ultimatum, 
which  then  seemed  to  the  Japanese  Government  the  only  way 
of  bringing  the  protracted  negotiations  to  a  speedy  close. 

"The  Japanese  delegation  cannot  bring  itself  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  any  useful  purpose  will  be  served  by  research  and 
re-examination  at  this  Conference  of  old  grievances  which  one 
of  the  nations  represented  here  may  have  against  another.  It 
will  be  more  in  line  with  the  high  aim  of  the  Conference  to 
look  forward  to  the  future  with  hope  and  with  confidence. 

"Having  in  view,  however,  the  changes  which^have  taken 
place  in  the  situation  since  the  conclusion  of  the  Sino-Japanese 


292  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Treaties  and  Notes  of  1915,  the  Japanese  delegation  is  happy 
to  avail  itself  of  the  present  occasion  to  make  the  following 
declaration : 

"1.  Japan  is  ready  to  throw  open  to  the  joint  activity  of 
the  International  Financial  Consortium  recently  organized, 
the  right  of  option  granted  exclusively  in  favor  of  Japanese 
capital,  with  regard,  first,  to  loans  for  the  construction  of 
railways  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 
and,  second,  to  loans  to  be  secured  on  taxes  in  that  region; 
it  being  understood  that  nothing  in  the  present  declaration 
shall  be  held  to  imply  any  modification  or  annulment  of  the 
understanding  recorded  in  the  officially  announced  notes  and 
memoranda  which  were  exchanged  among  the  Governments 
of  the  countries  represented  in  the  Consortium  and  also 
among  the  national  financial  groups  composing  the  Consor- 
tium, in  relation  to  the  scope  of  the  joint  activity  of  that 
organization. 

"2.  Japan  has  no  intention  of  insisting  on  her  preferential 
right  under  the  Sino-Japanese  arrangements  in  question  con- 
cerning the  engagement  by  China  of  Japanese  advisers  or 
instructors  on  political,  financial,  military  or  police  matters 
in  South  Manchuria. 

"3.  Japan  is  further  ready  to  withdraw  the  reservation 
which  she  made,  in  proceeding  to  the  signature  of  the  Sino- 
Japanese  Treaties  and  Notes  of  1915,  to  the  effect  that 
Group  V  of  the  original  proposals  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment would  be  postponed  for  future  negotiations. 

"It  would  be  needless  to  add  that  all  matters  relating  to 
Shantung  contained  in  those  Treaties  and  Notes  have  now 
been  definitely  adjusted  and  disposed  of. 

"In  coming  to  this  decision,  which  I  have  had  the  honor  to 
announce,  Japan  has  been  guided  by  a  spirit  of  fairness  and 
moderation,  having  always  in  view  China's  sovereign  rights 
and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity." 


APPENDIX  293 

B.    MR.  WANG'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EAST- 
ERN  COMMITTEE,  FEBRUARY  3,   1922 

"The  Chinese  delegation  has  taken  note  of  the  statement  of 
Baron  Shidehara  made  at  yesterday's  session  of  the  committee 
with  reference  to  the  Sino-Japanese  Treaties  and  Notes  of 
May  25,  1915. 

"The  Chinese  delegation  learns  with  satisfaction  that  Japan 
is  now  ready  to  throw  open  to  the  joint  activity  of  the  banking 
interests  of  other  powers  the  right  of  option  granted  exclusively 
in  favor  of  Japanese  capital  with  regard,  first,  to  loans  for  the 
construction  of  railways  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  and  second,  to  loans  secured  on  taxes  in  that  region ; 
and  that  Japan  has  no  intention  of  insisting  upon  a  preferen- 
tial right  concerning  the  engagement  by  China  of  Japanese 
advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial,  military  or  police 
matters  in  South  Manchuria;  also  that  Japan  now  withdraws 
the  reservation  which  she  made  to  the  effect  that  Group  V  of 
her  original  demands  upon  China  should  be  postponed  for 
future  negotiation. 

"The  Chinese  delegation  greatly  regrets  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  should  not  have  been  led  to  renounce  the  other 
claims  predicated  upon  the  Treaties  and  Notes  of  1915. 

"The  Japanese  delegation  expressed  the  opinion  that  abroga- 
tion of  these  agreements  would  constitute  'an  exceedingly  dan- 
gerous precedent,  with  far-reaching  consequences  upon  the 
stability  of  the  existing  international  relations  in  Asia,  in  Europe 
and  everywhere.' 

"The  Chinese  delegation  has  the  honor  to  say  that  a  still 
more  dangerous  precedent  will  be  established  with  consequences 
upon  the  stability  of  international  relations  which  cannot  be 
estimated  if,  without  rebuke  or  protest  from  other  powers,  one 
nation  can  obtain  from  a  friendly,  but  in  a  military  sense, 
weaker  neighbor,  and  under  circumstances  such  as  attended 
the  negotiation  and  signing  of  the  Treaties  of  1915,  valuable 
concessions  which  were  not  in  satisfaction  of  pending  contro- 
versies and  for  which  no  quid  pro  quo  was  offered.  These 
Treaties  and  Notes  stand  out,  indeed,  unique  in  the  annals  of 


294  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

international  relations.  History  records  scarcely  another  in- 
stance in  which  demands  of  such  a  serious  character  as  those 
which  Japan  presented  to  China  in  1915  have,  without  even 
pretense  of  provocation,  been  suddenly  presented  by  one  nation 
to  another  nation  with  which  it  was  at  the  time  in  friendly 
relations. 

"No  apprehension  need  be  entertained  that  the  abrogation 
of  the  agreements  of  1915  will  serve  as  a  precedent  for  the 
annulment  of  other  agreements  since  it  is  confidently  hoped 
that  the  future  will  furnish  no  such  similar  occurrence. 

"So  exceptional  were  the  conditions  under  which  the  agree- 
ments of  1915  were  negotiated,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  felt  justified  in  referring  to  them  in  the  identic  note  of 
May  13,  1915,  which  it  sent  to  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Gov- 
ernments. That  note  began  with  the  statement  that  'in  view 
of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations  which  have  taken  place 
and  which  are  now  pending  between  the  Government  of  China 
and  the  Government  of  Japan,  and  of  the  agreements  which 
have  been  reached  as  the  result  thereof,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  the  honor  to  notify  the  Government  of  the 
Chinese  Republic  (Japan)  that  it  cannot  recognize  any  agree- 
ment or  undertaking  which  has  been  entered  into  between  the 
Governments  of  China  and  Japan  impairing  the  treaty  rights  of 
the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China,  or  the  political  or 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China,  or  the  interna- 
tional policy  relative  to  China  commonly  known  as  the  Open 
Door  policy.* 

"Conscious  of  her  obligations  to  the  other  Powers,  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  immediately  after  signing  the  agreements, 
published  a  formal  statement  protesting  against  the  agreements 
which  she  had  been  compelled  to  sign,  and  disclaiming  respon- 
sibility for  consequent  violations  of  treaty  rights  of  the  other 
Powers.  In  the  statement  thus  issued  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment declared  that  although  they  were  'constrained  to  comply 
in  full  with  the  terms  of  the  (Japanese)  ultimatum,'  they 
nevertheless  'disclaim  any  desire  to  associate  themselves  with 
any  revision  which  may  be  thus  effected,  of  the  various  con- 
ventions and  agreements  concluded  between  the  other  Powers 


APPENDIX  295 

in  respect  of  the  maintenance  of  China's  territorial  indepen- 
dence and  integrity,  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo,  and 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  indus- 
try of  all  nations  in  China.' 

"Because  of  the  essential  injustice  of  these  provisions,  the 
Chinese  delegation,  acting  in  behalf  of  the  Chinese  Government 
and  of  the  Chinese  people,  has  felt  itself  in  duty  bound  to 
present  to  this  Conference,  representing  the  powers  with  sub- 
stantial interests  in  the  Far  East,  the  question  as  to  the  equity 
and  justice  of  these  agreements  and  therefore  as  to  their  funda- 
mental validity. 

"If  Japan  is  disposed  to  rely  solely  upon  a  claim  as  to  the 
technical  or  juristic  validity  of  the  agreements  of  1915,  as 
having  been  actually  signed  in  due  form  by  the  two  Govern- 
ments, it  may  be  said  that  so  far  as  this  Conference  is  con- 
cerned, the  contention  is  largely  irrelevant,  for  this  gathering 
of  the  representatives  of  the  nine  Powers,  has  not  had  for  its 
purpose  the  maintenance  of  the  legal  status  quo.  Upon  the 
contrary,  the  purpose  has  been,  if  possible,  to  bring  about  such 
changes  in  existing  conditions  upon  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Far 
East  as  might  be  expected  to  promote  that  enduring  friendship 
among  the  nations  of  which  the  President  of  the  United  States 
spoke  in  his  letter  of  invitation  to  the  Powers  to  participate  in 
this  Conference. 

"For  the  following  reasons,  therefore,  the  Chinese  delegation 
is  of  the  opinion  that  the  Sino-Japanese  Treaties  and  Exchange 
of  Notes  of  May  25,  1915,  should  form  the  subject  of  impartial 
examination  with  a  view  to  their  abrogation: 

"1.  In  exchange  for  the  concessions  demanded  of  China, 
Japan  offered  no  quid  pro  quo.  The  benefits  derived  from 
the  agreements  were  wholly  unilateral. 

"2.  The  agreements,  in  important  respects,  are  in  violation 
of  treaties  between  China  and  the  other  Powers. 

"3.  The  agreements  are  inconsistent  with  the  principles  relat- 
ing to  China  which  have  been  adopted  by  the  Conference. 

"4.  The  agreements  have  engendered  constant  misunder- 
standings between  China  and  Japan,  and,  if  not  abrogated, 
will  necessarily  tend,  in  the  future,  to  disturb  friendly  relations 


296  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

between  the  two  countries,  and  will  thus  constitute  an  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  realizing  the  purpose  for  the  attainment  of  which 
this  Conference  was  convened.  As  to  this,  the  Chinese  dele- 
gation, by  way  of  conclusion,  can,  perhaps,  do  no  better  than 
quote  from  a  resolution  introduced  in  the  Japanese  parliament 
in  June,  1915,  by  Mr.  Hara,  later  premier  of  Japan,  a  resolu- 
tion which  received  the  support  of  some  130  of  the  members  of 
the  parliament. 

"The  resolution  reads: 

Resolved,  that  the  negotiations  carried  on  with  China  by 
the  present  Government  have  been  inappropriate  in  every 
respect;  that  they  are  detrimental  to  the  amicable  relation- 
ship between  the  two  countries,  and  -provocative  of  suspicions 
on  the  part  of  the  Powers;  that  they  have  the  effect  of 
lowering  the  prestige  of  the  Japanese  Empire;  and  that, 
while  far  from  capable  of  establishing  the  foundation  of 
peace  in  the  Far  East,  they  will  form  the  source  of  future 
trouble. 

"The  foregoing  declaration  has  been  made  in  order  that  the 
Chinese  Government  may  have  upon  record  the  view  which 
it  takes,  and  will  continue  to  take,  regarding  the  Sino-Japanese 
Treaties  and  Exchange  of  Notes  of  May  25,  1915." 

C.     MR.  HUGHES'  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EAST- 
ERN COMMITTEE,  FEBRUARY  3,  1922 

"The  important  statement  made  by  Baron  Shidehara  on 
behalf  of  the  Japanese  Government  makes  it  appropriate  that 
I  should  refer  to  the  position  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  as  it  was  set  forth  in  identical  notes  addressed  by  that 
Government  to  the  Chinese  Government  and  to  the  Japanese 
Government  on  May  13,  1915. 

"The  note  to  the  Chinese  Government  was  as  follows: 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations  which 
have  taken  place  and  which  are  now  pending  between  the 
Government  of  China  and  the  Government  of  Japan  and 
of  the  agreements  which  have  been  reached  as  a  result 


APPENDIX  297 

thereof,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  the  honor 
to  notify  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  that  it 
cannot  recognize  any  agreement  or  undertaking  which  has 
been  entered  into  or  which  may  be  entered  into  between  the 
Governments  of  China  and  Japan  impairing  the  treaty 
rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China,  the 
political  or  territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China 
or  the  international  policy  relative  to  China  commonly 
known  as  the  Open  Door  policy. 

An  identical  note  has  been  transmitted  to  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government. 

"That  statement  was  in  accord  with  the  historical  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  its  relations  to  China,  and  its  posi- 
tion as  thus  stated  has  been  and  still  is  consistently  maintained. 

"It  has  been  gratifying  to  learn  that  the  matters  concerning 
Shantung,  which  formed  the  substance  of  Group  1  of  the  origi- 
nal demands  and  were  the  subject  of  the  Treaty  and  Exchange 
of  Notes  with  respect  to  the  Province  of  Shantung,  have  been 
settled  to  the  mutual  satisfaction  of  the  two  parties  by  negotia- 
tions made  collaterally  with  this  Conference  as  reported  to  the 
plenary  session  February  1. 

"It  is  also  gratifying  to  be  advised  by  the  statement  made 
by  Baron  Shidehara,  on  behalf  of  the  Japanese  Government, 
that  Japan  is  now  ready  to  withdraw  the  reservation  which 
she  made  in  proceeding  to  the  signature  of  the  Treaties  and 
Notes  of  1915,  to  the  effect  that  Group  V  of  the  original  pro- 
posals of  the  Japanese  Government — namely,  those  concerning 
the  employment  of  influential  Japanese  as  political,  financial 
and  military  advisers,  land  for  schools  and  hospitals,  certain 
railways  in  South  China,  the  supply  of  arms  and  the  right  of 
preaching — would  be  prepared  for  future  negotiations. 

"This  definite  withdrawal  of  the  outstanding  questions  under 
Group  V  removes  what  has  been  an  occasion  for  apprehension 
on  the  part  of  China  and  other  foreign  nations  which  felt  that 
the  renewal  of  these  demands  could  not  but  prejudice  the  open 
door. 

"With  respect  to  the  Treaty  and  Notes  concerning  South 


298  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  Baron  Shidehara  has 
made  the  reassuring  statement  that  Japan  has  no  intention  of 
insisting  on  a  preferential  right  concerning  the  engagement  by 
China  of  Japanese  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial, 
military  or  police  matters  in  South  Manchuria. 

"Baron  Shidehara  has  likewise  indicated  the  readiness  of 
Japan  not  to  insist  on  the  right  of  option  granted  exclusively 
in  favor  of  Japanese  capital  with  regard,  first  to  loans  for  the 
construction  of  railways  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  and,  second,  with  regard  to  loans  secured  on  the 
taxes  of  those  regions;  but  that  Japan  will  throw  them  open 
to  the  joint  activity  of  the  International  Financial  Consortium 
recently  organized. 

"As  to  this,  I  say  that  it  is  doubtless  the  fact  that  any  enter- 
prise of  the  character  which  may  be  undertaken  in  the  regions 
by  foreign  capital  would  in  all  probability  be  undertaken  by 
the  Consortium.  But  it  should  be  observed  that  existing  treaties 
would  leave  the  opportunity  for  such  enterprises  open  on  terms 
of  equality  to  the  citizens  of  all  nations.  It  can  scarcely  be 
assumed  that  this  general  right  of  the  treaty  powers  in  China 
can  be  effectively  restricted  to  the  nationals  of  those  countries 
which  are  participants  in  the  work  of  the  Consortium,  or  that 
any  of  the  Governments  which  have  taken  part  in  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Consortium  would  feel  themselves  to  be  in  a 
position  to  deny  all  rights  in  the  matter  to  any  save  the  mem- 
bers of  their  respective  national  groups  in  that  organization. 

"I  therefore  trust  that  it  is  in  this  sense  that  we  may  properly 
interpret  the  Japanese  Government's  declaration  of  willingness 
to  relinquish  its  claim  under  the  1915  treaties  to  any  exclusive 
position  with  respect  to  railway  construction  and  to  financial 
operations  secured  upon  local  revenues  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 

"It  is  further  to  be  pointed  out  that  by  Articles  II  and  IV 
of  the  Treaty  of  May  25,  1915,  with  respect  to  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  Chinese  Government 
granted  the  Japanese  subjects  the  right  to  lease  land  for  build- 
ing purposes,  for  trade  and  agricultural  purposes  in  South 
Manchuria,  to  reside  and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to 


APPENDIX  299 

engage  in  any  kind  of  business  and  manufacture  there,  and  to 
enter  into  joint  undertakings  with  Chinese  citizens  in  agricul- 
tural and  similar  industries  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 

"With  respect  to  this  grant,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  will,  of  course,  regard  it  as  not  intended  to  be  exclusive, 
and,  as  in  the  past,  will  claim  from  the  Chinese  Government 
for  American  citizens  the  benefits  accruing  to  them  by  virtue 
of  the  most  favored  nation  clauses  in  the  treaties  between  the 
United  States  and  China. 

"I  may  pause  here  to  remark  that  the  question  of  the  validity 
of  the  treaties  as  between  Japan  and  China  is  distinct  from 
the  question  of  the  treaty  rights  of  the  United  States  under 
its  treaties  with  China;  these  rights  have  been  emphasized  and 
constantly  asserted  by  the  United  States. 

"In  this,  as  in  all  matters  similarly  affecting  the  general 
right  of  its  citizens  to  engage  in  commercial  enterprise  in  China, 
it  has  been  the  traditional  policy  of  the  American  Government 
to  insist  upon  the  doctrine  of  equality  for  the  nationals  of  all 
countries,  and  this  policy,  together  with  the  other  policies  men- 
tioned in  the  note  of  May  13,  1915,  which  I  have  quoted,  are 
consistently  maintained  by  this  Government.  I  may  say  that 
it  is  with  especial  pleasure  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  finds  itself  now  engaged  in  the  act  of  reaffirming  and 
defining,  and,  I  hope  that  I  may  add,  revitalizing,  by  the  pro- 
posed Nine- Power  Treaty,  these  policies  with  respect  to  China," 


Appendix  IV 
THE   OPEN   DOOR 


A.  ROOT  RESOLUTION  ADOPTED  BY  THE  FAR  EAST- 

ERN COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  21,   1921 

It  is  the  firm  intention  of  the  Powers  attending  this  Con- 
ference hereinafter  mentioned,  to  wit,  the  United  States  of 
America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire,  France;  Italy,  Japan, 
the  Netherlands  and  Portugal: 

1.  To   respect   the   sovereignty,    the   independence   and    the 
territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China. 

2.  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unembarrassed   oppor- 
tunity to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  an  effective 
and  stable  government. 

3.  To   use   their   influence   for   the   purpose   of   effectually 
establishing  and  maintaining  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity 
for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  throughout  the 
territory  of  China. 

4.  To  refrain   from  taking  advantage  of  the  present  con- 
ditions in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or  privileges  which  would 
abridge  the  rights  of  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly  States 
and  from  countenancing  action  inimical  to  the  security  of  such 
States. 

B.  HUGHES  RESOLUTION  FOR  ENFORCING  THE  OPEN 
DOOR,  ADOPTED  BY  THE  FAR  EASTERN  COMMIT- 
TEE, JANUARY  18,   1922 

I.  With  a  view  to  applying  more  effectually  the  principles 
of  the  open  door  or  equality  of  opportunity  in  China  for  the 
trade  and  industry  of  all  nations,  the  Powers  other  than  China 
represented  at  this  Conference  agree: 

(a)  Not  to  seek  or  to  support  their  nationals  in  seeking  any 

300 


APPENDIX  301 

arrangement  which  might  purport  to  establish  in  favor  of  their 
interests  any  general  superiority  of  rights  with  respect  to  com- 
mercial or  economic  development  in  any  designated  region  of 
China ; 

(b)  Not  to  seek  or  to  support  their  nationals  in  seeking  any 
such  monopoly  or  preferences  as  would  deprive  other  nationals 
of  the  right  of  undertaking  any  legitimate  trade  or  industry  in 
China  or  of  participating  with  the  Chinese  Government  or  with 
any  local  authority  in  any  category  or  public  enterprise  which 
by  reason  of  its  scope,  duration  or  geographical  extent  is  cal- 
culated to  frustrate  the  practical  application  of  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity. 

It  is  understood  that  this  agreement  is  not  to  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  prohibit  the  acquisition  of  such  properties  or  rights 
as  may  be  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  a  particular  commercial, 
industrial  or  financial  undertaking  or  to  the  encouragement  of 
invention  and  research. 

II.  The  Chinese  Government  takes  note  of  the  above  agree- 
ment and  declares  its  intention  of  being  guided  by  the  same 
principles,  in  dealing  with  applications  for  economic  rights  and 
privileges  from  Governments  and  nationals  of  all  foreign  coun- 
tries whether  parties  to  that  agreement  or  not. 

III.  The  Powers,  including  China,  represented  at  this  Con- 
ference agree  in  principle  to  the  establishment  in  China  of  a 
Board  of  Reference  to  which  any  question  arising  on  the  above 
agreement  and  declaration  may  be  referred   for  investigation 
and  report.      (A  detailed  scheme  for  the  constitution  of  the 
board  shall  be  framed  by  the  special  conference  referred   to 
in  Article  I.  of  the  convention  on  Chinese  customs  duties.) 

C.  ROOT  RESOLUTION  PREVENTING  THE  CREATION 
OF  SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE.  ADOPTED  BY  THE 
FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  JANUARY  21,  1922 

Resolved,  That  the  signatory  Powers  will  not  support  any 
agreement  by  their  respective  nationals  with  each  other  de- 
signed to  create  spheres  of  influence  or  to  provide  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  exclusive  opportunity  in  designated  parts  of  Chinese 
territory. 


302  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

D.  GEDDES  RESOLUTION  AGAINST  RATE  DISCRIMINA- 
TION ON  CHINESE  RAILWAYS.     ADOPTED  BY  THE 
FAR  EASTERN   COMMITTEE,   NOVEMBER   10,   1921 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  throughout  the  whole 
of  the  railways  in  China,  it  will  not  exercise  or  permit  any 
unfair  discrimination  of  any  kind.  In  particular  there  shall 
be  no  discrimination  whatever,  direct  or  indirect,  in  respect  of 
charges  or  of  facilities  on  the  ground  of  the  nationality  of 
passengers  or  the  countries  from  which  or  to  which  they  are 
proceeding,  or  the  origin  or  ownership  of  goods  or  the  country 
from  which  or  to  which  they  are  consigned,  or  the  nationality 
or  ownership  of  the  ship  or  other  means  of  conveying  such 
passengers  or  goods  before  or  after  their  transport  on  the  Chi- 
nese railways. 

The  other  Powers  represented  at  this  Conference  take  note 
of  the  above  declaration  and  make  a  corresponding  declaration 
in  respect  of  any  of  the  aforesaid  railways  over  which  they  or 
their  nationals  are  in  a  position  to  exercise  any  control  in  virtue 
of  any  concession,  special  agreement  or  otherwise. 

Any  question  arising  under  this  declaration  may  be  referred 
by  any  of  the  Powers  concerned  to  the  Board  of  Reference, 
when  established,  for  consideration  and  report. 

E.  THE  OPEN  DOOR  TREATY  BASED  UPON  THE  FORE- 
GOING FOUR  RESOLUTIONS,   SIGNED   FEBRUARY  6, 
1922 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire, 
China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal : 

Desiring  to  adopt  a  policy  designed  to  stabilize  conditions 
in  the  Far  East,  to  safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of  China, 
and  to  promote  intercourse  between  China  and  the  other 
Powers  upon  the  basis  of  equality  of  opportunity; 

Have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  for  that  purpose,  and  to 
that  end  have  appointed  as  their  respective  plenipotentiaries: 

[here  follows  list  of  delegates] 

who,  having  communicated   to  each  other  their  full   powers, 
found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows: 


APPENDIX  803 

Article  I 

The  contracting  Powers,  other  than  China,  agree: 

1.  To    respect   the    sovereignty,    the   independence   and   the 
territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China; 

2.  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unembarrassed  oppor- 
tunity to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  an  effective 
and  stable  government; 

3.  To  use  their  influence  for  the  purpose  of  effectually  estab- 
lishing and  maintaining  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for 
the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  throughout  the  terri- 
tory of  China; 

4.  To  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of  conditions  in  China 
in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or  privileges  which  would  abridge 
the  rights  of  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly  states,  and  from 
countenancing  action  inimical  to  the  security  of  such  states. 

Article  II 

The  contracting  Powers  agree  not  to  enter  into  any  treaty, 
agreement,  arrangement  or  understanding,  either  with  one  an- 
other, or,  individually  or  collectively,  with  any  Power  or 
Powers,  which  would  infringe  or  impair  the  principles  stated 
in  Article  I. 

Article  HI 

With  a  view  to  applying  more  effectually  the  principles  of 
the  open  door  or  equality  of  opportunity  in  China  for  the  trade 
and  industry  of  all  nations,  the  contracting  Powers,  other  than 
China,  agree  that  they  will  not  seek,  nor  support  their  respec- 
tive nationals  in  seeking — 

(a)  Any  arrangement  which  might  purport  to  establish  in 
favor  of  their  interests  any  general  superiority  of  rights  with 
respect  to  commercial  or  economic  development  in  any  desig- 
nated region  of  China; 

(b)  Any  such  monopoly  or  preference  as  would  deprive  the 
nationals  of  any  other  Power  of  the  right  of  undertaking  any 
legitimate  trade  or  industry  in  China,  or  of  participating  with 
the  Chinese  Government,  or  with  any  local  authority,  in  any 
category  of  public  enterprise,  or  which  by  reason  of  its  scope, 


304*  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

duration  or  geographical  extent  is  calculated  to  frustrate  the 
practical  application  of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity. 

It  is  understood  that  the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this  article 
are  not  to  be  so  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  acquisition  of  such 
properties  or  rights  as  may  be  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  a 
particular  commercial,  industrial  or  financial  undertaking  or 
to  the  encouragement  of  invention  and  research. 

China  undertakes  to  be  guided  by  the  principles  stated  in 
the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this  article  in  dealing  with  appli- 
cations for  economic  rights  and  privileges  from  Governments 
and  nationals  of  all  foreign  countries,  whether  parties  to  the 
present  Treaty  or  not. 

Article  IV 

The  contracting  Powers  agree  not  to  support  any  agreements 
by  their  respective  nationals  with  each  other  designed  to  create 
spheres  of  influence  or  to  provide  for  the  enjoyment  of  mutually 
exclusive  opportunities  in  designated  parts  of  Chinese  territory. 

Article  V 

China  agrees  that,  throughout  the  whole  of  the  railways  in 
China,  she  will  not  exercise  or  permit  unfair  discrimination 
of  any  kind.  In  particular  there  shall  be  no  discrimination 
whatever,  direct  or  indirect,  in  respect  of  charges  or  of  facili- 
ties on  the  ground  of  the  nationality  of  passengers  or  the  coun- 
tries from  which  or  to  which  they  are  proceeding,  or  the  origin 
or  ownership  of  goods  or  the  country  from  which  or  to  which 
they  are  consigned,  or  the  nationality  or  ownership  of  the  ship 
or  other  means  of  conveying  such  passengers  or  goods  before 
or  after  their  transport  on  the  Chinese  railways. 

The  contracting  Powers,  other  than  China,  assume  a  corre- 
sponding obligation  in  respect  to  any  of  the  aforesaid  railways 
over  which  they  or  their  nationals  are  in  a  position  to  exer- 
cise any  control  in  virtue  of  any  concession,  special  agreement 
or  otherwise. 

'Article  VI 

The  contracting  Powers,  other  than  China,  agree  fully  to 
respect  China's  rights  as  a  neutral  in  time  of  war  to  which 


APPENDIX  305 

China  is  not  a  party;  and  China  declares  that  when  she  is  a 
neutral  she  will  observe  the  obligations  of  neutrality. 

Article  VII 

The  contracting  Powers  agree  that,  whenever  a  situation 
arises  which,  in  the  opinion  of  any  one  of  them,  involves  the 
applications  of  the  stipulations  of  the  present  Treaty,  and  ren- 
ders desirable  discussion  of  such  application,  there  shall  be  full 
and  frank  communication  between  the  contracting  Powers 
concerned. 

Article  VIII 

Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  Treaty,  which  have 
Governments  recognized  by  the  signatory  Powers  and  which 
have  treaty  relations  with  China,  shall  be  invited  to  adhere 
to  the  present  Treaty.  To  this  end  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  make  the  necessary  communications  to 
nonsignatory  Powers  and  will  inform  the  contracting  Powers 
of  the  replies  received.  Adherence  by  any  Power  shall  become 
effective  on  receipt  of  notice  thereof  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States. 

Article  IX 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  contracting 
Powers  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitutional 
methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  all 
the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Washington  as  soon 
as  possible.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  will  trans- 
mit to  the  other  contracting  Powers  a  certified  copy  of  the 
proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications. 

The  present  Treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified  copies 
thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to  the  other 
contracting  Powers. 


306  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

F.  RESOLUTION  ADOPTED  ON  FEBRUARY  4,  1922,  AND 
ATTACHED  TO  THE  ABOVE  TREATY,  RELATIVE  TO 
A  BOARD  OF  REFERENCE  IN  CHINA 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire, 
China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal: 

Desiring  to  provide  a  procedure  for  dealing  with  questions 
that  may  rise  in  connection  with  the  execution  of  the  provi- 
sions of  Articles  3  and  5  of  the  Treaty  to  be  signed  at  Wash- 
ington on  February  6,  1922,  with  reference  to  their  general 
policy  designed  to  stabilize  conditions  in  the  Far  East,  to 
safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of  China  and  to  promote 
intercourse  between  China  and  the  other  Powers  upon  the  basis 
of  equality  of  opportunity. 

Resolved,  that  there  shall  be  established  in  China  a  Board 
of  Reference  to  which  any  questions  arising  in  connection  with 
the  execution  of  the  aforesaid  articles  may  be  referred  for 
investigation  and  report. 

This  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article  2  of  the  Treaty 
to  be  signed  at  Washington  on  February  6,  1922,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Chinese  customs  tariff,  shall  formulate  for  the 
approval  of  the  Powers  concerned  a  detailed  plan  for  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Board. 

G.  HUGHES'      RESOLUTION      FOR      LISTING      CHINA'S 
COMMITMENTS.     ADOPTED   BY   THE   CONFERENCE 
FEBRUARY  i,  1923 

The  Powers  represented  in  this  Conference,  considering  it 
desirable  that  there  should  hereafter  be  full  publicity  with 
respect  to  all  matters  affecting  the  political  and  other  inter- 
national obligations  of  China  and  of  the  several  Powers  in 
relation  to  China,  are  agreed  as  follows: 

1.  The  several  Powers  other  than  China,  will  at  their 
earliest  convenience,  file  with  the  Secretariat  General  of  the 
Conference  for  transmission  to  the  participating  Powers  a  list 
of  all  treaties,  conventions,  exchange  of  notes  or  other  inter- 
national agreements  which  they  may  have  with  China,  or  with 
any  other  Power  or  Powers  in  relation  to  China,  which  they 


APPENDIX  307 

deem  to  be  still  in  force  and  upon  which  they  may  desire  to 
rely.  In  each  case  citations  will  be  given  to  any  official  or 
other  publication  in  which  an  authoritative  text  of  the  docu- 
ments may  be  found.  In  any  case  in  which  the  document  may 
not  have  been  published,  a  copy  of  the  text  (in  its  original 
language  or  languages)  will  be  filed  with  the  Secretariat 
General  of  the  Conference. 

Every  treaty  or  other  international  agreement  of  the  char- 
acter described  which  may  be  concluded  hereafter  shall  be 
notified  by  the  Governments  concerned  within  sixty  days  of 
its  conclusion  to  the  Powers  who  are  signatories  of  or  adherents 
to  this  agreement. 

2.  The  several  Powers  other  than  China  will  file  with  the 
Secretariat  General  of  the  Conference  at  their  earliest  con- 
venience for  transmission   to   the  participating   Powers  a   list, 
as  nearly  complete  as  may  be  possible,  of  all  those  contracts 
between  their'nationals,  of  the  one  part,  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment  or    any   of    its    administrative   subdivisions   or   local 
authorities,  of  the  other  »part,  which  involve  any  concession, 
franchise,  "option  or  preference  with   respect   to  railway  con- 
struction, mining,  forestry,  mavigation,  river  conservancy,  har- 
bor  works,    reclamation,   electrical   communications,    or    other 
public  works  or  public  services,  or   for   the  sale  of   arms  or 
ammunition,  ortwhich  involve  a  lien  upon  any  of   the  public 
revenues  or  properties  of  the  Chinese  Government  or  of  any  of 
its  administrative  subdivisions.     There  shall  be  in  the  case  of 
each  document  so'listed,  either  a  citation  to  a  published  text  or  a 
copy  of  the  text  itself. 

Every  contract  of  the  public  character  described  which  may 
be  concluded  hereafter  shall  be  notified  by  the  Governments 
concerned  within  sixty  days  after  the  receipt  of  information 
of  its  conclusion  to  the  Powers  who  are  signatories  of  or 
adherents  to  this  agreement. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  notify,   in  the  con- 
ditions laid  down  in  this  agreement,  every  treaty,   agreement 
or  contract  of  the  character  indicated  herein  which  has  been 
or  may  hereafter  be  concluded  by  that  Government  or  by  any 
local  authority  in  China  with  any  foreign  Power  or  the  na- 


308  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

tionals  of  any  foreign  Power,  whether  party  to  this  agreement 
or  not,  so  far  as  the  information  is  in  its  possession. 

4.  The  Governments  of  Powers  having  treaty  relations  with 
China,  which  are  not  represented  at  the  present  Conference, 
shall  be  invited  to  adhere  to  this  agreement.  The  United 
States  Government,  as  convener  of  the  Conference,  undertakes 
to  communicate  this  agreement  to  the  Governments  of  the  said 
Powers,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  their  adherence  thereto  as 
soon  as  possible. 

H.    BARON    SHIDEHARA'S    STATEMENT    BEFORE    THE 
FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  JANUARY  14,  1922 

"The  Japanese  delegation  understands  that  one  of  the  pri- 
mary objects  which  the  present  Conference  on  Far  Eastern 
questions  has  in  view  is  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the 
Chinese  people  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  all  nations  interested 
in  China.  For  the  realization  of  that  desirable  end,  nothing 
is  of  greater  importance  than  the  development  and  utilization 
of  the  unlimited  natural  resources  of  China. 

"It  is  agreed  on  all  sides  that  China  is  a  country  with  im- 
mense potentialities.  She  is  richly  endowed  by  nature  with 
arable  soil,  with  mines  and  with  raw  materials  of  various  kinds. 
But  those  natural  resources  are  of  little  practical  value  so 
long  as  they  remain  undeveloped  and  unutilized.  In  order 
to  make  full  use  of  them,  it  seems  essential  that  China  shall 
open  her  own  door  to  foreign  capital  and  to  foreign  trade  and 
enterprise. 

"Touching  on  this  subject,  Dr.  Sze,  on  behalf  of  the  Chi- 
nese delegation,  made  an  important  statement  to  the  full 
committee  on  November  16,  declaring  that  'China  wishes  to 
make  her  vast  natural  resources  available  to  all  people  who 
need  them.'  That  statement  evidently  represents  the  wisdom 
and  foresight  of  China,  and  the  Japanese  delegation  is  confi- 
dent that  the  principle  which  it  enunciated  will  be  carried  out 
to  its  full  extent. 

"It  is  to  be  hoped  that,  in  the  application  of  that  principle, 
China  may  be  disposed  to  extend  to  foreigners,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, the  opportunity  of  cooperation  in  the  development  and 


APPENDIX  309 

utilization  of  China's  natural  resources.  Any  spontaneous 
declaration  by  China  of  her  policy  in  that  direction  will  be 
received  with  much  gratification  by  Japan  and  also,  no  doubt, 
by  all  other  nations  interested  in  China.  Resolutions  which 
have  hitherto  been  adopted  by  this  committee  have  been  uni- 
formly guided  by  the  spirit  of  self-denial  and  self-sacrifice  on 
the  part  of  foreign  powers  in  favor  of  China.  The  Japanese 
delegation  trusts  that  China,  on  her  part,  will  not  be  unwilling 
to  formulate  a  policy  which  will  prove  of  considerable  benefit, 
no  less  to  China  herself  than  to  all  nations." 

I.     MR.  SZE'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  FEBRUARY  2,  1923 

"At  the  meeting  of  this  committee  on  January  18,  Baron 
Shidehara  on  behalf  of  the  Japanese  delegation,  expressed  a 
hope  that  China  might  be  disposed  to  extend  to  foreigners,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  opportunity  of  cooperation  in  the  develop- 
ment and  utilization  of  China's  natural  resources,  and  added 
that  any  spontaneous  declaration  of  her  policy  in  that  direction 
would  be  received  with  much  gratification. 

"The  Chinese  Government,  conscious  of  the  mutual  advan- 
tage which  foreign  trade  brings,  has  hitherto  pursued  an  estab- 
lished policy  to  promote  its  development.  Of  this  trade, 
products  of  nature  of  course  form  an  important  part.  In  view 
of  this  fact,  as  well  as  of  the  requirements  of  her  large  and 
increasing  population,  and  the  growing  needs  of  her  industries, 
China,  on  her  part,  has  been  steadily  encouraging  the  develop- 
ment of  her  natural  resources,  not  only  by  permitting  under 
her  laws  the  participation  of  foreign  capital,  but  also  by  other 
practical  means  at  her  disposal.  Thus  in  affording  facilities 
and  fixing  rates  for  the  transportation  on  all  her  railways  of 
such  products  of  nature  as  well  as  of  other  articles  of  merchan- 
dise, she  has  always  followed  and  observed  the  principle  of 
strict  equality  of  treatment  between  all  foreign  shippers. 
Thanks  to  this  liberal  policy,  raw  material  and  food  supplies 
in  China — as  my  colleague,  Dr.  Koo,  stated  before  this  com- 
mittee on  a  previous  occasion  with  reference  to  Manchuria, 
and  it  is  equally  true  of  other  parts  of  China — are  today 


310  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

accessible  to  all  nations,  on  fair  terms  and  through  the  normal 
operation  of  the  economic  law  of  supply  and  demand. 

"The  Chinese  Government  does  not  at  present  contemplate 
any  departure  from  this  mutually  beneficial  course  of  action. 
Consistent  with  the  vital  interests  of  the  Chinese  nation  and 
the  security  of  its  economic  life,  China  will  continue,  on  her 
own  accord,  to  invite  cooperation  of  foreign  capital  and  skill 
in  the  development  of  her  natural  resources. 

"The  Chinese  delegation,  animated  by  the  same  spirit  of 
self-denial  and  self-sacrifice  which  Baron  Shidehara  was  good 
enough  to  assure  the  Chinese  delegation  had  uniformly  guided 
the  foreign  Powers  here  represented  in  the  resolutions  hitherto 
adopted  by  the  committee  in  favor  of  China,  has  no  hesitation 
to  make  the  foregoing  statement.  It  is  all  the  more  glad  to 
make  it,  because  it  feels  confident  that  the  Japanese  delegation, 
in  expressing  the  hope  for  a  voluntary  declaration  of  policy 
on  China's  part  in  regard  to  the  development  and  utilization 
of  her  natural  resources,  was  not  seeking  any  special  considera- 
tion for  Japan  on  this  subject  or  for  the  foreign  powers  as  a 
whole,  but  merely  wished  to  be  assured  that  China  was  disposed 
to  extend  the  opportunity  of  cooperation  to  foreigners  on  the 
same  terms  as  are  accorded  by  nations  of  the  world  equally 
favored  by  nature  in  the  possession  of  rich  natural  resources." 


Appendix  V 
THE  CUSTOMS  TARIFF  OF  CHINA 


A.  MR.  KOO'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  23,  1921,  AS  SUMMARIZED 
IN  THE  OFFICIAL  COMMUNIQUE 

First  of  all,  Dr.  Koo  emphasized  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment had  no  desire  to  interfere  with  the  present  administra- 
tion of  maritime  customs  or  with  devotion  of  the  proceeds  of 
the  customs  revenue  to  the  liquidation  of  various  foreign  loans 
secured  thereon.  A  brief  account  was  given  by  him  of  the 
origin  and  history  of  the  Chinese  treaty  tariffs.  Prior  to 
1842,  he  said,  China  enjoyed  the  full  right  of  levying  customs 
duties.  In  1842,  however,  and  in  the  subsequent  years  after 
having  made  treaties  with  Great  Britain,  France  and  the 
United  States,  a  limitation  upon  this  right  was  for  the  first 
time  imposed. 

The  rule  of  5  per  cent  ad  valorem  was  thereby  established, 
and  the  rates  were  based  upon  the  current  prices  then  prevail- 
ing. In  1858,  as  prices  of  commodities  began  to  drop  and  the 
5  per  cent  actually  collected  appeared  to  be  somewhat  in  excess 
of  the  5  per  cent  prescribed,  a  revision  was  asked  for  by  the 
Treaty  Powers.  A  revision  was  accordingly  made.  Later, 
however,  as  prices  mounted,  no  request  for  a  revision  was 
forthcoming,  and  the  Chinese  Government  on  its  part  did  not 
press  for  a  revision,  seeing  that  the  revenue  then  collected  from 
other  sources  was  not  inadequate  to  meet  its  requirements. 

But  the  fact  was  that  the  customs  rate  then  prevailing  was 
much  less  than  the  5  per  cent  stipulated  for.  It  was  only  in 
1902  that  a  revision  was  made  in  order  to  afford  sufficient 

311 


312  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

funds  to  meet  the  Chinese  obligations  arising  out  of  the  Boxer 
protocol.  In  that  tariff  the  rate  was  calculated  on  the  basis 
of  the  average  prices  of  1897  to  1899.  In  1912  an  attempt 
was  made  by  the  Chinese  Government  to  have  another  revision, 
but  it  failed,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  securing  the  unanimous 
consent  of  sixteen  or  seventeen  Powers.  It  was  only  after  six 
years  of  long  negotiations  that  in  1918  another  revision  was 
effected.  The  tariff  of  1918  is  in  force  and  yields  only  3l/2 
per  cent. 

Dr.  Koo  proposed  to  restore  to  China  the  right  to  fix  and 
to  differentiate  the  import  tariff  rates,  but  as  it  appeared  hardly 
possible  to  establish  a  new  regime  all  at  once,  he  said  that  full 
autonomy  should  be  restored  to  China  after  a  certain  period 
to  be  agreed  upon.  In  the  meantime  China  would  impose  a 
maximum  rate  and  would  like  to  enjoy  full  freedom  within  a 
maximum,  such  as  the  right  of  differentiation  among  the  dif- 
ferent classes  of  commodities.  But  as  the  present  financial 
condition  of  the  Chinese  Government  was  such  as  to  require 
some  immediate  relief,  it  was  proposed  that  on  and  after  Jan. 
1,  1922,  the  Chinese  import  tariff  be  raised  to  12^  per  cent, 
as  it  was  stipulated  for  in  the  treaty  with  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain  and  Japan. 

Among  the  reasons  he  gave  in  support  of  the  proposals  of 
the  Chinese  delegation,  the  following  is  the  gist: 

1.  The    existing   customs   regime    in    China   constitutes    an 
infringement  of  China's  sovereign  right  to  fix  the  tariff  rates 
at  her  own  discretion. 

2.  It   deprives    China   of    the   power    to    make   reciprocity 
arrangements   with   the   foreign    Powers.      While   all    foreign 
goods  imported  into  China  pay  only  5  per  cent,  Chinese  goods 
exported  to  foreign  countries  have  to  pay  duties  of  a  maximum 
rate.    Examples  were  given  to  show  this  lack  of  reciprocity. 

3.  It  constitutes  a  serious  impediment  upon  the  economic 
development  of  China. 

4.  As  the  system  now  stands,  there  is  only  one  uniform  rate 
and  no  differentiation  of  rates.     The  disadvantage  is  obvious, 
because  it  does  not  take  into  account  the  economic  and  social 
needs  of  the  Chinese  people.     China  is  in  need  of  machinery 


APPENDIX  313 

and  metals  for  which  China  would  like  to  impose  a  tariff  rate 
even  lower  than  the  5  per  cent.  For  luxuries,  such  as  cigars 
and  cigarettes,  the  tax  ought,  perhaps,  to  be  heavy  in  order 
to  prevent  their  injurious  effects  upon  the  morals  and  social 
habits  of  the  people.  As  it  stands,  therefore,  the  Chinese  tariff 
is  not  scientific  at  all. 

5.  The  present  tariff  has  occasioned  a  serious  loss  of  revenue 
upon  the  Chinese  Exchequer.     The  item  of  customs  duties  is 
an  important  one  in  the  budget  of  nearly  all  countries.     For 
instance,  Great  Britain  raised  12  per  cent  of  its  revenue  from 
customs  duties;  France,   15  per  cent,  and  the  United  States 
raised  35  per  cent  from  this  source  before  the  World  War. 
But   the  customs  revenue  in   the   Chinese  budget   as  it   now 
stands  becomes  a  comparatively  insignificant  factor. 

6.  The  present  regime  makes  it  exceedingly  difficult  for  the 
Chinese  Government  to  ask  for  a  revision,  as  was  shown  in 
past  experiences  in  1912  and  in  1918. 

7.  Even  if   the  effective  5   per  cent  should  be  levied,   the 
revenue  resulting  therefrom  will  still  be  hardly  adequate  to 
meet   the   requirements  of   the   Chinese   Government,    as    the 
Government  has  many   functions   to   perform   in  matters   of 
modern  education,  sanitation,  public  utilities,  etc. 

B.    NINE-POWER  TREATY,   SIGNED   FEBRUARY   6,    1922 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire, 
China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal: 

With  a  view  to  increasing  the  revenues  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  relating  to  the 
revision  of  the  Chinese  customs  tariff  and  cognate  matters, 
and  to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  plenipotentiaries 

[here  follows  list  of  delegates] 

who,  having  communicated   to  each  other  their   full  powers, 
found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows: 

'Article  I 

The  representatives  of  the  contracting  Powers  having 
adopted,  on  the  4th  day  of  February,  1922,  in  the  city  of 
Washington,  a  resolution,  which  is  appended  as  an  annex  to 


314  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

this  article,  with  respect  to  the  revision  of  Chinese  customs 
duties,  for  the  purpose  of  making  such  duties  equivalent  to 
an  effective  5  per  cent  ad  valorem,  in  accordance  with  existing 
treaties  concluded  by  China  with  other  nations,  the  contract- 
ing Powers  hereby  confirm  the  said  resolution  and  undertake 
to  accept  the  tariff  rates  fixed  as  a  result  of  such  revision.  The 
said  tariff  rates  shall  become  effective  as  soon  as  possible,  but 
not  earlier  than  two  months  after  publication  thereof. 

Annex 

With  a  view  to  providing  additional  revenue  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  Powers  represented  at 
this  Conference,  namely,  the  United  States  of  America,  Bel- 
gium, the  British  Empire,  China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal,  agree: 

That  the  customs  schedule  of  duties  on  imports  into  China 
adopted  by  the  tariff  revision  commission  at  Shanghai  on  De- 
cember 19,  1918,  shall  forthwith  be  revised  so  that  the  rates 
of  duty  shall  be  equivalent  to  5  per  cent  effective,  as  provided 
for  in  the  several  commercial  treaties  to  which  China  is  a 
party. 

A  revision  commission  shall  meet  at  Shanghai,  at  the  earliest 
practicable  date,  to  effect  this  revision  forthwith  and  on  the 
general  lines  of  the  last  revision. 

This  commission  shall  be  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
Powers  above  named  and  of  representatives  of  any  additional 
Powers  having  governments  at  present  recognized  by  the 
Powers  represented  at  this  Conference  and  who  have  treaties 
with  China  providing  for  a  tariff  on  imports  and  exports  not 
to  exceed  5  per  cent  ad  valorem  and  who  desire  to  participate 
therein. 

The  revision  shall  proceed  as  rapidly  as  possible  with  a  view 
to  its  completion  within  four  months  from  the  date  of  the 
adoption  of  this  resolution  by  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation 
of  Armaments  and  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions. 

The  revised  tariff  shall  become  effective  as  soon  as  possible, 
but  not  earlier  than  two  months  after  its  publication  by  the 
revision  commission. 


APPENDIX  315 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  as  convener  of  the 
present  Conference,  is  requested  forthwith  to  communicate 
the  terms  of  this  resolution  to  the  Governments  of  Powers  not 
represented  at  this  Conference  but  who  participated  in  the 
revision  of  1918  aforesaid. 

Article  11 

Immediate  steps  shall  be  taken,  through  a  special  conference, 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  speedy  abolition  of  likin  and  for  the 
fulfillment  of  the  other  conditions  laid  down  in  Article  VIII 
of  the  treaty  of  September  5,  1902,  between  Great  Britain 
and  China,  in  Articles  IV  and  V  of  the  treaty  of  October  8, 
1903,  between  the  United  States  and  China,  and  in  Article  I 
of  the  supplementary  treaty  of  October  8,  1903,  between  Japan 
and  China,  with  a  view  to  levying  the  surtaxes  provided  for  in 
those  articles. 

The  special  conference  shall  be  composed  of  representatives 
of  the  signatory  Powers,  and  of  such  other  Powers  as  may 
desire  to  participate  and  may  adhere  to  the  present  Treaty, 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  VIII,  in  sufficient 
time  to  allow  their  representatives  to  take  part.  It  shall  meet 
in  China  within  three  months  after  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  present  Treaty,  on  a  day  and  at  a  place  to  be  designated 
by  the  Chinese  Government. 

Article  111 

The  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article  II  shall  con- 
sider the  interim  provisions  to  be  applied  prior  to  the  abolition 
of  likin  and  the  fulfillment  of  the  other  conditions  laid  down 
in  the  articles  of  the  treaties  mentioned  in  Article  II ;  and  it 
shall  authorize  the  levying  of  a  surtax  on  dutiable  imports  as 
from  such  date,  for  such  purposes,  and  subject  to  such  condi- 
tions as  it  may  determine. 

The  surtax  shall  be  at  a  uniform  rate  of  2l/2  per  cent 
ad  valorem,  provided,  that  in  case  of  certain  articles  of  luxury 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  special  conference,  can  bear  a 
greater  increase  without  unduly  inapeding  trade,  the  total  sur- 
tax may  be  increased,  but  may  not  exceed  5  per  centW  valorem. 


316  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Article  IV 

Following  the  immediate  revision  of  the  customs  schedule  of 
duties  on  imports  into  China,  mentioned  in  Article  I,  there 
shall  be  a  further  revision  thereof  to  take  effect  at  the  expiration 
of  four  years  following  the  completion  of  the  aforesaid  imme- 
diate revision,  in  order  to  insure  that  the  customs  duties  shall 
correspond  to  the  ad  'valorem  rates  fixed  by  the  special  con- 
ference provided  for  in  Article  II. 

Following  this  further  revision  there  shall  be,  for  the  same 
purpose^  periodical  revisions  of  the  customs  schedule  of  duties 
on  imports  into  China  every  seven  years  in  lieu  of  the  decennial 
revision  authorized  by  existing  treaties  with  China. 

In  order  to  prevent  delay,  any  revision  made  in  pursuance 
of  this  article  shall  be  effected  in  accordance  with  rules  to  be 
prescribed  by  the  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article  II. 

Article  V 

In  all  matters  relating  to  customs  duties  there  shall  be  effec- 
tive equality  of  treatment  and  of  opportunity  for  all  the 
contracting  Powers. 

Article  VI 

The  principle  of  uniformity  in  the  rates  of  customs  duties 
levied  at  all  the  land  and  maritime  frontiers  of  China  is  hereby 
recognized.  The  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article  II 
shall  make  arrangements  to  give  practical  effect  to  this  prin- 
ciple; and  it  is  authorized  to  make  equitable  adjustments  in 
those  cases  in  which  a  customs  privilege  to  be  abolished  was 
granted  in  return  for  some  local  economic  advantage. 

In  the  meantime,  any  increase  in  the  rates  of  customs  duties 
resulting  from  tariff  revision,  or  any  surtax  hereafter  imposed 
in  pursuance  of  the  present  Treaty,  shall  be  levied  at  a  uniform 
rate  ad  valorem  at  all  land  and  maritime  frontiers  of  China. 

Article  VII 

The  charge  for  transit  passes  shall  be  at  the  rate  of  2l/2  per 
cent  ad  valorem  until  the  arrangements  provided  for  by  Article 
II  come  into  force. 


APPENDIX  317 

Article  Fill 

Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  Treaty  whose  Govern- 
ments are  at  present  recognized  by  the  signatory  Powers,  and 
whose  present  treaties  with  China  provide  for  a  tariff  on  im- 
ports and  exports  not  to  exceed  5  per  cent  ad  valorem,  shall 
be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  present  Treaty. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes  to  make 
the  necessary  communications  for  this  purpose  and  to  inform 
the  Governments  of  the  contracting  Powers  of  the  replies 
received.  Adherence  by  any  Power  shall  become  effective  on 
receipt  of  notice  thereof  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

Article  IX 

The  provisions  of  the  present  Treaty  shall  override  all  stipu- 
lations of  treaties  between  China  and  the  respective  contracting 
Powers  which  are  inconsistent  therewith,  other  than  stipula- 
tions according  most  favored  nation  treatment. 

Article  X 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  contracting 
Powers  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitutional 
methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  all 
the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Washington  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
transmit  to  the  other  contracting  Powers  a  certified  copy  of 
the  proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications. 

The  present  Treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified 
copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to  the 
other  contracting  Powers. 


Appendix  VI 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY   IN    CHINA 


A.    MR.  WANG'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EAST- 
ERN COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  25,  1921 

"Extraterritoriality  in  China  dates  back  almost  to  the  begin- 
ning of  treaty  relations  with  foreign  countries.  It  was  clearly 
laid  down  in  the  Treaty  of  1844  between  the  United  States 
and  China,  and  a  similar  provision  has  since  been  inserted  in 
the  treaties  with  other  Powers.  Extraterritorial  rights  were 
granted  at  a  time  when  there  were  only  five  treaty  ports — 
that  is,  places  where  foreigners  could  trade  and  reside.  Now 
there  are  fifty  such  places  and  an  equal  number  of  places  open 
to  foreign  trade  on  China's  own  initiative. 

"This  means  an  ever-increasing  number  of  persons  within 
her  territory  over  whom  she  is  almost  powerless.  This  anoma- 
lous condition  has  become  a  serious  problem  with  which  the 
local  administration  is  confronted,  and  if  the  impairment  of 
the  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China  is  not  to 
be  continued  the  matter  demands  immediate  solution.  I  should 
like  to  point  out  a  few  of  the  serious  objections  to  the  extra- 
territorial system.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  in  derogation  of 
China's  sovereign  rights  and  is  regarded  by  the  Chinese  people 
as  a  national  humiliation. 

"There  is  a  multiplicity  of  courts  in  one  and  the  same 
locality  and  the  interrelation  of  such  courts  has  given  rise  to 
a  legal  situation,  which  is  perplexing  both  to  the  trained 
lawyer  and  to  the  layman. 

"The  disadvantage  arising  from  the  uncertainty  of  the  law: 
The  general  rule  is  that  the  law  to  be  applied  in  a  given  case 
is  the  law  of  the  defendant's  nationality,  and  so  in  a  com- 
mercial transaction  between,  say,  X  and  Y  of  different  nation- 

318 


APPENDIX  819 

alities,  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  vary  according 
as  X  sues  Y  first  or  Y  sues  X  first. 

"When  causes  of  action,  civil  or  criminal,  arise  in  which 
foreigners  are  defendants,  it  is  necessary  for  adjudication  that 
they  shall  be  carried  to  the  nearest  consular  court,  which  may 
be  many  miles  away,  and  so  it  often  happens  that  it  is  prac- 
tically impossible  to  obtain  the  attendance  of  the  necessary 
witnesses  or  to  produce  other  necessary  evidence. 

"Finally,  it  is  a  further  disadvantage  to  the  Chinese  that 
the  foreigners  in  China  under  cover  of  extraterritoriality  claim 
immunity  from  local  taxes  and  excises  which  the  Chinese  are 
required  to  pay.  Sir  Robert  Hart,  who  worked  and  lived  in 
China  for  many  years,  has  this  to  say  in  his  work,  These  From 
the  Land  of  Sinim:  'The  extraterritoriality  stipulation  may 
have  relieved  the  native  official  of  some  troublesome  duties, 
but  it  has  always  been  felt  to  be  offensive  and  humiliating  and 
has  ever  a  disintegrating  effect,  leading  the  people  on  one  hand 
to  despise  their  own  Government  and  officials,  and  on  the 
other  to  envy  and  dislike  the  foreigner  withdrawn  from  native 
control.' 

"Until  the  system  is  abolished  or  substantially  modified  it 
is  inexpedient  for  China  to  open  her  entire  territory  to  foreign 
trade  and  commerce.  The  evils  of  the  existing  system  have 
been  so  obvious  that  Great  Britain  in  1902,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  in  1903  and  Sweden  in  1908  agreed,  subject  to 
certain  conditions,  to  relinquish  their  extraterritorial  rights. 
Twenty  years  have  elapsed  since  the  conclusion  of  these  treaties, 
and  while  it  is  a  matter  of  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  the 
state  of  China's  laws  has  attained  the  standard  to  which  she 
is  expected  to  conform,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  China  has 
made  great  progress  on  the  path  of  legal  reform. 

"A  few  facts  will  suffice  for  the  present.  A  law  codifica- 
tion committee  for  the  compilation  and  revision  of  laws  has 
been  sitting  since  1904.  Five  codes  have  been  prepared,  some 
of  which  have  already  been  put  into  force.  First,  the  civil 
code,  still  in  course  of  revision.  Second,  criminal  code,  in 
force  since  1912.  Third,  code  of  civil  procedure.  Fourth, 
code  of  criminal  procedure,  both  of  which  have  just  been  pro- 


320  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

mulgated.  Fifth,  commercial  code,  part  of  which  has  been 
put  into  force.  These  codes  have  been  prepared  with  the 
assistance  of  foreign  experts  and  are  based  mainly  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  modern  jurisprudence.  Among  the  numerous  supple- 
mentary laws  may  be  especially  mentioned  a  law  of  1918, 
called  'Rules  for  the  Application  of  Foreign  Law,'  which  deals 
with  matters  relating  to  private  international  law.  Under 
these  rules  foreign  law  is  given  ample  application. 

"Then  there  is  a  new  system  of  law  courts,  established  in 
1910.  The  Judges  are  all  modern  trained  lawyers,  and  no 
one  can  be  appointed  a  Judge  unless  he  has  attained  the 
requisite  legal  training.  These  are  some  of  the  reforms  which 
have  been  carried  out  on  our  part.  I  venture  to  say  that  the 
China  of  today  is  not  what  she  was  twenty  years  ago,  when 
Great  Britain  encouraged  her  to  reform  her  judicial  system, 
and  a  fortiori  she  is  not  what  she  was  eighty  years  ago,  when 
she  first  granted  extraterritorial  rights  to  the  Treaty  Powers. 

"I  have  made  these  observations  not  for  the  purpose  of  ask- 
ing for  an  immediate  and  complete  abolition  of  extraterritor- 
iality, but  for  the  purpose  of  inviting  the  Powers  to  cooperate 
with  China  in  taking  initial  steps  toward  improving  and  even- 
tually abolishing  the  existing  system,  which  is  admitted  on  all 
hands  to  be  unsatisfactory  both  to  foreigners  and  to  Chinese. 
It  is  gratifying  to  learn  of  the  sympathetic  attitude  of  the 
Powers  toward  this  question,  as  expressed  by  the  various  dele- 
gations at  a  previous  meeting  of  this  Committee. 

"The  Chinese  delegation,  therefore,  asks  that  the  Powers 
now  represented  in  this  Conference  agree  to  relinquish  their 
extraterritorial  rights  in  China  at  the  end  of  a  definite  period. 
Meanwhile,  the  Chinese  delegation  proposes  that  the  Powers 
represented  at  this  Conference  will  at  a  date  to  be  agreed 
upon  designate  representatives  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
China  for  the  adoption  of  a  plan  for  a  progressive  modification 
and  ultimate  abolition  of  the  system  of  extraterritoriality  in 
China,  the  carrying  out  of  which  plan  is  to  be  distributed  over 
the  above-mentioned  period." 


APPENDIX  321 


B.    RESOLUTION     ADOPTED     BY     THE     CONFERENCE, 
DECEMBER  10,  1921 

Resolution  for  the  establishment  of  a  commission  to  inves- 
tigate and  report  upon  extraterritoriality  and  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  China. 

The  representatives  of  the  Powers  hereinafter  named,  par- 
ticipating in  the  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions 
in  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armament — to  wit, 
the  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal — 

Having  taken  note  of  the  fact  that  in  the  treaty  between 
Great  Britain  and  China,  dated  Sept.  5,  1902,  in  the  treaty 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  China,  dated  Oct. 
8,  1903,  and  in  the  treaty  between  Japan  and  China,  dated 
Oct.  8,  1903,  these  several  Powers  have  agreed  to  give  every 
assistance  toward  the  attainment  by  the  Chinese  Government 
of  its  expressed  desire  to  reform  its  judicial  system  and  to  bring 
it  into  accord  with  that  of  Western  nations,  and  have  declared 
that  they  are  also  "prepared  to  relinquish  extraterritorial  rights 
when  satisfied  that  the  state  of  the  Chinese  laws,  the  arrange- 
ments for  their  administration,  and  other  conditions  warrant" 
them  in  so  doing; 

Being  sympathetically  disposed  toward  furthering  in  this 
regard  the  aspiration  to  which  the  Chinese  delegation  gave 
expression  on  Nov.  16,  1921,  to  the  effect  that  "immediately, 
or  as  soon  as  circumstances  will  permit,  existing  limitations 
upon  China's  political,  jurisdictional  and  administrative  free- 
dom of  action  are  to  be  removed"; 

Considering  that  any  determination  in  regard  to  such  action 
as  might  be  appropriate  to  this  end  must  depend  upon  the  ascer- 
tainment and  appreciation  of  complicated  states  of  fact  in 
regard  to  the  laws  and  the  judicial  system  and  the  methods 
of  judicial  administration  of  China,  which  the  Conference  is 
not  in  a  position  to  determine; 

Have  resolved, 

That  the  Governments  of  the  Powers  above  named  shall 
establish  a  commission  (to  which  each  of  such  Governments 


322  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

shall  appoint  one  member)  to  inquire  into  the  present  practice 
of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  in  China,  and  into  the  laws 
and  the  judicial  system  and  the  methods  of  judicial  adminis- 
tration of  China,  with  a  view  to  reporting  to  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  several  Powers  above  named  their  findings  of 
fact  in  regard  to  these  matters,  and  their  recommendations  as 
to  such  means  as  they  may  find  suitable  to  improve  the  exist- 
ing conditions  of  the  administration  of  justice  in  China,  and 
to  assist  and  further  the  efforts  of  the  Chinese  Government  to 
effect  such  legislation  and  judicial  reforms  as  would  warrant 
the  several  Powers  in  relinquishing,  either  progressively  or 
otherwise,  their  respective  rights  of  extraterritoriality; 

That  the  commission  herein  contemplated  shall  be  constituted 
within  three  months  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Conference, 
in  accordance  with  detailed  arrangements  to  be  hereafter  agreed 
upon  by  the  Governments  of  the  Powers  above  named,  and  shall 
be  instructed  to  submit  its  report  and  recommendations  within 
one  year  after  the  first  meeting  of  the  commission; 

That  each  of  the  Powers  above  named  shall  be  deemed  free 
to  accept  or  to  reject  all  or  any  portion  of  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  commission  herein  contemplated,  but  that  in  no 
case  shall  any  of  the  said  Powers  make  its  acceptance  of  all 
or  any  portion  of  such  recommendations  either  directly  or  in- 
directly dependent  on  the  granting  by  China  of  any  special 
concession,  favor,  benefit,  or  immunity,  whether  political  or 
economic. 

Additional  Resolution: 

That  the  non-signatory  Powers,  having  by  treaty  extra- 
territorial rights  in  China,  may  accede  to  the  resolution  affect- 
ing extraterritoriality  and  the  administration  of  justice  in 
China  by  depositing  within  three  months  after  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  Conference  a  written  notice  of  accession  with  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  for  communication  by  it  to 
each  of  the  signatory  powers. 

Additional  Resolution : 

That  China,  having  taken  note  of  the  resolutions  affecting 
the  establishment  of  a  commission  to  investigate  and  report 
upon  extraterritoriality  and  the  administration  of  justice  in 


APPENDIX  323 

China,  expresses  its  satisfaction  with  the  sympathetic  disposi- 
tion of  the  Powers  hereinbefore  named  in  regard  to  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  Chinese  Government  to  secure  the  abolition  of 
extraterritoriality  from  China,  and  declares  its  intention  to 
appoint  a  representative  who  shall  have  the  right  to  sit  as  a 
member  of  the  said  commission,  it  being  understood  that  China 
shall  be  deemed  free  to  accept  or  reject  any  or  all  of  the 
recommendations  of  the  commission.  Furthermore,  China  is 
prepared  to  cooperate  in  the  work  of  this  commission  and  to 
afford  to  it  every  possible  facility  for  the  successful  accomplish- 
ment of  its  tasks. 


Appendix  VII 
LEASED   TERRITORIES    IN    CHINA 


A.  MR.  KOO'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  DECEMBER  3,  1921,  AS  SUMMARIZED 
IN  THE  OFFICIAL  COMMUNIQUE 

The  existence  of  the  leased  territories  in  China  was  due  in 
the  original  instance  to  the  aggressions  of  Germany,  whose 
forcible  occupation  of  part  of  Shantung  Province  constrained 
the  Chinese  Government  to  grant  a  lease  for  99  years  of  the 
Bay  of  Kiaochow  in  Shantung  Province  on  March  6,  1898. 
This  was  closely  followed  by  a  demand  on  the  part  of  Russia 
for  the  lease  of  the  Liatung  Peninsula,  in  which  are  found 
the  ports  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny,  along  with  the  demand 
for  the  right  of  building  a  railway,  to  be  guarded  by  Russian 
soldiers,  traversing  the  Manchurian  Province  from  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  to  join  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad  and  Vladi- 
vostok. This  was  later  the  cause  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
which  resulted  in  1905  in  the  transfer  of  those  territories  to 
Japan  with  the  consent  of  China.  Following  the  lease  of 
Kiaochow  Bay  to  Germany  and  that  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  to  Russia,  France  obtained  from  China  on  April  22, 
1898,  the  lease  of  Kwangchow-wan  on  the  coast  of  Kwangtung 
Province  for  99  years,  and  Great  Britain  the  lease  also  for 
99  years  of  an  extension  of  Kowloon  and  the  adjoining  terri- 
tory and  waters  close  to  Hongkong  on  June  9,  1898,  and  the 
lease  "for  so  long  a  period  as  Port  Arthur  should  remain  in  the 
occupation  of  Russia"  of  the  port  of  Weihaiwei  on  the  coast 
of  Shantung  on  July  1,  1898.  Both  Great  Britain  and  France 
based  their  claims  for  the  leases  on  the  ground  of  the  necessity 
of  preserving  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Far  East. 

While  the  measures  and  extent  of  control  by  the  lessee 

324 


APPENDIX  325 

Powers  over  the  leased  territories  vary  in  different  cases,  the 
leases  themselves  are  all  limited  to  a  fixed  period  of  years. 
Expressly  or  impliedly,  they  are  not  transferable  to  a  third 
Power  without  the  consent  of  China.  Though  the  exercise 
of  administrative  rights  over  the  territories  leased  is  relin- 
quished by  China  to  the  lessee  Power  during  the  period  of  the 
lease,  the  sovereignty  of  China  over  them  is  reserved  in  all  cases. 
These  are  all  creatures  of  compact  different  from  cessions  both 
in  fact  and  in  law.  These  leaseholds  were  granted  by  China 
with  the  sole  purpose  of  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Far  East,  not  so  much  between  China  and  the  other  Powers, 
but  between  other  Powers  themselves  concerning  China. 

Twenty  years  had  elapsed  since  then  and  conditions  had 
entirely  altered.  With  the  elimination  of  the  German  menace, 
in  particular,  an  important  disturbing  factor  had  been  removed. 
Russia  had  equally  disappeared  from  the  scene,  and  it  could 
be  hoped  with  confidence  that  she  would  eventually  return, 
not  as  the  former  aggressive  power,  but  as  a  great  democratic 
nation.  The  misrule  of  the  Manchu  dynasty,  which  had 
aggravated  the  situation,  had  also  disappeared.  The  very  fact 
that  this  Conference  is  being  held  at  Washington  for  the 
purpose  of  arriving  at  a  mutual  understanding  on  the  part  of 
the  Powers  provides  an  added  reason  for  dispensing  with  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Far  East, 
which  was  the  principal  ground  of  the  original  claims  of  the 
different  Powers.  In  the  absence  of  that  necessity,  the  Chinese 
delegation  believes  that  the  time  has  come  for  the  interested 
Powers  to  relinquish  their  control  over  the  territories  leased 
to  them. 

The  existence  of  such  leased  territories  has  greatly  preju- 
diced China's  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  because 
they  are  all  situated  upon  the  strategical  points  along  the 
Chinese  littoral.  These  foreign  leaseholds  have  besides  ham- 
pered her  work  of  national  defense  by  constituting  in  China  a 
virtual  imperlum  in  imperio,  that  is,  an  empire  within  the 
same  empire.  There  is  another  reason  which  the  Chinese 
delegation  desires  to  point  out.  The  shifting  conflict  of  inter- 
ests of  the  different  lessee  Powers  has  involved  China  more 


326  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

than  once  in  complications  of  their  own.  It  would  be  sufficient 
to  refer  here  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  which  was  caused 
by  the  Russian  occupation  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny.  The 
Kiaochow  leasehold  brought  upon  the  Far  East  the  hostilities 
of  the  European  War.  Furthermore,  some  of  those  territories 
were  utilized  with  a  view  to  economic  domination  over  the 
vast  adjoining  regions  as  points  d'appui  for  developing  spheres 
of  interest  to  the  detriment  of  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 
In  the  interest  not  only  of  China  but  of  all  nations,  especially 
for  the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  the  Chinese  delegation  asks  for 
the  annulment  and  an  early  termination  of  these  leases.  But 
pending  their  termination  they  would  be  demilitarized,  that 
is,  their  fortifications  dismantled  and  the  lessee  nations  to 
undertake  that  they  will  not  make  use  of  their  several  leased 
areas  for  military  purposes,  either  as  naval  bases  or  for  mili- 
tary operations  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

B.    MR.    HANIHARA'S    STATEMENT    BEFORE    THE    FAR 
EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  DECEMBER  3,  1921 

"The  leased  territories  held  by  Japan  at  present  are  Kiaochow 
and  Kwangtung  Province,  namely — Port  Arthur  and  Dairen. 
It  is  characteristic  of  Japan's  leased  territories  that  she  ob- 
tained them,  not  directly  from  China,  but  as  successor  to 
other  Powers  at  considerable  sacrifice  in  men  and  treasure. 
She  succeeded  Russia  in  the  leasehold  of  Kwangtung  Province 
with  the  express  consent  of  China,  and  she  succeeded  Germany 
in  the  leasehold  of  Kiaochow  under  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

"As  to  Kiaochow,  the  Japanese  Government  has  already 
declared  on  several  occasions  that  it  would  restore  that  leased 
territory  to  China.  We  are  prepared  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment with  China  on  this  basis.  In  fact,  there  are  now  going 
on  conversations  between  representatives  of  Japan  and  China 
regarding  this  question,  initiated  through  the  good  offices  of 
Mr.  Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour,  the  result  of  which  it  is  hoped 
will  be  a  happy  solution  of  the  problem.  Therefore,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  is  one  which  properly 
calls  for  separate  treatment. 


APPENDIX  327 

"The  only  leased  territory,  therefore,  which  remains  to  be 
discussed  at  the  Conference,  so  far  as  Japan  is  concerned,  is 
Kwangtung  Province,  namely,  Port  Arthur  and  Dairen.  As  to 
that  territory,  the  Japanese  delegates  desire  to  make  it  clear 
that  Japan  has  no  intention  at  present  to  relinquish  the  im- 
portant rights  she  has  lawfully  acquired  and  at  no  small  sacri- 
fice. The  territory  in  question  forms  a  part  of  Manchuria 
— a  region  where,  by  reason  of  its  close  propinquity  to  Japan's 
territory  more  than  anything  else,  she  has  vital  interests  in 
that  which  relates  to  her  economic  life  and  national  safety. 

"This  fact  was  recognized  and  assurance  was  given  by  the 
American,  British  and  French  Governments  at  the  time  of 
the  formation  of  the  International  Consortium  that  these  vital 
interests  of  Japan  in  the  region  in  question  shall  be  safeguarded. 

"In  the  leased  territory  of  Kwangtung  Province  there  reside 
no  less  than  65,000  Japanese,  and  the  commercial  and  indus- 
trial interests  they  have  established  there  are  of  such  impor- 
tance and  magnitude  to  Japan  that  they  are  regarded  as  an 
essential  part  of  her  economic  life. 

"It  is  believed  that  this  attitude  of  the  Japanese  delegation 
toward  the  leased  territory  of  Kwangtung,  is  not  against  the 
principle  of  the  resolution  adopted  November  21." 

C.  MR.  BALFOUR'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR 
EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  DECEMBER  3,  1921,  AS  SUM- 
MARIZED IN  THE  OFFICIAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Mr.  Balfour  pointed  out  that  leased  territories,  though 
nominally  all  described  under  the  same  title,  were  held  under 
very  different  and  varying  circumstances.  The  Japanese  dele- 
gation had  already  indicated  that  Shantung  and  Manchuria, 
respectively,  were  held  on  entirely  different  bases  and  must  be 
considered  from  different  points  of  view.  Great  Britain  had 
two  different  kinds  of  leases,  and  these,  as  he  thought  the  Chi- 
nese delegation  itself  would  admit,  must  be  held  to  stand  on 
a  different  footing  one  from  the  other.  Mr.  Balfour  referred 
first  to  the  Leased  Territory  of  the  Kowloon*  extension.  Why, 
he  asked,  was  it  considered  necessary  that  the  Leased  Terri- 

*  This  is  frequently  spelt  Kaulung. 


328  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

tory  of  Kowloon  should  come  under  the  same  administration 
as  Hongkong?  The  reason  was  that  without  the  leased  terri- 
tory, Hongkong  was  perfectly  indefensible  and  would  be  at 
the  mercy  of  any  enemy  possessing  modern  artillery.  He  hoped 
that  he  would  carry  the  Conference  with  him  when  he  asserted 
that  the  safeguarding  of  the  position  of  Hongkong  was  not 
merely  a  British  interest  but  one  in  which  the  whole  world 
was  concerned.  He  was  informed  that  Hongkong  was  easily 
first  among  the  ports  of  the  world,  exceeding  in  this  respect 
Hamburg  before  the  War,  Antwerp  and  New  York. 

[Here  follows  a  quotation  from  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment Commercial  Handbook  of  China.] 

The  lease  of  the  Kowloon  extension  had  been  obtained  for 
no  other  reason  except  to  give  security  to  the  Port  of  Hong- 
kong, and  it  would  be  a  great  misfortune  if  anything  should 
occur  which  was  calculated  to  shake  the  confidence  of  the 
nations  using  this  great  open  port  in  its  security.  He  hoped  he 
need  say  no  more  to  explain  that  the  Kowloon  extension  was 
in  a  different  category  and  must  be  dealt  with  in  a  different 
spirit  from  those  leased  territories  which  had  been  acquired 
for  totally  different  motives. 

Mr.  Balfour  then  passed  to  the  question  of  Weihaiwei. 
The  acquisition  by  Great  Britain  of  this  lease  had  been  part 
of  the  general  movement  for  obtaining  leased  territories  in 
1898,  in  which  Russia,  Germany  and  France,  as  well  as  Great 
Britain,  had  been  concerned.  The  motive  which  had  animated 
the  Germans  in  acquiring  Kiaochow  had  been  largely  to  secure 
economic  domination.  The  motive  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, on  the  other  hand,  in  acquiring  the  lease  of  Weihaiwei 
had  been  connected  with  resistance  to  the  economic  domination 
of  China  by  other  Powers;  in  fact,  it  had  been  based  on  a 
desire  for  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Far 
East,  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  the  policy  of  the  open 
door,  and  had  been  intended  as  a  check  to  the  predatory  action 
*  i  of  Germany  and  Russia.  Mr.  Balfour  laid  emphasis  on  the 
fact  that  the  convention  of  July  1,  1898,  confirming  the  lease, 
gave  no  economic  rights  or  advantages  to  Great  Britain.  There 
had  been  no  question  of  its  being  a  privileged  port  of  entry 


APPENDIX  329 

for  British  commerce,  nor  for  the  establishment  of  British 
commercial  rights  to  the  exclusion  or  diminution  of  the  rights 
of  any  other  Power.  In  fact,  on  April  20,  1898,  Great  Britain  . 
had  announced  that  "England  will  not  construct  any  railroad 
communication  from  Weihaiwei  and  the  district  leased  there- 
with into  the  interior  of  the  Province  of  Shantung."  As  , 
regards  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government  to  the  request 
of  the  Chinese  delegation  for  the  abrogation  of  these  leases, 
Mr.  Balfour  stated  that  he  had  very  little  to  add  to,  and  he 
did  not  wish  to  qualify  the  conditions  contained  in  the  state- 
ment just  made  by  M.  Viviani,  which  represented  very  much 
the  spirit  in  which  the  British  Government  approached  the 
question.  The  British  Government  would  be  perfectly  ready 
to  return  Weihaiwei  to  China  as  part  of  a  general  arrange- 
ment intended  to  confirm  the  sovereignty  of  China  and  to  give 
effect  to  the  principle  of  the  open  door.  This  surrender,  how- 
ever, could  only  be  undertaken  as  part  of  some  such  general 
arrangement,  and  he  spoke  with  his  Government  behind  him 
when  he  said  that  on  these  conditions  he  was  prepared  to  give 
up  the  rights  which  had  been  acquired.  The  British  Govern- 
ment's policy  was  to  make  use  of  the  surrender  of  Weihaiwei 
to  assist  in  securing  a  settlement  of  the  question  of  Shantung. 
If  agreement  could  be  reached  on  this  question,  the  British 
Government  would  not  hesitate  to  do  their  best  to  promote 
a  general  settlement  by  restoring  Weihaiwei  to  the  Central 
Government  of  China. 


Appendix  VIII 
FOREIGN   TROOPS   IN   CHINA 


A.    MR.  SZE'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  28,  1931 

"At  the  session  held  on  November  21  the  Conference  declared 
'that  it  was  the  firm  intention  of  the  Powers  represented  to 
respect  the  sovereignty,  the  independence  and  the  territorial  and 
administrative  integrity  of  China;  and  to  provide  the  fullest 
and  most  unembarrassed  opportunity  to  China  to  develop  and 
maintain  for  herself  an  effective  and  stable  government. 

"It  will  have  already  appeared  that,  in  application  of  these 
two  principles,  China  is  asking  not  merely  that  existing  treaty 
or  conventional  limitations  upon  the  autonomous  and  unem- 
barrassed exercise  by  her  of  her  territorial  and  administrative 
powers  should  be  removed  as  rapidly  and  as  completely  as 
circumstances  will  justify,  but  that  conditions  shall  be  cor- 
rected which  now  constitute  a  continuing  violation  of  her 
rights  as  an  independent  State.  The  proposition  that  these 
limitations  upon  the  exercise  of  her  sovereign  powers  should 
be  progressively  removed  was  stated  in  Principle  No.  5  which 
the  Chinese  delegation  presented  to  the  Conference  on  Novem- 
ber 16,  and  applications  are  seen  in  the  propositions  that  have 
been  made  to  the  Conference  with  reference  to  extraterritorial 
rights  and  to  tariff  autonomy. 

"A  specific  illustration  of  a  violation  of  China's  sovereignty 
and  territorial  and  administrative  integrity,  as  distinguished 
from  limitations  based  upon  agreements  to  which  China  has 
been  a  party,  was  presented  to  the  Conference  for  correction 
last  week  and  had  to  do  with  the  maintenance  of  foreign  postal 
services  upon  Chinese  soil. 

"This  morning  it  is  the  desire  of  the  Chinese  delegation  to 

330 


APPENDIX  331 

bring  before  you,  for  correction  in  accord  with  the  controlling 
principles  which  you  have  already  affirmed,  several  other  in- 
stances of  subsisting  violations  of  China's  sovereignty  and  terri- 
torial and  administrative  integrity. 

"These  relate  to  the  maintenance  upon  the  Chinese  territory, 
without  China's  consent  and  against  her  protests,  of  foreign 
troops,  railway  guards,  police  boxes  and  electrical  wire  and 
wireless  communication  installations. 

"I  shall  not  exhaust  your  patience  by  enumerating  all  of 
the  specific  instances  of  these  violations,  for  I  shall  not  ask 
merely  that  each  of  these  violations  be  specifically  discounte- 
nanced, for  this  would  not  give  complete  relief  to  China  since 
it  would  not  prevent  other  similar  violations  in  the  future.  In 
behalf  of  the  Chinese  Government,  I  therefore  ask  that  this 
Conference  declare  as  a  comprehensive  proposition,  that  no 
one  of  the  Powers  here  represented — China,  of  course,  not 
included — shall  maintain  electrical  communication  installations, 
or  troops,  or  railway  guards,  or  police  boxes  upon  Chinese  soil, 
except  in  those  specific  cases  in  which  the  Powers  desiring  to 
do  so  may  be  able  to  show  by  affirmative  and  preponderant 
evidence  and  argument  that  it  has  a  right  so  to  do  such  as  can 
be  defended  upon  the  basis  of  accepted  principles  of  inter- 
national law  and  practice  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Chinese 
Government. 

"No  argument  by  me  is  needed  to  show  that  this  Conference 
stands  committed  to  the  declaration  which  I  now  ask,  by  the 
principles  which  were  adopted  on  November  21.  Should  any 
one  of  you  consider  the  possibility  of  foreign  troops  or  railway 
guards,  or  police  boxes,  or  electrical  communication  installa- 
tions being  maintained  upon  the  soil  of  your  own  country 
without  the  consent  of  the  Government  which  you  represent, 
your  feelings  of  justice  and  your  sense  of  the  dignity  due  to 
your  own  State  would  make  evident  to  you  the  propriety  of 
the  joint  declaration  which  China  now  asks  you  to  make  in 
her  behalf.  The  proposition  surely  stands  self-evident  that,  if 
a  nation  asserts  a  right  to  maintain  troops  or  guards,  or  police, 
or  to  erect  and  operate  systems  of  communication  upon  the 
soil  of  another  State,  whose  sovereignty  and  independence  and 


332  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

territorial  and  administrative  integrity  it  has  just  solemnly 
affirmed  and  obligated  itself  to  respect,  upon  that  State  should 
lie  a  heavy  burden  of  proof  to  justify  so  grievous  an  infringe- 
ment of  the  rights  of  exclusive  territorial  jurisdiction  which 
international  law  as  well  as  a  general  sense  of  international 
comity  and  justice  recognize  as  attaching  to  the  status  of 
sovereignty  and  independence. 

"In  behalf  of  my  Government  and  the  people  whom  I  rep- 
resent, I  therefore  ask  that  the  Conference  give  its  approval 
to  the  following  proposition: 

11  'Each  of  the  Powers  attending  this  Conference  hereinafter 
mentioned,  to  wit,  the  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the 
British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and 
Portugal,  severally  declare  that,  without  the  consent  of  the 
Government  of  China,  expressly  and  specifically  given  in  each 
case,  it  will  not  station  troops  or  railway  guards  or  establish 
and  maintain  police  boxes,  or  erect  or  operate  electrical  com- 
munication installations,  upon  the  soil  of  China;  and  that  if 
there  now  exists  upon  the  soil  of  China  such  troops  or  railway 
guards  or  police  boxes  or  electrical  installations  without  China's 
express  consent,  they  will  be  at  once  withdrawn.1  " 

B.    MR.    HANIHARA'S    STATEMENT   BEFORE   THE    FAR 
EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  29,  1921 

Japanese  Troops 

"The  Japanese  delegation  wishes  to  explain,  as  succinctly 
as  possible,  why  and  how  the  Japanese  garrisons  in  various 
parts  of  China  have  come  to  be  stationed  there.  At  the  outset, 
however,  I  desire  to  disclaim  most  emphatically  that  Japan 
has  ever  entertained  any  aggressive  purposes  or  any  desire  to 
encroach  illegitimately  upon  Chinese  sovereignty  in  establishing 
or  maintaining  these  garrisons  in  China. 

"1.  Japanese  railway  guards  are  actually  maintained  along 
the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  Shantung  Railway. 

"With  regard  to  the  Shantung  railway  guards,  Japan  be- 
lieves that  she  has  on  more  than  one  occasion  made  her  position 
sufficiently  clear.  She  has  declared  and  now  reaffirms  her  inten- 


APPENDIX  333 

tion  of  withdrawing  such  guards  as  soon  as  China  shall  have 
notified  her  that  a  Chinese  police  force  has  been  duly  organized 
and  is  ready  to  take  over  the  charge  of  the  railway  protection. 

"The  maintenance  of  troops  along  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway  stands  on  a  different  footing.  This  is  conceded  and 
recognized  by  China  under  the  Treaty  of  Peking  of  1905. 
(Additional  agreement,  Art.  II.)  It  is  a  measure  of  absolute 
necessity  under  the  existing  state  of  affairs  in  Manchuria — a 
region  which  has  been  made  notorious  by  the  activity  of 
mounted  bandits.  Even  in  the  presence  of  Japanese  troops, 
those  bandits  have  made  repeated  attempts  to  raid  the  railway 
zone.  In  a  large  number  of  cases,  they  have  cut  telegraph  lines 
and  committed  other  acts  of  ravage. 

"Their  lawless  activity  on  an  extended  scale  has,  however, 
been  efficiently  checked  by  Japanese  railway  guards,  and  gen- 
eral security  has  been  maintained  for  civilian  residents  in  and 
around  the  railway  zone.  The  efficiency  of  such  guards  will 
be  made  all  the  more  significant  by  a  comparison  of  the  con- 
ditions prevailing  in  the  railway  zone  with  those  prevailing 
in  the  districts  remote  from  the  railway.  The  withdrawal  of 
railway  guards  from  the  zone  of  the  South  Manchurian  Rail- 
way will  no  doubt  leave  those  districts  at  the  mercy  of  bandits, 
and  the  same  conditions  of  unrest  will  there  prevail  as  in  remote 
corners  of  Manchuria.  In  such  a  situation  it  is  not  possible 
for  Japan  to  forego  the  right,  or  rather  the  duty,  of  main- 
taining railway  guards  in  Manchuria,  whose  presence  is  duly 
recognized  by  treaty. 

"2.  Toward  the  end  of  1911  the  first  revolution  broke  out 
in  China  and  there  was  complete  disorder  in  the  Hupeh  dis- 
trict, which  formed  the  base  of  the  revolutionary  operations. 
As  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners  were  exposed  to  danger, 
Japan,  together  with  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Germany  and 
other  principal  Powers,  dispatched  troops  to  Hankow  for  the 
protection  of  her  people.  This  is  how  a  small  number  of 
troops  have  come  to  be  stationed  at  Hankow.  The  region  has 
since  been  the  scene  of  frequent  disturbances.  There  was 
recently  a  clash  between  the  North  and  South  at  Changsha, 
pillage  by  troops  at  Ichang  and  a  mutiny  of  soldiers  at  Hankow. 


334  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Such  conditions  of  unrest  have  naturally  retarded  the  with- 
drawal of  Japanese  troops  from  Hankow. 

"It  has  never  been  intended  that  these  troops  should  remain 
permanently  at  Hankow,  and  the  Japanese  Government  have 
been  looking  forward  to  an  early  opportunity  of  effecting  com- 
plete withdrawal  of  the  Hankow  garrison.  They  must  be 
assured,  however,  that  China  will  immediately  take  effective 
measures  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  that  she  will  fully 
assume  the  responsibility  for  the  damage  that  may  be  or  may 
have  been  done  to  foreigners. 

"3.  The  stationing  of  the  garrisons  of  foreign  countries  in 
North  China  is  recognized  by  the  Chinese  Government  under 
the  protocol  relating  to  the  Boxer  revolution  in  1900.  Pro- 
vided there  is  no  objection  from  the  other  countries  concerned, 
Japan  will  be  ready,  acting  in  unison  with  them,  to  withdraw 
her  garrison  as  soon  as  the  actual  conditions  warrant  it. 

"4.  The  Japanese  troops  scattered  along  the  lines  of  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway  have  been  stationed  in  connection 
with  an  inter-allied  agreement  concluded  at  Vladivostok  in 
1919.  Their  duties  are  to  establish  communication  between 
the  Japanese  contingents  in  Siberia  and  South  Manchuria.  It 
goes  without  saying,  therefore,  that  these  troops  will  be  with- 
drawn as  soon  as  the  evacuation  of  Siberia  by  the  Japanese 
troops  is  effected. 

"Memorandum — At  the  present  time  Japan  maintains  in 
China  proper  approximately  4,500  troops,  located  as  follows: 

"At  Tientsin,  two  battalions,  approximately   1,200  men. 

"At  Hankow,  one  battalion,  approximately  600  men. 

"In  Shantung:  At  Tsinan,  two  companies,  approximately 
300  men ;  along  the  Tsinan-Tsingtao  Railway  and  at  Tsingtao, 
four  battalions,  approximately  2,400  men. 

"Total,  4,500  men. 

Japanese  Police 

"In  considering  the  question  of  Japanese  consular  police  in 
China,  two  points  must  be  taken  into  account: 

"1.  Such  police  do  not  interfere  with  Chinese  or  other 
foreign  nationals.  Their  functions  are  strictly  confined  to  the 
protection  and  control  of  Japanese  subjects. 


APPENDIX  335 

"2.  The  most  important  duties  with  which  the  Japanese 
police  are  charged  are:  First,  to  prevent  the  commission  of 
crimes  by  Japanese,  and,  second,  to  find  and  prosecute  Japanese 
criminals  when  crimes  are  committed. 

"In  view  of  the  geographical  proximity  of  the  two  countries, 
it  is  natural  that  certain  disorderly  elements  in  Japan  should 
move  to  China  and,  taking  advantage  of  the  present  conditions 
in  that  country,  should  there  undertake  unlawful  activities. 
When  these  lawless  persons  are  caught  in  the  act  of  crime  by 
the  Chinese  police,  it  is  not  difficult  for  that  police  force  to 
deal  with  the  case.  The  culprits  are  handed  over  as  early  as 
possible  to  the  Japanese  authorities  for  prosecution  and  trial. 
But  when  the  criminals  flee  from  the  scene  of  their  acts,  it 
is  in  many  cases  hard  to  discover  who  committed  the  crimes 
and  what  were  the  causes  and  circumstances  that  led  up  to 
their  commission.  This  is  more  difficult  for  the  Chinese 
authorities,  as  they  have  no  power  to  make  domiciliary  visits 
to  the  homes  of  foreigners,  who  enjoy  extraterritorial  rights, 
or  to  obtain  judicial  testimony  in  due  form  from  such  for- 
eigners. 

"Without  the  full  cooperation  of  the  Japanese  police,  there- 
fore, the  punishment  of  crime  is,  in  a  great  many  cases,  an 
impossibility,  and  those  who  are  responsible  for  lawbreaking 
escape  trial  and  punishment. 

"This  tendency  is  especially  evident  in  Manchuria,  in  which 
region  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Japanese  are  resident.  In 
places  where  the  Japanese  police  are  stationed  there  are  far 
fewer  criminal  cases  among  Japanese  than  in  places  without 
Japanese  police.  Lawless  elements  constantly  move  to  districts 
beyond  the  reach  of  Japanese  police  supervision. 

"Apart  from  the  theoretical  side  of  the  question,  it  will 
thus  be  observed  that  the  stationing  of  Japanese  police  in  the 
interior  of  China  has  proved  to  be  of  much  practical  usefulness 
in  the  prevention  of  crimes  among  Japanese  residents,  without 
interfering  with  the  daily  life  of  the  Chinese  or  of  other  foreign 
nationals.  The  Japanese  policing  provides  a  protection  for 
the  Chinese  communities  which  at  present  their  own  organiza- 
tion fails  to  provide. 


336  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

"The  Japanese  delegation  is  in  possession  of  knowledge  and 
information  as  to  the  actual  conditions  prevailing  in  China, 
and  especially  in  Manchuria.  However,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
go  into  details  at  the  present  stage." 

C.    RESOLUTION     ADOPTED     BY     THE     CONFERENCE, 
FEBRUARY  i,  1922 

Whereas  the  Powers  have  from  time  to  time  stationed  armed 
forces,  including  police  and  railway  guards,  in  China  to  protect 
the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners  lawfully  in  China; 

And  whereas  it  appears  that  certain  of  these  armed  forces 
are  maintained  in  China  without  the  authority  of  any  treaty 
or  agreement; 

And  whereas  the  Powers  have  declared  their  intention  to 
withdraw  their  armed  force  now  on  duty  in  China  without 
the  authority  of  any  treaty  or  agreement,  whenever  China 
shall  assure  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  for- 
eigners in  China; 

And  whereas  China  has  declared  her  intention  and  capacity 
to  assure  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners 
in  China; 

Now  to  the  end  that  there  may  be  clear  understanding  of 
the  conditions  upon  which  in  each  case  the  practical  execution 
of  those  intentions  must  depend: 

It  is  resolved :  That  the  diplomatic  representatives  in  Peking 
of  the  Powers  now  in  Conference  at  Washington,  to  wit,  the 
United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire,  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal,  will  be  instructed 
by  their  respective  Governments,  whenever  China  shall  so 
request,  to  associate  themselves  with  three  representatives  of 
the  Chinese  Government  to  conduct  collectively  a  full  and 
impartial  inquiry  into  the  issues  raised  by  the  foregoing  declara- 
tions of  intention  made  by  the  Powers  and  by  China  and  shall 
hereafter  prepare  a  full  and  comprehensive  report  setting  out 
without  reservation  their  findings  of  fact  and  their  opinion 
with  regard  to  the  matter  hereby  referred  for  inquiry,  and 
shall  furnish  a  copy  of  their  report  to  each  of  the  nine  Govern- 
ments concerned  which  shall  severally  make  public  the  report 


APPENDIX  337 

with  such  comment  as  each  may  deem  appropriate.  The  rep- 
resentatives of  any  of  the  Powers  may  make  or  join  in  minor- 
ity reports  stating  their  differences,  if  any,  from  the  majority 
report. 

That  each  of  the  Powers  above  named  shall  be  deemed  free 
to  accept  or  reject  all  or  any  of  the  findings  of  fact  or  opinions 
expressed  in  the  report,  but  that  in  no  case  shall  any  of  the 
said  Powers  make  its  acceptance  of  all  or  any  of  the  findings 
of  fact  or  opinions  either  directly  or  indirectly  dependent  on 
the  granting  by  China  of  any  special  concession,  favor,  benefit 
or  immunity,  whether  political  or  economic. 


Appendix  IX 
FOREIGN    POST   OFFICES    IN    CHINA 


A.    MR.  SZE'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  25,  1921 

"As  was  referred  to  by  Mr.  Koo  the  other  day  in  his  re- 
marks before  the  committee,  China  has  suffered  and  is  now 
suffering  not  only  from  limitations  upon  her  territorial  and 
administrative  integrity,  to  which  she  has  been  led  to  consent, 
but  also  from  open  violations  of  her  rights  as  a  territorial 
sovereign  for  which  not  even  a  vestige  of  contractual  right  can 
be  claimed. 

"Among  these  violations  are  the  stationing  of  foreign  troops 
and  railway  guards  at  various  points,  the  installation  of  wire 
and  wireless  telegraph  communications,  the  maintenance  of 
foreign  post  offices,  and  so-called  'police  boxes.'  I  shall  first 
j-'peak  of  the  foreign  postal  services  maintained  upon  Chinese 
soil. 

"China  requests  that  the  Powers  assembled  in  the  Confer- 
ence agree  at  once  to  abolish  all  postal  services  now  maintained 
by  them  in  China.  She  bases  her  request  upon  the  following 
propositions: 

"1.  That  China  has  organized  and  is  now  conducting  a 
postal  system  covering  the  entire  country,  and  maintaining  rela- 
tions with  all  foreign  countries  adequate  to  meet  all  require- 
ments. The  transmission  of  postal  matter  is  a  Government 
monopoly,  the  first  paragraph  of  the  postal  statutes  of  October 
12,  1921,  reading:  'The  postal  business  is  exclusively  conducted 
by  the  Government.' 

"2.  That  the  existence  of  these  foreign  post  offices  inter- 
feres with  and  makes  more  difficult  the  development  of  this 
system,  and  deprives  it  of  a  revenue  which  legally  and  equitably 
should  belong  to  it. 

"3.  That  the  maintenance  by  foreign  Governments  of  post 

338 


APPENDIX  339 

offices  in  China  is  in  direct  violation  of  the  latter's  territorial 
and  administrative  integrity,  and  rests  upon  no  treaty  or  other 
legal  rights. 

"Early  in  the  '60's  of  the  last  century  foreign  post  offices 
began  to  open  branches  and  agencies  in  the  particular  treaty 
ports  of  China.  The  opening  of  these  offices  was  not  based 
on  any  treaty  provision  or  concession.  Their  existence  and 
gradual  increase  was  merely  tolerated  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. 

"About  the  same  time  a  regular  service  for  the  carriage  of 
mails  was  established  on  foreign  lines  in  connection  with  the 
customs,  operating  chiefly  between  the  numerous  ports  on  the 
coast  of  China  and  those  far  up  the  Yangtse  River.  This 
service  continued  tcx  work  and  improved  its  machinery  year  by 
year.  By  imperial  decree  of  March  20,  1896,  this  system  was 
developed  into  a  distinct  Chinese  postal  system,  and  placed 
under  the  general  direction  of  the  Inspector  General  of  Cus- 
toms. Finally,  by  imperial  decree  of  May  28,  1911,  the  system 
was  taken  from  under  the  administration  of  the  Inspector 
General  of  Customs  and  developed  into  an  independent  system 
operating  directly  under  the  Minister  of  Posts  and  Communi- 
cations. Since  that  date  the  system  has  operated  wholly  as 
one  of  the  administrative  services  of  the  Chinese  Government. 

"On  March  1,  1914,  China  gave  her  adherence  to  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Convention,  and  since  September  1  of  that  year 
China  has  continued  as  a  member  in  good  standing  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union. 

"As  the  Universal  Postal  Union  does  not  recognize  the  right 
of  any  country  to  maintain  post  offices  in  another  country 
which  is  a  member  of  the  postal  union,  the  Chinese  delegation 
brought  up  the  question  of  alien  establishments  in  China  at 
the  Universal  Postal  Congress,  opened  at  Madrid  on  October  1, 
1920.  The  question  of  their  withdrawal  was,  however,  re- 
garded as  within  the  purview  of  their  respective  Foreign  Offices, 
and  no  definite  decision  was  reached.  A  measure  was  passed, 
however,  to  the  effect  that  only  such  foreign  postal  agencies 
could  be  considered  as  within  the  Union  as  were  established 
in  a  foreign  country  not  itself  within  the  Universal  Postal 


840  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

Union,  of  which  China  has  been  a  member  since-  September  1, 
1914. 

"The  Chinese  Post  Office  maintains  the  cheapest  general 
service  in  the  world.  [Here  follows  table  of  postal  rates.] 
In  spite  of  these  very  cheap  rates  and  very  high  transportation 
costs  of  maintaining  long  courier  lines  where  no  modern  facili- 
ties are  available,  the  surplus  of  receipts  over  expenditures  has 
been  steadily  increasing.  All  profits  are  being  put  into  improve- 
ments on  the  service,  particularly  in  new  offices  and  extension 
of  the  service  to  the  smaller  villages  inland.  Its  income  in 
1920  was  $12,679,121.98  and  its  expenditures  $10,467,053.07, 
thus  leaving  a  surplus  for  the  year's  operation  of  $2,212,068.91. 

"Senders  of  registered  articles,  parcels,  insured  letters  and 
express  articles  are  entitled  to  claim  indemnity  in  case  of  loss 
by  the  Post  Office.  Although  in  1920  over  37,000,000  of  such 
articles  were  posted,  less  than  400  claims  for  indemnity  were 
made,  the  percentage  being  about  1  in  90,000. 

"There  has  been  a  decrease  of  30  per  cent  in  the  number 
of  insured  letters  posted  in  the  last  four  years,  though  other 
mail  matter  has  increased  by  50  per  cent  in  the  same  time. 
This  is  considered  as  indicating  a  growing  public  confidence  in 
the  other  non-insured  services. 

"The  Chinese  Post  Office  has  over  3,000  interpreter  em- 
ployees, and  every  office  serving  places  of  foreign  residence  in 
China  is  amply  supplied  from  this  large  number  of  linguists  to 
cope  with  all  foreign  correspondence. 

"The  efficiency  of  the  Chinese  postal  service  is  further  guar- 
anteed by  sturdy  civil  service  methods  in  appointments  of  staff. 
Employees  enter  only  after  a  fair  examination,  both  mental  and 
physical.  Postmasters,  even  in  the  larger  cities,  are  selected 
from  the  most  efficient  of  the  employees,  never  from  outside  the 
service.  The  penalty  for  invoking  political  aid  is  dismissal 
and  in  practice  is  never  done. 

"The  Post  Office  functions  under  the  same  central  adminis- 
tration over  the  entire  country.  In  time  of  local  disturbance 
and  revolution  the  revolutionists  have  recognized  the  Post  Office 
as  a  necessity  to  the  welfare  of  the  community  and  have  always 
permitted  it  to  continue  its  functions  without  change  of  staff 
or  control. 


APPENDIX  341 

"Notwithstanding  the  disturbed  condition  of  affairs  in  China 
during  recent  years,  this  system  has  been  steadily  developed 
since  it  was  placed  wholly  under  the  direction  and  control  of 
Chinese  authorities. 

"Mail  matter  posted  has  increased  approximately  300  per 
cent  since  1911  (from  126,539,228  to  400,886,935  in  1920). 
Parcels  posted  have  increased  from  954,740  in  1911  to 
4,216,200  in  1920. 

"There  is  now  scarcely  a  Chinese  village  which  is  not  served 
by  a  post  office,  agency,  or  minor  postal  establishment.  Major 
establishments  (offices  and  agencies)  have  increased  from  9,103 
in  1917  to  10,469  in  1920.  Minor  establishments  (town  box 
offices  and  rural  stations)  have  increased  from  4,890  in  1917 
to  20,806  in  1920.  This  makes  a  total  of  31,325  places  now 
provided  with  postal  facilities,  more  than  double  the  number 
of  places  served  four  years  ago. 

"Mr.  Willoughby,  in  his  careful  study,  Foreign  Rights  and 
Interests  In  China,  in  speaking  of  this  system  says: 

11  'At  the  present  time  (1920)  the  postal  service  in  China  is 
one  for  which  the  Government  deserves  great  credit.  Gener- 
ally speaking,  the  service  is  efficiently  operated  and  with  rea- 
sonable financial  success,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  China 
has  been  obliged  to  acquiesce  in  the  operation  within  her  borders 
of  some  sixty  or  more  foreign  post  offices/ 

"Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  China  now  has  an  efficient 
postal  system,  certain  foreign  Governments  continue  to  main- 
tain post  offices  of  this  order  in  China.  At  the  present  time 
Great  Britain,  France,  America  and  Japan  are  maintaining 
and  operating  offices  of  this  kind  at  a  large  number  of  places. 
The  alien  postal  establishments  in  China  as  they  stand  at  pres- 
ent are  as  follows:  Great  Britain,  12;  Japan,  124;  France,  13; 
the  United  States,  1.  The  Japanese  establishments  are  classed 
as  follows:  First  class  offices,  7;  second  class  offices,  23;  third 
class  offices,  4;  unclassified  offices,  10;  suboffices,  3;  box  offices, 
1 ;  agencies,  33;  letter  boxes,  33;  field  post  offices,  10. 

"These  post  offices  have  their  own  postage  stamps  and 
operate  in  every  respect  in  direct  competition  with  the  Chinese 


342  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

system.  It  is  to  be  noted,  moreover,  that  these  foreign  offices 
are  located  at  the  chief  centres  of  population,  industry  and 
commerce.  They  are  thus  in  a  position  where  they  can,  so  to 
speak,  skim  the  cream  of  the  postal  business,  since  they  are 
under  no  obligations  to,  and,  in  fact,  do  not  maintain  offices 
at  unimportant  points. 

"It  is  submitted  that  if  the  necessity  ever  existed  for  the 
maintenance  of  foreign  post  offices  in  China,  this  necessity  has 
now  passed  away.  As  early  as  April  20,  1902,  the  American 
Minister  at  Peking  reported  to  his  Government  (United 
States  Foreign  Relations,  1902,  p.  255)  : 

u  'I  have  given  such  investigation  as  I  have  been  able  and 
report  that  in  my  judgment  foreign  post  offices  in  China, 
except  in  Shanghai,  are  not  a  necessity,  because  the  Chinese 
postal  service,  under  the  imperial  maritime  customs,  is  every- 
where giving  satisfactory  service  and  is  rapidly  and  effectively 
increasing  and  extending  into  the  interior.' 

"More  recently  The  Commercial  Hand  Book  of  China,  from 
which  we  have  already  quoted,  says:  'The  developments  of 
the  Chinese  postal  service  during  the  last  decade  have  been  so 
extensive  and  so  favorable  that  there  is  in  reality  no  longer 
any  need  for  a  continuance  of  the  foreign  post  offices  operated 
in  that  country.' 

"It  is  to  be  noted,  moreover,  that  the  maintenance  of  these 
foreign  offices  rests  upon  no  treaty  or  other  legal  right.  Re- 
garding this  point,  the  American  Minister,  in  his  communica- 
tion to  his  country  on  April  20,  1902,  to  which  reference  has 
already  been  made,  said: 

;  'The  foreign  post  offices  are  being  established  principally 
for  political  reasons,  either  in  view  of  their  future  designs  upon 
the  Empire,  to  strengthen  their  own  footing  or  because  jealous 
of  that  of  others.  They  are  not  established  with  the  consent  of 
China,  but  in  spite  of  her.  They  will  not  be  profitable.  Their 
establishment  materially  interferes  with  and  embarrasses  the 
development  of  the  Chinese  postal  service,  is  an  interference 
with  China's  sovereignty,  is  inconsistent  with  our  well-known 
policy  toward  the  Empire,  and  I  cannot  find  any  good  reason 
for  their  establishment  by  the  United  States.' 


APPENDIX  343 

"In  conclusion  China  wishes  to  point  out  that,  wholly  apart 
from  the  financial  loss  suffered  by  her  as  a  result  of  the  exis- 
tence of  foreign  post  offices  on  her  soil  and  the  obstacles  thereby 
placed  in  the  way  of  the  development  of  her  own  postal  system, 
the  maintenance  of  such  offices  represents  a  most  direct  viola- 
tion of  her  territorial  and  administrative  integrity.  It  is  one, 
moreover,  that  is  peculiarly  objectionable,  since  it  is  a  constant, 
visible  reminder  to  the  Chinese  people  that  they  are  not  ac- 
corded the  consideration  given  to  other  peoples.  This  neces- 
sarily has  a  tendency  to  lower  the  prestige  of  the  Chinese 
Government  in  the  eyes  of  her  people  and  to  make  more  diffi- 
cult the  already  difficult  problem  of  maintaining  a  Government 
that  will  command  the  respect  and  ready  obedience  of  her 
population.  From  whatever  standpoint  it  is  viewed,  the  con- 
tinuance of  these  foreign  post  offices  upon  Chinese  soil  should, 
therefore,  be  disapproved.'* 

B.    RESOLUTION  ADOPTED  BY  THE  CONFERENCE,  FEB- 
RUARY i,  1922 

(A)  Recognizing  the  justice  of  the  desire  expressed  by  the 
Chinese  Government  to  secure  the  abolition  of  foreign  costal 
agencies  in  China,  save  or  except  in  leased  territories  or  as 
otherwise  specifically  provided  by  treaty,  it  is  resolved: 

1.  The  four  Powers  [England,  Japan,  France,  the  United 
States]  having  such  postal  agencies  agree  to  their  aban- 
donment subject  to  the  following  conditions: 

(a)  That   an   efficient   Chinese  postal   service  is   main- 
tained ; 

(b)  That  an  assurance  is  given  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment that  they  contemplate  no  change  in  the  present 
postal   administration   so   far   as   the   status   of   the 
foreign  Co-Director  General  is  concerned. 

2.  To  enable  China  and  the  Powers  concerned  to  make  the 
necessary  dispositions,  this  arrangement  shall  come  into 
force  and  effect  not  later  than  January  1,  1923. 

(B)  Pending   the   complete   withdrawal    of    foreign    postal 
agencies,   the   four    Powers  concerned   severally   undertake   to 


344  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

afford  full  facilities  to  the  Chinese  customs  authorities  to  exam- 
ine in  those  agencies  all  postal  matter  (excepting  ordinary 
letters,  whether  registered  or  not,  which  upon  external  exam- 
ination appear  plainly  to  contain  only  written  matter)  passing 
through  them,  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  whether  they  con- 
tain articles  which  are  dutiable  or  contraband  or  which  other- 
wise contravene  the  customs  regulations  or  laws  of  China. 

C.    JAPAN'S  LETTER  ACCEPTING  THE  ABOVE  RESOLU- 
TION 

"Japanese  Delegation,  Washington,  D.  C. 

"Dec.  9,   1921. 

"Dear  Sir :  With  regard  to  the  proposed  abolition  of  foreign 
postal  agencies,  I  am  happy  to  inform  you  that  my  Govern- 
ment have  no  objection  to  the  initiation  of  the  arrangement  as 
from  the  date  in  the  draft  resolution,  that  is,  not  later  than 
Jan.  1,  1923. 

"In  announcing  this  agreement  of  my  Government,  I  am 
instructed  to  state  before  the  committee  their  desire  concerning 
the  maintenance  of  efficient  Chinese  postal  service  substantially 
to  the  following  effect: 

"Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the  proposed  change  in 
the  postal  regime  in  China  cannot  fail  practically  to  affect  the 
Japanese  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  any  other  nationals,  the 
Japanese  Government  wish  to  place  on  record  their  desire  that 
a  suitable  number  of  experienced  Japanese  postal  officers  be 
engaged  by  China  in  the  interest  of  the  efficiency  of  the  Chinese 
postal  administration.  The  reasonableness  of  this  desire  will 
readily  be  appreciated  when  it  is  considered  that  the  powers 
concerned  have  recognized  the  need  of  effective  foreign  assis- 
tance in  the  Chinese  postal  administration,  and  that  no  less  than 
seventy  British  subjects  and  twenty  Frenchmen  are  in  that 
service,  while  only  two  Japanese  experts  are  employed  in  it. 
"Yours  respectfully, 

"M.    HANIHARA. 

"Hon.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Chairman  Sub-Committee 
for  Foreign  Post  Offices  in  China." 


Appendix  X 
FOREIGN    RADIO    STATIONS    IN    CHINA 


A.  RESOLUTION  ADOPTED  BY  FAR  EASTERN  COMMIT- 
TEE, DECEMBER  7,  1921,  AND  BY  THE  CONFERENCE 
FEBRUARY  i,  1922 

The  representatives  of  the  Powers  hereinafter  named  par- 
ticipating in  the  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions 
in  the  Conference  for  Limitation  of  Armament,  to  wit:  The 
United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire,  China, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal,  have 
resolved : 

1.  That   all   radio  stations   in    China,   whether  maintained 
under  the  provisions  of  the  international  protocol  of  Sept.  7, 
1901,  or  in  fact  maintained  in  the  grounds  of  any  of  the  foreign 
legations  in  China,  shall  be  limited  in  their  use  to  sending  and 
receiving  Government  messages  and  shall  not  receive  or  send 
commercial  or  personal  or  unofficial  messages,  including  press 
matter:  provided,  however,  that  in  case  all  other  telegraphic 
communication  is  interrupted,  then,  upon  official  notification, 
accompanied  by  proof  of  such  interruption  to  the  Chinese  Min- 
istry of  Communications,  such  stations  may  afford  temporary 
facilities  for  commercial,  personal  or  unofficial  messages,  includ- 
ing  press  matter,   until   the   Chinese   Government  has   given 
notice  of  the  termination  of  the  interruption; 

2.  All  radio  stations  operated  within  the  territory  of  China 
by  a  foreign  Government  or  the  citizens  or  subjects  thereof 
under  treaties  or  concessions  of  the  Government  of  China,  shall 
limit  the  messages  sent  and  received  by  the  terms  of  the  treaties, 

345 


346  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

or  concessions  under  which  the  respective  stations  are  main- 
tained ; 

3.  In   case   there   be   any   radio   station   maintained    in    the 
territory  of  China  by  a   foreign   Government  or   citizens   or 
subjects  thereof  without  the  authority  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, such  station  and  all  the  plant,  apparatus  and  material 
thereof  shall  be  transferred  to  and  taken  over  by  the  Govern- 
ment of   China,   to  be   operated   under   the  direction   of   the 
Chinese  Ministry  of  Communications  upon  fair  and  full  com- 
pensation to  the  owners  for  the  value  of  the  installation,  as 
soon  as  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Communications  is  prepared 
to  operate  the  same  effectively  for  the  general  public  benefit  ; 

4.  If   any  questions  shall  arise  as  to  the  radio  stations  in 
leased  territories,   in  the   South   Manchuria  Railway  zone  or 
in  the  French  concession  at  Shanghai,  they  shall  be  regarded 
as  matters  for  discussion  between  the  Chinese  Government  and 
the  Governments  concerned; 

5.  The  owners  or  managers  of  all  radio  stations  maintained 
in   the   territory  of   China  by   foreign   powers  or   citizens   of 
subjects   thereof   shall   confer   with    the   Chinese   Ministry   of 
Communications  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  a  common  arrange- 
ment to  avoid  interference  in  the  use  of  wave  lengths  by  wire- 
less stations   in   China,   subject   to  such   general   arrangements 
as  may  be  made  by  an  international  conference  convened   for 
the  revision  of  the  rules  established  by  the  International  Radio 
Telegraph  Convention  signed  at  London,  July  5,  1912. 

B.     DECLARATION  CONCERNING  THE  RESOLUTION  ON 
RADIO   STATIONS  IN  CHINA  OF  DECEMBER  7,   1921 

The  Powers  other  than  China  declare  that  nothing  in  para- 
graphs 3  or  4  of  the  Resolutions  of  December  7,  1921,  is  to 
be  deemed  to  be  an  expression  of  opinion  by  the  Conference 
as  to  whether  the  stations  referred  to  therein  are  or  are  not 
authorized  by  China. 

They  further  give  notice  that  the  result  of  any  discussion 
arising  under  paragraph  4  must,  if  it  is  not  to  be  subject  to 
objection  by  them,  conform  with  the  principles  of  the  open 
door  or  equality  of  opportunity  approved  by  the  Conference. 


APPENDIX  347 


C.     CHINESE    DECLARATION     ON    THE    ABOVE    RESO- 
LUTION 

The  Chinese  delegation  takes  this  occasion  formally  to  de- 
clare that  the  Chinese  Government  does  not  recognize  or 
concede  the  right  of  any  foreign  Power  or  of  the  nationals 
thereof  to  install  or  operate,  without  its  express  consent,  radio 
stations  in  legation  grounds,  settlements,  concessions,  leased 
territories,  railway  areas  or  other  similar  areas. 


Appendix  XI 

TREATIES  ON   CHINA  CONCLUDED  WITHOUT 
HER    KNOWLEDGE 


A.  MR.  KOO'S  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EASTERN 
COMMITTEE,  DECEMBER  8,  1921,  AS  SUMMARIZED 
IN  THE  OFFICIAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Agreements  have  in  the  past  frequently  been  made,  relating 
to  the  Far  East,  or  to  China  particularly,  without  participation 
on  the  part  of  China  or  previous  notice  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. In  agreements  of  this  kind  the  nations  concerned  were 
presumably  disposing  of  rights  and  interests  belonging  to  them, 
or  they  were  giving  mutual  promises  with  regard  to  action 
which  they  would  take  or  from  which  they  would  abstain. 
Taking  any  one  of  those  agreements  by  itself,  it  might  be 
argued  that  its  subject-matter  was  composed  entirely  of  rights, 
interests,  and  actions  of  the  parties  to  the  agreement. 

This  kind  of  agreement  falls  roughly  into  two  divisions,  one 
being  in  the  nature  of  mutual  engagements  to  abstain  from 
certain  action  in  special  parts  of  China,  the  other  being  engage- 
ments for  mutual  assistance  in  support  of  the  general  interests 
of  all  foreign  Powers  in  China,  or  of  the  special  interests 
claimed  by  the  parties  to  the  agreements. 

The  effect  of  all  such  treaties  and  agreements  has  been  to 
maintain  in  China  conditions  which  intimately  affected  the 
rights,  prospects  and  liberty  of  action  of  China  herself. 

It  appeared,  therefore,  that  the  Chinese  Government  has 
an  equitable  right  to  be  consulted  in  all  agreements  which  deal 
with  or  pretend  to  deal  with  the  general  situation  in  the  Far 
East,  including  China.  Even  if  such  treaties  should  be  animated 
by  an  entirely  friendly  spirit  toward  China,  yet  their  bearing  is 
such  that  they  may  involve  consequences  which  would  impose 

348 


APPENDIX  349 

limitations  on  Chinese  freedom  of  action,  and  even  such  treaties 
therefore  should  not  be  made  without  consultation  with  China. 

B.    MR.     BALFOUR'S     OBSERVATIONS     AT    THE     SAME 
MEETING 

One  of  the  most  important  passages  in  Mr.  Koo's  speech 
had  referred  to  spheres  of  influence.  So  far  as  Great  Britain 
was  concerned,  spheres  of  influence  were  a  thing  of  the  past. 
.  .  .  How  did  spheres  of  influence  come  into  existence?  Be- 
cause at  a  certain  period  of  Russian  and  German  aggression  in 
China,  other  Powers,  in  order  to  prevent  China  from  being 
cut  up  before  their  eyes,  had  to  do  for  each  other  what  China 
could  not  do  for  herself.  In  China's  interest,  as  well  as  their 
own,  they  had  to  guard  against  their  exclusion  from  legitimate 
opportunities  of  enterprise.  This  was  due  not  so  much  to 
their  own  policy  as  to  China's  want  of  policy;  not  in  conse- 
quence of  their  own  strength,  but  of  China's  weakness. 

Mr.  Balfour  thought  it  was  the  hope  of  all  these  present  to  i 
place  China  in  a  position  to  defend  her  interests,  to  protect  her  \ 
neutrality,  and  no  longer  to  be  the  prey  of  acquisitive  powers. 
He  did  not  think  that  this  end  was  likely  to  be  obtained  by 
adopting  the  broad  principle  proposed  by  the  Chinese  delega- 
tion, but  rather  by  dealing  with  the  difficulties  that  beset 
China  one  by  one,  as  the  committee  was  actually  doing.  .  .  * 
He  could  not  see  that  the  position  was  helped  by  this  principle, 
which  went  a  good  deal  beyond  any  existing  principle  of  inter- 
national law.  He  could  not  believe  that  the  Powers  would 
accept  it,  more  especially  as  China  was  not  in  possession  of 
material  forces  to  enable  her  to  carry  out  any  policy  outside 
her  own  frontiers.  .  .  .  Translated  into  international  language, 
this  [Dr.  Koo's  proposal]  would  prevent  France  and  Belgium 
from  entering  into  a  defensive  treaty  of  any  kind  without 
consulting  Germany.  All  agreed  that  treaties  had  been  entered 
into  not  only  in  regard  to  China,  but  also  in  regard  to  other 
nations,  which  reflected  no  credit  on  those  who  had  concluded 
them.  For  this  evil  the  great  remedy  was  publicity.  Most  of  ,/ 
the  nations  represented  at  this  Conference  were  members  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  and  were  bound  to  register  their  trea- 


350  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

ties  with  the  League.  The  United  States  was  not  a  member 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  but  its  Constitution  necessitated 
wide  publicity  in  regard  to  treaties.  That  was  the  real  protec- 
tion for  China.  The  whole  world,  would  become  the  judge 
of  future  treaties. 

C.    MR.  HUGHES'  STATEMENT  AT  THE  SAME  MEETING 

The  Chairman,  Mr.  Hughes,  desired  to  offer  a  few  sugges- 
tions in  order  to  find  a  point  upon  which  the  committee  might 
agree.  .  .  .  The  committee  had  agreed  in  the  second  paragraph 
of  the  Root  resolution  "to  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unem- 
barrassed opportunity  to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for 
herself  an  effective  and  stable  government";  that  was  not  only 
a  pledge,  but,  he  believed,  a  recognition  of  the  fundamental 
fact  that  China  alone  could  develop  and  maintain  an  effective 
and  stable  government.^  This  could  not  be  done  by  others — 
China  must  do  it  herself,  but  other  Governments  could  afford 
her,  the  opportunity  and  possibility  of  doing  so.  But  there 
must  be  patience;  development  in  China  is  an  age-long  process. 
The  hurrying  peoples  must  be  patient,  for  the  matter  could 
never  be  worked  out  by  coercion  or  by  rousing  the  passive 
resistance  of  the  Chinese  people  against  interference  in  their 
public  affairs.  There  was  no  wish  to  interfere  while  waiting, 
but  there  was  a  wish  to  aid.  This,  he  said,  was  the  spirit  of 
the  Conference.  The  Powers  concerned  were  most  anxious 
to  help  and  to  assist  this  legitimate  aspiration.  And  the  oppor- 
tunity was  one  which  could  not  be  conserved  by  any  action 
that  took  advantage  of  China's  plightr  It  had  been  agreed,  he 
said,  to  respect  the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  China,  and  this 
naturally  implied  agreement  by  China  to  respect  the  integrity  of 
other  Powers.  Each  Power  should  be  free  to  make  the  agree- 
ments necessary  for  the  preservation  of  its  proper  interests ;  any 
general  proposition  going  so  far  as  to  derogate  or  limit  the  right 
to  make  agreements  relative  to  fundamental  legitimate  interests 
would  be  one  not  easily  defended.  .  .  .  There  might  be  treaties 
affecting  China  not  adverse  to  China,  but  it  could  be  said  that 
there  would  be  no  secret  agreements.  'More  than  that  could  be 
(Jone,  however ;  there  could  be  recorded  an  expression  of  a  desire 


APPENDIX  351 

to  be  helpful  to  China  in  the  preservation  of  the  legitimate  field 
of  her  administrative  autonomy,  and  a  reassertion,  in  connec- 
tion with  Paragraph  I  of  the  Root  resolution,  of  the  determina- 
tion to  do  nothing  in  derogation  of  the  sovereignty,  indepen- 
dence and  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China. 
.  .  .  If  there  were  embodied  in  the  resolution  relating  to 
treaties  the  principles  underlying  the  Chinese  proposal,  and  an 
expression  of  the  intention  to  do  nothing  in  derogation  of 
those  principles,  and  to  make  no  treaties  or  engagements  in 
derogation  of  the  sovereignty  and  administrative  integrity  of 
China,  all  that  China  desired  would  be  attained. 

D.    RESOLUTION   ADOPTED 

That  the  Powers  attending  this  Conference,  hereinafter  men- 
tioned, to  wit,  the  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the 
British  Empire,  China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands 
and  Portugal,  declare  that  it  is  their  intention  not  to  enter  into 
any  treaty,  agreement,  arrangement,  or  understanding,  either 
with  one  another  or  individually  or  collectively  with  any  Power 
or  Powers,  which  would  infringe  or  impair  the  principles  which 
have  been  declared  by  the  resolution  adopted  Nov.  21  by  this 
committee  (i.e.,  the  Root  resolution). 


Appendix  XII 
CHINESE    RAILWAYS 


A.  HUGHES  RESOLUTION   FOR  THE   UNIFICATION   OF 
THE  CHINESE  RAILWAYS,  ADOPTED  BY  THE  CON- 
FERENCE, FEBRUARY  i,  1922 

The  Powers  represented  in  this  Conference  record  their 
hope  that,  to  the  utmost  degree  consistent  with  legitimate  exist- 
ing rights,  the  future  development  of  railways  in  China  shall 
be  so  conducted  as  to  enable  the  Chinese  Government  to  effect 
the  unification  of  railways  into  a  railway  system  under  Chinese 
control,  with  such  foreign  financial  and  technical  assistance  as 
may  prove  necessary  in  the  interests  of  that  system. 

B.  CHINESE  DELEGATION'S  STATEMENT  CONCERNING 
THE  HUGHES  RESOLUTION  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EAST- 
ERN COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER  19,  1921 

"The  Chinese  delegation  notes  with  sympathetic  apprecia- 
tion the  expression  of  the  hope  of  the  Powers  that  the  existing 
and  future  railways  of  China  may  be  unified  under  the  control 
and  operation  of  the  Chinese  Government  with  such  foreign 
financial  and  technical  assistance  as  may  be  needed.  It  is  our 
intention  as  speedily  as  possible  to  bring  about  this  result.  It 
is  our  purpose  to  develop  existing  and  future  railways  in 
accordance  with  a  general  program  that  will  meet  the  eco- 
nomic, industrial  and  commercial  requirements  of  China.  It 
will  be  our  policy  to  obtain  such  foreign  financial  and  technical 
assistance  as  may  be  needed  from  the  Powers  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  open  door  or  equal  opportunity;  and 
the  friendly  support  of  these  Powers  will  be  asked  for  the 
effort  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  bring  all  the  railways  of 

352 


APPENDIX  853 

China  now  existing,   or  to  be  built,  under  its  effective  and 
unified  control  and  operation." 

C.    RESOLUTIONS   ON   CHINESE  EASTERN  RAILWAY 

[NOTE: — Properly  speaking,  these  resolutions  should  be  regarded  as 
resolutions  on  the  Siberian  or  Russian  question.  This  railway  is  Rus- 
sian property  which  the  Powers  have  obligated  themselves  to  safe- 
guard in  the  interest  of  Russia  until  she  shall  have  established  a  stable 
government  capable  of  taking  care  of  her  interests  in  the  Far  East. — 
THE  AUTHOR.] 

a.  ADOPTED  BY  THE  CONFERENCE,  FEBRUARY  4,  1922 
Resolved,  That  the  preservation  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way for   those  in  interest   requires   that  better   protection  be 
given  to  the  railway  and  the  persons  engaged  in  its  operation 
and  use,  a  more  careful  selection  of  personnel  to  secure  effi- 
ciency of  service,  and  a  more  economical  use  of  funds  to  prevent 
waste  of  the  property. 

That  the  subject  should  immediately  be  dealt  with  through 
the  proper  diplomatic  channels. 

b.  ADOPTED    BY   THE   CONFERENCE,   EXCEPT   CHINA, 
FEBRUARY  4,  1922 

The  Powers  other  than  China,  in  agreeing  to  the  resolution 
regarding  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  reserve  the  right  to 
insist  hereafter  upon  the  responsibility  of  China  for  perform- 
ance or  nonperformance  of  the  obligations  toward  the  foreign 
stockholders,  bondholders  and  creditors  of  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway  Company  which  the  Powers  deem  to  result  from  the 
contracts  under  which  the  railroad  was  built,  and  the  action  of 
China  thereunder  and  the  obligations  which  they  deem  to  be 
in  the  nature  of  a  trust  resulting  from  the  exercise  of  power 
by  the  Chinese  Government  over  the  possession  and  adminis- 
tration of  the  railroad. 


Appendix  XIII 
SIBERIA 


A.    BARON    SHIDEHARA'S     STATEMENT    BEFORE    THE 
FAR  EASTERN  COMMITTEE,  JANUARY  23,  1922 

"The  military  expedition  of  Japan  to  Siberia  was  originally 
undertaken  in  common  accord  and  in  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  in  1918.  It  was  primarily  intended  to  render 
assistance  to  the  Czecho-Slovak  troops  who,  in  their  homeward 
journey  across  Siberia  from  European  Russia,  found  themselves 
in  grave  and  pressing  danger  at  the  hands  of  hostile  forces 
under  German  command.  The  Japanese  and  American  expe- 
ditionary forces,  together  with  other  allied  troops,  fought  their 
way  from  Vladivostok  far  into  the  region  of  the  Amur  and 
the  Trans-Baikal  Provinces  to  protect  the  railway  lines  which 
afforded  the  sole  means  of  transportation  of  the  Czecho-Slovak 
troops  from  the  interior  of  Siberia  to  the  port  of  Vladivostok. 
Difficulties  which  the  allied  forces  had  to  encounter  in  their 
operations  in  the  severe  cold  weather  of  Siberia  were  immense. 

"In  January,  1920,  the  United  States  decided  to  terminate 
its  military  undertaking  in  Siberia,  and  ordered  the  withdrawal 
of  its  forces.  For  some  time  thereafter  Japanese  troops  con- 
tinued alone  to  carry  out  the  duty  of  guarding  several  points 
along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railways  in  fulfillment  of  inter- 
allied arrangements  and  of  affording  facilities  to  the  returning 
Czecho-Slovaks. 

"The  last  column  of  Czecho-Slovak  troops  safely  embarked 
from  Vladivostok  in  September,  1920.  Ever  since  then,  Japan 
has  been  looking  forward  to  an  early  moment  for  the  with- 
drawal of  her  troops  from  Siberia.  The  maintenance  of  such 
troops  in  a  foreign  land  is  for  her  a  costly  and  thankless  under- 
taking, and  she  will  be  only  too  happy  to  be  relieved  of  such 

354 


APPENDIX  355 

responsibility.  In  fact,  the  evacuation  of  the  Trans-Baikal 
and  Amur  Provinces  was  already  completed  in  1920.  The 
only  region  which  now  remains  to  be  evacuated  is  a  southern 
portion  of  Maritime  Province  around  Vladivostok  and  Nikolsk. 

"It  will  be  appreciated  that  for  Japan  the  question  of  the 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  Siberia  is  not  quite  as  simple  as  it 
was  for  other  allied  Powers.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  a 
considerable  number  of  Japanese  residents  who  had  lawfully 
and  under  guarantees  of  treaty  established  themselves  in  Siberia 
long  before  the  Bolshevik  eruption,  and  were  there  entirely 
welcome.  In  1917,  prior  to  the  joint  American-Japanese  mili- 
tary enterprise,  the  number  of  such  residents  was  already  no 
less  than  9,717.  In  the  actual  situation  prevailing  there,  those 
Japanese  residents  can  hardly  be  expected  to  look  for  the  pro- 
tection of  their  lives  and  property  to  any  other  authorities 
than  Japanese.  Whatever  districts  those  troops  have  evacuated 
in  the  past  have  fallen  into  disorder,  and  practically  all  Japa- 
nese residents  have  had  precipitately  to  withdraw,  to  seek  for 
their  personal  safety.  In  so  withdawing  they  have  been  obliged 
to  leave  behind  large  portions  of  their  property,  abandoned  and 
unprotected,  and  their  homes  and  places  of  business  have  been 
destroyed.  While  the  hardships  and  losses  thus  caused  the 
Japanese  in  the  Trans-Baikal  and  Amur  Provinces  have 
been  serious  enough,  more  extensive  damages  are  likely  to 
follow  from  the  evacuation  of  Vladivostok  in  which  a  larger 
number  of  Japanese  have  always  been  resident  and  a  greater 
amount  of  Japanese  capital  invested. 

"There  is  another  difficulty  by  which  Japan  is  faced  in  pro- 
ceeding to  the  recall  of  her  troops  from  Maritime  Province. 
Due  to  geographical  propinquity,  the  general  situation  in  the 
districts  around  Vladivostok  and  Nikolsk  are  found  to  affect 
the  security  of  the  Korean  frontier.  In  particular,  it  is  known 
that  these  districts  have  long  been  the  base  of  Korean  con- 
spiracies against  Japan.  Those  hostile  Koreans,  joining  hands 
with  lawless  elements  in  Russia,  attempted  in  1920  to  invade 
Korea  through  the  Chinese  territory  of  Chientao.  They  set 
fire  to  the  Japanese  consulate  at  Hunchun  and  committed  in- 
discriminate acts  of  murder  and  pillage.  At  the  present  time, 


356  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

they  are  under  the  effective  control  of  Japanese  troops  stationed 
in  Maritime  Province,  but  they  will  no  doubt  renew  the 
attempt  to  penetrate  into  Korea  at  the  first  favorable  oppor- 
tunity that  may  present  itself. 

"Having  regard  to  those  considerations,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment have  felt  bound  to  exercise  precaution  in  carrying  out 
the  contemplated  evacuation  of  Maritime  Province.  Should 
they  take  hasty  action  without  adequate  provision  for  th^ 
future,  they  would  be  delinquent  in  their  duty  of  affording 
protection  to  a  large  number  of  their  nationals  resident  in  the 
districts  in  question  and  of  maintaining  order  and  security  in 
Korea. 

"It  should  be  made  clear  that  no  part  of  Maritime  Prov- 
ince is  under  Japan's  military  occupation.  Japanese  troops  are 
still  stationed  in  the  southern  portion  of  that  Province,  but 
they  have  not  set  up  any  civil  or  military  administration  to 
displace  local  authorities.  Their  activity  is  confined  to  meas- 
ures of  self-protection  against  the  menace  to  their  own  safety 
and  to  the  safety  of  their  country  and  nationals.  They  are 
not  in  occupation  of  those  districts  any  more  than  American  or 
other  allied  troops  could  be  said  to  have  been  in  occupation  of 
the  places  in  which  they  were  formerly  stationed. 

"The  Japanese  Government  ^?  anxious  to  see  an  orderly 
and  stable  authority  speedily  re-established  in  the  Far  Eastern 
possessions  of  Russia.  It  was  in  this  spirit  that  they  manifested 
a  keen  interest  in  the  patriotic  but  ill-fated  struggle  of  Admiral 
Kolchak.  They  have  shown  readiness  to  lend  their  good  offices 
for  promoting  the  reconciliation  of  various  political  groups  in 
Eastern  Siberia.  But  they  have  carefully  refrained  from  sup- 
porting one  faction  against  another.  It  will  be  recalled,  for 
instance,  that  they  withheld  all  assistance  from  General  Ro- 
zanov  against  the  revolutionary  movements  which  led  to  his 
overthrow  in  January,  1920.  They  maintained  an  attitude 
of  strict  neutrality  and  refused  to  interfere  in  these  movements, 
which  it  would  have  been  quite  easy  for  them  to  suppress  if 
they  had  so  desired. 

"In  relation  to  this  policy  of  non-intervention,  it  may  be 
useful  to  refer  briefly  to  the  past  relations  between  the  Japa- 


APPENDIX  357 

nese  authorities  and  Ataman  Semenoff,  which  seem  to  have 
been  a  source  of  popular  misgiving  and  speculation.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  the  growing  rapprochement  between  the 
Germans  and  the  Bolshevist  Government  in  Russia  in  the  early 
part  of  1918  naturally  gave  rise  to  apprehensions  in  the  allied 
countries  that  a  considerable  quantity  of  munitions  supplied 
by  those  countries,  and  stored  in  Vladivostok,  might  be  removed 
by  the  Bolsheviki  to  European  Russia  for  the  use  of  the  Ger- 
mans. Ataman  Semenoff  was  then  in  Siberia,  and  was  organ- 
izing a  movement  to  check  such  Bolshevist  activities  and  to 
preserve  order  and  stability  in  that  region.  It  was  in  this 
situation  that  Japan,  as  well  as  some  of  the  Allies,  began  to 
give  support  to  the  Cossack  chief.  After  a  few  months  such 
support  by  the  other  Powers  was  discontinued.  But  the  Japa- 
nese were  reluctant  to  abandon  their  friend,  whose  efforts  in 
the  allied  cause  they  had  originally  encouraged,  and  they  main- 
tained for  some  time  their  connection  with  Ataman  Semenoff. 
They  had,  however,  no  intention  whatever  of  interfering  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  Russia,  and  when  it  was  found  that  the 
assistance  rendered  to  Ataman  Semenoff  was  likely  to  compli- 
cate the  internal  situation  in  Siberia,  they  terminated  all  rela- 
tions with  him,  and  no  support  of  any  kind  has  since  been 
extended  to  him  by  the  Japanese  authorities. 

"The  Japanese  Government  are  now  seriously  considering 
plans  which  would  justify  them  in  carrying  out  their  decision 
of  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops  from  Maritime 
Province,  with  reasonable  precaution  for  the  security  of  Japa- 
nese residents  and  of  the  Korean  frontier  regions.  It  is  for 
this  purpose  that  negotiations  were  opened  some  time  ago  at 
Dairen  between  the  Japanese  representatives  and  the  agents  of 
the  Chita  Government. 

"Those  negotiations  at  Dairen  are  in  no  way  intended  to 
secure  for  Japan  any  right  or  advantage  of  an  exclusive  nature. 
They  have  been  solely  actuated  by  a  desire  to  adjust  some  of 
the  more  pressing  questions  with  which*  Japan  is  confronted 
in  relation  to  Siberia.  They  have  essentially  in  view  the 
conclusion  of  provisional  commercial  arrangements,  the  removal 
of  the  existing  menace  to  the  security  of  Japan  and  to  the 


358  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

lives  and  property  of  Japanese  residents  in  Eastern  Siberia,  the 
provision  of  guarantees  for  the  freedom  of  lawful  undertak- 
ings in  that  region,  and  the  prohibition  of  Bolshevist  propa- 
ganda over  the  Siberian  border.  Should  adequate  provisions 
be  arranged  on  the  line  indicated,  the  Japanese  Government 
will  at  once  proceed  to  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Japanese 
troops  from  Maritime  Province. 

"The  occupation  of  certain  points  in  the  Russian  province  of 
Sakhalin*  is  wholly  different,  both  in  nature  and  in  origin,  from 
the  stationing  of  troops  in  Maritime  Province.  History  affords 
few  instances  similar  to  the  incident  of  1920  at  Nikolaievsk, 
where  more  than  700  Japanese,  including  women  and  children, 
as  well  as  the  duly  recognized  Japanese  Consul  and  his  family 
and  his  official  staff,  were  cruelly  tortured  and  massacred.  No 
nation  worthy  of  respect  will  possibly  remain  forbearing  under 
such  a  strain  of  provocation.  Nor  was  it  possible  for  the 
Japanese  Government  to  disregard  the  just  popular  indignation 
aroused  in  Japan  by  the  incident.  Under  the  actual  condition 
of  things,  Japan  found  no  alternative  but  to  occupy,  as  a 
measure  of  reprisal,  certain  points  in  the  Russian  Province  of 
Sakhalin  in  which  the  outrage  was  committed,  pending  the 
establishment  in  Russia  of  a  responsible  authority  with  whom 
she  can  communicate  in  order  to  obtain  due  satisfaction. 

"Nothing  is  further  from  the  thought  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment than  to  take  advantage  of  the  present  helpless  condi- 
tion of  Russia  for  prosecution  of  selfish  designs.  Japan  recalls 
with  deep  gratitude  and  appreciation  the  brilliant  role  which 
Russia  played  in  the  interest  of  civilization  during  the  earlier 
stage  of  the  Great  War.  The  Japanese  people  have  shown 
and  will  continue  to  show  every  sympathetic  interest  in  the 
efforts  of  patriotic  Russians  aspiring  to  the  unity  and  re- 
habilitation of  their  country.  The  military  occupation  of  the 
Russian  province  of  Sakhalin  is  only  a  temporary  measure,  and 
will  naturally  come  to  an  end  as  soon  as  a  satisfactory  settle- 
ment of  the  question  shall  have  been  arranged  with  an  orderly 
Russian  Government. 

"In    conclusion,    the    Japanese    delegation    is    authorized    to 

*This  is  frequently  spelled  Saghalien. 


APPENDIX  359 

declare  that  it  is  the  fixed  and  settled  policy  of  Japan  to  respect 
the  territorial  integrity  of  Russia  arid  to  observe  the  principle 
of  non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country,  as  well 
as  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  in  every  part  of  the  Russian  possessions." 

B.     MR.  HUGHES'  STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  FAR  EAST- 
ERN COMMITTEE,  JANUARY  24,  1922 

"The  American  delegation  has  heard  the  statement  by  Baron 
Shidehara  and  has  taken  note  of  the  assurance  given  on  behalf 
of  the  Japanese  Government  with  respect  to  the  withdrawal 
of  Japanese  troops  from  Maritime  Province  of  Siberia  and 
from  the  Province  of  Sakhalin.  The  American  delegation 
has  also  noted  the  assurance  of  Japan  by  her  authorized  spokes- 
man that  it  is  her  fixed  and  settled  policy  to  respect  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  Russia,  and  to  observe  the  principle  of 
non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that  country,  as  well 
as  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  in  every  part  of  the  Russian  possessions. 

"These  assurances  are  taken  to  mean  that  Japan  does  not 
seek,  through  her  military  operation  in  Siberia,  to  impair  the 
rights  of  the  Russian  people  in  any  respect,  or  to  obtain  any 
unfair  commercial  advantages,  or  to  absorb  for  her  own  use 
the  Siberian  fisheries,  or  to  set  up  an  exclusive  exploitation 
either  of  the  resources  of  Sakhalin  or  of  Maritime  Province. 

"As  Baron  Shidehara  pointed  out,  the  military  expedition 
of  Japan  to  Siberia  was  originally  undertaken  in  common 
accord  and  in  cooperation  with  the  United  States.  It  will  be 
recalled  that  public  assurances  were  given  at  the  outset  by  both 
Governments  of  a  firm  intention  to  respect  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Russia  and  to  abstain  from  all  interference  in  Russian 
internal  politics.  In  view  of  the  reference  by  Baron  Shidehara 
to  the  participation  of  the  American  Government  in  the  expe- 
dition of  1918,  I  should  like  to  place  upon  our  records  for 
transmission  to  the  Conference  the  purposes  which  were  then 
clearly  stated  by  both  Governments. 

"The  American  Government  set  forth  its  aims  and  policies** 
publicly  in  July,  1918.  The  purposes  of  the  expedition  were 


360  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

said  to  be,  first,  to  help  the  Czecho-Slovaks  consolidate  their 
forces;  second,  to  steady  any  efforts  at  self-government  or 
self-defense  in  which  the  Russians  themselves  might  be  willing 
to  accept  assistance;  and,  third,  to  guard  the  military  stores  at 
Vladivostok. 

"The  American  Government  opposed  the  idea  of  a  military 
intervention,  but  regarded  military  action  as  admissible  at  the 
time  solely  for  the  purpose  of  helping  the  Czecho-Slovaks  con- 
solidate their  forces  and  get  into  successful  cooperation  with 
their  Slavic  kinsmen,  and  to  steady  any  efforts  at  self-govern- 
ment or  self-defense  in  which  the  Russians  themselves  might 
be  willing  to  accept  assistance.  It  was  stated  that  the  American 
Government  proposed  to  ask  all  associated  in  this  course  of 
action  to  unite  in  assuring  the  people  of  Russia  in  the  most 
public  and  solemn  manner  that  none  of  the  Governments  unit- 
ing in  action  either  in  Siberia  or  in  Northern  Russia  con- 
templated any  interference  of  any  kind  with  the  political 
sovereignty  of  Russia,  any  intervention  in  her  internal  affairs, 
or  any  impairment  of  her  territorial  integrity,  either  now  or 
thereafter,  but  that  each  of  the  associated  Powers  had  the  single 
object  of  affording  such  aid  as  should  be  acceptable,  and  only 
such  aid  as  should  be  acceptable  to  the  Russian  people  in  their 
endeavor  to  regain  control  of  their  affairs,  their  own  territory 
and  their  own  destiny. 

"What  I  have  just  stated  is  found  in  the  public  statement 
of  the  American  Government  at  that  time. 

"The  Japanese  Government,  with  the  same  purpose,  set 
forth  its  position  in  a  statement  published  by  the  Japanese 
Government  on  Aug.  2,  1918,  in  which  it  was  said: 

'  'The  Japanese  Government,  being  anxious  to  fall  in  with 
the  desires  of  the  American  Government  and  also  to  act  in 
harmony  with  the  Allies  in  this  expedition,  have  decided  to 
proceed  at  once  to  dispatch  suitable  forces  for  the  proposed 
mission.  A  certain  number  of  these  troops  will  be  sent  forth- 
with to  Vladivostok.  In  adopting  this  course,  the  Japanese 
Government  remain  unshaken  in  their  constant  desire  to  pro- 
mote relations  of  enduring  friendship  with  Russia  and  the 
Russian  people,  and  reaffirm  their  avowed  policy  of  respecting 


APPENDIX  361 

the  territorial  integrity  of  Russia  and  of  abstaining  from  all 
interference  in  her  internal  politics.  They  further  declare  that, 
upon  the  realization  of  the  projects  above  indicated,  they  will 
immediately  withdraw  all  Japanese  troops  from  Russian  terri- 
tory and  will  leave  wholly  unimpaired  the  sovereignty  of  Russia 
in  all  its  phases,  whether  political  or  military.' 

"The  United  States  of  America  withdrew  its  troops  from 
Siberia  in  the  Spring  of  1920  because  it  considered  that  the 
original  purposes  of  the  expedition  had  either  been  accomplished 
or  would  no  longer  be  subserved  by  continued  military  activity 
in  Siberia.  The  American  Government  then  ceased  to  be  a 
party  to  the  expedition,  but  it  remained  a  close  observer  of 
events  in  Eastern  Siberia  and  has  had  an  extended  diplomatic 
correspondence  upon  this  subject  with  the  Government  of 
Japan. 

"It  must  be  frankly  avowed  that  this  correspondence  has 
not  always  disclosed  an  identity  of  views  between  the  two 
Governments.  The  United  States  has  not  been  unmindful  of 
the  direct  exposure  of  Japan  to  Bolshevism  in  Siberia  and  the 
special  problems  which  the  conditions  existing  there  have 
created  for  the  Japanese  Government,  but  it  has  been  strongly 
disposed  to  the  belief  that  the  public  assurances  given  by  the 
two  Governments  at  the  inception  of  the  joint  expedition 
nevertheless  required  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Japanese 
troops  from  all  Russian  territory — if  not  immediately  after  the 
departure  of  the  Czecho-Slovak  troops,  then  within  a  reason- 
able time. 

"As  to  the  occupation  of  Sakhalin  in  reprisal  for  the  mas- 
sacre of  the  Japanese  at  Nikolaievsk,  the  United  States  was 
not  unimpressed  by  the  serious  character  of  that  catastrophe; 
but,  having  in  mind  the  conditions  accepted  by  both  Gov- 
ernments at  the  outset  of  the  joint  expedition,  of  which  the 
Nikolaievsk  massacre  must  be  considered  an  incident,  it  has 
regretted  that  Japan  should  deem  necessary  the  occupation  of 
Russian  territory  as  a  means  of  assuring  a  suitable  adjustment 
with  a  future  Russian  Government. 

"The  general  position  of  the  American  Government  was  set 


362  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY; 

forth  in  a  communication  to  Japan  of  May  31,  1921.     In  that 
communication  appears  the  following  statement: 

"  'The  Government  of  the  United  States  would  be  untrue 
to  the  spirit  of  cooperation  which  led  it,  in  the  summer  of 
1918,  upon  an  understanding  with  the  Government  of  Japan, 
to  dispatch  troops  to  Siberia,  if  it  neglected  to  point  out  that, 
in  its  view,  continued  occupation  of  the  strategic  centres  in 
Eastern  Siberia — involving  the  indefinite  possession  of  the  Port 
of  Vladivostok,  the  stationing  of  troops  at  Habarovsk,  Niko- 
laievsk,  De  Castries,  Mago,  Sophiesk,  and  other  important 
points,  the  seizure  of  the  Russian  portion  of  Sakhalin,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  civil  administration,  which  inevitably  lends 
itself  to  misconception  and  antagonism — tends  rather  to  in- 
crease than  to  allay  the  unrest  and  disorder  in  that  region.' 

'  'The  military  occupation  in  reprisal  for  the  Nikolaievsk 
affair  is  not  fundamentally  a  question  of  the  validity  of  pro- 
cedure under  the  recognized  rules  of  international  law.' 

'  'The  issue  presented  is  that  of  the  scrupulous  fulfillment  of 
the  assurances  given  to  the  Russian  people,  which  were  a 
matter  of  frank  exchanges  and  of  apparently  complete  under- 
standing between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and 
of  Japan.  These  assurances  were  intended  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  convey  to  the  people  of  Russia 
a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  two  Governments  not  to  use  the 
joint  expedition,  or  any  incidents  which  might  arise  out  of  it, 
as  an  occasion  to  occupy  territory,  even  temporarily,  or  to 
assume  any  military  or  administrative  control  over  the  people 
of  Siberia.' 

"Further,  in  the  same  note,  the  American  Government  stated 
its  position  as  follows: 

'  'In  view  of  its  conviction  that  the  course  followed  by  the 
Government  of  Japan  brings  into  question  the  very  definite 
understanding  concluded  at  the  time  troops  were  sent  to  Si- 
beria, the  Government  of  the  United  States  must  in  candor 
explain  its  position  and  say  to  the  Japanese  Government  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  can  neither  now  nor 
hereafter  recognize  as  valid  any  claims  or  titles  arising  out  of 
the  present  occupation  and  control,  and  that  it  cannot  acquiesce 


APPENDIX  363 

in  any  action  taken  by  the  Government  of  Japan,  which  might 
impair  existing  treaty  rights  or  the  political  or  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Russia. 

'The  Government  of  Japan  will  appreciate  that,  in  express- 
ing its  views,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  no  desire 
to  impute  to  the  Government  of  Japan  motives  or  purposes 
other  than  those  which  have  heretofore  been  so  frankly  avowed. 
The  purpose  of  this  Government  is  to  inform  the  Japanese 
Government  of  its  own  conviction  that,  in  the  present  time 
of  disorder  in  Russia,  it  is  more  than  ever  the  duty  of  those 
who  look  forward  to  the  tranquillization  of  the  Russian  people 
and  a  restoration  of  normal  conditions  among  them,  to  avoid 
all  action  which  might  keep  alive  their  antagonism  and  distrust 
toward  outside  political  agencies.  Now,  especially,  it  is  incum- 
bent upon  the  friends  of  Russia  to  hold  aloof  from  the  domes- 
tic contentions  of  the  Russian  people,  to  be  scrupulous  to  avoid 
inflicting  what  might  appear  to  them  a  vicarious  penalty  for 
sporadic  acts  of  lawlessness,  and  above  all,  to  abstain  from 
even  the  temporary  and  conditional  impairment  by  any  foreign 
Power  of  the  territorial  status  which,  for  them  as  for  other 
peoples,  is  a  matter  of  deep  and  sensitive  national  feeling, 
transcending  perhaps  even  the  issues  at  stake  among  them- 
selves.' 

"To  that  American  note  the  Japanese  Government  replied 
in  July,  1921,  setting  forth  in  substance  what  Baron  Shide- 
hara  has  now  stated  to  this  Committee,  pointing  out  the  con- 
ditions under  which  Japan  had  taken  the  action  to  which 
reference  was  made,  and  giving  the  assurances,  which  have  here 
been  reiterated,  with  respect  to  its  intention  and  policy. 

"While  the  discussion  of  these  matters  has  been  attended 
with  the  friendliest  feeling,  it  has  naturally  been  the  constant 
and  earnest  hope  of  the  American  Government — and  of  Japan 
as  well,  I  am  sure — that  this  occasion  for  divergence  of  views 
between  the  two  Governments  might  be  removed  with  the 
least  possible  delay.  It  has  been  with  a  feeling  of  special 
gratification,  therefore,  that  the  American  delegation  has  lis- 
tened to  the  assurances  given  by  their  Japanese  colleague,  and 
it  is  with  the  greatest  friendliness  that  they  reiterate  the  hope 


364  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

that  Japan  will  find  it  possible  to  carry  out  within  the  near 
future  her  expressed  intention  of  terminating  finally  the  Siberian 
expedition  and  of  restoring  Sakhalin  to  the  Russian  people. 

"My  suggestion  would  be,  if  it  is  not  desired  otherwise  by 
the  delegates,  that  the  statement  made  on  behalf  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  by  Baron  Shidehara  and  the  one  that  I  have 
made  setting  forth  the  position  of  the  American  Government, 
which  is  as  stated  in  its  communication  of  May  31,  1921, 
which  I  have  read,  should  be  communicated  to  the  Confer- 
ence for  the  purpose  of  being  spread  upon  its  records. 
"I  suggest  the  adoption  of  the  following  resolution: 
"Resolved,  that  the  statements  by  the  Japanese  and  Ameri- 
can delegations  in  respect  to  the  presence  of  foreign  troops  in 
Siberia  be  reported  to  the  Conference  at  its  next  plenary  ses- 
sion to  be  spread  upon  its  records." 


<?a 

Appendix  XIV 

BARON  SHIDEHARA'S  STATEMENT,  DEFINING 
JAPAN'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  CHINA,  AT 
THE  FINAL  PLENARY  SESSION,  FEBRUARY  4, 
1922 

"We  have  listened  with  great  emotion  to  the  report  made 
by  the  Chairman  upon  the  final  outcome  of  the  labors  of  the 
Committee  on  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions,  and  of  the 
Committee  on  Naval  Matters.  The  task  imposed  upon  these 
Committees  has  by  no  means  been  easy  or  simple.  Unanimity 
of  views  could  hardly  be  expected  on  all  questions  submitted 
for  consideration.  But  after  numerous  sessions,  one  broad 
fact  has  been  brought  markedly  to  the  fore.  It  has  been 
found  that  all  differences  of  opinion  which  have  divided  such 
Committees  relate,  not  so  much  to  the  ultimate  purposes  of 
the  nations  represented  here,  as  to  the  means  by  which  such 
purposes  are  to  be  attained.  It  has  been  found  that  we  are 
all  striving  for  the  same  goal  of  life.  That  goal  is  now 
perceptibly  within  sight. 

"Take,  for  instance,  the  Chinese  problem,  which  it  was 
often  asserted,  would  one  day  lead  to  worldwide  conflagration. 
What  has  the  Conference  revealed?  No  sooner  had  Mr. 
Root  formulated  and  proposed  the  four  great  rules  of  inter- 
national conduct  with  regard  to  China,  than  those  proposals 
found  a  ready  and  whole-hearted  approval  on  all  sides.  They 
laid  the  foundation  of  the  work  of  the  delegations — and  of 
friendly  understandings  among  nations. 

"No  one  denies  to  China  her  sacred  right  to  govern  herself. 
No  one  stands  in  the  way  of  China  working  out  her  own 
great  national  destiny.  No  one  has  come  to  the  Conference 
with  any  plan  of  seeking  anything  at  the  expense  of  China. 

365 


366  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY 

On  the  contrary,  every  participating  nation  has  shown  readi- 
ness at  all  times  to  help  China  out  of  her  present  difficulties. 

"Japan  believes  that  she  has  made  to  China  every  possible 
concession,  consistent  with  the  sense  of  reason,  fairness  and 
honor.  She  does  not  regret  it.  She  rejoices  in  the  thought 
that  the  sacrifice  which  she  has  offered  will  not  be  in  vain,  in 
the  greater  cause  of  international  friendship  and  good  will. 

"We  are  vitally  interested  in  a  speedy  establishment  of 
peace  and  unity  in  China,  and  in  the  economic  development 
of  her  vast  natural  resources.  It  is,  indeed,  to  the  Asiatic 
mainland  that  we  must  look  primarily  for  raw  materials  and 
for  the  markets  where  our  manufactured  articles  may  be  sold. 
Neither  raw  materials  nor  the  markets  can  be  had,  unless 
order,  happiness,  and  prosperity  reign  in  China  under  good 
and  stable  government.  With  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our 
nationals  resident  in  China,  with  enormous  amounts  of  our 
capital  invested  there,  and  with  our  own  national  existence 
largely  dependent  on  that  of  our  neighbor,  we  are  naturally 
interested  in  that  country  to  a  greater  extent  than  any  of  the 
countries  remotely  situated. 

"To  say  that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  is  simply 
to  state  a  plain  and  actual  fact.  It  intimates  no  claim  or 
pretension  of  any  kind  prejudicial  to  China  or  to  any  other 
nation. 

"Nor  are  we  actuated  by  any  intention  of  securing  prefer- 
ential or  exclusive  economic  rights  in  China.  Why  should  we 
need  them?  Why  should  we  be  afraid  of  foreign  competition 
in  the  Chinese  market,  provided  it  is  conducted  squarely  and 
honestly?  Favored  by  geographical  position,  and  having  fair 
knowledge  of  the  actual  requirements  of  the  Chinese  people, 
our  traders  and  business  men  can  well  take  care  of  themselves 
in  their  commercial,  industrial,  or  financial  activity  in  China 
without  any  preferential  or  exclusive  rights.  We  do  not  seek 
any  inch  of  territory  in  China.  But  we  do  seek  a  field  of 
economic  activity,  beneficial  as  much  to  China  as  to  Japan, 
based  always  on  the  principle  of  the  open  door  and  equal 
opportunity. 

"We  came  to  Washington  with  full  confidence  in  the  future 


APPENDIX  867 

of  international  relations.  We  are  now  departing  with  re- 
assured confidence.  We  knew  that  the  Conference  would  do 
good;  and  it  has  done  good.  Competition  in  naval  armament, 
ruinous  to  national  welfare  and  harmful  to  international  peace, 
is  now  a  matter  of  the  past.  The  relief  from  tension  is  pro- 
vided by  the  agreements  reached  by  the  Conference  for  the 
limitation  of  naval  armament,  for  the  suppression  of  the  brutal 
practices  of  warfare,  and  for  the  definition  of  a  policy  on 
matters  relating  to  China.  The  Conference  has  also  given 
occasion  to  the  Powers  directly  interested  to  conclude  the 
Pacific  Treaty,  and  to  adjust  the  difficult  question  of  the 
Pacific  mandates  and  the  still  more  difficult  question  of  Shan- 
tung. 

"In  arriving  at  this  happy  result,  we  are  under  everlasting 
debt  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  at  whose  gracious 
initiative  the  Conference  was  convoked.  We  feel  no  less  grate- 
ful to  our  trusted  Chairman,  to  whose  able  leadership  the 
success  of  our  work  is  largely  due.  Permit  me  further  to 
express,  on  behalf  of  the  Japanese  delegation,  our  sincere  appre- 
ciation of  the  unfailing  spirit  of  generosity,  of  conciliation,  and 
of  ready  co-operation  shown  by  all  of  our  colleagues  and  friends 
around  this  table. 

"Freed  from  suspicion  by  frankness,  assured  of  peace  by 
good  will,  we  may  devoutly  give  thanks  for  the  opportunity 
given  by  the  Washington  Conference,  which,  we  believe,  ushers 
into  a  troubled  world  a  new  spirit  of  international  friendship 
and  good  understanding." 


Appendix  XV 

THE  YAP  TREATY,  SIGNED  FEBRUARY  11,   1922 

Considering  that  by  Article  119  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
signed  on  June  28,  1919,  Germany  renounced  in  favor  of  the 
Powers  described  in  that  Treaty  as  the  Principal  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers,  to  wit,  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan,  all  her  rights  and 
titles  over  her  oversea  possessions; 

Considering  that  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  United  States 
under  the  aforesaid  Article  119  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
were  confirmed  by  the  Treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany,  signed  on  August  25,  1921,  to  restore  friendly  rela- 
tions between  the  two  nations; 

Considering  that  the  said  four  Powers,  to  wit,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan,  have  agreed  to  confer  upon 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  a  Mandate,  pursuant  to 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  to  administer  the  groups  of  the  former 
German  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  lying  north  of  the  Equa- 
tor, in  accordance  with  the  following  provisions: 

"Article  i.  The  islands  over  which  a  Mandate  is 
conferred  upon  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan 
(hereinafter  called  the  Mandatory)  comprise  all  the 
former  German  islands  situated  in  the  Pacific  Ocean 
and  lying  north  of  the  Equator. 

"Article  2.  The  Mandatory  shall  have  full  power 
of  administration  and  legislation  over  the  territory 
subject  to  the  present  Mandate  as  an  integral  portion 
of  the  Empire  of  Japan,  and  may  apply  the  laws  of  the 
Empire  of  Japan  to  the  territory,  subject  to  such  local 
modifications  as  circumstances  may  require.  The  Man- 
datory shall  promote  to  the  utmost  the  material  and 
368 


APPENDIX  369 

moral  well-being  and  the  social  progress  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  territory  subject  to  the  present  Mandate. 

Article  3.  The  Mandatory  shall  see  that  the  slave 
trade  is  prohibited  and  that  no  forced  labour  is  per- 
mitted, except  for  essential  public  works  and  services, 
and  then  only  for  adequate  remuneration.  The  Man- 
datory shall  also  see  that  the  traffic  in  arms  and  ammu- 
nition is  controlled  in  accordance  with  principles  analo- 
gous to  those  laid  down  in  the  Convention  relating  to 
the  control  of  the  arms  traffic,  signed  on  September 
10th,  1919,  or  in  any  convention  amending  same.  The 
supply  of  intoxicating  spirits  and  beverages  to  the 
natives  shall  be  prohibited. 

"Article  4.  The  military  training  of  the  natives, 
otherwise  than  for  purposes  of  internal  police  and  the 
local  defence  of  the  territory,  shall  be  prohibited. 
Furthermore,  no  military  or  naval  bases  shall  be  es- 
tablished or  fortifications  erected  in  the  territory. 

"Article  5.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  any  local 
law  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  public 
morals,  the  Mandatory  shall  insure  in  the  territory 
freedom  of  conscience  and  the  free  exercise  of  all  forms 
of  worship,  and  shall  allow  all  missionaries,  nationals  of 
any  State,  Member  of  the  League  of  Nations,  to  enter 
into,  travel,  and  reside  in  the  territory  for  the  purpose 
of  prosecuting  their  calling. 

Article  6.  The  Mandatory  shall  make  to  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  League  of  Nations  an  annual  report  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Council,  containing  full  information 
with  regard  to  the  territory,  and  indicating  the  meas- 
ures taken  to  carry  out  the  obligations  assumed  under 
Articles  2,  3,  4  and  5. 

"Article  7.  The  consent  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  required  for  any  modification  of 
the  terms  of  the  present  mandate.  The  Mandatory 


370  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY; 

agrees  that,  if  any  dispute  whatever  should  arise  be- 
tween the  Mandatory  and  another  member  of  the 
League  of  Nations  relating  to  the  interpretation  or 
the  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Mandate,  such 
dispute,  if  it  cannot  be  settled  by  negotiation,  shall 
be  submitted  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice  provided  for  by  Article  14  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations." 

Considering  that  the  United  States  did  not  ratify  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  and  did  not  participate  in  the  agreement  respect- 
ing the  aforesaid  Mandate; 

Desiring  to  reach  a  definite  understanding  with  regard  to 
the  rights  of  the  two  Governments  and  their  respective  na- 
tionals in  the  aforesaid  islands,  and  in  particular  the  Island 
of  Yap,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a  Convention  for  that  pur- 
pose and  to  that  end  have  named  as  their  plenipotentiaries: 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan:  Baron  Kijuro  Shide- 
hara,  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipo- 
tentiary at  Washington;  and 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America:  Charles 
Evans  Hughes,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States; 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respec- 
tive full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed 
as  follows: 

Article  I 

Subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  present  Convention,  the 
United  States  consents  to  the  administration  by  Japan,  pur- 
suant to  the  aforesaid  Mandate,  of  all  the  former  German 
islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  lying  north  of  the  Equator. 

Article  II 

The  United  States  and  its  nationals  shall  receive  all  the 
benefits  of  the  engagements  of  Japan,  defined  in  Articles  3,  4 
and  5  of  the  aforesaid  Mandate,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  is  not  a  Member  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

It  is  further  agreed  between  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
as  follows: 


APPENDIX  371 

(1)  Japan  shall  insure  in  the  islands  complete  freedom  of 
conscience  and  the  free  exercise  of  all  forms  of  worship  which 
are  consonant  with  public  order  and  morality;  American  mis- 
sionaries of  all  such  religions  shall  be  free  to  enter  the  islands 
and  to  travel  and  reside  therein,  to  acquire  and  possess  prop- 
erty, to  erect  religious  buildings  and  to  open  schools  throughout 
the  islands ;  it  being  understood,  however,  that  Japan  shall  have 
the  right  to  exercise  such  control  as  may  be  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  public  order  and  good  government  and  to  take 
all  measures  required  for  such  control. 

(2)  Vested    American    property    rights    in    the    mandated 
islands  shall  be  respected  and  in  no  way  impaired  ; 

(3)  Existing  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
shall  be  applicable  to  the  mandated  islands; 

(4)  Japan  will  address  to  the  United  States  a  duplicate  of 
the  annual  report  on  the  administration  of  the  mandate  to  be 
made  by  Japan  to  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

(5)  Nothing  contained  in  the  present  Convention  shall  be 
affected  by  any  modification  which  may  be  made  in  the  terms 
of  the  Mandate  as  recited  in  the  Convention,  unless  such  modi- 
fication shall  have  been  expressly  assented  to  by  the  United 
States. 

Article  III 

The  United  States  and  its  nationals  shall  have  free  access 
to  the  Island  of  Yap  on  a  footing  of  entire  equality  with  Japan 
or  any  other  nation  and  their  respective  nationals  in  all  that 
relates  to  the  landing  and  operation  of  the  existing  Yap-Guam 
cable  or  of  any  cable  which  may  hereafter  be  laid  or  operated 
by  the  United  States  or  by  its  nationals  connecting  with  the 
Island  of  Yap. 

The  rights  and  privileges  embraced  by  the  preceding  para- 
graph shall  also  be  accorded  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  its  nationals  with  respect  to  radio-telegraphic  com- 
munication ;  provided,  however,  that  so  long  as  the  Government 
of  Japan  shall  maintain  on  the  Island  of  Yap  an  adequate 
radio-telegraphic  station,  cooperating  effectively  with  the  cables 
and  with  other  radio  stations  on  ships  or  on  shore,  without 
discriminatory  exactions  or  preferences,  the  exercise  of  the  right 


372  JAPAN'S    PACIFIC    POLICY, 

to   establish   radio-telegraphic   stations   on   the   Island   by   the 
United  States  or  its  nationals  shall  be  suspended. 

Article  W 

In  connection  with  the  rights  embraced  by  Article  III,  spe- 
cific rights,  privileges,  and  exemptions,  in  so  far  as  they  relate 
to  electrical  communications,  shall  be  enjoyed  in  the  Island 
of  Yap  by  the  United  States  and  its  nationals  in  terms  as 
follows : 

(1)  Nationals  of  the  United   States  shall  have  the  unre- 
stricted right  to  reside  in  the  Island,  and  the  United  States 
and  its  nationals  shall  have  the  right  to  acquire  and  hold  on 
a  footing  of  entire  equality  with  Japan  or  any  other  nation 
or  their  respective  nationals  all  kinds  of  property  and  interests, 
both  personal  and  real,  including  lands,  buildings,  residences, 
offices,  works  and  appurtenances. 

(2)  Nationals  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  obliged  to 
obtain  any  permit  or  license  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  land 
and  operate  cables  on  the  Island,  or  to  establish  radio-tele- 
graphic service,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  III,  or  to 
enjoy  any  of  the  rights  and  privileges  embraced  by  this  Article 
and  by  Article  III. 

(3)  No  censorship  or  supervision  shall   be  exercised  over 
cable  or  radio  messages  or  operations. 

(4)  Nationals  of   the   United   States  shall  have   complete 
freedom  of  entry  and  exit  in  the  Island  for  their  persons  and 
property. 

(5)  No  taxes,   port,  harbor,   or   landing  charges  or  exac- 
tions of  any  nature  whatsoever,  shall  be  levied  either  with 
respect  to  the  operation  of  cables  or  radio  stations,  or  with 
respect  to  property,  persons  or  vessels. 

(6)  No  discriminatory  police  regulations  shall  be  enforced. 

(7)  The  Government  of  Japan  will  exercise  its  power  of 
expropriation  in  the  Island  to  secure  to  the  United  States  or 
its  nationals  needed  property  and  facilities  for  the  purpose  of 
electrical  communications  if  such  property  or  facilities  cannot 
otherwise  be  obtained. 

It  is  understood  that  the  location  and  the  area  of  land  so 


APPENDIX  373 

to  be  expropriated  shall  be  arranged  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments according  to  the  requirements  of  each  case.  Property 
of  the  United  States  or  of  its  nationals  and  facilities  for  the 
purpose  of  electrical  communication  in  the  Island  shall  not  be 
subject  to  expropriation. 

Article  V 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitu- 
tions. The  ratifications  of  this  Convention  shall  be  exchanged 
in  Washington  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  it  shall  take  effect 
on  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications. 


INDEX 

America:  War  with  Japan,  18-20;  American  trade  in  China  and 
Korea,  163-165;  American  cotton  trade  in  Manchuria,  173; 
American  railway  enterprises  in  China,  211-212;  American 
expansion,  228;  annexation  of  Hawaii,  229;  attitude  towards 
Kolchak,  236;  towards  Siberia,  246,  247,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Hughes, 
359^-364;  American  withdrawal  from  Siberia,  250,  251;  American 
Siberian  policy  criticised  by  Siberian  Russians,  252 ;  interest  in 
Siberian  railway,  261 ;  interest  in  Manchurian  railway,  262. 

American  International  Corporation:  134,  211. 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance :  First  treaty,  43 ;  second  treaty,  44 ;  Ameri- 
can interest  in,  45 ;  third  alliance,  46 ;  its  recent  unpopularity  in 
Japan  and  England,  47;  India  and  alliance,  53;  New  Zealand 
and  Australia  on  alliance,  54;  Chinese  objection  to,  74. 

Balfour,  Arthur  J.,  British  delegate  to  Washington  Conference: 
Proposes  plan  for  restricting  Pacific  naval  bases,  38;  proposes 
to  include  Japan  proper  in  Pacific  Treaty,  67;  on  British  lease- 
holds in  China,  146,  327;  on  listing  foreign  obligations  of  China, 
154;  his  good  offices  concerning  Shantung  controversy,  196;  on 
treaties  affecting  China,  349. 

Bland,  J.  O.  P. :  On  China,  81 ;  On  factional  feuds  in  China,  117. 

Bliss,  General  Tasker  Howard :  On  international  fear  of  armaments, 
20. 

Bolsheviki :  Japan's  attitude  towards,  244,  251 ;  American  attitude, 
250. 

Bonin  Islands:  Distance  from  Japan,  36;  affecting  naval  treaty,  37. 

California  question:    Influence  on  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  45. 

Chang  Tsolin,  General,  103,  114. 

Cheng,  S.  G. :  On  Chinese  customs  system,  93,  94 ;  on  Chinese  rail- 
ways, 208. 

China :  Her  program  at  Washington  Conference,  73  et  seq.;  her  people 
indifferent  to  Washington  Conference,  76;  her  chaotic  finances, 
82  et  seq.;  Japan's  interest  in  China's  finances,  82-83;  national 
loans  of,  86;  revenue  and  expenditure,  87;  customs  tariff,  91  et 
seq.;  311,  313;  extraterritoriality  in,  97  et  seq.;  318-322;  instances 
of  recent  internal  disorder,  100-102;  politico-military  factions  in, 
103  et  seq.;  factional  feuds  in,  114  et  seq.;  resolution  of  Wash- 
ington Conference  on  military  expenditure  of,  120;  what  Wash- 
ington Conference  did  for,  123;  foreign  concessions  in,  149-150; 
foreign  leased  territories  in,  324-329;  new  diplomacy  in,  151  et 
seq.;  International  Consortium  for,  157  et  seq.;  Japan's  "twenty- 
one  demands"  on,  176-186;  policy  as  to  Shantung  question,  192- 
195;  foreign  control  of  railways  in,  206  et  seq.,  352;  foreign 

375 


376  INDEX 

railway  loans  for,  212-215;  foreign  radio  stations  in,  284,  345- 
347;  foreign  troops  in,  287,  330-337;  foreign  post  offices  in,  288, 
339-344;  "Open  door"  in,  300-311. 

China  Year  Book:    Quoted  on  Chinese  finances,  83,  86. 

Chinese  delegation  at  Washington  Conference:  Proposal  of,  73; 
text  of  same,  77-79;»on  tariff  revision,  91,  94,  311;  its  attitude 
criticised,  119  et  seq.;  its  conduct  of  Shantung  negotiations,  200; 
its  victory  concerning  Shantung,  216;  statement  on  "twenty-one 
demands,"  293;  on  extraterritoriality  in  China,  318-322;  on  for- 
eign troops  in  China,  330;  on  foreign  post  offices  in  China,  338; 
on  foreign  radio  stations,  345;  on  railways  in  China,  352. 

Chita,  representing  Far  Eastern  Republic  of  Siberia:  Its  forces  in 
Mongolia,  143;  delegation  to  Washington,  234;  organization  of 
its  government,  235;  Dairen  conference  between  Chita  and 
Tokyo,  239,  242,  357;  Japan's  proposal  to  Chita,  239;  note  to 
American  government,  249. 

Continental  and  Commercial  Bank  of  Chicago :  Chinese  loan  from, 
90. 

Dairen :   167,  177,  184,  239,  242,  357. 

Eastern  Chinese  Railway:  Control  by  China,  241,  267;  Washington 
Conference  .on,  263 ;  effect  of  interallied  expedition  in  Siberia, 
265,  266;  inefficiency  of  Chinese  management,  268;  resolutions 
adopted  by  Washington  Conference  on,  358. 

Edison,  Thomas  A. :    Oh  Japan  and  Siberia,  225. 

England :  Alliance  with  Japan,  44-46 ;  recent  attitude  towards  alliance, 
51 ;  India  and  England,  53 ;  her  Chinese  trade,  54 ;  treaty  with 
China,  91  et  seq.;  her  sphere  of  influence  in  China,  132;  interest 
in  Tibet,  143-144;  her  railway  enterprises  in  China,  209-211;  aid 
to  Kolchak,  236. 

Extraterritoriality  in  China:  Japan's  attitude  towards,  98;  British 
Chambers  of  Commerce  in  China  on,  98-99;  China  unprepared 
for  abolition  of,  126;  Japan  Advertiser  on,  127;  Chinese  conten- 
tions on,  318-322. 

Ferguson,  Dr.  John  C,  73. 

Fortifications  and  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific:  Kato  approaches 
Hughes  on,  35;  original  article  19  of  naval  treaty,  36;  Tokyo 
government  seeks  alteration  of  same,  36;  Balfour's  proposal,  38; 
Japan  concedes  on  Bonin  Islands,  39;  final  article  19,  as  adopted 
by  Washington  Conference,  38-39. 

France:  Her  interest  in  Pacific  Treaty,  60;  her  sphere  of  influence 
in  China,  132;  her  leased  territories  in  China,  146;  her  coopera- 
tion with  Russia  in  China,  148. 

Geddes,  Sir  Auckland,  British  delegate  to  Washington  Conference: 
On  Board  of  Reference  for  China,  154;  text  of  his  resolution 
on  "open  door,"  302. 

Germany:  Her  sphere  of  influence  in  China,  132;  her  assistance  to 
Russia,  141. 

(}uam :   Distance  from  Japan,  5 ;  fortifications  and  naval  base,  25,  26. 


INDEX  377 

Hanihara,  M.,  Japanese  delegate  to  Washington  Conference:  On 
Pacific  Treaty,  61 ;  on  leased  territories  in  China,  146 ;  statement 
on  Japanese  leaseholds  in  China,  326;  statement  on  Japanese 
troops  in  China,  332-336;  letter  on  Japanese  post  offices  in  China, 
344. 

Han-yeh-ping  Company,  179. 

Harding,  President:  His  invitation  to  conference  received  in  Japan, 
56;  his  interpretation  of  territorial  scope  of  Pacific  Treaty,  68. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  92. 

Hawaii,  18,  36,  229. 

Hay,  John,  American  Secretary  of  State:  His  open  door  doctrine, 
138,  139,  153. 

Hongkong,  147,  149,  328. 

Hughes,  Charles  Evans,  American  Secretary  of  State :  His  dramatic 
naval  proposal,  1  et  seq.;  Japanese  attitude  towards  same,  4,  5, 
11,  13,  15;  his  speech  on  naval  reduction  quoted,  7-10;  his  esti- 
mate of  naval  ratio,  13;  his  announcement  of  naval  agreement, 
28,  31-34;  attitude  towards  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific,  35;  puzzled 
by  Japanese  contention  concerning  Bonin  Islands,  36,  37 ;  his  open 
door  resolutions,  138,  145,  156;  his  influence  upon  international 
policy  in  China,  151  et  seq.;  on  "twenty-one  demands,"  175,  296; 
his  good  offices  concerning  Shantung  controversy,  1%;  on  Siberia, 
257;  text  of  Hughes  resolution  on  "open  door,"  300;  resolution 
on  listing  China's  commitments,  306;  observations  on  treaties 
affecting  China,  350;  text  of  Hughes  resolution  on  Chinese  rail- 
ways, 352;  statement  on  Siberia,  359-364. 

India,  53. 

International  Consortium  for  China,  157  et  seq.;  its  definition  of 
Japan's  special  rights  in  Manchuria,  159,  187. 

James,  Edwin  L.,  New  York  Times  correspondent:  On  Chinese 
policy  at  Washington  Conference,  119. 

Japan:  Her  iron  supply,  6,  19;  alliance  with  England,  44-46;  fear 
of  isolation,  47;  her  suspicions  of  American  motives  concerning 
Washington  Conference,  56;  her  interest  in  China's  finances,  83; 
her  troops  in  China,  110;  her  sphere  of  influence  in  China,  132, 
133;  her  fight  against  Russia,  141;  her  special  position  in  China, 
156  et  seq.,  165;  in  South  Manchuria,  159;  enjoys  no  exclusive 
privileges  in  Manchuria,  160-162;  helps  American  trade  in  China, 
162-163 ;  her  holdings  in  Manchuria,  166 ;  secret  of  her  com- 
mercial success  in  Manchuria,  171-173;  her  diplomatic  defeat 
concerning  Shantung,  216  et  seq.;  in  Siberia,  227  et  seq.;  her 
"manifest  destiny,"  229;  her  area  and  population  compared  with 
those  of  other  countries,  230;  her  proposal  to  Chita,  239;  atti- 
tude towards  Siberia,  245,  247;  interest  in  Eastern  Chinese  Rail- 
way, 266,  269;  her  Siberian  policy  as  stated  by  Baron  Shidehara, 
354-359. 

Japanese  delegation  to  Washington  Conference:  Its  optimistic  atti- 
tude, 11;  its  trust  in  Mr.  Hughes,  15;  its  resentment  of  insinua- 
tions, 22;  its  satisfaction  with  naval  agreement,  28;  its  attitude 
on  naval  base  question,  36-37;  its  memorandum  on  China,  98, 


378  INDEX 

107,  112;  attitude  towards  China,  108  et  seq.,  365-367;  on  "twenty- 
one"  demands,  174,  290-292;  on  Siberia,  242,  354-359. 
Japanese  press:    On  naval  agreement,  30;  on  Pacific  Treaty,  31. 

Kato,  Admiral  Baron,  Japanese  delegate  to  Washington  Conference: 
His  speech  on  Hughes  naval  program,  11-12;  his  acceptance  of 
American  proposal,  12,  13;  his  personal  view  on  naval  ratio,  25; 
approaches  Hughes  on  naval  bases  in  Pacific,  35;  his  embarrass- 
ment on  naval  base  question,  37;  on  Manchuria,  144. 

Kaulung  peninsula,  British  leased  territory,  146,  147,  150,  327. 

Kerensky,  245. 

Kiaochow,  former  German  territory,  146,  147,  149,  150,  192,  193,  196, 
m  277,  326. 

Kii,  Japanese  battleship,  5,  9. 

Kolchak,  Admiral,  236,  253. 

Koo,  Dr.  Wellington,  Chinese  delegate  to  Washington  Conference: 
On  Chinese  customs  tariff,  91  et  seq.;  his  remarks  criticised  by 
Senator  Underwood,  122;  statement  on  customs  tariff,  311;  state- 
ment on  leased  territories,  324 ;  statement  on  foreign  treaties 
affecting  China,  348. 

'Kwangchow  Bay,  French  leased  territory  in  China,  146,  148,  150. 

Kwantung,  Japanese  leased  territory  in  Manchuria,  146,  166,  167. 

Lamont,  Thomas,  86,  157. 

Lansing,  Robert,  ex-Secretary  of  State :  As  China's  adviser,  73 ; 
Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  156,  158. 

League  of  Nations  Covenant,  article  10  of,  59. 

Leased  Territories  in  China :  How  they  were  established,  147 ;  chron- 
ology of,  149- 150;  Mr.  Koo's  statement  on,  324-326. 

Li  Hung-chang,  his  intrigue  against  Japan,  185,  186. 

Likin:  China's  obligation  to  abolish,  95,  125;  treaty  concerning,  96; 
likin  and  railways,  201. 

Lodge,  Senator,  announces  Pacific  Treaty,  59. 

Mskino,  Baron,  statement  on  Shantung,  192. 

Manchuria:  Russian  encroachment  upon,  140  et  seq.;  Japan's  special 
position  in,  159  et  seq.;  Japanese  holdings  in,  166;  Russian  hold- 
ings in,  167;  bean  industry  in,  170  et  seq.;  Japanese ^ enterprise 
in  bean  industry,  171;  American  trade  in,  163,  173;  with  respect 
to  "twenty-one  demands,"  177,  183. 

Morris,  Roland  S.,  American  ambassador  to  Tokyo,  236. 

Mongolia,  143. 

Muravieff,  Count,  260. 

Mutsu,  Japanese  dreadnaught,  9,  21,  24,  26,  29,  32. 

Nanking  Treaty,  91. 

Naval  ratio:  Mr.  Hughes'  estimate  of,  13;  Japanese  estimate  of,  14; 
naval  ratio  between  Japan  and  America,  17-20;  Japan  concedes 
on  ratio,  24,  29;  final  agreement  as  announced  by  Hughes,  31-34. 

New  Zealand  and  Australia :    On  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  54. 

Nikolaievsk,  massacre  of  Japanese  in,  240,  243,  255,  358,  361. 


INDEX  379 

Open  door  fn  China:  Secretary  Hay  on,  139;  resolutions  adopted  by 
Washington  Conference,  145;  text  of  .Root  resolution  on,  300, 
301;  text  of  Hughes  resolution  on,  300;  Geddes  resolution  on, 
302;  text  of  Nine-Power  treaty  on,  302. 

Owari,  Japanese  battleship,  5,  9. 

Pacific  Treaty:  Its  influence  upon  naval  ratio,  25;  satisfactory  to 
Japanese  delegation,  56;  its  nature  and  scope,  59-61;  text  of 
Pacific  Treaty,  63,  64,  67;  American  reservations,  64-65;  Japa- 
nese reservation,  67-68;  text  of  Japanese  reservation,  69. 

Philippines:    Distance  from  Japan,  5;  American  naval  base,  18,  26. 

Port  Arthur,  166,  167,  184. 

Reinsch,  Dr.  Paul  S.,  51,  73. 

Roosevelt,  ex-President :   On  leadership,  21 ;  on  Pacific  era,  62. 

Root,  Elihu:  Root-Takahira  note,  48-49,  59;  Root  resolution  on 
"open  door,"  87,  138,  154;  mission  to  Russia,  264;  text  of  Root 
resolution  on  "open  door,"  3QO;  text  of  Root  resolution  on 
sphere  of  influence,  301. 

Russia:  Her  influence  on  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  44-46;  war  with 
Japan,  74;  her  sphere  of  influence  in  China,  132;  her  encroach- 
ment on  China,  140-141,  149;  her  intrigue  with  Li  Hung-chang, 
185;  annexation  of  Siberia  and  Chinese  territories,  258  et  seq.; 
annexation  of  Japanese  island  of  Saghalien,  261. 

Saghalien,  island  of,  243,  261,  358,  361. 

Semenov  (or  Semenoff),  Cossack  Ataman,  238,  357. 

Scott-Muravieff  agreement  on  China,  150. 

Shantung:  American  trade  in,  163;  in  relation  to  "twenty-one 
demands,"  175,  176,  183;  facts  concerning,  192;  dealt  at  Paris 
Peace  Conference,  192,  216;  Japan's  proposal  of  September,  1921, 
197,  198;  Shantung  railway,  201-203,  287;  Chinese  proposal  to 
buy  Shantung  railway,  205;  Japanese  proposal  concerning  rail- 
way, 206;  terms  of  settlement  of  Shantung  question,  218-220; 
text  of  Versailles  treaty  on,  274;  text  of  Japanese  memorandum 
on,  275;  text  of  Washington  treaty  on,  277-282. 

Shibusawa,  Count:  Quoted  as  to  possibility  of  American- Japanese 
war,  19. 

Shidehara,  Ambassador  Baron,  Japanese  delegate  to  Washington 
Conference :  Alleged  to  have  drafted  article  19  of  Naval  Treaty, 
40;  alleged  author  of  Pacific  Treaty,  61;  on  Japan's  special 
interest  in  China,  165;  on  "twenty-one  demands,"  174,  290;  on 
Siberian  question,  242,  257,  354-359;  statement  on  China's  natu- 
ral resources,  308;  statement  on  Japan's  policy  in  China,  365-367. 

Siberia:  Thomas  Edison  on  Siberia  and  Japan,  225;  Japan  in  Siberia, 
227  et  seq.;  interallied  expedition  to,  244  et  seq.;  German  and 
Bolshevik  activities  in,  245-246;  Mr.  Wilson's  policy  in,  245,  246; 
American  withdrawal  from,  250;  Japanese  troops  in,  251-252; 
attitude  of  <  Siberians  towards  America,  253,  254;  how  Russia 
absorbed  Siberia,  258;  Siberian  railway  and  interallied  expe- 
dition, 165;  Baron  Shidehara's  statement  on,  354-359;  Mr. 


Hughes'  statement  on,  359-364. 


\ 


380  INDEX 

Siems-Carey  Company  of  St.  Paul,  133,  211. 

South  Manchuria  Railway,  159,  167. 

Stead,  Alfred,  on  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  44. 

Spheres  of  influence  in  China:  132  et  seq.;  German  sphere,  133; 
British,  133;  their  harmful  effect  upon  American  interests,  134; 
Japanese  sphere,  135;  Secretary  Hay  on,  139;  Root  resolution 
on,  301. 

Stevens,  Colonel  John  F.,  American  railway  engineer,  226,  269. 

Sun  Yat  Sen,  Dr.,  104,  105,  128. 

Sze,  Alfred,  Chinese  minister  and  delegate  to  Washington  Confer- 
ence:  Statement  on  China's  natural  resources,  309;  statement 
on  foreign  troops  in  China,  330-332;  statement  on  foreign  post 
offices  in  China,  338-343. 

Tibet,  British  influence  in,  143,  144. 

"Twenty-one  demands":  Their  injection  into  Washington  Confer- 
ence, 166;  Baron  Shidehara  on,  174;  Japan's  concessions  concern- 
ing, 174,  175;  Mr.  Hughes  on,  175;  "group  five"  of,  176,  180,  182, 
183,  291,  292;  comparison  between  original  demands  and  final 
agreements,  176-181 ;  essence  of,  183 ;  text  of  Baron  Shidehara's 
statement  on,  290-292;  Mr.  Hughes'  statement  on,  296. 

Underwood,  Senator,  American  delegate  to  Washington  Conference; 
Proposes  Chinese  tariff  revision,  85,  91;  his  rejoinder  to  Dr. 
Koo's  remarks  on  tariff  revision,  122. 

Viviani,  French  delegate  to  Washington  Conference:    On  leased  ter- 
ritories in  China,  147,  149. 
Vladivostok:    New  government  at,  238,  240;  fortifications  at,  239. 

Wang,  Dr.,  former  Chief  Justice  of  China,  Chinese  delegate  to 
Washington  Conference:  On  Shantung  settlement,  221;  state- 
ment on  "twenty-one  demands,"  293-296;  statement  on  extra- 
territoriality, 318. 

Weihaiwei,  British  leased  territory,  146,  149,  328. 

Wells,  H.  G.,  on  Japanese  population,  232. 

Wilson,  ex-President^  His  Chinese  policy,  50;  his  influence  upon 
international  policies  in  China,  151-152;  attitude  towards  Shan- 
tung question,  192,  193;  on  American  annexation  of  Hawaii,  228; 
his  attitude  towards  Siberia,  246;  statement  on  Siberian  railway, 
264. 

Wu  Peifu,  Chinese  general,  104,  114. 

Yap :     In  relation  to  naval  bases  in  Pacific,  26 ;  American- Japanese 

treaty  on,  358-373. 

Yih  Shih  Pao:    Quoted  on  Chinese  finances,  134. 
Younghusband,  Colonel,  his  expedition  to  Tibet,  143. 


IFORNT 


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